irrebuttable presumption in South Carolina

2011Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. at 448 , 527 S.E.2d at 109 .

2011Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. at 448 , 527 S.E.2d at 109 .

2012Even in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 , 109 S.Ct. 1597 , 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989), the only case in which the United States Supreme Court has addressed ICWA, the tribal court, on remand, ordered child placement with the non-Indian adoptive parent.

2012Even in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 , 109 S.Ct. 1597 , 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989), the only case in which the United States Supreme Court has addressed ICWA, the tribal court, on remand, ordered child placement with the non-Indian adoptive parent.

2011Accordingly, in the interest of logical progression, we have addressed these two claims separately. [16] See State v. Parker, 391 S.C. 606, 612 , 707 S.E.2d 799, 802 (2011) (stating that "[o]nly where the governmental conduct in question is intended to `goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion" (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982))). [17] Citing Quattlebaum , Inman claims that "deliberate prosecutorial miscondu

2011Accordingly, in the interest of logical progression, we have addressed these two claims separately. [16] See State v. Parker, 391 S.C. 606, 612 , 707 S.E.2d 799, 802 (2011) (stating that "[o]nly where the governmental conduct in question is intended to `goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion" (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982))). [17] Citing Quattlebaum , Inman claims that "deliberate prosecutorial miscondu

1994Where no fundamental right is implicated and the legislation in question bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative objective, an irrebuttable presumption does not violate due process if it is based upon “an objective criterion” which bears “a sufficiently close nexus with underlying policy objectives.” Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 771 , 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2470 , 45 L.Ed. (2d) 522 (1975).

1994Where no fundamental right is implicated and the legislation in question bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative objective, an irrebuttable presumption does not violate due process if it is based upon “an objective criterion” which bears “a sufficiently close nexus with underlying policy objectives.” Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 771 , 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2470 , 45 L.Ed. (2d) 522 (1975).

1990In re McGrath’s Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 78 , 46 A. (2d) 735 (1946); 59 C J.S.

1963It is not an irrebuttable presumption, but it is a presumption that has the force and effect of evidence, and such evidence should not be lightly disregarded when the instrument is attacked.” See also Merck v. Merck, 95 S. C. 328, 78 S. E. 1027 .