abandonment analysis in Utah

2014Indeed, "Utah courts have declined to terminate parental rights, even after finding parental misconduct, where it is not in the child's best interests." In re B.M.S., 2003 UT App 51, 18 , 65 P.3d 639 .

2014Indeed, "Utah courts have declined to terminate parental rights, even after finding parental misconduct, where it is not in the child's best interests." In re B.M.S., 2003 UT App 51, 18 , 65 P.3d 639 .

2014Further, "the court may also consider any other evidence that is probative of what is in the child's best interest." In re T.E., 2011 UT 51, ¶ 18 , 266 P.3d 739 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-509(1) (LexisNexis Supp.2011) (current version at id. (2012))). {18 Although we have "recognize[d] that only rarely will a child's best interests not be served by terminating the rights of an unfit parent," In re D.R.A, 2011 UT App 397, ¶ 21 , 266 P.3d 844 ; see also In re Adoption of AFK, 2009 UT App 198 , T 83, 216 P.3d 980 ("When a party proves that the parental bond was destroyed under the abandonment

2014Further, "the court may also consider any other evidence that is probative of what is in the child's best interest." In re T.E., 2011 UT 51, ¶ 18 , 266 P.3d 739 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-509(1) (LexisNexis Supp.2011) (current version at id. (2012))). {18 Although we have "recognize[d] that only rarely will a child's best interests not be served by terminating the rights of an unfit parent," In re D.R.A, 2011 UT App 397, ¶ 21 , 266 P.3d 844 ; see also In re Adoption of AFK, 2009 UT App 198 , T 83, 216 P.3d 980 ("When a party proves that the parental bond was destroyed under the abandonment

2014Further, "the court may also consider any other evidence that is probative of what is in the child's best interest." In re T.E., 2011 UT 51, ¶ 18 , 266 P.3d 739 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-509(1) (LexisNexis Supp.2011) (current version at id. (2012))). {18 Although we have "recognize[d] that only rarely will a child's best interests not be served by terminating the rights of an unfit parent," In re D.R.A, 2011 UT App 397, ¶ 21 , 266 P.3d 844 ; see also In re Adoption of AFK, 2009 UT App 198 , T 83, 216 P.3d 980 ("When a party proves that the parental bond was destroyed under the abandonment

2014Further, "the court may also consider any other evidence that is probative of what is in the child's best interest." In re T.E., 2011 UT 51, ¶ 18 , 266 P.3d 739 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-509(1) (LexisNexis Supp.2011) (current version at id. (2012))). {18 Although we have "recognize[d] that only rarely will a child's best interests not be served by terminating the rights of an unfit parent," In re D.R.A, 2011 UT App 397, ¶ 21 , 266 P.3d 844 ; see also In re Adoption of AFK, 2009 UT App 198 , T 83, 216 P.3d 980 ("When a party proves that the parental bond was destroyed under the abandonment

2009We also evaluate whether this court's prior declaration that the statutory definition of prima facie abandonment supplements Utah case law's definition of abandonment, see In re J.R.T., 750 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah Ct.App.1988), precluded the trial court from determining that First Parents abandoned A.F.K. when an attachment between First Parents and A.F.K. existed. "[M]atters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness," In re Adoption of P.N., 2006 UT 64 , ¶ 12, 148 P.3d 927 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), as are iss

2009We also evaluate whether this court’s prior declaration that the statutory definition of prima facie abandonment supplements Utah case law’s definition of abandonment, see In re J.R.T., 750 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah Ct.App.1988), precluded the trial court from determining that First Parents abandoned A.F.K. when an attachment between First Parents and A.F.K. existed. “[M]atters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness,” In re adoption of P.N., 2006 UT 64 , ¶ 12, 148 P.3d 927 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), as are iss

2009We also evaluate whether this court's prior declaration that the statutory definition of prima facie abandonment supplements Utah case law's definition of abandonment, see In re J.R.T., 750 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah Ct.App.1988), precluded the trial court from determining that First Parents abandoned A.F.K. when an attachment between First Parents and A.F.K. existed. "[M]atters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness," In re Adoption of P.N., 2006 UT 64 , ¶ 12, 148 P.3d 927 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), as are iss

2009We also evaluate whether this court’s prior declaration that the statutory definition of prima facie abandonment supplements Utah case law’s definition of abandonment, see In re J.R.T., 750 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah Ct.App.1988), precluded the trial court from determining that First Parents abandoned A.F.K. when an attachment between First Parents and A.F.K. existed. “[M]atters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness,” In re adoption of P.N., 2006 UT 64 , ¶ 12, 148 P.3d 927 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), as are iss

2003However, we part ways when the majority concludes that Rynhart maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the van and its contents when, following a single car accident, she left it, unsecured and parked on property not owned by Rynhart. [1] My reasons for dissenting are threefold: (1) The majority, in summarily deciding that Rynhart did not abandon her expectation of privacy, relies on a series of cases that have little or nothing to do with the issue of abandonment; (2) the abandonment standard relied upon by the majority is actually a standard applicable to property law and it flies

2003However, we part ways when the majority concludes that Rynhart maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the van and its contents when, following a single car accident, she left it, unsecured and parked on property not owned by Rynhart. [1] My reasons for dissenting are threefold: (1) The majority, in summarily deciding that Rynhart did not abandon her expectation of privacy, relies on a series of cases that have little or nothing to do with the issue of abandonment; (2) the abandonment standard relied upon by the majority is actually a standard applicable to property law and it flies

1996Id. at 1334-35 ; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78 -3a-408(l)(b) (1995) (declaring that it is prima facie evidence of abandonment for parent to “have failed to communicate with the child by mail, telephone, or otherwise for six months or failed to have shown the normal interest of a natural parent, without just cause”).

1996Id. at 1334-35 ; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78 -3a-408(1)(b) (1995) (declaring that it is prima facie evidence of abandonment for parent to "have failed to communicate with the child by mail, telephone, or otherwise for six months or failed to have shown the normal interest of a natural parent, without just cause").

1996Summers Children v. Wulffenstein, 560 P.2d 331 (Utah 1977).

1996Summers Children v. Wulffenstein, 560 P.2d 331 (Utah 1977).

2020The majority recognizes that there are exceptions to when the domicile of a child born out ______________________________________________________________________________ 32This is strong evidence that Birth Mother even intended to “immediately and unconditionally relinquish” her parental rights and obligations, if I were to apply the majority’s abandonment standard. 48 Cite as: 2020 UT 53 Himonas, J., dissenting of wedlock follows the domicile of the mother.

2020The result of Holyfield, therefore, would’ve been the same under the abandonment standard that I endorse. 54 Cite as: 2020 UT 53 Himonas, J., dissenting IV.

2016Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, ¶ 13 , 164 P.3d 1247 {noting that under certain cireumstances, "the abandonment doctrine provides that a client forfeits any legal malpractice claims arising from an attorney's alleged mishandling of litigation when the client settles the wnderlying Wiigation before final judicial review" (emphasis added)); Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 441 (Utah 1996).

2016Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, ¶ 13 , 164 P.3d 1247 {noting that under certain cireumstances, "the abandonment doctrine provides that a client forfeits any legal malpractice claims arising from an attorney's alleged mishandling of litigation when the client settles the wnderlying Wiigation before final judicial review" (emphasis added)); Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 441 (Utah 1996).

2013UTAH CODE § 73-1-4(3)(a) (2002) (emphasis added.) The district court granted Vincent summary judgment on the abandonment claim based on Utah Code section 73- 6 The current version of this exemption is located at Utah Code section 73-1-4(2)(e)(iii). 12 Cite as: 2013 UT 54 Opinion of the Court 1-4(3)(f)(i) (subsequent to 2002 amendments)—the exemption that we hold to be a codification of the physical-causes exception.

2013UTAH CODE § 73-1-4(3)(a) (2002) (emphasis added.) The district court granted Vincent summary judgment on the abandonment claim based on Utah Code section 73- 6 The current version of this exemption is located at Utah Code section 73-1-4(2)(e)(iii). 12 Cite as: 2013 UT 54 Opinion of the Court 1-4(3)(f)(i) (subsequent to 2002 amendments)—the exemption that we hold to be a codification of the physical-causes exception.

2008This presents "a [question] of law that we review under a correction-of-error standard." Cowley v. Porter, 2005 UT App 518, ¶ 31 , 127 P.3d 1224 . 111 In addition, Lunt asks this court to hold that the trial court incorrectly applied the doctrine of abandonment and, as a result, unjustly limited his prescriptive rights in the Lane.

2008This presents "a [question] of law that we review under a correction-of-error standard." Cowley v. Porter, 2005 UT App 518, ¶ 31 , 127 P.3d 1224 . 111 In addition, Lunt asks this court to hold that the trial court incorrectly applied the doctrine of abandonment and, as a result, unjustly limited his prescriptive rights in the Lane.

2005Pursuant to State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah Ct.App.1991), rev’d on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992), the district court rejected the State’s theory that Rynhart abandoned her privacy expectation in the van, declaring that “[t]he apparent early hour, the winter conditions, and the single vehicle nature of the accident all combine to belie the officer’s imputing an intent to abandon the vehicle.” The district court upheld the constitutionality of the search, however, under the emergency aid doctrine. ¶ 6 On September 23, 2002, Rynhart filed a petition for interlocutory appeal, which the

2005In Bissegger, the court of appeals relied on State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah Ct.App.1991), rev’d on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992), in describing the doctrine of abandonment.

2005We address each issue in turn. ¶ 12 Before beginning our analysis, we pause to note that “federal Fourth Amendment protections may differ from those guaranteed our citizens by our state constitution.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ¶ 10 , 122 P.3d 506 ; see also State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ¶ 12 , 996 P.2d 546 (“While this court’s interpretation of article I, section 14 has often paralleled the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, we have stated that we will not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different construction where doing so will more approp

2005We address each issue in turn. ¶ 12 Before beginning our analysis, we pause to note that “federal Fourth Amendment protections may differ from those guaranteed our citizens by our state constitution.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ¶ 10 , 122 P.3d 506 ; see also State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ¶ 12 , 996 P.2d 546 (“While this court’s interpretation of article I, section 14 has often paralleled the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, we have stated that we will not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different construction where doing so will more approp

2005In Bissegger, the court of appeals relied on State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah Ct.App.1991), rev’d on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992), in describing the doctrine of abandonment.

2005Pursuant to State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah Ct.App.1991), rev’d on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992), the district court rejected the State’s theory that Rynhart abandoned her privacy expectation in the van, declaring that “[t]he apparent early hour, the winter conditions, and the single vehicle nature of the accident all combine to belie the officer’s imputing an intent to abandon the vehicle.” The district court upheld the constitutionality of the search, however, under the emergency aid doctrine. ¶ 6 On September 23, 2002, Rynhart filed a petition for interlocutory appeal, which the

2003Detaining Valdez to ensure that no harm came to either the officers or Ms. Young was minimally intrusive, necessary to ensure safety in the situation and thus, not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. [9] The trial court did not find, however, that an investigatory detention, where information of any kind is sought, was necessary to secure the safety of the participants. [10] Therefore, the officer safety justification proffered by the State cannot be extended, no matter how minimally intrusive. ¶ 20 We can find no authority supporting an abandonment of the rule requiring that any further dete

2003Detaining Valdez to ensure that no harm came to either the officers or Ms. Young was minimally intrusive, necessary to ensure safety in the situation and thus, not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. [9] The trial court did not find, however, that an investigatory detention, where information of any kind is sought, was necessary to secure the safety of the participants. [10] Therefore, the officer safety justification proffered by the State cannot be extended, no matter how minimally intrusive. ¶ 20 We can find no authority supporting an abandonment of the rule requiring that any further dete

2003Support for this position can be found in State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991), where the Utah Supreme Court "held that running a warrants check on a passenger in an automobile that had been properly stopped exceeded the appropriate scope of detention." Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453 (emphasis omitted) (citing Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764 ).

2003Support for this position can be found in State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991), where the Utah Supreme Court "held that running a warrants check on a passenger in an automobile that had been properly stopped exceeded the appropriate scope of detention." Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453 (emphasis omitted) (citing Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764 ).