11 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1924–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pruitt v. Stategreen2 sentences2020This Court has held that for an abandonment instruction to be warranted, the evidence must show that the defendant voluntarily abandoned his intent and did “not have his intent frustrated by the resistance of the victim . . . .” Pruitt v. State, 528 So. 2d 828, 831 (Miss. 1988). 2016This Court has held that for an abandonment instruction to be warranted, the evidence must show that the defendant voluntarily abandoned his intent and did “not have his intent frustrated by the resistance of the victim . . . .” Pruit v. State, 528 So. 2d 828, 831 (Miss. 1988). | 3 | 3 |
Wimley v. Reidgreen2 sentences2010The Meadowses present three issues for this Court's consideration: (1) whether Blake and Baptist waived their objection to the Meadowses' lack of strict compliance with Mississippi Code Section 11-1-58(4) by actively litigating the case for nearly three years and by waiting until after the Meadowses had designated their experts before pursuing their defense; (2) alternatively, whether the trial court's dismissal was erroneous in light of this Court's abandonment of the rule of strict compliance with Mississippi Code Section 11-1-58 as stated in Wimley v. Reid, 991 So.2d 135 (Miss.2008), and it 2010The Meadowses present three issues for this Court’s consideration: (1) whether Blake and Baptist waived their objection to the Meadowses’ lack of strict compliance with Mississippi Code Section 11 — 1— 58(4) by actively litigating the case for nearly three years and by waiting until after the Meadowses had designated their experts before pursuing their defense; (2) alternatively, whether the trial court’s dismissal was erroneous in light of this Court’s abandonment of the rule of strict compliance with Mississippi Code Section 11-1-58 as stated in Wimley v. Reid, 991 So.2d 135 (Miss.2008), and | 1 | 2 |
Alexander v. Stategreen2 sentences1995This Court held in Alexander v. State, 520 So.2d 127 (Miss. 1988) (Prather, J.), that where the appellant's rape attempt failed because of the victim's resistance and ability to sound the alarm, the appellant cannot establish an abandonment defense. 1995Id. at 130 . | 1 | 2 |
Ward v. . Erie R.R. Co.green1 sentence2020Further, as Nichols recognized, “a conspirator cannot escape responsibility for an act which is the natural result of a criminal scheme which he has helped to devise and carry forward because as the result of fear or even of a better motive he concludes to run away. . . .” Nichols, 230 N.Y. at 230, 129 N.E. 883 . | 1 | 1 |
Kizart v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Id. at 584 (¶6). | 1 | 1 |
Superior Crewboats, Inc. v. Primary P & I Underwritersgreen2 sentences2015Sept. 16, 2009) (Pepper, J.); accord Superior Crewboats, 374 F.3d at 335 (applying the doctrine despite the trustee’s abandonment of the claim); Robey v. Cleveland Sch. 2015Sept. 16, 2009) (Pepper, J.); accord Superior Crewboats, 374 F.3d at 335 (applying the doctrine despite the trustee’s abandonment of the claim); Robey v. Cleveland Sch. | 1 | 1 |
Moeller v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.green2 sentences2010"Although this Court employs an abuse-of-discretion standard to an appeal of an order granting or denying a motion to amend, Moeller v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 812 So.2d 953, 961 (Miss.2002), we review de novo a trial court's dismissal of a suit based on a question of law." Wimley v. Reid, 991 So.2d 135, 136 (Miss.2008) (citing Ralph Walker, Inc. v. Gallagher, 926 So.2d 890, 893 (Miss.2006)). 2010“Although this Court employs an abuse-of-discretion standard to an appeal of an order granting or denying a motion to amend, Moeller v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 812 So.2d 953, 961 (Miss.2002), we review de novo a trial court’s dismissal of a suit based on a question of law.” Wimley v. Reid, 991 So.2d 135, 136 (Miss.2008) (citing Ralph Walker, Inc. v. Gallagher, 926 So.2d 890, 893 (Miss.2006)). | 1 | 1 |
Ralph Walker, Inc. v. Gallaghergreen2 sentences2010"Although this Court employs an abuse-of-discretion standard to an appeal of an order granting or denying a motion to amend, Moeller v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 812 So.2d 953, 961 (Miss.2002), we review de novo a trial court's dismissal of a suit based on a question of law." Wimley v. Reid, 991 So.2d 135, 136 (Miss.2008) (citing Ralph Walker, Inc. v. Gallagher, 926 So.2d 890, 893 (Miss.2006)). 2010“Although this Court employs an abuse-of-discretion standard to an appeal of an order granting or denying a motion to amend, Moeller v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 812 So.2d 953, 961 (Miss.2002), we review de novo a trial court’s dismissal of a suit based on a question of law.” Wimley v. Reid, 991 So.2d 135, 136 (Miss.2008) (citing Ralph Walker, Inc. v. Gallagher, 926 So.2d 890, 893 (Miss.2006)). | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Stategreen2 sentences2008In order for an abandonment instruction to be warranted a defendant must show that he voluntarily abandoned his intent and did “not have his intent frustrated by the resistance of the victim or the intervention of a third party.” Pruitt v. State, 528 So.2d 828, 831 (Miss.1988) (citing Edwards v. State, 500 So.2d 967, 969 (Miss.1986)). 2008In order for an abandonment instruction to be warranted a defendant must show that he voluntarily abandoned his intent and did “not have his intent frustrated by the resistance of the victim or the intervention of a third party.” Pruitt v. State, 528 So.2d 828, 831 (Miss.1988) (citing Edwards v. State, 500 So.2d 967, 969 (Miss.1986)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. . Nichols
green
2 sentences2020Further, as Nichols recognized, “a conspirator cannot escape responsibility for an act which is the natural result of a criminal scheme which he has helped to devise and carry forward because as the result of fear or even of a better motive he concludes to run away. . . .” Nichols, 230 N.Y. at 230, 129 N.E. 883 . 2016Further, as Nichols recognized, “a conspirator cannot escape responsibility for an act which is the natural result of a criminal scheme which he has helped to devise and carry forward because as the result of fear or even of a better motive he concludes to run away . . . .” Nichols, 230 N.Y. at 230 . ¶73. | 2 | 2016–2020 |
Brandy Nicole Williams v. State of Mississippi
green
2 sentences2015Williams, 2014 WL 6756335 at **7-8 . 2015Williams, 174 So.3d at 282-283 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State Stove Manufacturing Company v. Hodges
green
1 sentence1974In State Stove , we quoted with approval from Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57 , 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 (1962): "Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law * * *, and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products * * * make clear that the liabilit | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.
green
2 sentences1974In State Stove , we quoted with approval from Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57 , 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 (1962): "Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law * * *, and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products * * * make clear that the liabilit 1974In State Stove , we quoted with approval from Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57 , 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 (1962): "Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law * * *, and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products * * * make clear that the liabilit | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Burnley v. Tufts
green
1 sentence1924There is no express provision to that effect, and to give such effect to(Dederick’s act is to cause a forfeiture of his right to be paid in full, at all events, as promised by the buyer, while the other view does justice to both parties, according to their contract, by allowing the seller what he was promised and the buyer what was purchased, and treating the press as it was intended to be, as a security for tbe payment of the stipulated price. ’ ’ In the case of Foundry Company v. Pascagoula Ice Co., 72 Miss. 615 , 18 So. 364 , the court said: ‘ ‘ The right of the seller of personal property | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.