irrebuttable presumption in New Mexico

2014The hearing examiner recognized that not only does the rule require disqualification when factual information was actually disclosed, but that “the prohibition should also be extended to the ‘appearance’ that confidential information might have been given to the attorney in the prior representation.” See State v. Barnett, 1998-NMCA-105, ¶¶ 18, 24 , 125 N.M. 739 , 965 P.2d 323 (“[W]hether there is a substantial relationship turns on the . . . appearance thereof.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). {17} Once the tribunal determines that there was a substantial relationship betwee

2014The hearing examiner recognized that not only does the rule require disqualification when factual information was actually disclosed, but that “the prohibition should also be extended to the ‘appearance’ that confidential information might have been given to the attorney in the prior representation.” See State v. Barnett, 1998-NMCA-105, ¶¶ 18, 24 , 125 N.M. 739 , 965 P.2d 323 (“[W]hether there is a substantial relationship turns on the . . . appearance thereof.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). {17} Once the tribunal determines that there was a substantial relationship betwee

2019Mercer, LLC v. Reynolds, 2013-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 14, 17 , 292 5 P.3d 466 (explaining that “[c]lients must be secure in their understanding that 6 attorneys will maintain their confidences, even after the termination of an 7 attorney-client relationship[,]” and “each lawyer is vicariously bound by the 8 obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated” 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Gonzales, 2005-NMSC-025 , 10 ¶ 31, 138 N.M. 271 , 119 P.3d 151 (“In considering vicarious disqualification, a court 11 should determine whether a reasonable person

2019Mercer, LLC v. Reynolds, 2013-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 14, 17 , 292 P.3d 466 (explaining that “[c]lients must be secure in their understanding that attorneys will maintain their confidences, even after the termination of an attorney-client relationship[,]” and “each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Gonzales, 2005-NMSC-025, ¶ 31 , 138 N.M. 271 , 119 P.3d 151 (“In considering vicarious disqualification, a court should determine whether a reasonable person standing in the

2014Once the tribunal determines that there was a substantial relationship between the former representation and the current proceedings, “an irrebuttable presumption arises that the former client revealed facts requiring the, attorney’s disqualification.” Koch v. Koch Indus., 798 F.Supp. 1525, 1536 (D.

2014The hearing examiner recognized that not only does the rule require disqualification when factual information was actually disclosed, but that “the prohibition should also be extended to the ‘appearance’ that confidential information might have been given to the attorney in the prior representation.” See State v. Barnett, 1998-NMCA-105, ¶¶ 18, 24 , 125 N.M. 739 , 965 P.2d 323 (“[W]hether there is a substantial relationship turns on the . . . appearance thereof.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). {17} Once the tribunal determines that there was a substantial relationship betwee

2025“These statutes provide predictability by specifying a 8 limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant’s right to a 9 fair trial would be prejudiced.” United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971). 10 The purpose of a limitations period on criminal charges “is to limit exposure to 11 criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of 12 those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions.” Toussie v. 13 United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114 (1970).

1990State statutes of limitation specify a limit beyond which “there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant’s right to a fair trial would be prejudiced.” Id. 404 U.S. at 322 , 92 S.Ct. at 464, 30 L.Ed.2d at 479-80 .

2019See 4 1 generally Rule 16-110(A) NMRA (providing that the conflicts of interest of a single 2 attorney are imputed to the entire firm); Living Cross, 2014-NMSC-036 , ¶ 17 3 (adopting an irrebuttable presumption that a former client revealed facts requiring 4 disqualification); Roy D.

2019See generally Rule 16-110(A) NMRA (providing that the conflicts of interest of a single attorney are imputed to the entire firm); Living Cross, 2014-NMSC-036, ¶ 17 (adopting an irrebuttable presumption that a former client revealed facts requiring disqualification); Roy D.

2025“These statutes provide predictability by specifying a 8 limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant’s right to a 9 fair trial would be prejudiced.” United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971). 10 The purpose of a limitations period on criminal charges “is to limit exposure to 11 criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of 12 those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions.” Toussie v. 13 United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114 (1970).

2011State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 562 , 817 P.2d 1196, 1204 (1991) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Frazier, 2007-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 1, 31 , 142 N.M. 120 , 164 P.3d 1 .

2011State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 562 , 817 P.2d 1196, 1204 (1991) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Frazier, 2007-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 1, 31 , 142 N.M. 120 , 164 P.3d 1 .

2011State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 562 , 817 P.2d 1196, 1204 (1991) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Frazier, 2007-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 1, 31 , 142 N.M. 120 , 164 P.3d 1 .

2011State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 562 , 817 P.2d 1196, 1204 (1991) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Frazier, 2007-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 1, 31 , 142 N.M. 120 , 164 P.3d 1 .

2006In State v. Hunt, 26 N.M. 160, 170 , 189 P. 1111, 1115 (1920), the Lopez rule was extended to “any communication between the judge and the jury respecting the case.” In Hunt, we went as far as holding that there was an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice when there was any “unauthorized communication” between a judge and a juror.

2006In State v. Hunt, 26 N.M. 160, 170 , 189 P. 1111, 1115 (1920), the Lopez rule was extended to “any communication between the judge and the jury respecting the case.” In Hunt, we went as far as holding that there was an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice when there was any “unauthorized communication” between a judge and a juror.

2006This bright-line rule was tempered in State v. Costales, 37 N.M. 115, 119-20 , 19 P.2d 189, 191 (1933), where the trial judge had simply informed the jury as to whether they could write their recommendation for clemency on the verdict form.

2006This bright-line rule was tempered in State v. Costales, 37 N.M. 115, 119-20 , 19 P.2d 189, 191 (1933), where the trial judge had simply informed the jury as to whether they could write their recommendation for clemency on the verdict form.

1998See State v. Gonzales, 1997 NMSC 050, ¶ 15, 124 N.M. 171 , 947 P.2d 128 . *753 68.

1998See State v. Gonzales, 1997 NMSC 050, ¶ 15, 124 N.M. 171 , 947 P.2d 128 . *753 68.

1994Therefore, Defendant presents this issue in the context of fundamental error under State v. Orosco, 113 N.M. 780, 784-86 , 833 P.2d 1146, 1150-52 (1992), and State v. Osborne, 111 N.M. 654, 662-63 , 808 P.2d 624, 632-33 (1991), or in the context of an impermissible mandatory presumption, see SCRA 1986, 11-302(C), that must be analyzed for harmless error under Sullivan v. Louisiana, — U.S. -,---, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081-83 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), and Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 401-06 , 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892-94 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

1994Therefore, Defendant presents this issue in the context of fundamental error under State v. Orosco, 113 N.M. 780, 784-86 , 833 P.2d 1146, 1150-52 (1992), and State v. Osborne, 111 N.M. 654, 662-63 , 808 P.2d 624, 632-33 (1991), or in the context of an impermissible mandatory presumption, see SCRA 1986, 11-302(C), that must be analyzed for harmless error under Sullivan v. Louisiana, — U.S. -,---, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081-83 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), and Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 401-06 , 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892-94 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

1994Therefore, Defendant presents this issue in the context of fundamental error under State v. Orosco, 113 N.M. 780, 784-86 , 833 P.2d 1146, 1150-52 (1992), and State v. Osborne, 111 N.M. 654, 662-63 , 808 P.2d 624, 632-33 (1991), or in the context of an impermissible mandatory presumption, see SCRA 1986, 11-302(C), that must be analyzed for harmless error under Sullivan v. Louisiana, — U.S. -,---, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081-83 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), and Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 401-06 , 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892-94 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

1994Therefore, Defendant presents this issue in the context of fundamental error under State v. Orosco, 113 N.M. 780, 784-86 , 833 P.2d 1146, 1150-52 (1992), and State v. Osborne, 111 N.M. 654, 662-63 , 808 P.2d 624, 632-33 (1991), or in the context of an impermissible mandatory presumption, see SCRA 1986, 11-302(C), that must be analyzed for harmless error under Sullivan v. Louisiana, — U.S. -,---, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081-83 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), and Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 401-06 , 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892-94 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

1984See Wynne v. Pino, 78 N.M. 520 , 433 P.2d 499 (1967).

1984See Wynne v. Pino, 78 N.M. 520 , 433 P.2d 499 (1967).

1984See also Huihui v. Shimoda, 64 Haw. 527 , 644 P.2d 968 (1982) (no bail where offense punishable by life imprisonment).

1984See also Huihui v. Shimoda, 64 Haw. 527 , 644 P.2d 968 (1982) (no bail where offense punishable by life imprisonment).

1974See U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 , 93 S.Ct. 2832 , 37 L.Ed.2d 767 (1973).

1974See U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 , 93 S.Ct. 2832 , 37 L.Ed.2d 767 (1973).