18 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1906–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences1982See State v. Davis, 117 Ariz. 5 , 570 P.2d 776 (1977). 1982See State v. Davis, 117 Ariz. 5 , 570 P.2d 776 (1977). | 2 | 2 |
cluster 253772green2 sentences1999Transport Indemnity cites Bran-naker v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 428 S.W.2d 524 (Mo.1968), Cox v. Bond Transportation, Inc., 53 N.J. 186 , 249 A.2d 579 (1969), and Mellon National Bank & Trust Co. v. Sophie Lines, Inc., 289 F.2d 473, 477 (3d Cir.1961), “holding that federal law creates an irrebuttable presumption that the lessor’s driver is the employer [sic — employee] of the vehicle [sic — lessee] whose placards identify the vehicle.” [Emphasis added]. 1984Mellon National Bank & Trust Company v. Sophie Lines, Inc., 289 F.2d 473 (3rd Cir.1961). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Robingreen2 sentences1983Cf. State v. Robin, 112 Ariz. 467 , 543 P.2d 779 (1975) (the trial judge answered from his notes and recollection questions submitted by the jury while deliberating); State v. Werring, 111 Ariz. 68 , 523 P.2d 499 (1974) and State v. Burnetts, 80 Ariz. 208 , 295 P.2d 377 (1956) (both cases involved the actual physical intrusion by the judge into the jury room where he communicated orally with the panel on issues of fact and law). 1983Cf. State v. Robin, 112 Ariz. 467 , 543 P.2d 779 (1975) (the trial judge answered from his notes and recollection questions submitted by the jury while deliberating); State v. Werring, 111 Ariz. 68 , 523 P.2d 499 (1974) and State v. Burnetts, 80 Ariz. 208 , 295 P.2d 377 (1956) (both cases involved the actual physical intrusion by the judge into the jury room where he communicated orally with the panel on issues of fact and law). | 1 | 2 |
Norton v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2024See Norton v. Superior Court, 171 Ariz. 155, 158 (App. 1992) (“Conclusive or irrebuttable presumptions unconstitutionally relieve the State of its burden of proof.”); see also State v. Abdi, 226 Ariz. 361 , 364–65, ¶¶ 11, 13 (App. 2011) (similar). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Abdigreen1 sentence2024See Norton v. Superior Court, 171 Ariz. 155, 158 (App. 1992) (“Conclusive or irrebuttable presumptions unconstitutionally relieve the State of its burden of proof.”); see also State v. Abdi, 226 Ariz. 361 , 364–65, ¶¶ 11, 13 (App. 2011) (similar). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Rayesgreen2 sentences2016II, § 22(A)(1) and A.R.S. § 13-3961(A)(3) ] do not create an irrebuttable presumption that a person charged with a listed offense will be denied bail — Instead, the amendments require that if the State wants a defendant ... to be held without bail, it must convince the judge, at a hearing, that the opportunity for bail is limited by proving that the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is great.” 206 Ariz. 58, 61, ¶ 11 , 75 P.3d 148 (App.2003). 2016II, § 22(A)(1) and A.R.S. § 13-3961(A)(3) ] do not create an irrebuttable presumption that a person charged with a listed offense will be denied bail — Instead, the amendments require that if the State wants a defendant ... to be held without bail, it must convince the judge, at a hearing, that the opportunity for bail is limited by proving that the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is great.” 206 Ariz. 58, 61, ¶ 11 , 75 P.3d 148 (App.2003). | 1 | 1 |
Metzler v. Bci Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles, Inc.green1 sentence2015See Metzler v. BCI Coca- Cola Bottling Co., 235 Ariz. 141, 144, ¶ 13 (2014) ("If the statute's language is clear, it controls unless an absurdity or constitutional violation results.") (quotation omitted). ¶14 Finally, Ayiyi argues that, as applied, the referenced paternity statutes violated his constitutional right to due process by creating an irrebuttable presumption of paternity. | 1 | 1 |
City of Flagstaff v. Babbittgreen2 sentences2011City of Flagstaff v. Babbitt, 8 Ariz.App. 123, 133 , 443 P.2d 938, 948 (1968). ¶ 27 The trial court observed here that the plat expressly reserved use of the private roadways and playground for the subdivision’s property owners “but not to the general public.” A to the drainage easements shown on the plat, its declaration specified only that they were to be used for “drainage purposes.” Notably, the drainage easements passed over one of the subdivision’s private roads. 2011City of Flagstaff v. Babbitt, 8 Ariz.App. 123, 133 , 443 P.2d 938, 948 (1968). ¶ 27 The trial court observed here that the plat expressly reserved use of the private roadways and playground for the subdivision’s property owners “but not to the general public.” A to the drainage easements shown on the plat, its declaration specified only that they were to be used for “drainage purposes.” Notably, the drainage easements passed over one of the subdivision’s private roads. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 390354green2 sentences2003The “fatal flaw,” according to the Hunt court, was that the Nebraska legislature “created an irrebuttable presumption that every individual charged with this particular offense is incapable of assuring his appearance by conditioning it upon reasonable bail or is too dangerous to be granted release.” Id. at 1164. 2003See Hunt, 648 F.2d at 1164 . | 1 | 1 |
cluster 675832green1 sentence1999See also Zamalloa v. Hart, 31 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir.1994) (under ICC requirements, carrier becomes statutory employer of lessor’s driver); Wilson v. Riley Whittle, Inc., 145 Ariz. 317, 321 , 701 P.2d 575, 579 (App.1984) (federal law creates irrebuttable presumption that lessor is employee of the motor carrier). 2 ¶ 17 The cartage agreement provides that Kifsco is to protect and indemnify Motor Cargo against all loss that Motor Cargo might incur for injury to persons caused by negligent acts of Kifsco or its agents, servants, or employees. | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Riley Whittle, Inc.green2 sentences1999See also Zamalloa v. Hart, 31 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir.1994) (under ICC requirements, carrier becomes statutory employer of lessor’s driver); Wilson v. Riley Whittle, Inc., 145 Ariz. 317, 321 , 701 P.2d 575, 579 (App.1984) (federal law creates irrebuttable presumption that lessor is employee of the motor carrier). 2 ¶ 17 The cartage agreement provides that Kifsco is to protect and indemnify Motor Cargo against all loss that Motor Cargo might incur for injury to persons caused by negligent acts of Kifsco or its agents, servants, or employees. 1999See also Zamalloa v. Hart, 31 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir.1994) (under ICC requirements, carrier becomes statutory employer of lessor’s driver); Wilson v. Riley Whittle, Inc., 145 Ariz. 317, 321 , 701 P.2d 575, 579 (App.1984) (federal law creates irrebuttable presumption that lessor is employee of the motor carrier). 2 ¶ 17 The cartage agreement provides that Kifsco is to protect and indemnify Motor Cargo against all loss that Motor Cargo might incur for injury to persons caused by negligent acts of Kifsco or its agents, servants, or employees. | 1 | 1 |
Ronquillo v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1977If the previous injury is non-industrial, but would have been scheduled if it had been industrial, the presumption as to loss of earning capacity is rebuttable. 4 Ronquillo, supra, articulates the rule we apply today, “that where there is a prior scheduled industrially related injury, the Commission may not ignore the previous injury when the workman suffers a second industrial injury.” 107 Ariz. 542 at 544 , 490 P.2d 423 at 425 (1971). 1977If the previous injury is non-industrial, but would have been scheduled if it had been industrial, the presumption as to loss of earning capacity is rebuttable. 4 Ronquillo, supra, articulates the rule we apply today, “that where there is a prior scheduled industrially related injury, the Commission may not ignore the previous injury when the workman suffers a second industrial injury.” 107 Ariz. 542 at 544 , 490 P.2d 423 at 425 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Werring
green
2 sentences1983Cf. State v. Robin, 112 Ariz. 467 , 543 P.2d 779 (1975) (the trial judge answered from his notes and recollection questions submitted by the jury while deliberating); State v. Werring, 111 Ariz. 68 , 523 P.2d 499 (1974) and State v. Burnetts, 80 Ariz. 208 , 295 P.2d 377 (1956) (both cases involved the actual physical intrusion by the judge into the jury room where he communicated orally with the panel on issues of fact and law). 1983Cf. State v. Robin, 112 Ariz. 467 , 543 P.2d 779 (1975) (the trial judge answered from his notes and recollection questions submitted by the jury while deliberating); State v. Werring, 111 Ariz. 68 , 523 P.2d 499 (1974) and State v. Burnetts, 80 Ariz. 208 , 295 P.2d 377 (1956) (both cases involved the actual physical intrusion by the judge into the jury room where he communicated orally with the panel on issues of fact and law). | 2 | 1981–1983 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences2022Id. ¶44 In Alma S. v. Department of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146 , 150 ¶ 10 (2018), the Court held that most grounds for termination in § 8-533(B)— including the length of sentence ground at issue here—are “proxies for parental unfitness.” Hence, each operates as essentially an irrebuttable presumption, such that proof of the statutory ground satisfies the government’s burden to terminate the parent’s fundamental right. ¶45 In Santosky, the Supreme Court observed that this first stage of termination proceedings “entails a judicial determination that the parents are unfit to raise their own chil 2022At that stage, “the State cannot presume that a child and his parents are adversaries.” Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Brannaker v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc.
green
1 sentence1999Transport Indemnity cites Bran-naker v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 428 S.W.2d 524 (Mo.1968), Cox v. Bond Transportation, Inc., 53 N.J. 186 , 249 A.2d 579 (1969), and Mellon National Bank & Trust Co. v. Sophie Lines, Inc., 289 F.2d 473, 477 (3d Cir.1961), “holding that federal law creates an irrebuttable presumption that the lessor’s driver is the employer [sic — employee] of the vehicle [sic — lessee] whose placards identify the vehicle.” [Emphasis added]. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Cox v. Bond Transportation, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999Transport Indemnity cites Bran-naker v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 428 S.W.2d 524 (Mo.1968), Cox v. Bond Transportation, Inc., 53 N.J. 186 , 249 A.2d 579 (1969), and Mellon National Bank & Trust Co. v. Sophie Lines, Inc., 289 F.2d 473, 477 (3d Cir.1961), “holding that federal law creates an irrebuttable presumption that the lessor’s driver is the employer [sic — employee] of the vehicle [sic — lessee] whose placards identify the vehicle.” [Emphasis added]. 1999Transport Indemnity cites Bran-naker v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 428 S.W.2d 524 (Mo.1968), Cox v. Bond Transportation, Inc., 53 N.J. 186 , 249 A.2d 579 (1969), and Mellon National Bank & Trust Co. v. Sophie Lines, Inc., 289 F.2d 473, 477 (3d Cir.1961), “holding that federal law creates an irrebuttable presumption that the lessor’s driver is the employer [sic — employee] of the vehicle [sic — lessee] whose placards identify the vehicle.” [Emphasis added]. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Kent v. United States
green
2 sentences1995Id. at 563 , 86 S.Ct. at 1058 . 1995Id. at 563 , 86 S.Ct. at 1058 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Mohr
green
2 sentences1989State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564 , 724 P.2d 1233 (App. 1986), warned trial courts not to confine a jury’s discretion by creating an irrebuttable presumption of guilt through an improper instruction. 1989State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564 , 724 P.2d 1233 (App. 1986), warned trial courts not to confine a jury’s discretion by creating an irrebuttable presumption of guilt through an improper instruction. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Burnetts
green
2 sentences1983Cf. State v. Robin, 112 Ariz. 467 , 543 P.2d 779 (1975) (the trial judge answered from his notes and recollection questions submitted by the jury while deliberating); State v. Werring, 111 Ariz. 68 , 523 P.2d 499 (1974) and State v. Burnetts, 80 Ariz. 208 , 295 P.2d 377 (1956) (both cases involved the actual physical intrusion by the judge into the jury room where he communicated orally with the panel on issues of fact and law). 1983Cf. State v. Robin, 112 Ariz. 467 , 543 P.2d 779 (1975) (the trial judge answered from his notes and recollection questions submitted by the jury while deliberating); State v. Werring, 111 Ariz. 68 , 523 P.2d 499 (1974) and State v. Burnetts, 80 Ariz. 208 , 295 P.2d 377 (1956) (both cases involved the actual physical intrusion by the judge into the jury room where he communicated orally with the panel on issues of fact and law). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Heiner v. Donnan
green
2 sentences1981In Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 , 52 S.Ct. 358 , 76 L.Ed. 772 (1932), the supreme court held that where an irrebuttable presumption attempts by legislative fiat to enact into existence a fact that does not exist in actuality, it cannot be upheld. 1981In Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 , 52 S.Ct. 358 , 76 L.Ed. 772 (1932), the supreme court held that where an irrebuttable presumption attempts by legislative fiat to enact into existence a fact that does not exist in actuality, it cannot be upheld. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Morissette v. United States
green
2 sentences1970Such a presumption is in violation of due process, as was pointed out in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 , 72 S.Ct. 240, 255 , 96 L.Ed.2d 288 : “As we read the record, this case was tried on the theory that even if criminal intent were essential its presence (a) should be decided by the court (b) as a presumption of law, apparently conclusive, (c) predicated upon the isolated act of taking rather than upon all of the circumstances. 1970Such a presumption is in violation of due process, as was pointed out in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 , 72 S.Ct. 240, 255 , 96 L.Ed.2d 288 : “As we read the record, this case was tried on the theory that even if criminal intent were essential its presence (a) should be decided by the court (b) as a presumption of law, apparently conclusive, (c) predicated upon the isolated act of taking rather than upon all of the circumstances. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Conrad v. West End Hotel & Land Co.
green
2 sentences1906Hughes v. Clark, 134 N. C. 457 , 46 S. E. 556; Conrad v. Land Co., 126 N. C. 776 , 36 S. E. 282 . 1906Hughes v. Clark, 134 N. C. 457 , 46 S. E. 556; Conrad v. Land Co., 126 N. C. 776 , 36 S. E. 282 . | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Hughes v. Clark.
neutral
1 sentence1906Hughes v. Clark, 134 N. C. 457 , 46 S. E. 556; Conrad v. Land Co., 126 N. C. 776 , 36 S. E. 282 . | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Aaron v. Southern Ry.
green
1 sentence1906Hughes v. Clark, 134 N. C. 457 , 46 S. E. 556; Conrad v. Land Co., 126 N. C. 776 , 36 S. E. 282 . | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.