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8 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2024See id. ¶ 18 (“[T]he party asserting the physician-patient privilege has the burden of establishing the privilege.”); see also State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421 , 759 P.2d 1003 (stating that “[a] party responding to a summary calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out errors of law and fact,” and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this requirement”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Harris, 2013-NMCA-031, ¶ 3 , 297 P.3d 374 . 2024See id. ¶ 18 (“[T]he party asserting the physician-patient privilege has the burden of establishing the privilege.”); see also State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421 , 759 P.2d 1003 (stating that “[a] party responding to a summary calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out errors of law and fact,” and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this requirement”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Harris, 2013-NMCA-031, ¶ 3 , 297 P.3d 374 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mondragonred2 sentences2024See id. ¶ 18 (“[T]he party asserting the physician-patient privilege has the burden of establishing the privilege.”); see also State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421 , 759 P.2d 1003 (stating that “[a] party responding to a summary calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out errors of law and fact,” and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this requirement”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Harris, 2013-NMCA-031, ¶ 3 , 297 P.3d 374 . 2024See id. ¶ 18 (“[T]he party asserting the physician-patient privilege has the burden of establishing the privilege.”); see also State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027 , ¶ 10, 107 N.M. 421 , 759 P.2d 1003 (stating that “[a] party responding to a summary calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out errors of law and fact,” and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this requirement”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Harris, 2013-NMCA-031, ¶ 3 , 297 P.3d 374 . | 1 | 1 |
Pincheira v. Allstate Insurancegreen1 sentence2019See Pincheira, 2008-NMSC-049, ¶ 33 (observing that the communication privileges, including the physician-patient privilege, “are destroyed by any revelation of the actual communications” (emphasis added)); see also State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. O'Malleygreen1 sentence2001Co. v. O’Malley, 898 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Mo.1995) (en banc) (observing that “[a]lthough as of yet there is no subsection in the Missouri Rules equivalent to the Federal Rule 26(b)(5), the justifications for the subsection are equally valid in Missouri’s courts”). {23} On remand, Plaintiff should be provided with an opportunity to re-assert the physician-patient privilege. | 1 | 1 |
Trujillo v. Purogreen2 sentences1996Trujillo v. Puro, 101 N.M. 408, 412 , 683 P.2d 963, 967 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 362 , 683 P.2d 44 (1984). 1996Trujillo v. Puro, 101 N.M. 408, 412 , 683 P.2d 963, 967 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 362 , 683 P.2d 44 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
McVay v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See McVay v. State, 312 Ark. 73 , 847 S.W.2d 28, 31 (1993) (where defense was that defendant smelled like beer solely because he had spilled it, condition at issue and privilege waived); State v. Alston, 212 N.J.Super. 644 , 515 A.2d 1280, 1281 (App.Div.1986) (defendant’s testimony waived privilege because word “defense” signified facts that reduced crime charged, as well as facts that precluded conviction); Wigmore, supra, at § 2389 (a party’s voluntary testimony to physical condition at issue should waive the privilege). 1996See McVay v. State, 312 Ark. 73 , 847 S.W.2d 28, 31 (1993) (where defense was that defendant smelled like beer solely because he had spilled it, condition at issue and privilege waived); State v. Alston, 212 N.J.Super. 644 , 515 A.2d 1280, 1281 (App.Div.1986) (defendant’s testimony waived privilege because word “defense” signified facts that reduced crime charged, as well as facts that precluded conviction); Wigmore, supra, at § 2389 (a party’s voluntary testimony to physical condition at issue should waive the privilege). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Alstongreen2 sentences1996See McVay v. State, 312 Ark. 73 , 847 S.W.2d 28, 31 (1993) (where defense was that defendant smelled like beer solely because he had spilled it, condition at issue and privilege waived); State v. Alston, 212 N.J.Super. 644 , 515 A.2d 1280, 1281 (App.Div.1986) (defendant’s testimony waived privilege because word “defense” signified facts that reduced crime charged, as well as facts that precluded conviction); Wigmore, supra, at § 2389 (a party’s voluntary testimony to physical condition at issue should waive the privilege). 1996See McVay v. State, 312 Ark. 73 , 847 S.W.2d 28, 31 (1993) (where defense was that defendant smelled like beer solely because he had spilled it, condition at issue and privilege waived); State v. Alston, 212 N.J.Super. 644 , 515 A.2d 1280, 1281 (App.Div.1986) (defendant’s testimony waived privilege because word “defense” signified facts that reduced crime charged, as well as facts that precluded conviction); Wigmore, supra, at § 2389 (a party’s voluntary testimony to physical condition at issue should waive the privilege). | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co.green2 sentences1992See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C.1983); Romine v. Medicenters of Am., Inc., 476 So.2d 51 (Ala.1985); Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1987); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257 (Del.Super.Ct.1985); Pic N’ Save v. Singleton, 551 So.2d 1244 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989); Davenport v. Ephraim McDowell Mem. 1992See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C. 1983); Romine v. Medicenters of Am., Inc., 476 So.2d 51 (Ala. 1985); Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1987); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257 (Del. | 1 | 1 |
Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeneygreen2 sentences1992Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 355 (Iowa 1986)). 1992Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 355 (Iowa 1986)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pina v. Espinoza
green
2 sentences2007Cf. Piña, 2001-NMCA-055, ¶¶ 23-24 , 130 N.M. 661 , 29 P.3d 1062 (stating that “[fjailure to adequately support a claim of privilege thwarts both the adversarial process and meaningful independent judicial review and justifies denial of the claim of privilege” but remanding to provide the plaintiff an opportunity to reassert properly the physician-patient privilege). {20} First, as observed by the district court, a valid underlying privilege must exist for a document to be protected from discovery by the common interest doctrine. 2007Cf. Piña, 2001-NMCA-055, ¶¶ 23-24 , 130 N.M. 661 , 29 P.3d 1062 (stating that “[fjailure to adequately support a claim of privilege thwarts both the adversarial process and meaningful independent judicial review and justifies denial of the claim of privilege” but remanding to provide the plaintiff an opportunity to reassert properly the physician-patient privilege). {20} First, as observed by the district court, a valid underlying privilege must exist for a document to be protected from discovery by the common interest doctrine. | 2 | 2007–2008 |
Gingrich v. Sandia Corporation
green
2 sentences2019State Highway Comm’n v. Steinkraus, 1966-NMSC-134 , ¶ 4, 76 N.M. 617 , 417 P.2d 431 (“It is clear to us that the attorney-client privilege should only be applied to protect communications—not facts.”); Gingrich v. Sandia Corp., 2007-NMCA-101, ¶¶ 12-13 , 142 N.M. 359 , 165 P.3d 1135 (concluding that a client waived the attorney-client privilege for a report prepared by its attorney when the client disclosed the report to the opposing party and to third parties outside the litigation). 2019State Highway Comm’n v. Steinkraus, 1966-NMSC-134 , ¶ 4, 76 N.M. 617 , 417 P.2d 431 (“It is clear to us that the attorney-client privilege should only be applied to protect communications—not facts.”); Gingrich v. Sandia Corp., 2007-NMCA-101, ¶¶ 12-13 , 142 N.M. 359 , 165 P.3d 1135 (concluding that a client waived the attorney-client privilege for a report prepared by its attorney when the client disclosed the report to the opposing party and to third parties outside the litigation). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State Ex Rel. State Highway Commission v. Steinkraus
green
2 sentences2019State Highway Comm’n v. Steinkraus, 1966-NMSC-134 , ¶ 4, 76 N.M. 617 , 417 P.2d 431 (“It is clear to us that the attorney-client privilege should only be applied to protect communications—not facts.”); Gingrich v. Sandia Corp., 2007-NMCA-101, ¶¶ 12-13 , 142 N.M. 359 , 165 P.3d 1135 (concluding that a client waived the attorney-client privilege for a report prepared by its attorney when the client disclosed the report to the opposing party and to third parties outside the litigation). 2019State Highway Comm’n v. Steinkraus, 1966-NMSC-134 , ¶ 4, 76 N.M. 617 , 417 P.2d 431 (“It is clear to us that the attorney-client privilege should only be applied to protect communications—not facts.”); Gingrich v. Sandia Corp., 2007-NMCA-101, ¶¶ 12-13 , 142 N.M. 359 , 165 P.3d 1135 (concluding that a client waived the attorney-client privilege for a report prepared by its attorney when the client disclosed the report to the opposing party and to third parties outside the litigation). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Green v. Bloodsworth
green
2 sentences1992See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C.1983); Romine v. Medicenters of Am., Inc., 476 So.2d 51 (Ala.1985); Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1987); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257 (Del.Super.Ct.1985); Pic N’ Save v. Singleton, 551 So.2d 1244 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989); Davenport v. Ephraim McDowell Mem. 1992See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C. 1983); Romine v. Medicenters of Am., Inc., 476 So.2d 51 (Ala. 1985); Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1987); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257 (Del. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Pic N' Save v. Singleton
neutral
1 sentence1992See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C.1983); Romine v. Medicenters of Am., Inc., 476 So.2d 51 (Ala.1985); Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1987); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257 (Del.Super.Ct.1985); Pic N’ Save v. Singleton, 551 So.2d 1244 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989); Davenport v. Ephraim McDowell Mem. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Morrison v. Century Engineering
green
2 sentences1992The Iowa Supreme Court recognized its prior holding “that a plaintiff in a personal injury action could not be compelled to waive the physician-patient privilege so as to allow defendant’s counsel to communicate privately with plaintiff’s treating physician.” Id. at 876 (citing Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. 1992The Iowa Supreme Court recognized its prior holding "that a plaintiff in a personal injury action could not be compelled to waive the physician-patient privilege so as to allow defendant's counsel to communicate privately with plaintiff's treating physician." Id. at 876 (citing Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Romine v. Medicenters of America, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C.1983); Romine v. Medicenters of Am., Inc., 476 So.2d 51 (Ala.1985); Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1987); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257 (Del.Super.Ct.1985); Pic N’ Save v. Singleton, 551 So.2d 1244 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989); Davenport v. Ephraim McDowell Mem. 1992See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C. 1983); Romine v. Medicenters of Am., Inc., 476 So.2d 51 (Ala. 1985); Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1987); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257 (Del. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Langdon v. Champion
green
2 sentences1992See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C.1983); Romine v. Medicenters of Am., Inc., 476 So.2d 51 (Ala.1985); Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1987); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257 (Del.Super.Ct.1985); Pic N’ Save v. Singleton, 551 So.2d 1244 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989); Davenport v. Ephraim McDowell Mem. 1992See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C. 1983); Romine v. Medicenters of Am., Inc., 476 So.2d 51 (Ala. 1985); Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1987); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257 (Del. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Randolph v. Supreme Liberty Life Insurance
green
2 sentences1984Randolph v. Supreme Liberty Life Insurance Co., 359 Mo. 251 , 221 S.W.2d 155 (1949); Bozicevich v. Kenilworth Mercantile Co., 58 Utah 458 , 199 P. 406 (1921); see also Annot. 10 A.L.R. 4th 552 (1981). 1984Randolph v. Supreme Liberty Life Insurance Co., 359 Mo. 251 , 221 S.W.2d 155 (1949); Bozicevich v. Kenilworth Mercantile Co., 58 Utah 458 , 199 P. 406 (1921); see also Annot. 10 A.L.R. 4th 552 (1981). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Bozicevich v. Kenilworth Mercantile Co.
green
1 sentence1984Randolph v. Supreme Liberty Life Insurance Co., 359 Mo. 251 , 221 S.W.2d 155 (1949); Bozicevich v. Kenilworth Mercantile Co., 58 Utah 458 , 199 P. 406 (1921); see also Annot. 10 A.L.R. 4th 552 (1981). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Trans-World Investments v. Drobny
green
1 sentence1984Trans-World Investments v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148 (Alaska 1976). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.