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15 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1882–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Lyonsgreen2 sentences2026Commonwealth v. Lyons, 830 A.2d 663, 665 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (“Act 84 relates only to the method of collection and has no bearing whatsoever on the legality of [a] sentence[].”). 2026Commonwealth v. Lyons, 830 A.2d 663, 665 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (“Act 84 relates only to the method of collection and has no bearing whatsoever on the legality of [a] sentence[].”). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Hainesworthgreen2 sentences2020See Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444, 447 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc) (reciting standard of review for whether a plea agreement has been breached). 2014See Brief for Commonwealth at 9; see also N.T. (guilty plea hearing), 6/21/07, at 2-3. - 11 - J-A27039-14 Hainesworth, 82 A.3d at 449 n.4; see also Nase, 2014 PA Super 194, at *15 (stating that “Hainesworth demonstrates that the collateral consequence construct does not eliminate the requirement that courts enforce bargained-for exchanges where the parties negotiate over a collateral consequence of a plea.”). | 2 | 2 |
In the Interest of A.P.green1 sentence2020See In Interest of A.P., 617 A.2d 764 , 767 -5- J-S41025-20 (Pa.Super. 1992), aff'd, 639 A.2d 1181 (Pa.1994) (“Once it is determined that an appellant was denied his or her constitutional right of direct appeal, the proper course of action is to grant the appellant leave to file a direct appeal nunc pro tunc”). | 1 | 1 |
In Interest of APgreen1 sentence2020See In Interest of A.P., 617 A.2d 764 , 767 -5- J-S41025-20 (Pa.Super. 1992), aff'd, 639 A.2d 1181 (Pa.1994) (“Once it is determined that an appellant was denied his or her constitutional right of direct appeal, the proper course of action is to grant the appellant leave to file a direct appeal nunc pro tunc”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Danielsgreen1 sentence2018Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa.Super. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2015See Braun, 24 A.3d at 891 . 2015See generally Braun, 24 A.3d at 890 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2015Cf. Commonwealth v. Reyes- Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 783-74 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (holding that, where a PCRA petitioner fails to develop an evidentiary record at a hearing, he cannot show counsel lacked a reasonable basis for failing to request cautionary instructions). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Rabangreen1 sentence2014Commonwealth v. Raban, 85 A.3d 467, 468 (Pa. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Nasegreen1 sentence2014See Brief for Commonwealth at 9; see also N.T. (guilty plea hearing), 6/21/07, at 2-3. - 11 - J-A27039-14 Hainesworth, 82 A.3d at 449 n.4; see also Nase, 2014 PA Super 194, at *15 (stating that “Hainesworth demonstrates that the collateral consequence construct does not eliminate the requirement that courts enforce bargained-for exchanges where the parties negotiate over a collateral consequence of a plea.”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fontanezgreen2 sentences2012See Esquilin, 583 Pa. at 560 , 880 A.2d at 532 ; Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 559 Pa. 92, 96 , 739 A.2d 152, 155 (1999); Marshall, 548 Pa. 495, 501 , 698 A.2d 576, 579 (1997); Commonwealth v. Three Hundred Ten Thousand Twenty Dollars ($310,020.00) In United States Currency, 894 A.2d 154, 161 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006). 2012See Esquilin, 583 Pa. at 560 , 880 A.2d at 532 ; Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 559 Pa. 92, 96 , 739 A.2d 152, 155 (1999); Marshall, 548 Pa. 495, 501 , 698 A.2d 576, 579 (1997); Commonwealth v. Three Hundred Ten Thousand Twenty Dollars ($310,020.00) In United States Currency, 894 A.2d 154, 161 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Three Hundred Ten Thousand Twenty Dollarsgreen1 sentence2012See Esquilin, 583 Pa. at 560 , 880 A.2d at 532 ; Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 559 Pa. 92, 96 , 739 A.2d 152, 155 (1999); Marshall, 548 Pa. 495, 501 , 698 A.2d 576, 579 (1997); Commonwealth v. Three Hundred Ten Thousand Twenty Dollars ($310,020.00) In United States Currency, 894 A.2d 154, 161 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Marshallgreen2 sentences2012See Esquilin, 583 Pa. at 560 , 880 A.2d at 532 ; Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 559 Pa. 92, 96 , 739 A.2d 152, 155 (1999); Marshall, 548 Pa. 495, 501 , 698 A.2d 576, 579 (1997); Commonwealth v. Three Hundred Ten Thousand Twenty Dollars ($310,020.00) In United States Currency, 894 A.2d 154, 161 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006). 2012See Esquilin, 583 Pa. at 560 , 880 A.2d at 532 ; Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 559 Pa. 92, 96 , 739 A.2d 152, 155 (1999); Marshall, 548 Pa. 495, 501 , 698 A.2d 576, 579 (1997); Commonwealth v. Three Hundred Ten Thousand Twenty Dollars ($310,020.00) In United States Currency, 894 A.2d 154, 161 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Mallory
green
1 sentence2023Indeed, in illustrating under what circumstances a defendant could still make voluntary and knowing waiver in the absence of an on-the-record colloquy, the Mallory Court offered “a career criminal defendant with previous, first-hand experience with jury trials.” Mallory, supra at 697 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Commonwealth v. Perry
green
1 sentence2018Nothing in the record presents any basis on which King could argue that the trial court’s judgment was “manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” See Perry, 32 A.3d at 236 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. King
green
2 sentences2012King, 554 Pa. at 356-57 , 721 A.2d at 775-76 . 2012King, 554 Pa. at 356-57 , 721 A.2d at 775-76 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Socha v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
green
1 sentence2008Addressing Crompton’s argument, the Board relied upon this Court’s opinion in Socha v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Bell Atlantic PA), 725 A.2d 1276 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999) (Socha I), aff'd, 566 Pa. 602 , 783 A.2d 288 (2001) (plurality) (Socha II), to determine that the WCJ was correct in finding that the report from Dr. Turner triggered the notice period rather than the statement that King made to Dr. Turner on May 7, 2002. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Socha v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
green
2 sentences2008Addressing Crompton’s argument, the Board relied upon this Court’s opinion in Socha v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Bell Atlantic PA), 725 A.2d 1276 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999) (Socha I), aff'd, 566 Pa. 602 , 783 A.2d 288 (2001) (plurality) (Socha II), to determine that the WCJ was correct in finding that the report from Dr. Turner triggered the notice period rather than the statement that King made to Dr. Turner on May 7, 2002. 2008Addressing Crompton’s argument, the Board relied upon this Court’s opinion in Socha v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Bell Atlantic PA), 725 A.2d 1276 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999) (Socha I), aff'd, 566 Pa. 602 , 783 A.2d 288 (2001) (plurality) (Socha II), to determine that the WCJ was correct in finding that the report from Dr. Turner triggered the notice period rather than the statement that King made to Dr. Turner on May 7, 2002. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Snell v. Wyman
green
2 sentences1974A case directly on point is Snell v. Wyman, 281 F. Sup. 853, affirmed without opinion, 393 U.S. 323 . 1 Although the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York decided the case in 1968, before King was decided, the judgment was affirmed in 1969, after King was decided. 1974A case directly on point is Snell v. Wyman, 281 F. Sup. 853, affirmed without opinion, 393 U.S. 323 . 1 Although the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York decided the case in 1968, before King was decided, the judgment was affirmed in 1969, after King was decided. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Townsend v. Swank
green
2 sentences1974The King doctrine was crystallized in Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 , decided in 1971, which states: “Thus, King v. Smith establishes that, at least in the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.” In Townsend , the court invalidated Illinois’ exclusion of dependent children eighteen through twenty years of age 1974The King doctrine was crystallized in Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 , decided in 1971, which states: “Thus, King v. Smith establishes that, at least in the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.” In Townsend , the court invalidated Illinois’ exclusion of dependent children eighteen through twenty years of age | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Carleson v. Remillard
green
2 sentences1974The King doctrine was crystallized in Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 , decided in 1971, which states: “Thus, King v. Smith establishes that, at least in the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.” In Townsend , the court invalidated Illinois’ exclusion of dependent children eighteen through twenty years of age 1974The King doctrine was crystallized in Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 , decided in 1971, which states: “Thus, King v. Smith establishes that, at least in the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.” In Townsend , the court invalidated Illinois’ exclusion of dependent children eighteen through twenty years of age | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Haines v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1903Abr. it is stated to have been “ the established practice of the courts, that if the king shall challenge a juror before the panel is perused, he need not show any cause of his challenge till the whole panel be gone through and it appear that there will not be a full jury without the persons so challenged.” This gives some support to the suggestion of counsel in Haines v. Commonwealth, 100 Pa. 317 , that, originally, a challenge preceded the standing aside of the juror, the right reserved being simply to assign cause of challenge after the whole panel had been called. | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Commonwealth v. Jolliffe
neutral
1 sentence1882The practice thus inaugurated and firmly established in England was inherited by us, and. has since been repeatedly recognized by our courts: Commonwealth v. Jolliffe, 7 Watts 585 ; Warren v. Commonwealth, supra; Zell v. Commonwealth, 13 Norris 258. | 1 | 1882–1882 |
Stanley v. Norris
green
1 sentence1882Abr. 365, and 2 Ib. 764, Avherein the construction given to the statute is thus spoken of : “ It hath also been agreed, and is now the established practice of the courts, that- if the king challenge a juror before the panel is perused, he need not show any cause of his challenge till the whole panel be gone through and it appear that .there will not be a full jury without the persons so challenged : Co. Litt. 156 ; Vent. 309 ; 2 Hale P. C. 271; 2 Hawk. 518.” Substantially the same language is used in 4 Black. 353 ; Roberts’ Dig. 339, and other authorities that might be cited. | 1 | 1882–1882 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.