irrebuttable presumption in California

1999(See People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 153 , 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 .) As the United States Supreme Court has observed, statutes of limitations "provide predictability by specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced." ( United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307, 322 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 .) Statutes of limitations tell people when they no longer need to fear prosecution for crimes which they may or may not have committed.

1999(See People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 153 , 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 .) As the United States Supreme Court has observed, statutes of limitations "provide predictability by specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced." ( United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307, 322 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 .) Statutes of limitations tell people when they no longer need to fear prosecution for crimes which they may or may not have committed.

1978Code, tit. 22, § 51321(e)(8)) establishes an irrebuttable presumption that such a mattress can never be considered as part of a remedial or preventative program in the promotion of appellant's health and care, and thus violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Heiner v. Donnan (1932) 285 U.S. 312, 329 [ 76 L.Ed. 772, 780 , 52 S.Ct. 358 ].)" The court responded, "There is no such presumption at bench.

1978Code, tit. 22, § 51321(e)(8)) establishes an irrebuttable presumption that such a mattress can never be considered as part of a remedial or preventative program in the promotion of appellant's health and care, and thus violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Heiner v. Donnan (1932) 285 U.S. 312, 329 [ 76 L.Ed. 772, 780 , 52 S.Ct. 358 ].)" The court responded, "There is no such presumption at bench.

1999Appellant asserts that, as interpreted by the juvenile court in this case, “anytime a parent comes within the meaning of [subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(12)], he or she is automatically an unfit parent and the [minor] may be removed without further ado.” The result, appellant argues, is the creation of a constitutionally impermissible “conclusive presumption.” 3 In In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 477-478 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 793 ], the court rejected the mother’s argument that subdivision (b)(10) of section 361.5 created “an irrebuttable presumption of inability to parent based on prior

1999Appellant asserts that, as interpreted by the juvenile court in this case, “anytime a parent comes within the meaning of [subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(12)], he or she is automatically an unfit parent and the [minor] may be removed without further ado.” The result, appellant argues, is the creation of a constitutionally impermissible “conclusive presumption.” 3 In In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 477-478 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 793 ], the court rejected the mother’s argument that subdivision (b)(10) of section 361.5 created “an irrebuttable presumption of inability to parent based on prior

1999Appellant asserts that, as interpreted by the juvenile court in this case, “anytime a parent comes within the meaning of [subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(12)], he or she is automatically an unfit parent and the [minor] may be removed without further ado.” The result, appellant argues, is the creation of a constitutionally impermissible “conclusive presumption.” 3 In In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 477-478 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 793 ], the court rejected the mother’s argument that subdivision (b)(10) of section 361.5 created “an irrebuttable presumption of inability to parent based on prior

1999Appellant asserts that, as interpreted by the juvenile court in this case, “anytime a parent comes within the meaning of [subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(12)], he or she is automatically an unfit parent and the [minor] may be removed without further ado.” The result, appellant argues, is the creation of a constitutionally impermissible “conclusive presumption.” 3 In In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 477-478 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 793 ], the court rejected the mother’s argument that subdivision (b)(10) of section 361.5 created “an irrebuttable presumption of inability to parent based on prior

1981Code, §§ 4351, 4600.) The provision here can be distinguished from the lease agreement found in Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 89 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 375 ] which the court held created an irrebuttable presumption.

1981Code, §§ 4351, 4600.) The provision here can be distinguished from the lease agreement found in Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 89 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 375 ] which the court held created an irrebuttable presumption.

2025(Ibid.) The court concluded: “A reasonable juror would have understood CALCRIM No. 335 as directing that neither defendant could be convicted solely upon the testimony of his codefendant without independent supporting evidence, and that the testimony of each 12 defendant against the other should be viewed with ‘care and caution’—not that the entire trial was without purpose because the court’s instruction on how to view an accomplice’s testimony was really a direction to find defendants guilty of aiding and abetting the charged offenses.” (Id. at pp. 1276-1277; see People v. Heishman (1988) 45

2022(Id. at pp. 690–691.) Our Supreme Court rejected that argument, concluding that because consciousness is not an element of any crime, “there is no constitutional impediment to the state’s use of a rebuttable presumption in meeting its assumed burden—once the issue has been raised—to prove consciousness beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at pp. 693–694; see also People v. Hardy (1948) 33 Cal.2d 52 , 14 63–64 [judicially created presumption that a person who acts conscious is conscious].) Contrary to defendant’s assertions, CALCRIM No. 3425 does not create an irrebuttable presumption that defendan

2022(See United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307, 322 ; People v. Angel (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1144, 1150 .) We review the issue de novo.

2022II DISCUSSION A. Statute of Limitations “ ‘[W]hen the charging document indicates on its face that an action is time-barred, a person convicted of a charged offense may raise the statute of limitations at any time,’ including on appeal.” (People v. Ortega (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1427 (Ortega), quoting People v. Williams (1999) 21 Cal.4th 335, 341 .) The limitations period ends when an information is filed. (§§ 800, 803, 804.) A court must dismiss charges filed after a statute has run due to an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant’s right to a fair trial is prejudiced unless the statu

2015Co. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 354, 360-362 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 602 , 482 P.2d 226 ].) “The per se rule reflects an irrebuttable presumption that, if the court were to subject the conduct in question to a full-blown inquiry, a violation would be found under the traditional rule of reason.” (Fisher v. City of Berkeley, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 666 .) More recently, a third category, quick look rule of reason analysis, has emerged.

2015Co. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 354, 360-362 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 602 , 482 P.2d 226 ].) “The per se rule reflects an irrebuttable presumption that, if the court were to subject the conduct in question to a full-blown inquiry, a violation would be found under the traditional rule of reason.” (Fisher v. City of Berkeley, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 666 .) More recently, a third category, quick look rule of reason analysis, has emerged.

2015(California Dental Assn. v. FTC (1999) 526 U.S. 756, 769-770 [ 143 L.Ed.2d 935 , 119 S.Ct. 1604 ]; see FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists (1986) 476 U.S. 447, 459-460 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 445 , 106 S.Ct. 2009 ]; NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (1984) 468 U.S. 85, 109-110 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 70 , 104 S.Ct. 2948 ].) Under the quick look approach, applicable to cases where “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics *147 could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets,” a defendant may be asked to come forward with

2015(California Dental Assn. v. FTC (1999) 526 U.S. 756, 769-770 [ 143 L.Ed.2d 935 , 119 S.Ct. 1604 ]; see FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists (1986) 476 U.S. 447, 459-460 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 445 , 106 S.Ct. 2009 ]; NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (1984) 468 U.S. 85, 109-110 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 70 , 104 S.Ct. 2948 ].) Under the quick look approach, applicable to cases where “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics *147 could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets,” a defendant may be asked to come forward with

2015“It is settled that an action for declaratory relief is not appropriate to review an administrative decision.” (State of California v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237, 249 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 524 P.2d 1281 ].) “A declaratory relief action is an appropriate method for obtaining a declaration that a statute or regulation is facially unconstitutional,” but administrative mandamus is “ ‘the proper and sole remedy’ ” where a local agency’s application of the law is at *126 issue.

2015“It is settled that an action for declaratory relief is not appropriate to review an administrative decision.” (State of California v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237, 249 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 524 P.2d 1281 ].) “A declaratory relief action is an appropriate method for obtaining a declaration that a statute or regulation is facially unconstitutional,” but administrative mandamus is “ ‘the proper and sole remedy’ ” where a local agency’s application of the law is at *126 issue.

2015(California Dental Assn. v. FTC (1999) 526 U.S. 756, 769-770 [ 143 L.Ed.2d 935 , 119 S.Ct. 1604 ]; see FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists (1986) 476 U.S. 447, 459-460 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 445 , 106 S.Ct. 2009 ]; NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (1984) 468 U.S. 85, 109-110 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 70 , 104 S.Ct. 2948 ].) Under the quick look approach, applicable to cases where “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics *147 could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets,” a defendant may be asked to come forward with

2015(California Dental Assn. v. FTC (1999) 526 U.S. 756, 769-770 [ 143 L.Ed.2d 935 , 119 S.Ct. 1604 ]; see FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists (1986) 476 U.S. 447, 459-460 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 445 , 106 S.Ct. 2009 ]; NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (1984) 468 U.S. 85, 109-110 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 70 , 104 S.Ct. 2948 ].) Under the quick look approach, applicable to cases where “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics *147 could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets,” a defendant may be asked to come forward with

2015(California Dental Assn. v. FTC (1999) 526 U.S. 756, 769-770 [ 143 L.Ed.2d 935 , 119 S.Ct. 1604 ]; see FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists (1986) 476 U.S. 447, 459-460 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 445 , 106 S.Ct. 2009 ]; NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (1984) 468 U.S. 85, 109-110 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 70 , 104 S.Ct. 2948 ].) Under the quick look approach, applicable to cases where “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics *147 could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets,” a defendant may be asked to come forward with

2015(California Dental Assn. v. FTC (1999) 526 U.S. 756, 769-770 [ 143 L.Ed.2d 935 , 119 S.Ct. 1604 ]; see FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists (1986) 476 U.S. 447, 459-460 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 445 , 106 S.Ct. 2009 ]; NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (1984) 468 U.S. 85, 109-110 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 70 , 104 S.Ct. 2948 ].) Under the quick look approach, applicable to cases where “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics *147 could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets,” a defendant may be asked to come forward with

2002Vlandis held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a state statute from denying an individual the resident tuition rate based on an irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence, “when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true[,] in fact, and when the State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination.” (Vlandis v. Kline, supra, 412 U.S. at p. 452 [ 93 S.Ct. at p. 2236 ].) In Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, 422 U.S. 749 , the United States Supreme Court applied a different test.

2002Vlandis held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a state statute from denying an individual the resident tuition rate based on an irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence, “when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true[,] in fact, and when the State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination.” (Vlandis v. Kline, supra, 412 U.S. at p. 452 [ 93 S.Ct. at p. 2236 ].) In Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, 422 U.S. 749 , the United States Supreme Court applied a different test.

2001Code, § 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A)), and “ordinarily it is improper to suspend or halt visits even after the end of the reunification period. [Citations.] Visitation may be seen as an element critical to promotion of the parents’ interest in the care and management of their children, even if actual physical custody is not the outcome. [Citation.]” (In re Luke L., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 679 .) Moreover, “the rights of children in their family relationships are at least as fundamental and compelling as those of their parents.” (In re Bridget R. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1504 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d

2001Code, § 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A)), and “ordinarily it is improper to suspend or halt visits even after the end of the reunification period. [Citations.] Visitation may be seen as an element critical to promotion of the parents’ interest in the care and management of their children, even if actual physical custody is not the outcome. [Citation.]” (In re Luke L., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 679 .) Moreover, “the rights of children in their family relationships are at least as fundamental and compelling as those of their parents.” (In re Bridget R. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1504 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d

1999(See People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 153 , 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 .) As the United States Supreme Court has observed, statutes of limitations "provide predictability by specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced." ( United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307, 322 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 .) Statutes of limitations tell people when they no longer need to fear prosecution for crimes which they may or may not have committed.

1999(See People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 153 , 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 .) As the United States Supreme Court has observed, statutes of limitations "provide predictability by specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced." ( United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307, 322 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 .) Statutes of limitations tell people when they no longer need to fear prosecution for crimes which they may or may not have committed.

1995“Although delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-789 [ 52 L.Ed.2d 752, 758-759 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 ] (1977), or to a claim under any applicable statutes of limitations, no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending.” (United States v. MacDonald (1982) 456 U.S. 1, 7 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 696, 703 , 102 S.Ct. *464 1497].) 4 As the court in Marion found, however, the case before it should not have been dismissed simply because there was an extended delay between the crime

1995“Although delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-789 [ 52 L.Ed.2d 752, 758-759 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 ] (1977), or to a claim under any applicable statutes of limitations, no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending.” (United States v. MacDonald (1982) 456 U.S. 1, 7 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 696, 703 , 102 S.Ct. *464 1497].) 4 As the court in Marion found, however, the case before it should not have been dismissed simply because there was an extended delay between the crime

1995“Although delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-789 [ 52 L.Ed.2d 752, 758-759 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 ] (1977), or to a claim under any applicable statutes of limitations, no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending.” (United States v. MacDonald (1982) 456 U.S. 1, 7 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 696, 703 , 102 S.Ct. *464 1497].) 4 As the court in Marion found, however, the case before it should not have been dismissed simply because there was an extended delay between the crime

1995“Although delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-789 [ 52 L.Ed.2d 752, 758-759 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 ] (1977), or to a claim under any applicable statutes of limitations, no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending.” (United States v. MacDonald (1982) 456 U.S. 1, 7 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 696, 703 , 102 S.Ct. *464 1497].) 4 As the court in Marion found, however, the case before it should not have been dismissed simply because there was an extended delay between the crime

1985And a statute creating such a conclusive presumption “may not be set aside on constitutional grounds ... if any basis reasonably may be conceived to justify it.” (Rittenband v. Cory (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 410, 427 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 576 ].) We opine that the strong legislative policy to rid the state’s highways of drunk drivers justifies an irrebuttable presumption such as is here argued against by plaintiff. *1131 Equal Protection The state’s high court has opined that, as a class, “drunken drivers are extremely dangerous people.” (Burg v. Municipal Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 257, 262.) Vehicle Code

1985And a statute creating such a conclusive presumption “may not be set aside on constitutional grounds ... if any basis reasonably may be conceived to justify it.” (Rittenband v. Cory (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 410, 427 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 576 ].) We opine that the strong legislative policy to rid the state’s highways of drunk drivers justifies an irrebuttable presumption such as is here argued against by plaintiff. *1131 Equal Protection The state’s high court has opined that, as a class, “drunken drivers are extremely dangerous people.” (Burg v. Municipal Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 257, 262.) Vehicle Code