irrebuttable presumption in Texas

2015CODE § 13.002. 59 Ford, 235 S.W.3d at 617; Noble Mortg. & Invs., LLC v. D&M Invs., LLC, 340 S.W.3d 65, 76 (Tex. App. – Houston [ 1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); see also HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 887 (Tex. 1998) (“The need for stability and certainty regarding titles to real property has led courts to hold that real property records can constitute constructive notice.”). 60 Noble Mortg., 340 S.W.3d at 76 . 22 conveyances. 61 In some circumstances, such as those present in this case, “[c]onstructive notice creates an irrebuttable presumption of actual notice”. 62 It is undeniable

2015Co., 235 S.W.3d 615 , 617–18 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam). 24 See Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 928 (Tex. 2011). 25 HECI Exploration Co., 982 S.W.2d at 887 ; Ford, 235 S.W.3d at 617–18 (public records in a grantor’s chain of title generally create an irrebuttable presumption of notice). 26 Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex. 1962). 8 grounds for avoiding the transaction.27 Reasonable diligence requires mineral interest owners to read and inspect their deeds to ensure their mineral interests are properly reserved. 28 The Cades’ ability to monitor information contained in public rec

2026When constructive notice is obtained through public records, it creates “an irrebuttable presumption of actual notice.” Mooney v. Harlin, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1981).

2020See Hooks, 457 S.W.3d at 59 (“Land title records and probate proceedings create constructive notice, ‘an irrebuttable presumption of actual notice,’ which prevents limitations from being delayed.” (quoting Mooney v. Harlin, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1981))).

2016Co., L.P., 359 S.W.3d 856, 859 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (bona fide purchaser claim; recorded instruments in grantee’s chain of title “generally establish an irrebuttable presumption of notice) (citing Ford, 235 S.W.3d at 617 (fraud claim)).

2015Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (‘While not all public records establish an irrebuttable presumption of notice, the recorded instruments in a grantee's chain of title generally do.’).have been acquired by examining public records.’)”. 5 Kansas Reinsurance Co. v. Congressional Mortgage Corp., 20 F.3d 1362, 1370 (5th Cir. Tex. 1994) BAILEY V.

2022“Lawyers who violate the conflict-of-interest rules must be disqualified because 3 there is an irrebuttable presumption that a lawyer obtains a client’s confidential information during representation.” In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d at 373 (citing In re Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P., 320 S.W.3d 819, 824 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding)).

2020See also id. 1.10(d). 69 See Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., 320 S.W.3d at 822-23 ; Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 124 - 26. 70 Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., 320 S.W.3d at 824 (“A nonlawyer employee who worked on a matter at a prior firm is also subject to an irrebuttable presumption ‘that confidences and secrets were imparted’ to the employee at the firm . . .

2021See Noble Mortg. & Inv., LLC v. D&M Vision Inv., LLC, 340 S.W.3d 65, 76 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (“Recorded instruments in a grantee’s chain of title generally establish an irrebuttable presumption of notice.”); Jones v. Fuller, 856 S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex. App.—Waco 1993, writ denied). 20 The legislature has spoken extensively about restrictive covenants, both upholding their enforcement and setting limits.

2015See also Noble Mortg. & Invs., LLC v. D&M Vision Invs., LLC, 340 S.W.3d 65, 74 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) which held that “[r]ecorded instruments in a grantee's chain of title generally establish an irrebuttable presumption of notice.

2024“Mere allegations of unethical conduct or evidence showing a remote possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules will not suffice under this standard.” Spears, 797 S.W.2d at 656 . “[L]awyers who violate the conflict-of-interest rules must be disqualified because there is an irrebuttable presumption that a lawyer obtains a client’s confidential information during representation.” In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d 362, 373 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).

2022“Lawyers who violate the conflict-of-interest rules must be disqualified because 3 there is an irrebuttable presumption that a lawyer obtains a client’s confidential information during representation.” In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d at 373 (citing In re Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P., 320 S.W.3d 819, 824 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding)).

2015See Salinas v. Gary Pools, Inc., 31 S.W.3d 333, 336-37 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2000, no pet.); Lightfoot v. Weissgarber, 763 S.W.2d 624, 626-27 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1989, writ denied).5 As the Court confirmed in Salinas: The doctrine of constructive notice has limited application, and when the rationale behind application of the doctrine does not exist, public records will not be held to create an irrebuttable presumption of actual notice.

2015Salinas, 31 S.W.3d at 336-37 .

2015Consequently, there is an "irrebuttable presumption that an attorney in a law firm has access to the confidences of the clients and former clients of other attorneys in the firm." Id.; see also In re Mitcham, 133 S.W.3d 274, 276 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding). ("For attorneys, there is an irrebuttable presumption they gain confidential information on every case at the firm where they work (whether they work on them or not).").

2014Consequently, there is an “irrebuttable presumption that an attorney in a law firm has access to the confidences of the clients and former clients of other attorneys in the firm.” Id.; see also Mitcham, 133 S.W.3d at 276 (“For attorneys, there is an irrebuttable presumption they gain confidential information on every case at the firm where they work (whether they work on them or not).”).

2020See also id. 1.10(d). 69 See Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., 320 S.W.3d at 822-23 ; Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 124 - 26. 70 Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., 320 S.W.3d at 824 (“A nonlawyer employee who worked on a matter at a prior firm is also subject to an irrebuttable presumption ‘that confidences and secrets were imparted’ to the employee at the firm . . .

2013Enters., Inc., 924 S.W.2d at 131 (“There is, in effect, an irrebuttable presumption that an attorney in a law firm has access to the confidences of the clients and former clients of other attorneys in the firm.”); In re Columbia Valley, 320 S.W.3d at 824 .

2016Co., L.P., 359 S.W.3d 856, 859 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (bona fide purchaser claim; recorded instruments in grantee’s chain of title “generally establish an irrebuttable presumption of notice) (citing Ford, 235 S.W.3d at 617 (fraud claim)).

2015Co., 359 S.W.3d 856, 859 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied). ' Once the constable’s deed ‘was properly filed in the deed records of Tarrant County, an irrebuttable presumption of notice arose as to Firlde’s ownership of the property free and clear of all liens.

2010Id. at 887; see Andretta v. West , 415 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Tex. 1967); see also Little v. Smith , 943 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1997).

2010Id. at 887 ; see Andretta v. West, 415 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Tex.1967); see also Little v. Smith, 943 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex.1997).

2010Id. at 887; see Andretta v. West , 415 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Tex. 1967); see also Little v. Smith , 943 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1997).

2010Id. at 887 ; see Andretta v. West, 415 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Tex.1967); see also Little v. Smith, 943 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex.1997).

1996The Court disagreed, holding Geesa `s requirement that the reasonable doubt instruction be given in all cases even without objection or request, "to mean that omitting the instruction will always be considered properly preserved error, and will therefore require reversal if there is any harm to the accused." Boozer, 848 S.W.2d at 369 (emphasis in original).

1993In Boozer v. State, 848 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd), the court considered exactly the same error, and held that Geesa only created an irrebuttable presumption against waiver, and not any presumption of harm.

1995Mooney , 622 S.W.2d at 85 ; University State Bank v. Gifford-Hill Concrete Corp. , 431 S.W.2d 561, 571 (Tex. Civ.

1988See Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex.Comm’n App.1928, jdgmt. adopted); University State Bank v. Gifford-Hill Concrete Corp., 431 S.W.2d 561, 570 (Tex.Civ.App.1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2022“Although the attorney will not be presumed to have shared that information with his current client, the ‘appearance of impropriety’ demands that the trial court disqualify counsel.” Id. (citing NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank, 765 S.W.2d at 400 ).

2022See, e.g., In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d at 373 ; NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank, 765 S.W.2d at 400 .

2024“Mere allegations of unethical conduct or evidence showing a remote possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules will not suffice under this standard.” Spears, 797 S.W.2d at 656 . “[L]awyers who violate the conflict-of-interest rules must be disqualified because there is an irrebuttable presumption that a lawyer obtains a client’s confidential information during representation.” In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d 362, 373 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).

2020“Mere allegations of unethical conduct or evidence showing a remote possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules will not suffice under this standard.” Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990)(orig. proceeding). “[L]awyers who violate the conflict-of-interest rules must be disqualified because there is an irrebuttable presumption that a lawyer obtains a client’s confidential information during representation.” In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d 362, 373 (Tex. 2019)(orig. proceeding).

2015Smith v. Brown & Root, Inc., 430 SW2d 549 (Tex. App. - Houston 1968, no writ); Chapa v. Wirth, 343 SW2d 936 (Tex. App. - Eastland 1961, no writ); Ponsart v. Citicorp Vendor Finance, Inc., 89 SW3d 285 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 2002, no pet.); K&S Interests, Inc. v. Texas American Bank/Dallas, ~ 49 SW2d 887 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1988, writ denied)(op. on reh'g); Pentikis v. Texas Electric Service Company, 470 Page 6of12 SW2d 387(Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1971, writ ref d n.r.e.); Mooney v. Harlin, 622 SW2d 83 (Tex. 1981); Hexter v. Pratt, 10 SW2d 692 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, judgment adopted); University

1988See Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex.Comm’n App.1928, jdgmt. adopted); University State Bank v. Gifford-Hill Concrete Corp., 431 S.W.2d 561, 570 (Tex.Civ.App.1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2020See Hooks, 457 S.W.3d at 59 (“Land title records and probate proceedings create constructive notice, ‘an irrebuttable presumption of actual notice,’ which prevents limitations from being delayed.” (quoting Mooney v. Harlin, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1981))).

2015P’ship, 457 S.W.3d 52, 59 (Tex. 2015) (quotation omitted).

2015Co., 235 S.W.3d 615 , 617–18 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam). 24 See Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 928 (Tex. 2011). 25 HECI Exploration Co., 982 S.W.2d at 887 ; Ford, 235 S.W.3d at 617–18 (public records in a grantor’s chain of title generally create an irrebuttable presumption of notice). 26 Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex. 1962). 8 grounds for avoiding the transaction.27 Reasonable diligence requires mineral interest owners to read and inspect their deeds to ensure their mineral interests are properly reserved. 28 The Cades’ ability to monitor information contained in public rec

2015Co., 235 S.W.3d 615 , 617–18 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam). 24 See Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 928 (Tex. 2011). 25 HECI Exploration Co., 982 S.W.2d at 887 ; Ford, 235 S.W.3d at 617–18 (public records in a grantor’s chain of title generally create an irrebuttable presumption of notice). 26 Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex. 1962). 8 grounds for avoiding the transaction.27 Reasonable diligence requires mineral interest owners to read and inspect their deeds to ensure their mineral interests are properly reserved. 28 The Cades’ ability to monitor information contained in public rec

2015Mooney v. Harlin, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1981); Sherman v. Sipper, 152 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Tex. 1941).

2015Mooney v. Harlin, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex.1981); Sherman v. Sipper, 137 Tex. 85 , 152 S.W.2d 319, 321 (1941).

2015“If the lawyer works on a matter, there is an irrebuttable presumption that the lawyer obtained confidential information during the representation.” In re Kahn, 14-13-00081-CV, 2013 WL 1197895 , at *4 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 26, 2013, orig. proceeding) (citing Phoenix, 887 S.W.2d at 833 ).

2013Phoenix Founders, Inc., 887 S.W.2d at 833 .

2019Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1982) (“It 14 successive ownership history of the land.

2015The parties agree this claim had to be brought within four years of when the fraud should have been discovered by reasonable diligence...While not all public records establish an irrebuttable presumption of notice, the recorded instruments in a grantee's chain of title generally do [citing, inter alia, Westland Oil Development Corporation, supra}. 23 Ford, at 617 (emphasis added).

2015Seros., Inc:, 343 S.W.3d at 134 ; Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P., 320 S.W.3d at 824 (citing Phoenix Founders, Inc., 887 S.W.2d at 833); Epic Holdings, Inc., 985 S.W.2d at 48 : The attorneys knowledge of client confidences is imputed by law to every other attorney in the firm; an irrebuttable presumption exists that an attorney in a law firm has access to the confidences of thé clients and former clients of other attorneys 'in the firm.

2013See In re EPIC Holdings, Inc., 985 S.W.2d 41, 49 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).

2015Id. at 74-76 .

2013In In re American Home Products, the Court applied a rebuttable presumption, placing the burden on the “party seeking disqualification [to] first demonstrate that there were ‘substantive’ conversations between disqualified counsel and co-counsel, joint preparation for trial by those counsel, or the apparent receipt by co-counsel of confidential information.” In re American Home Products Corp., 985 S.W.2d 68, 81 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).

2015Id.

2011Once that period expires, “there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant’s right to a fair trial would be prejudiced.”19 And punishment for such a time-barred offense constitutes an ex post facto 15 Id. at 595 . 16 Id. 17 Id. at 595-96 . 18 Id. at 597-98 . 19 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971).

2004For attorneys, there is an irrebuttable presumption they gain confidential information on every case at the firm where they work (whether they work on them or not), National Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123, 131 (Tex.1996), and an irrebuttable presumption they share that information with the members of a new firm, see Henderson v. Floyd, 891 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex.1995) (per curiam).

1996Henderson, 891 S.W.2d at 254 .

2026“Constructive notice in law creates an irrebuttable presumption of actual notice.” Id.

2026See Brown, 571 S.W.3d at 334 .

2021See Noble Mortg. & Inv., LLC v. D&M Vision Inv., LLC, 340 S.W.3d 65, 76 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (“Recorded instruments in a grantee’s chain of title generally establish an irrebuttable presumption of notice.”); Jones v. Fuller, 856 S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex. App.—Waco 1993, writ denied). 20 The legislature has spoken extensively about restrictive covenants, both upholding their enforcement and setting limits.