abandonment rule in Vermont

2015Respondents further assert that — res judicata notwithstanding — if the permit had expired then the NRB and the courts were without subject matter jurisdiction over this Act 250 enforcement action, and therefore the abandonment claim could be raised “at any time.” Myers v. Brown, 143 Vt. 159, 164 , 465 A.2d 254, 257 (1983).

2015Respondents further assert that — res judicata notwithstanding — if the permit had expired then the NRB and the courts were without subject matter jurisdiction over this Act 250 enforcement action, and therefore the abandonment claim could be raised “at any time.” Myers v. Brown, 143 Vt. 159, 164 , 465 A.2d 254, 257 (1983).

2013See, e.g., Flath v. Bauman, 722 S.W.2d 125, 128-29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (finding as a factor indicating intent to abandon that “purchaser waited nearly a year to seek enforcement of the contract”); Hull v. Clemens, 267 P.2d 225, 233 (Or. 1954) (finding it important to the abandonment analysis that the purchaser left the property in 1942, and that property value rose before the case was brought in 1948: “When that development occurred, Hull bethought the recent past and seemingly looked around in an effort to regain his hold upon the land which a few years previously he had walked away from, but

2013See State v. Jackson, 40 A.3d 290, 300 (Conn. 2012) (identifying the “common law sense” of the term abandonment as the “voluntary and intentional renunciation of ownership”).

2013See, e.g., Flath v. Bauman, 722 S.W.2d 125, 128-29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (finding as a factor indicating intent to abandon that “purchaser waited nearly a year to seek enforcement of the contract”); Hull v. Clemens, 267 P.2d 225, 233 (Or. 1954) (finding it important to the abandonment analysis that the purchaser left the property in 1942, and that property value rose before the case was brought in 1948: “When that development occurred, Hull bethought the recent past and seemingly looked around in an effort to regain his hold upon the land which a few years previously he had walked away from, but

2008Our holding that the instant case represents one of those rare instances justifying relief does not represent an abandonment of the rule but rather an application of it under “the historical authority of the courts of equity to reform judgments in special circumstances.” Levinsky, 146 Vt. at 318 , 503 A.2d at 536 (quotation omitted); see also Kellner v. Kellner, 2004 VT 1, ¶ 12 , 176 Vt. 571 , 844 A.2d 743 (mem.) (“Finality and repose sometimes must yield to the interests of justice . . . .”); Koch v. Billings Sch.

2008Our holding that the instant case represents one of those rare instances justifying relief does not represent an abandonment of the rule but rather an application of it under “the historical authority of the courts of equity to reform judgments in special circumstances.” Levinsky, 146 Vt. at 318 , 503 A.2d at 536 (quotation omitted); see also Kellner v. Kellner, 2004 VT 1, ¶ 12 , 176 Vt. 571 , 844 A.2d 743 (mem.) (“Finality and repose sometimes must yield to the interests of justice . . . .”); Koch v. Billings Sch.

2008Our holding that the instant case represents one of those rare instances justifying relief does not represent an abandonment of the rule but rather an application of it under “the historical authority of the courts of equity to reform judgments in special circumstances.” Levinsky, 146 Vt. at 318 , 503 A.2d at 536 (quotation omitted); see also Kellner v. Kellner, 2004 VT 1, ¶ 12 , 176 Vt. 571 , 844 A.2d 743 (mem.) (“Finality and repose sometimes must yield to the interests of justice . . . .”); Koch v. Billings Sch.

2008Our holding that the instant case represents one of those rare instances justifying relief does not represent an abandonment of the rule but rather an application of it under “the historical authority of the courts of equity to reform judgments in special circumstances.” Levinsky, 146 Vt. at 318 , 503 A.2d at 536 (quotation omitted); see also Kellner v. Kellner, 2004 VT 1, ¶ 12 , 176 Vt. 571 , 844 A.2d 743 (mem.) (“Finality and repose sometimes must yield to the interests of justice . . . .”); Koch v. Billings Sch.