King claim in California

2022The order granting summary judgment, King asserts, failed to make the distinction mandated by Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th 75 when it differentiated personnel or a public safety agency,” our colleagues in Division Six of this court observed in Aldana v. Stillwagon (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1 that, in light of Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th 75 , it was questionable whether both the EMT driving the ambulance and the EMT attending the patient were rendering professional services.

2022(Cf. Aldana v. Stillwagon (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1, 8 [“MICRA is not limited to suits by patients”].) Nor is there merit to a contention King’s claim was not one for a negligent act “in the rendering of professional services.” As discussed, King does not argue transporting the patient to a hospital was not professional medical care that McMichael was providing.

2022(See Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 85-86; see also Mitchell v. Los Robles Regional Medical Center (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 291 , 298 [section 340.5 applied to personal injury action brought by emergency room patient who fell when allowed to walk to the restroom unattended; “[w]e recognize that accompanying someone to the restroom is not a sophisticated medical procedure.

2022(See Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 88 [explaining, in concluding the allegedly negligent inspection and maintenance of hospital equipment constituted professional negligence, “A hospital’s negligent failure to maintain equipment that is necessary or otherwise integrally related to the medical treatment and diagnosis of the patient implicates a duty that the hospital owes to a patient by virtue of being a health care provider”].) Applying the reasoning in Flores, McMichael’s 19 alleged negligence in operating the vehicle directly implicated a professional duty owed by McMichael as a health ca

2021(See generally People v. Sasser (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1, 8 [describing the determinate sentencing law].) The statutes under which Rodriguez was convicted specify three possible terms. (§§ 288, 647.6.) Moreover, even if King’s analysis were sound, it would not show that Rodriguez is not entitled to the same relief ordered by the Supreme Court in Stamps.

2015(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373 (Carmony).) The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to show that the decision was “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.) “Where the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling, even if we might have ruled differently in the first instance.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 .) Here, the trial court denied King’s motion after weighin

2013(See ibid.; see also People v. Martinez (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1332 [that fellow gang member was defendant’s brother-in-law does not cancel his gang membership].) In supplemental briefing, King argues the jury should have been “informed” that the crime is not gang related if appellants “were on a ‘frolic and detour’ which was not related to gang activity, but rather occurred because appellants were friends.” Certainly, if King’s defense counsel believed that the evidence supported it, he could have argued to the jury that appellants committed the crimes as friends rather than as gang mem

2013But to the extent King suggests the jury should have been instructed with the “frolic and detour” language from Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 47, 62 , we disagree that such an instruction is required.

2013But to the extent King suggests the jury should have been instructed with the “frolic and detour” language from Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 47, 62 , we disagree that such an instruction is required.

2011(See People v. King (1978) 22 Cal.3d 12, 24 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 582 P.2d 1000 ] (King).) As defendant acknowledges, the King rule does not permit such a disqualified person to possess a firearm in anticipation of using it one day in self-defense.

2011(See People v. King (1978) 22 Cal.3d 12, 24 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 582 P.2d 1000 ] (King).) As defendant acknowledges, the King rule does not permit such a disqualified person to possess a firearm in anticipation of using it one day in self-defense.

2011(See People v. McClindon (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 336, 339-340 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 492 ].) Instead, King only recognized “when a member of one of the affected classes is in imminent peril of great bodily harm or reasonably believes himself or others to be in such danger, and without preconceived design on his part a firearm is made available to him, his temporary possession of that weapon for a period no longer than that in which the necessity or apparent necessity to use it in self-defense continues, does not violate section 12021.” (King, at p. 24.) This limited exception to the general rule prohib

2011(See People v. McClindon (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 336, 339-340 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 492 ].) Instead, King only recognized “when a member of one of the affected classes is in imminent peril of great bodily harm or reasonably believes himself or others to be in such danger, and without preconceived design on his part a firearm is made available to him, his temporary possession of that weapon for a period no longer than that in which the necessity or apparent necessity to use it in self-defense continues, does not violate section 12021.” (King, at p. 24.) This limited exception to the general rule prohib

2010“If a defendant has failed to show that the challenged actions of counsel were prejudicial, a reviewing court may reject the claim [of ineffective assistance] on that ground without determining whether counsel’s performance was deficient.” (People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 366 ; see In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 239 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 431 , 19 P.3d 1171 ].) On this record, there is no reason to address whether King’s counsel performed deficiently by failing to cross-examine Holloman regarding the DNA found on Nicole’s breast because the evidence against King was overwhelming.

2010“If a defendant has failed to show that the challenged actions of counsel were prejudicial, a reviewing court may reject the claim [of ineffective assistance] on that ground without determining whether counsel’s performance was deficient.” (People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 366 ; see In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 239 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 431 , 19 P.3d 1171 ].) On this record, there is no reason to address whether King’s counsel performed deficiently by failing to cross-examine Holloman regarding the DNA found on Nicole’s breast because the evidence against King was overwhelming.

2010(People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1091 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 352 , 767 P.2d 619 ].) In any event, we return to the pivotal point that, independent of the question of whether King’s counsel performed deficiently, King’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be disposed of on the ground that he has failed to show sufficient prejudice.

2010(People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1091 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 352 , 767 P.2d 619 ].) In any event, we return to the pivotal point that, independent of the question of whether King’s counsel performed deficiently, King’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be disposed of on the ground that he has failed to show sufficient prejudice.

1994Smith, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 1459 ; Henderson, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d 1129 .) In support of his contention, defendant relies on our recent decision in People v. King, supra, 5 Cal.4th 59 (hereafter King), in which we held that our decision overruling In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330, 333 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ], could not be applied retroactively to the King defendant because to do so would “make the punishments for [defendant’s] crimes more burdensome after he committed them.” (King, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 80 .) In In re Culbreth, supra, 17 Cal.3d 330 , we applied section 12022.

1994Smith, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 1459 ; Henderson, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d 1129 .) In support of his contention, defendant relies on our recent decision in People v. King, supra, 5 Cal.4th 59 (hereafter King), in which we held that our decision overruling In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330, 333 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ], could not be applied retroactively to the King defendant because to do so would “make the punishments for [defendant’s] crimes more burdensome after he committed them.” (King, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 80 .) In In re Culbreth, supra, 17 Cal.3d 330 , we applied section 12022.

1987However, in some instances, a prosecutor cannot establish reasons for exclusion by normal methods of proof or cannot do so without causing embarrassment to the challenged venireman and resentment among remaining jurors. ( People v. Hall, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 167 .) Wheeler and its progeny do not compel the prosecutor to make the sort of inquiry King would require before the People may exercise a peremptory challenge. (7) Also, the evaluation of a prosecutor's reasons for excluding jurors must be made in the context of the facts of the particular case. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at

1987(People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 281-282; see Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 20 [90 L.Ed.2d at pp. 88-89].) The charged offense was a rape by a person known to the victim, and King’s defense was one of consent.