King motion in Georgia

2024See Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010); Williams v. State, 283 Ga. 94, 94 ( 656 SE2d 144 ) (2008).

2024See Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010); Williams v. State, 283 Ga. 94, 94 ( 656 SE2d 144 ) (2008).

2024See Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010); Williams v. State, 283 Ga. 94, 94 ( 656 SE2d 144 ) (2008).

2024See Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 ( 690 SE2d 150 ) (2010); Williams v. State, 283 Ga. 94, 94 ( 656 SE2d 144 ) (2008).

2024OCGA § 5-6-34 (d) generally allows for pendent appellate jurisdiction and provides in pertinent part: Where an appeal is taken under any provision of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this Code section, all judgments, rulings, or orders rendered in the case which are raised on appeal and which may affect the proceedings below shall be reviewed and determined by the appellate court, without regard to the appealability of the judgment, ruling, or order standing alone and without regard to whether the judgment, ruling, or order appealed from was final or was appealable by some other express provisio

2024OCGA § 5-6-34 (d) generally allows for pendent appellate jurisdiction and provides in pertinent part: Where an appeal is taken under any provision of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this Code section, all judgments, rulings, or orders rendered in the case which are raised on appeal and which may affect the proceedings below shall be reviewed and determined by the appellate court, without regard to the appealability of the judgment, ruling, or order standing alone and without regard to whether the judgment, ruling, or order appealed from was final or was appealable by some other express provisio

2024OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) authorizes direct appeals from “[a]ll final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below.” “[A]s a general rule, when a party seeks to appeal a non-final order issued by a trial court before the case is fully adjudicated below, Georgia courts require adherence to the interlocutory procedures of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b) for appellate review.” Buckner-Webb v. State, 314 Ga. 823, 827 (2) (a) (878 SE2d 481) (2022).

2024OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) authorizes direct appeals from “[a]ll final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below.” “[A]s a general rule, when a party seeks to appeal a non-final order issued by a trial court before the case is fully adjudicated below, Georgia courts require adherence to the interlocutory procedures of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b) for appellate review.” Buckner-Webb v. State, 314 Ga. 823, 827 (2) (a) (878 SE2d 481) (2022).

2023In its order denying King’s motion for a new trial, the court expressly rejected King’s general grounds claim because it found that “the weight of the evidence does not preponderate heavily against the verdict and the 13 verdict was not contrary to the evidence or the principles of justice and equity.” King’s general grounds claim therefore fails.8 See Strother v. State, 305 Ga. 838, 843 (828 SE2d 327) (2019) (trial court properly exercised its discretion as the thirteenth juror when “[i]n its order denying the motion, the trial court referred to the numbered paragraphs in which Appellant asse

2023In its order denying King’s motion for a new trial, the court expressly rejected King’s general grounds claim because it found that “the weight of the evidence does not preponderate heavily against the verdict and the 13 verdict was not contrary to the evidence or the principles of justice and equity.” King’s general grounds claim therefore fails.8 See Strother v. State, 305 Ga. 838, 843 (828 SE2d 327) (2019) (trial court properly exercised its discretion as the thirteenth juror when “[i]n its order denying the motion, the trial court referred to the numbered paragraphs in which Appellant asse

2023Third, the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it “affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error— discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error “‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 636 (884 SE2d 346) (2023) (quoting Gates, 298 Ga. at 327). (i) We first address King’s claim that it was impro

2023Third, the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it “affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error— discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error “‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 637 ( 884 SE2d 346 ) (2023) (quoting Gates, 298 Ga. at 327 ). (i) We first address King’s claim that it was im

2023Specifically, he argues that the trial court should have exercised its discretion as the thirteenth juror and granted King’s motion for new trial “in the interest of justice.” That argument implicates the “general grounds” for obtaining a new trial under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 & 5-5-21. 12 “When these so-called ‘general grounds’ are properly raised in a timely motion for new trial, the trial judge must exercise a broad discretion to sit as a ‘thirteenth juror.’” Ridley v. State, 315 Ga. 452, 456 (883 SE2d 357) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023Specifically, he argues that the trial court should have exercised its discretion as the thirteenth juror and granted King’s motion for new trial “in the interest of justice.” That argument implicates the “general grounds” for obtaining a new trial under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 & 5-5-21. 12 “When these so-called ‘general grounds’ are properly raised in a timely motion for new trial, the trial judge must exercise a broad discretion to sit as a ‘thirteenth juror.’” Ridley v. State, 315 Ga. 452, 456 (883 SE2d 357) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023Third, the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it “affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error— discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error “‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 636 (884 SE2d 346) (2023) (quoting Gates, 298 Ga. at 327). (i) We first address King’s claim that it was impro

2023Third, the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it “affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error— discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error “‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 636 (884 SE2d 346) (2023) (quoting Gates, 298 Ga. at 327). (i) We first address King’s claim that it was impro

2019See generally Rowland, 264 Ga. at 875-876 (2).

2018See Choisnet v. State , 292 Ga. 860 , 742 S.E.2d 476 (2013) (vacating and remanding where trial court applied the wrong standard and considered only the sufficiency of the evidence despite defendant's argument that the verdict was contrary to the evidence and strongly against the weight of the evidence).

2018See Choisnet v. State , 292 Ga. 860 , 742 S.E.2d 476 (2013) (vacating and remanding where trial court applied the wrong standard and considered only the sufficiency of the evidence despite defendant's argument that the verdict was contrary to the evidence and strongly against the weight of the evidence).

2017Third, the Supreme Court has explained that the ante litem requirements “ensure that the State receives adequate notice of the claim to facilitate settlement before the filing of a lawsuit,” and that it should provide “notice to the State of the magnitude of the claim.” Myers, 295 Ga. at 845, 847 (citation omitted).

2017Third, the Supreme Court has explained that the ante litem requirements “ensure that the State receives adequate notice of the claim to facilitate settlement before the filing of a lawsuit,” and that it should provide “notice to the State of the 8 magnitude of the claim.” Myers, 295 Ga. at 845, 847 (citation omitted).

2016That trial counsel is unavailable due to her untimely death following the trial “does not relieve [King] of his heavy burden of proving ineffective assistance [of counsel].” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hicks v. State, 295 Ga. 268, 276 (3) (b), n. 7 ( 759 SE2d 509 ) (2014). (a) We find no merit in King’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an expert witness on eyewitness identification.

2016That trial counsel is unavailable due to her untimely death following the trial “does not relieve [King] of his heavy burden of proving ineffective assistance [of counsel].” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hicks v. State, 295 Ga. 268, 276 (3) (b), n. 7 ( 759 SE2d 509 ) (2014). (a) We find no merit in King’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an expert witness on eyewitness identification.

2016Likewise, the relevance of the prior DUI was heightened because King’s defense was that he did not drive the vehicle while intoxicated, “making evidence that he had voluntarily driven under the influence of alcohol on a previous occasion all the more relevant because it tended to show that it was more likely that he intentionally did so on this occasion.” Jones, 297 Ga. at 161 (2).

2015See Jenkins v. State, 284 Ga. 642, 643 (1) ( 670 SE2d 425 ) (2008) (“A constitutional question raised and distinctly ruled upon in the trial court need not be reduced to a written order or other similar writing to invoke [the Supreme] Court’s jurisdiction.”).

2015See Jenkins v. State, 284 Ga. 642, 643 (1) ( 670 SE2d 425 ) (2008) (“A constitutional question raised and distinctly ruled upon in the trial court need not be reduced to a written order or other similar writing to invoke [the Supreme] Court’s jurisdiction.”).

2015However, the King rule has “no application to crimes that do not have as an element the defendant’s prior conviction of a felony.” Hillman v. Johnson, 297 Ga. 609 *429 (2) (a) ( 774 SE2d 615 ) (2015).

2015However, the King rule has “no application to crimes that do not have as an element the defendant’s prior conviction of a felony.” Hillman v. Johnson, 297 Ga. 609 *429 (2) (a) ( 774 SE2d 615 ) (2015).

2013See Bell v. Cohran, 244 Ga. App. 510, 511 ( 536 SE2d 187 ) (2000).

2013See Bell v. Cohran, 244 Ga. App. 510, 511 ( 536 SE2d 187 ) (2000).

2009Walker v. Hale, 283 Ga. 131, 132 (1) ( 657 SE2d 227 ) (2008).

2009Walker v. Hale, 283 Ga. 131, 132 (1) ( 657 SE2d 227 ) (2008).

2008This court rejected that argument, finding that “it is not required that the prior convictions be included in the indictment but only that the accused receive notice of the state’s intention to seek recidivist punishment and of the identity of the prior convictions.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Thompson v. State, supra, 237 Ga. App. at 470 (5). 5 “For the purpose of this Code section, conviction of two or more crimes charged on separate counts of one indictment or accusation, or in two or more indictments or accusations consolidated for trial, shall be deemed to be only one conviction

2008This court rejected that argument, finding that “it is not required that the prior convictions be included in the indictment but only that the accused receive notice of the state’s intention to seek recidivist punishment and of the identity of the prior convictions.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Thompson v. State, supra, 237 Ga. App. at 470 (5). 5 “For the purpose of this Code section, conviction of two or more crimes charged on separate counts of one indictment or accusation, or in two or more indictments or accusations consolidated for trial, shall be deemed to be only one conviction

2006Since it is undisputed that King “was not stopped by the roadblock, [the] legality [of the roadblock] is not at issue.” (Footnote omitted.) Id.; see also Gary v. State, 268 Ga. App. 773, 776 (2) ( 603 SE2d 304 ) (2004) (where defendant did not stop at roadblock “the legality of the roadblock [was] simply not significant to the issue of whether [drugs] should have been suppressed”) (physical precedent only). 1 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying King’s motion to suppress.

2006Since it is undisputed that King “was not stopped by the roadblock, [the] legality [of the roadblock] is not at issue.” (Footnote omitted.) Id.; see also Gary v. State, 268 Ga. App. 773, 776 (2) ( 603 SE2d 304 ) (2004) (where defendant did not stop at roadblock “the legality of the roadblock [was] simply not significant to the issue of whether [drugs] should have been suppressed”) (physical precedent only). 1 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying King’s motion to suppress.

2004We have held that "a trained police officer's perception of the odor of burning marijuana, provided his ability to identify that odor is placed into evidence, constitutes sufficient probable cause to support the warrantless search of a vehicle." State v. Folk, 238 Ga.App. 206, 209 , 521 S.E.2d 194 (1999).

2004We have held that "a trained police officer's perception of the odor of burning marijuana, provided his ability to identify that odor is placed into evidence, constitutes sufficient probable cause to support the warrantless search of a vehicle." State v. Folk, 238 Ga.App. 206, 209 , 521 S.E.2d 194 (1999).

2003See Fuller v. Charter South, 216 Ga. App. 211, 212-213 (1) ( 453 SE2d 754 ) (1995) (directed verdict properly granted to employer where no evidence of ownership of vehicle was presented and thus no presumption was raised that employee was acting in scope of his employment at time of collision).

2003See Fuller v. Charter South, 216 Ga. App. 211, 212-213 (1) ( 453 SE2d 754 ) (1995) (directed verdict properly granted to employer where no evidence of ownership of vehicle was presented and thus no presumption was raised that employee was acting in scope of his employment at time of collision).

2000DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 786 (6), 493 S.E.2d 157 (1997); Wellons v. State, 266 Ga. 77, 91 (32), 463 S.E.2d 868 (1995).

2000DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 786 (6), 493 S.E.2d 157 (1997); Wellons v. State, 266 Ga. 77, 91 (32), 463 S.E.2d 868 (1995).

2000Jenkins, 269 Ga. at 291 (15), 498 S.E.2d 502 ; OCGA §§ 17-7-131(a)(3); 17-9-1(a). 30.

2000Jenkins, 269 Ga. at 291 (15), 498 S.E.2d 502 ; OCGA §§ 17-7-131(a)(3); 17-9-1(a). 30.