irrebuttable presumption in Oregon

2025Citing State v. Greenwood, 332 Or App 166, 177 , 548 P3d 831 (2024) (a pur- poseful intrusion into the attorney-client privilege results in a rebuttable presumption of prejudice); State v. Russum, 265 Or App 103 , 333 P3d 1191 , rev den, 356 Or 575 (2014) (“[N]o presumption of prejudice arises in the absence of evi- dence of a purposeful intrusion that conveys the content of attorney-client communications to the prosecution.”); and a South Carolina and federal case, State v. Quattlebaum, 338 SC 441, 448, 527 SE2d 105 (2000) (“Deliberate prosecutorial Cite as 339 Or App 405 (2025) 415 misconduc

2025Citing State v. Greenwood, 332 Or App 166, 177 , 548 P3d 831 (2024) (a pur- poseful intrusion into the attorney-client privilege results in a rebuttable presumption of prejudice); State v. Russum, 265 Or App 103 , 333 P3d 1191 , rev den, 356 Or 575 (2014) (“[N]o presumption of prejudice arises in the absence of evi- dence of a purposeful intrusion that conveys the content of attorney-client communications to the prosecution.”); and a South Carolina and federal case, State v. Quattlebaum, 338 SC 441, 448, 527 SE2d 105 (2000) (“Deliberate prosecutorial misconduct raises an irrebuttable presumpti

2025Citing State v. Greenwood, 332 Or App 166, 177 , 548 P3d 831 (2024) (a pur- poseful intrusion into the attorney-client privilege results in a rebuttable presumption of prejudice); State v. Russum, 265 Or App 103 , 333 P3d 1191 , rev den, 356 Or 575 (2014) (“[N]o presumption of prejudice arises in the absence of evi- dence of a purposeful intrusion that conveys the content of attorney-client communications to the prosecution.”); and a South Carolina and federal case, State v. Quattlebaum, 338 SC 441, 448, 527 SE2d 105 (2000) (“Deliberate prosecutorial Cite as 339 Or App 405 (2025) 415 misconduc

2025Cite as 339 Or App 405 (2025) 415 The content of the protected communication is not rele- vant.”); Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir 1995) (“Because we believe that a prosecutor’s intentional intrusion into the attorney-client relationship constitutes a direct interference with the Sixth Amendment rights of a defendant, * * * absent a countervailing state interest, such an intrusion must constitute a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment.”); defendant contends that the state’s actions were a deliberate intrusion into the attorney-client relation- ship that are presumed to be

2025Citing State v. Greenwood, 332 Or App 166, 177 , 548 P3d 831 (2024) (a pur- poseful intrusion into the attorney-client privilege results in a rebuttable presumption of prejudice); State v. Russum, 265 Or App 103 , 333 P3d 1191 , rev den, 356 Or 575 (2014) (“[N]o presumption of prejudice arises in the absence of evi- dence of a purposeful intrusion that conveys the content of attorney-client communications to the prosecution.”); and a South Carolina and federal case, State v. Quattlebaum, 338 SC 441, 448, 527 SE2d 105 (2000) (“Deliberate prosecutorial Cite as 339 Or App 405 (2025) 415 misconduc

2025Citing State v. Greenwood, 332 Or App 166, 177 , 548 P3d 831 (2024) (a pur- poseful intrusion into the attorney-client privilege results in a rebuttable presumption of prejudice); State v. Russum, 265 Or App 103 , 333 P3d 1191 , rev den, 356 Or 575 (2014) (“[N]o presumption of prejudice arises in the absence of evi- dence of a purposeful intrusion that conveys the content of attorney-client communications to the prosecution.”); and a South Carolina and federal case, State v. Quattlebaum, 338 SC 441, 448, 527 SE2d 105 (2000) (“Deliberate prosecutorial Cite as 339 Or App 405 (2025) 415 misconduc

2010In support of her constitutional argument, petitioner cited Vlandis v. Kline, 412 US 441 , 93 S Ct 2230 , 37 L Ed 2d 63 (1973), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a state cannot create an irrebuttable presumption that students who move to the state shortly before enrolling in school are nonresidents; it must afford *166 them an opportunity to establish that they are residents and not just in the state for educational purposes.

2010In support of her constitutional argument, petitioner cited Vlandis v. Kline, 412 US 441 , 93 S Ct 2230 , 37 L Ed 2d 63 (1973), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a state cannot create an irrebuttable presumption that students who move to the state shortly before enrolling in school are nonresidents; it must afford *166 them an opportunity to establish that they are residents and not just in the state for educational purposes.

2010A state may not “arbitrarily invoke a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence against students who [seek] to obtain in-state tuition rates when that presumption [is] not necessarily or universally true in fact.” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 US 393, 409 , 95 S Ct 553 , 42 L Ed 2d 532 (1975) (describing the Vlandis holding).

2010A state may not “arbitrarily invoke a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence against students who [seek] to obtain in-state tuition rates when that presumption [is] not necessarily or universally true in fact.” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 US 393, 409 , 95 S Ct 553 , 42 L Ed 2d 532 (1975) (describing the Vlandis holding).

1994A driver who faces a license suspension is entitled to try to prove that that result does not reflect the true facts.” Id. at 113 .

1992Galioto v. Department of Treasury, 602 F Supp 682 (DNJ 1985), vacated 477 US 556 (1986), held that a similar federal statute violated federal due process standards, because the defendant had no opportunity to regain his right by showing that he was no longer dangerous. 5 The court held that the irrebuttable presumption that, once committed, the person was forever mentally ill and dangerous and permanently prohibited from possessing a firearm, violated due process, because it did not “include [a] provision for the granting of relief from [firearm] disability to former mental patients” and, ther

1992Galioto v. Department of Treasury, 602 F Supp 682 (DNJ 1985), vacated 477 US 556 (1986), held that a similar federal statute violated federal due process standards, because the defendant had no opportunity to regain his right by showing that he was no longer dangerous. 5 The court held that the irrebuttable presumption that, once committed, the person was forever mentally ill and dangerous and permanently prohibited from possessing a firearm, violated due process, because it did not “include [a] provision for the granting of relief from [firearm] disability to former mental patients” and, ther

1992Galioto v. Department of Treasury, 602 F Supp 682 (DNJ 1985), vacated 477 US 556 (1986), held that a similar federal statute violated federal due process standards, because the defendant had no opportunity to regain his right by showing that he was no longer dangerous. 5 The court held that the irrebuttable presumption that, once committed, the person was forever mentally ill and dangerous and permanently prohibited from possessing a firearm, violated due process, because it did not “include [a] provision for the granting of relief from [firearm] disability to former mental patients” and, ther

1914In People v. Wiman, 148 N. Y. 33 ( 42 N. E. 409 ), the court says: “Criminal intent is essential to constitute the crime (forgery), and the testimony bearing thereon is always a question for the jury. ’ ’ In State v. Bjornaas, 88 Minn. 305, 306 ( 92 N. W. 982 ), the court says: “It is elementary that the animo furandi, or intent to defraud, is an essential element of the crime of forgery, or of uttering a forged instrument, which is to be proved or inferred from facts reasonably tending to establish a guilty purpose, and may be negatived by evidence showing the absence of such an intent. * * A

1914In People v. Wiman, 148 N. Y. 33 ( 42 N. E. 409 ), the court says: “Criminal intent is essential to constitute the crime (forgery), and the testimony bearing thereon is always a question for the jury. ’ ’ In State v. Bjornaas, 88 Minn. 305, 306 ( 92 N. W. 982 ), the court says: “It is elementary that the animo furandi, or intent to defraud, is an essential element of the crime of forgery, or of uttering a forged instrument, which is to be proved or inferred from facts reasonably tending to establish a guilty purpose, and may be negatived by evidence showing the absence of such an intent. * * A

1914It withdraws from the jury all consideration of the intent to defraud — a matter of inference from the facts before them, which it was their province to draw or reject.” In Kotter v. People, 150 Ill. 441 ( 37 N. E. 932 ), the syllabus in part is: “On the trial of one for the forgery of receipts, the court on behalf of the people, instructed the jury that, while it was necessary that the defendant should have forged the receipts with the intent to damage and defraud the persons whose names were signed thereto, yet if they found that the defendant forged the receipts or either of them, then the

1914It withdraws from the jury all consideration of the intent to defraud — a matter of inference from the facts before them, which it was their province to draw or reject.” In Kotter v. People, 150 Ill. 441 ( 37 N. E. 932 ), the syllabus in part is: “On the trial of one for the forgery of receipts, the court on behalf of the people, instructed the jury that, while it was necessary that the defendant should have forged the receipts with the intent to damage and defraud the persons whose names were signed thereto, yet if they found that the defendant forged the receipts or either of them, then the