abandonment defense in California

2024(In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 779–780; In re Ricky T. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 515, 517 ; In re 8 Karen R. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 84 , 90–91; In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1347 .) Father’s behavior toward L.P. in the family home is a “ ‘betrayal of the appropriate relationship between the generations’ ” and an abandonment and violation of the parental role.

2023(I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 778 .) Based on the record before us, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. 3.

2017Nor can the court's conclusion be squared with its own observation that the Board's rejection of Tri-Fanucchi's abandonment defense was "consistent with how California appellate courts have construed the ALRA." The Court of Appeal cited several published appellate decisions, including Montebello Rose Co. v. ALRB (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 1 , 173 Cal.Rptr. 856 , and F & P Growers , supra , 168 Cal.App.3d 667 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 355 , for the principle that an employer's duty to bargain under the ALRA continues until the union is replaced or decertified, and then explained how the Board's position on ab

2017Nor can the court's conclusion be squared with its own observation that the Board's rejection of Tri-Fanucchi's abandonment defense was "consistent with how California appellate courts have construed the ALRA." The Court of Appeal cited several published appellate decisions, including Montebello Rose Co. v. ALRB (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 1 , 173 Cal.Rptr. 856 , and F & P Growers , supra , 168 Cal.App.3d 667 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 355 , for the principle that an employer's duty to bargain under the ALRA continues until the union is replaced or decertified, and then explained how the Board's position on ab

2017But we have repeatedly held that courts should "accord significant weight and respect to the long-standing construction of a law by the agency charged with its *1172 enforcement." ( In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061 , 1082, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 104 P.3d 783 ; see Highland Ranch , supra , 29 Cal.3d at p. 859 , 176 Cal.Rptr. 753 , 633 P.2d 949 [the Board's interpretation of the ALRA " 'must be given great weight' "].) Yet the Court of Appeal gave no weight to the Board's interpretation that the ALRA does not allow for an abandonment defense, even though it acknowledged that the Board has c

2017But we have repeatedly held that courts should "accord significant weight and respect to the long-standing construction of a law by the agency charged with its *1172 enforcement." ( In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061 , 1082, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 104 P.3d 783 ; see Highland Ranch , supra , 29 Cal.3d at p. 859 , 176 Cal.Rptr. 753 , 633 P.2d 949 [the Board's interpretation of the ALRA " 'must be given great weight' "].) Yet the Court of Appeal gave no weight to the Board's interpretation that the ALRA does not allow for an abandonment defense, even though it acknowledged that the Board has c

2014(People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1119 .) Furthermore, “[i]n the absence of a request for a particular instruction, a trial court’s obligation to instruct on a particular defense arises ‘“only if [1] it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or [2] if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.”’ [Citations.]” (People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1148 .) Here, defendant did not rely on the defense of abandonment.

2013The Trial Court Did Not Err in Failing to Sua Sponte Instruct on an Abandonment Defense We also reject Williams’s contention that the trial court should have sua sponte instructed on an abandonment defense.5 “In the absence of a request for a particular instruction, a trial court’s obligation to instruct on a particular defense arises ‘ “only if [1] it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or [2] if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Dominguez (200

2002That burden belongs to Honda. ( Barker, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 431-432; Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 562 ; Bresnahan v. Chrysler Corp., supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1565 [where plaintiff proved causation but did not provide evidence as to risk-benefit, nonsuit improper because it is defendant’s burden to provide risk-benefit evidence].) McCabe’s failure to cite such evidence does not suggest an abandonment or waiver of the risk-benefit theory.

2000The trial court may not force the litigant to rely on abstract generalities, but must instruct in specific terms that relate the party's theory to the particular case." ( Soide v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 572 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 882 P.2d 298 .) In a civil case, "there ordinarily is no duty to instruct in the absence of a specific request by a party; the exception is a complete failure to instruct on material issues and controlling legal principles which may amount to reversible error." ( Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 951 , 160 *169 Cal.Rptr. 141, 603 P.2d 58 .)

2026Konther primarily relies on two United States Supreme Court 22 cases, Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373 (Riley), and Carpenter v. United States (2018) 585 U.S. 296 (Carpenter).

2024(In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 779–780; In re Ricky T. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 515, 517 ; In re 8 Karen R. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 84 , 90–91; In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1347 .) Father’s behavior toward L.P. in the family home is a “ ‘betrayal of the appropriate relationship between the generations’ ” and an abandonment and violation of the parental role.

2024(In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 779–780; In re Ricky T. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 515, 517 ; In re 8 Karen R. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 84 , 90–91; In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1347 .) Father’s behavior toward L.P. in the family home is a “ ‘betrayal of the appropriate relationship between the generations’ ” and an abandonment and violation of the parental role.

2024(In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 779–780; In re Ricky T. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 515, 517 ; In re 8 Karen R. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 84 , 90–91; In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1347 .) Father’s behavior toward L.P. in the family home is a “ ‘betrayal of the appropriate relationship between the generations’ ” and an abandonment and violation of the parental role.

2020(People v. Parson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 346 ; People v. Daggs, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 369 .) Defendant also seems to suggest that the abandonment doctrine only applies when an item is discarded in a public area, pointing in claimed support to the authorities on which the prosecutor relied to oppose the motion to suppress.

2020(See California v. Greenwood (1988) 486 U.S. 35 , 37–41 [garbage bags left on the curb for city collection]; People v. Gallego (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 388, 396 [cigarette butt discarded on a public sidewalk]; People v. Siegenthaler (1972) 7 Cal.3d 465, 470 [stolen property “abandoned on a sidewalk and in plain view”]; People v. Brown, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 446 [paper bag dropped in a dance hall].) While the cited cases indeed found abandonment in public areas, defendant cites no authority suggesting that abandonment must occur in a public area.

2018For example, in Dycus v. N.L.R.B. (9th Cir. 1980) 615 F.2d 820 (Dycus), the court addressed the topic of disclaimers by stating: “An exclusive bargaining agent may avoid its statutory duty to bargain on behalf of the unit it represents by unequivocally and in good faith disclaiming further interest in representing the unit. [Citations.] A disclaimer will not be given effect if it is inconsistent with the union’s conduct, [citation], nor if it is made for an improper purpose, such as the evasion of the terms and obligations of a collective bargaining agreement, [citation].” (Id. at p. 826; see

2017Nor can the court's conclusion be squared with its own observation that the Board's rejection of Tri-Fanucchi's abandonment defense was "consistent with how California appellate courts have construed the ALRA." The Court of Appeal cited several published appellate decisions, including Montebello Rose Co. v. ALRB (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 1 , 173 Cal.Rptr. 856 , and F & P Growers , supra , 168 Cal.App.3d 667 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 355 , for the principle that an employer's duty to bargain under the ALRA continues until the union is replaced or decertified, and then explained how the Board's position on ab

2017Nor can the court's conclusion be squared with its own observation that the Board's rejection of Tri-Fanucchi's abandonment defense was "consistent with how California appellate courts have construed the ALRA." The Court of Appeal cited several published appellate decisions, including Montebello Rose Co. v. ALRB (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 1 , 173 Cal.Rptr. 856 , and F & P Growers , supra , 168 Cal.App.3d 667 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 355 , for the principle that an employer's duty to bargain under the ALRA continues until the union is replaced or decertified, and then explained how the Board's position on ab

2017The work of the Board would be effectively impaired, its decisions similar in impression to that of a tinkling triangle practically unnoticed in the triumphant blare of trumpets." ( United Farm Workers v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 268 , 272, 140 Cal.Rptr. 87 .) Tri-Fanucchi's briefing in this court makes clear this danger: It contends that "until such time as [Tri-] Fanucchi raised the question of law before the Court of Appeal as to whether long term and total abandonment by the bargaining representative was a defense to an employer's duty to bargain, the Board's statutory construct

2017The work of the Board would be effectively impaired, its decisions similar in impression to that of a tinkling triangle practically unnoticed in the triumphant blare of trumpets." ( United Farm Workers v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 268 , 272, 140 Cal.Rptr. 87 .) Tri-Fanucchi's briefing in this court makes clear this danger: It contends that "until such time as [Tri-] Fanucchi raised the question of law before the Court of Appeal as to whether long term and total abandonment by the bargaining representative was a defense to an employer's duty to bargain, the Board's statutory construct

2017The work of the Board would be effectively impaired, its decisions similar in impression to that of a tinkling triangle practically unnoticed in the triumphant blare of trumpets." ( United Farm Workers v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 268 , 272, 140 Cal.Rptr. 87 .) Tri-Fanucchi's briefing in this court makes clear this danger: It contends that "until such time as [Tri-] Fanucchi raised the question of law before the Court of Appeal as to whether long term and total abandonment by the bargaining representative was a defense to an employer's duty to bargain, the Board's statutory construct

2017The work of the Board would be effectively impaired, its decisions similar in impression to that of a tinkling triangle practically unnoticed in the triumphant blare of trumpets." ( United Farm Workers v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 268 , 272, 140 Cal.Rptr. 87 .) Tri-Fanucchi's briefing in this court makes clear this danger: It contends that "until such time as [Tri-] Fanucchi raised the question of law before the Court of Appeal as to whether long term and total abandonment by the bargaining representative was a defense to an employer's duty to bargain, the Board's statutory construct

2017To be sure, "the courts are the ultimate arbiters of the construction of a statute." ( California Assn. of Psychology Providers v. Rank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1 , 11, 270 Cal.Rptr. 796 , 793 P.2d 2 .) And there may be cases in which an employer's challenge to the Board's settled construction of the ALRA in order to obtain judicial review sufficiently advances the Act's policies and purposes.

2017To be sure, "the courts are the ultimate arbiters of the construction of a statute." ( California Assn. of Psychology Providers v. Rank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1 , 11, 270 Cal.Rptr. 796 , 793 P.2d 2 .) And there may be cases in which an employer's challenge to the Board's settled construction of the ALRA in order to obtain judicial review sufficiently advances the Act's policies and purposes.

2016(See Ram v. Onewest Bank (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1 , 9 fn. 2 [on appeal from a judgment sustaining a demurrer, an appellant’s failure to advance arguments in connection with a cause of action set forth in the complaint constitutes an abandonment of that claim]; Bagley v. International Harvester Co. (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 922, 926 ; Cf. In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994 [because an “appealed-from judgment is presumed correct,” issues not raised in an appellant’s brief are deemed waived or abandoned].) C.

2016(See Gonzalez v. Rebollo (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 969, 977 ; Wagner v. Wagner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 249, 259 ; Stevens v. Stevens (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 19, 20 .) 14 On our review of the appellate record, we have found no indication that Padilla represented to the court that he was intending to seek to reopen the bankruptcy case to obtain an abandonment of the claim or that he intended to take any other action during the stay.

2016(See Gonzalez v. Rebollo (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 969, 977 ; Wagner v. Wagner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 249, 259 ; Stevens v. Stevens (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 19, 20 .) 14 On our review of the appellate record, we have found no indication that Padilla represented to the court that he was intending to seek to reopen the bankruptcy case to obtain an abandonment of the claim or that he intended to take any other action during the stay.