physician-patient privilege in Illinois

2007See Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital, 105 Ill.App.3d 850, 853-54 , 61 Ill.Dec. 651 , 435 N.E.2d 140 (1982) (a hospital is mandated to assert the physician-patient privilege to ensure that the patients' records will be protected in accordance with the intention of the statute); Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill.App.3d 581, 588 , 102 Ill.Dec. 172 , 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986) (an ex parte conference between defense counsel and a plaintiff's treating physician jeopardizes the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship and, therefore, is prohibited as being against public policy); Rea

2007App.3d 393, 398 , 256 Ill.Dec. 216 , 751 N.E.2d 606 (2001) (the medical records of nonparties are protected by the physician-patient privilege).

2019As the appellate court explained when applying the physician-patient privilege in House v. SwedishAmerican Hospital, 206 Ill.

2019As the appellate court explained when applying the physician-patient privilege in House v. SwedishAmerican Hospital, 206 Ill.

2016While it is true that, under Illinois law, medical records of nonparties are protected by the physician-patient privilege with regard to both the facts and communications contained therein (In re D.H., 319 Ill.

2016While it is true that, under Illinois law, medical records of nonparties are protected by the physician-patient privilege with regard to both the facts and communications contained therein (In re D.H., 319 Ill.

2007See Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital, 105 Ill.App.3d 850, 853-54 , 61 Ill.Dec. 651 , 435 N.E.2d 140 (1982) (a hospital is mandated to assert the physician-patient privilege to ensure that the patients' records will be protected in accordance with the intention of the statute); Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill.App.3d 581, 588 , 102 Ill.Dec. 172 , 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986) (an ex parte conference between defense counsel and a plaintiff's treating physician jeopardizes the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship and, therefore, is prohibited as being against public policy); Rea

2007See Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital, 105 Ill.App.3d 850, 853-54 , 61 Ill.Dec. 651 , 435 N.E.2d 140 (1982) (a hospital is mandated to assert the physician-patient privilege to ensure that the patients' records will be protected in accordance with the intention of the statute); Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill.App.3d 581, 588 , 102 Ill.Dec. 172 , 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986) (an ex parte conference between defense counsel and a plaintiff's treating physician jeopardizes the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship and, therefore, is prohibited as being against public policy); Rea

1986(See People v. Bickham (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 1 , 431 N.E.2d 365 .) This right, however, is not absolute and the statute, accordingly, contains several exceptions wherein the legislature deemed that the protection afforded by the physician-patient privilege ought give way to the public’s desire to ascertain the truth.

1986(See People v. Bickham (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 1 , 431 N.E.2d 365 .) This right, however, is not absolute and the statute, accordingly, contains several exceptions wherein the legislature deemed that the protection afforded by the physician-patient privilege ought give way to the public’s desire to ascertain the truth.

2014The physician-patient privilege “ ‘exists as to “any information” acquired by a physician in a professional capacity which is “necessary” to enable him to “serve” his patient.’ ” Kraima v. Ausman, 365 Ill.

2014The physician-patient privilege 15 " 'exists as to "any information" acquired by a physician in a professional capacity which is "necessary" to enable him to "serve" his patient.' " Kraima v. Ausman, 365 Ill.

2015In Doyle v. Shlensky, 120 Ill.

2015In Doyle v. Shlensky, 120 Ill.

2018Patients’ medical records contain “information regarding diagnosis, examinations, tests, or treatment rendered.” Pritchard v. SwedishAmerican Hospital, 191 Ill.

2017Patients' medical records contain "information regarding diagnosis, examinations, tests, or treatment rendered." Pritchard v. SwedishAmerican Hospital , 191 Ill.

2019If the Secretary receives a medical report regarding a driver that does not address a medical condition contained in a previous medical report, the Secretary may disclose the unaddressed medical condition to the driver or his or her physician, or both, solely for the purpose of submission of a medical report that addresses the condition.” (Emphasis added.) See also id. § 6-908 (substantially similar). ¶ 37 This section, however, is substantially different from the physician-patient privilege found in section 8-802.

2019If the Secretary receives a medical report regarding a driver that does not address a medical condition contained in a previous medical report, the Secretary may disclose the unaddressed medical condition to the driver or his or her physician, or both, solely for the purpose of submission of a medical report that addresses the condition.” (Emphasis added.) See also id. § 6-908 (substantially similar). ¶ 37 This section, however, is substantially different from the physician-patient privilege found in section 8-802.

2016App. 3d 947, 954 (1993) (the defendant hospital is included within the physician-patient privilege when the patient attempts to hold the hospital vicariously liable for the conduct of the treating physician, and the patient has impliedly consented to the release of his medical information to the hospital’s attorneys); Aylward v. Settecase, 409 Ill.

2016App. 3d 947, 954 (1993) (the defendant hospital is included within the physician-patient privilege when the patient attempts to hold the hospital vicariously liable for the conduct of the treating physician, and the patient has impliedly consented to the release of his medical information to the hospital’s attorneys); Aylward v. Settecase, 409 Ill.

2016See Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21 (2001) (the statutory provisions of the HLA concerning the authorized limited communication between the hospital’s counsel and medical staff members regarding a patient’s care, even though those staff members were not named as defendants in the patient’s lawsuit, were constitutional); In re Medical Malpractice Cases in Law Division, 337 Ill.

2016See Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21 (2001) (the statutory provisions of the HLA concerning the authorized limited communication between the hospital’s counsel and medical staff members regarding a patient’s care, even though those staff members were not named as defendants in the patient’s lawsuit, were constitutional); In re Medical Malpractice Cases in Law Division, 337 Ill.

2016We agree, because John Doe's partially redacted records were protected from disclosure under the provisions of the Confidentiality Act, plaintiff failed to show that any exception to the Confidentiality Act applies, and these conclusions are dispositive of this appeal. 2 ¶ 18 In Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60 (2001), our supreme court outlined many of the standards guiding our analysis of this matter.

2016We agree, because John Doe's partially- redacted records were protected from disclosure under the provisions of the Confidentiality Act, plaintiff failed to show that any exception to the Confidentiality Act applies, and these conclusions are dispositive of this appeal. 2 ¶ 18 In Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60 (2001), our supreme court outlined many of the standards guiding our analysis of this matter.

2016Id. at 317-18 (the hospital’s right to defend itself does not justify an abrogation of the physician- patient privilege when the hospital sought to communicate with employee-physicians whose conduct was not a basis for liability as provided for in the complaint); Morgan v. County of Cook, 252 Ill.

2016Id. at 317-18 (the hospital’s right to defend itself does not justify an abrogation of the physician- patient privilege when the hospital sought to communicate with employee-physicians whose conduct was not a basis for liability as provided for in the complaint); Morgan v. County of Cook, 252 Ill.

2017In Morgan, the court held that, if a plaintiff attempts to hold a hospital liable for the conduct of a hospital’s own treating caregivers, “the defendant hospital is included within the physician-patient privilege and the patient has impliedly consented to the release of his medical information to the defendant hospital’s attorneys.” Id. at 954 .

2017In Morgan, the court held that, if a plaintiff attempts to hold a hospital liable for the conduct of a hospital’s own treating caregivers, “the defendant hospital is included within the physician-patient privilege and the patient has impliedly consented to the release of his medical information to the defendant hospital’s attorneys.” Id. at 954 .

2007App. 3d 850, 853-54 (1982) (a hospital is mandated to assert the physician-patient privilege to ensure that the patients’ records will be protected in accordance with the intention of the statute); Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill.

2007See Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital, 105 Ill.App.3d 850, 853-54 , 61 Ill.Dec. 651 , 435 N.E.2d 140 (1982) (a hospital is mandated to assert the physician-patient privilege to ensure that the patients' records will be protected in accordance with the intention of the statute); Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill.App.3d 581, 588 , 102 Ill.Dec. 172 , 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986) (an ex parte conference between defense counsel and a plaintiff's treating physician jeopardizes the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship and, therefore, is prohibited as being against public policy); Rea

2007See, e.g., House v. SwedishAmerican Hospital, 206 Ill.App.3d 437, 445 , 151 Ill.Dec. 467 , 564 N.E.2d 922 (1990); Davis v. Hinde, 141 Ill.App.3d 664, 666 , 96 Ill.Dec. 13 , 490 N.E.2d 1049 (1986); Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill.App.3d 435, 438 , 28 Ill.Dec. 586 , 390 N.E.2d 945 (1979).

2007See, e.g., House v. SwedishAmerican Hospital, 206 Ill.App.3d 437, 445 , 151 Ill.Dec. 467 , 564 N.E.2d 922 (1990); Davis v. Hinde, 141 Ill.App.3d 664, 666 , 96 Ill.Dec. 13 , 490 N.E.2d 1049 (1986); Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill.App.3d 435, 438 , 28 Ill.Dec. 586 , 390 N.E.2d 945 (1979).

2024“The primary purpose of the physician-patient privilege is to encourage free disclosure between a doctor and a patient and to protect the patient from embarrassment and invasion of privacy that disclosure would entail.” Id. at 575 .

2024The physician-patient privilege “is a legislative balancing between relationships that society feels should be fostered through the shield of confidentiality and the interests served by disclosure of the information.” Manos, 202 Ill. 2d at 575-76 .

2019Id. ¶ 29 On appeal, this court determined that the plain language of section 11-501.4-1 permitted the disclosure of the test results to local law enforcement personnel without the need for judicially authorized methods of court discovery.

2018Id. ¶ 29 On appeal, this court determined that the plain language of section 11-501.4-1 permitted the disclosure of the test results to local law enforcement personnel without the need for judicially authorized methods of court discovery.

2011Other patients' triage and treatment times were "mere incidents of fact unnecessary to enable a physician to perform his or her professional duty and, therefore, fall outside the ambit of the physician-patient privilege." Tomczak, 359 Ill.App.3d at 454 , 295 Ill.Dec. 968 , 834 N.E.2d 549 . ¶ 42 Defendants correctly recognize that Tomczak involved the physician-patient privilege, in contrast to a privilege under the Act.

2011Other patients' triage and treatment times were "mere incidents of fact unnecessary to enable a physician to perform his or her professional duty and, therefore, fall outside the ambit of the physician-patient privilege." Tomczak, 359 Ill.App.3d at 454 , 295 Ill.Dec. 968 , 834 N.E.2d 549 . ¶ 42 Defendants correctly recognize that Tomczak involved the physician-patient privilege, in contrast to a privilege under the Act.

2005LoCoco v. XL Disposal Corp., 307 Ill.

2005LoCoco v. XL Disposal Corp. , 307 Ill.

2019The parties briefed the broader issue of whether the physician-patient privilege applied at all in this case, not whether it applied to the two interrogatories. 2017 IL App (3d) 170087, ¶ 15 .

2019App. 3d 388 , -5- 405 (1989), the court held that “[n]either the nature of a plaintiff’s cause of action nor factual allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint waive a defendant’s physician-patient privilege.” 2017 IL App (3d) 170087 , ¶ 24.