abandonment claim in Texas

2026When assessing whether a statement of “no objection” waives a previously preserved error, we first ask whether “the record as a whole plainly demonstrates that the defendant did not intend, nor did the trial court construe, his ‘no objection’ statement to constitute an abandonment of a claim of error that he had earlier preserved for appeal[.]” Stairhime, 463 S.W.3d at 906 (quoting Thomas, 408 S.W.3d at 885 ).

2026If the “no objection” statement does not constitute an abandonment of a claim of error that was preserved earlier, then an appellate court should not regard the claim as “waived.” Id.

2005King v. Fisher , 918 S.W.2d 108, 112 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1996, writ denied). 3.

2005King v. Fisher, 918 S.W.2d 108, 112 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied). 3 In Lunsford, this Court affirmed an order of the Board of Nursing Examiners imposing discipline for “unprofessional or dishonorable conduct” in refusing to treat a patient who had presented himself at an emergency room with chest pains.

2026When assessing whether a statement of “no objection” waives a previously preserved error, we first ask whether “the record as a whole plainly demonstrates that the defendant did not intend, nor did the trial court construe, his ‘no objection’ statement to constitute an abandonment of a claim of error that he had earlier preserved for appeal[.]” Stairhime, 463 S.W.3d at 906 (quoting Thomas, 408 S.W.3d at 885 ).

2025When assessing whether a statement of “no objection” waives a previously preserved error, we first ask whether “the record as a whole plainly demonstrates that the defendant did not intend, nor did the trial court construe, [her] ‘no objection’ statement to constitute an abandonment of a claim of error that [s]he had earlier preserved for appeal.” Stairhime, 463 S.W.3d at 906 (quoting Thomas, 408 S.W.3d at 885 ).

2025Servs., 346 S.W.3d 172, 180 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. denied)); accord Bundren v. Holly Oaks Townhomes Ass’n, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 421, 431 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). “[T]here is nothing in the case law linking a failure to respond to discovery to an abandonment of a claim[.]” Bundren, 347 S.W.3d at 431 (quoting Killam Ranch Props., Ltd. v. Webb Cnty., No. 04-08-00105-CV, 2008 WL 4958452 , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 19, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.)). (1) there was good cause for the failure to timely make, amend, or supplement the discovery response; or (2) the failure to timel

2022Servs., 346 S.W.3d 172, 180 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. denied)); accord Bundren v. Holly Oaks Townhomes Ass’n, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 421, 431 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2011, pet. denied). “[T]here is nothing in the case law linking a failure to respond to discovery to an abandonment of a claim[.]” Bundren, 347 S.W.3d at 431 (quoting Killam Ranch Props., Ltd. v. Webb Cnty., No. 04-08-00105-CV, 2008 WL 4958452 , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 19, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.)). 17 Rather, notice that a party is pursuing a particular legal theory “generally must come from the pleadings.” Concept Gen.

2019To date, this court has not received any response from appellant or appellant’s counsel. “[I]nvoluntary termination of parental rights involves fundamental constitutional rights.” Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 302 (Tex. 2002).

2018Because “involuntary termination of parental rights involves fundamental constitutional rights,” Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 302 (Tex. 2002), we look to the abandonment procedures for criminal cases for guidance in this circumstance.

2019To date, this court has not received any response from appellant or appellant’s counsel. “[I]nvoluntary termination of parental rights involves fundamental constitutional rights.” Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 302 (Tex. 2002).

2018Because “involuntary termination of parental rights involves fundamental constitutional rights,” Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 302 (Tex. 2002), we look to the abandonment procedures for criminal cases for guidance in this circumstance.

2025Servs., 346 S.W.3d 172, 180 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. denied)); accord Bundren v. Holly Oaks Townhomes Ass’n, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 421, 431 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). “[T]here is nothing in the case law linking a failure to respond to discovery to an abandonment of a claim[.]” Bundren, 347 S.W.3d at 431 (quoting Killam Ranch Props., Ltd. v. Webb Cnty., No. 04-08-00105-CV, 2008 WL 4958452 , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 19, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.)). (1) there was good cause for the failure to timely make, amend, or supplement the discovery response; or (2) the failure to timel

2025Servs., 346 S.W.3d 172, 180 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. denied)); accord Bundren v. Holly Oaks Townhomes Ass’n, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 421, 431 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). “[T]here is nothing in the case law linking a failure to respond to discovery to an abandonment of a claim[.]” Bundren, 347 S.W.3d at 431 (quoting Killam Ranch Props., Ltd. v. Webb Cnty., No. 04-08-00105-CV, 2008 WL 4958452 , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 19, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.)). (1) there was good cause for the failure to timely make, amend, or supplement the discovery response; or (2) the failure to timel

2019A “no objection” statement waives preservation of an adverse pretrial ruling unless the record “plainly demonstrates that the defendant did not intend, nor did the trial court construe his ‘no objection’ statement to constitute an abandonment of a claim of error that he had earlier preserved for appeal.” Thomas, 408 S.W.3d at 885 ; see Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 302 (Tex. Crim.

2014But when a defendant affirmatively asserts during trial that he or she has no objection to the admission of the complained-of evidence, he or she forfeits any error in the admission of the evidence despite the pretrial ruling unless the “record as a whole plainly demonstrates that the defendant did not intend, nor did the trial court construe, his ‘no objection’ statement to constitute an abandonment of a claim of error that he had earlier preserved for appeal.” Thomas, 408 S.W.3d at 885-86 (holding that “if from the record as a whole the appellate court simply cannot tell whether an abandonme

2005Person v. Latham , 582 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. Civ.

2005Person v. Latham, 582 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.). *36 The Jordans assert that an abandoned cause of action cannot be revived.

2005See Friendswood , 926 S.W.2d at 282 .

2005See Friendswood, 926 S.W.2d at 282 .

2014But when a defendant affirmatively asserts during trial that he or she has no objection to the admission of the complained-of evidence, he or she forfeits any error in the admission of the evidence despite the pretrial ruling unless the “record as a whole plainly demonstrates that the defendant did not intend, nor did the trial court construe, his ‘no objection’ statement to constitute an abandonment of a claim of error that he had earlier preserved for appeal.” Thomas, 408 S.W.3d at 885-86 (holding that “if from the record as a whole the appellate court simply cannot tell whether an abandonme

2014App. 2013) (holding that “if from the record as a whole the appellate court simply cannot tell whether an abandonment was intended or understood,” an “affirmative ‘no objection’ statement will, by itself, serve as an unequivocal indication that a waiver was both intended and understood”); see also Moraguez, 701 S.W.2d at 904 .

2024Nothing in this record “plainly demonstrates that [Appellant] did not intend, nor [that] the trial court construe[d], his ‘no objection’ statement to constitute an abandonment of a claim of error that he had earlier preserved for appeal.” See Thomas, 408 S.W.3d at 885 ; see also Sharper v. State, 485 S.W.3d 612, 616 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. ref’d) (“Since the record does not plainly demonstrate that [Appellant] did not intend to abandon his Sixth Amendment objections, we find that [Appellant] has failed to preserve this error for our review.”).

2022See Pollard v. State, 392 S.W.3d 785, 790 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet. ref’d); Guy v. State, No. 03-12-00466-CR, 2014 WL 5423760 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 22, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

2022LLC, 274 S.W.3d 299, 307 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (concluding that the abandonment of a claim is not governed by Rule 162 pertaining to nonsuits).

2022Useful reference can be made to the abandonment doctrine. “[N]o person can reasonably expect privacy in property he abandons.” State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 286 (Tex. Crim.

2020See United States v. Crumble, 878 F.3d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 2018); United States v. Quashie, 162 F.Supp.3d 135, 141-42 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding Riley does not eliminate abandonment exception for cell phones); Kelso v. State, 562 S.W.3d 120, 135 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, pet. ref’d); Edwards, 497 S.W.3d at 160 ; Lopez v. State, 512 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016, no pet.) (holding that appellant abandoned phone and had no standing to object to evidence retrieved from it when he left the device at his workplace and never requested that it be returned to him).

2020See State v. K.C., 207 So. 3d 951, 958 (Fla. Ct. App. 2016) (concluding that under Riley the abandonment exception does not apply to cell phones whose contents are protected by a password).

2020See State v. K.C., 207 So. 3d 951, 958 (Fla. Ct. App. 2016) (concluding that under Riley the abandonment exception does not apply to cell phones whose contents are protected by a password).

2020Ed. 2d 430 (2014) (finding that search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to the cell phone, but noting the continuing applicability of other case-specific exceptions); see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 , 201 L.

2020Ed. 2d 430 (2014) (finding that search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to the cell phone, but noting the continuing applicability of other case-specific exceptions); see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 , 201 L.

2020See United States v. Crumble, 878 F.3d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 2018); United States v. Quashie, 162 F.Supp.3d 135, 141-42 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding Riley does not eliminate abandonment exception for cell phones); Kelso v. State, 562 S.W.3d 120, 135 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, pet. ref’d); Edwards, 497 S.W.3d at 160 ; Lopez v. State, 512 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016, no pet.) (holding that appellant abandoned phone and had no standing to object to evidence retrieved from it when he left the device at his workplace and never requested that it be returned to him).

2020While this Court has recognized that the abandonment doctrine may apply as an exception to the warrantless search of a cell phone, State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399, 409 (Tex. Crim.

2020See United States v. Crumble, 878 F.3d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 2018); United States v. Quashie, 162 F.Supp.3d 135, 141-42 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding Riley does not eliminate abandonment exception for cell phones); Kelso v. State, 562 S.W.3d 120, 135 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, pet. ref’d); Edwards, 497 S.W.3d at 160 ; Lopez v. State, 512 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016, no pet.) (holding that appellant abandoned phone and had no standing to object to evidence retrieved from it when he left the device at his workplace and never requested that it be returned to him).