physician-patient privilege in Washington

1997Extending the physician-patient privilege to necessary third parties, Division One of this court held that, "`if the third person is present as a needed and customary participant in such consultation, the circle of confidence may be reasonably extended to include him and the privilege will be maintained.'" State v. Gibson, 3 Wash. App. 596, 599 , 476 P.2d 727 (1970) (quoting Charles T.

1997Extending the physician-patient privilege to necessary third parties, Division One of this court held that, " 'if the third person is present as a needed and customary participant in such consultation, the circle of confidence may be reasonably extended to include him and the privilege will be maintained.’ ” State v. Gibson, 3 Wn.

1992The physician-patient privilege is applicable "only 'so far as practicable' in criminal cases." State v. Mark, 23 Wn.

1983He argues that prescription records are not covered by the physician-patient privilege under State v. Mark, 23 Wn.

2026State v. Smith, 84 Wn.

2018State v. Smith, 84 Wn.

2024The court reasoned that 3 The Youngs court also declined to distinguish between written communications and ex parte interviews. 179 Wn.2d at 665 (citing Smith v. Orthopedics Int’l, Ltd., 170 Wn.2d 659 , 244 P.3d 939 (2010)). 4 Newman was not in the Loudon context and did not involve the physician-patient privilege; it involved counsel for a school district and former football coaches whose actions were alleged to have given rise to plaintiff’s injuries. 186 Wn.2d at 774-76 . 11 No. 83526-2-I/12 former employees categorically differ from current employees with respect to the interests underlyin

2020We have previously identified two core purposes of the physician-patient privilege: “(1) to ‘surround patient-physician communications with a cloak of confidentiality to promote proper treatment by facilitating full disclosure of information’ and (2) ‘to protect the patient from embarrassment or scandal which may result from revelation of intimate details of medical treatment.’” Smith v. Orthopedics Int’l, Ltd., PS, 170 Wn.2d 659, 667 , 244 P.3d 939 (2010) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Carson v. Fine, 123 Wn.2d 206, 213 , 867 P.2d 610 (1994)). -8- Hermanson v.

1994Phipps v. Sasser, 74 Wn.2d 439 , 445 P.2d 624 (1968) is also inapposite, since it deals with the physician-patient privilege, not the attorney-client privilege. 2 Virginia Mason argues lack of proximate cause as an alternative basis for the summary judgment, an issue that we need not reach. 3 In Wilder , the third person whose presence caused waiver of the privilege (Mrs. Wilder) was not a joint client with Mr. Martin; his attorney was not her attorney.

1994Phipps v. Sasser, 74 Wn.2d 439 , 445 P.2d 624 (1968) is also inapposite, since it deals with the physician-patient privilege, not the attorney-client privilege. 2 Virginia Mason argues lack of proximate cause as an alternative basis for the summary judgment, an issue that we need not reach. 3 In Wilder , the third person whose presence caused waiver of the privilege (Mrs. Wilder) was not a joint client with Mr. Martin; his attorney was not her attorney.

2022State v. Boehme, 71 Wn.2d 621, 636 , 430 P.2d 527 (1967).

2022State v. Boehme, 71 Wn.2d 621, 636 , 430 P.2d 527 (1967).

2014Order of Foresters, 69 Wn.2d 879 , 421 P.2d 351 (1966); Randa v. Bear, 50 Wn.2d 415 , 312 P.2d 640 (1957); McUne v. Fuqua, 42 Wn.2d 65 , 253 P.2d 632 , 257 P.2d 636 (1953). ¶17 In 1986, our legislature amended the physician-patient privilege statute to provide that “[w]aiver of the physician-patient privilege for any one physician or condition constitutes a waiver of the privilege as to all physicians or conditions, subject to such limitations as a court may impose pursuant to court rules.” Laws of 1986, ch. 305, § 101(4)(b).

2014Order of Foresters, 69 Wn.2d 879 , 421 P.2d 351 (1966); Randa v. Bear, 50 Wn.2d 415 , 312 P.2d 640 (1957); McUne v. Fuqua, 42 Wn.2d 65 , 253 P.2d 632 , 257 P.2d 636 (1953). ¶17 In 1986, our legislature amended the physician-patient privilege statute to provide that “[w]aiver of the physician-patient privilege for any one physician or condition constitutes a waiver of the privilege as to all physicians or conditions, subject to such limitations as a court may impose pursuant to court rules.” Laws of 1986, ch. 305, § 101(4)(b).

2016The Mcintosh court noted, however, that the psychologist-patient privilege must in some cases give way to '"supervening interest of society,"' in the same way the attorney-client privilege may not be used to "protect or conceal" the commission of a crime. !d. (quoting Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 336 , 181 A.2d 345 (1962)).

2016The Mcintosh court noted, however, that the psychologist-patient privilege must in some cases give way to '"supervening interest of society,"' in the same way the attorney-client privilege may not be used to "protect or conceal" the commission of a crime. !d. (quoting Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 336 , 181 A.2d 345 (1962)).

2010Requiring parties to use formal discovery processes when contacting nonparty treating physicians, we said, would not be *944 overly burdensome because "[d]efendants could still reach relevant medical records; cost and scheduling problems of depositions could be minimized by using depositions pursuant to CR 31; plaintiff's counsel might agree to an informal interview with both counsel present; and the purpose behind the discovery rules—to prevent surprise at trial —was maintained." Holbrook, 118 Wash.2d at 310 , 822 P.2d 271 (citing Loudon, 110 Wash.2d at 680 , 756 P.2d 138 ). ¶ 13 As we have i

2010Requiring parties to use formal discovery processes when contacting nonparty treating physicians, we said, would not be *944 overly burdensome because "[d]efendants could still reach relevant medical records; cost and scheduling problems of depositions could be minimized by using depositions pursuant to CR 31; plaintiff's counsel might agree to an informal interview with both counsel present; and the purpose behind the discovery rules—to prevent surprise at trial —was maintained." Holbrook, 118 Wash.2d at 310 , 822 P.2d 271 (citing Loudon, 110 Wash.2d at 680 , 756 P.2d 138 ). ¶ 13 As we have i

2008Packard v. Coberly, 147 Wash. 345, 348-49 , 265 P. 1082 (1928).

2008Packard v. Coberly, 147 Wash. 345, 348-49 , 265 P. 1082 (1928).

1998Our written opinion agreed with State v. Brewton, 49 Wash.App. 589 , 744 P.2d 646 (1987) and State v. Nuss, 52 Wash.App. 735 , 763 P.2d 1249 (1988), review denied, 112 Wash.2d 1010 (1989), which held a Defendant who asserts a diminished capacity defense, like one who pleads insanity, waives both the physician-patient privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination.

1998Our written opinion agreed with State v. Brewton, 49 Wash.App. 589 , 744 P.2d 646 (1987) and State v. Nuss, 52 Wash.App. 735 , 763 P.2d 1249 (1988), review denied, 112 Wash.2d 1010 (1989), which held a Defendant who asserts a diminished capacity defense, like one who pleads insanity, waives both the physician-patient privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination.

1998Our written opinion agreed with State v. Brewton, 49 Wash.App. 589 , 744 P.2d 646 (1987) and State v. Nuss, 52 Wash.App. 735 , 763 P.2d 1249 (1988), review denied, 112 Wash.2d 1010 (1989), which held a Defendant who asserts a diminished capacity defense, like one who pleads insanity, waives both the physician-patient privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination.

1998App. 735 , 763 P.2d 1249 (1988), review denied, 112 Wn.2d 1010 (1989), which held a Defendant who asserts a diminished capacity defense, like one who pleads insanity, waives both the physician-patient privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination.

1974It held, however, that testimony identifying the bullet and its removal from defendant did not come within the privilege described in RCW *358 5.60.060(4), which requires that the privileged testimony be of matters “necessary to enable him [the physician] to prescribe or act for the patient.” Regardless of the rule announced in State v. Betts, supra, since State v. Miller, 105 Wash. 475 , 178 P. 459 (1919), RCW 10.58.010 has been construed to permit recognition of the physician-patient privilege in criminal cases.

1974It held, however, that testimony identifying the bullet and its removal from defendant did not come within the privilege described in RCW *358 5.60.060(4), which requires that the privileged testimony be of matters “necessary to enable him [the physician] to prescribe or act for the patient.” Regardless of the rule announced in State v. Betts, supra, since State v. Miller, 105 Wash. 475 , 178 P. 459 (1919), RCW 10.58.010 has been construed to permit recognition of the physician-patient privilege in criminal cases.

2024Hermanson, 196 Wn.2d at 590 n.1. 11 The court reasoned that this argument “would allow any corporation to circumvent a plaintiff’s physician-patient privilege by entering into a representation agreement with a treatment physician, rendering the physician-patient privilege moot whenever the corporation chooses.” Id.

2024Hermanson, 196 Wn.2d at 590 n.1. 11 The court reasoned that this argument “would allow any corporation to circumvent a plaintiff’s physician-patient privilege by entering into a representation agreement with a treatment physician, rendering the physician-patient privilege moot whenever the corporation chooses.” Id.

2024The court reasoned that 3 The Youngs court also declined to distinguish between written communications and ex parte interviews. 179 Wn.2d at 665 (citing Smith v. Orthopedics Int’l, Ltd., 170 Wn.2d 659 , 244 P.3d 939 (2010)). 4 Newman was not in the Loudon context and did not involve the physician-patient privilege; it involved counsel for a school district and former football coaches whose actions were alleged to have given rise to plaintiff’s injuries. 186 Wn.2d at 774-76 . 11 No. 83526-2-I/12 former employees categorically differ from current employees with respect to the interests underlyin

2024Id. at 780 .

2024In Anderson, the court held that statements made by the defendant and his wife in a “family therapy” session were not protected by the physician-patient privilege because of the presence of the couple’s son where “the 11 84811-9-I/12 record [did] not disclose the necessity of the son’s presence.” 44 Wn.

2020The intent behind our decision in Youngs was to ensure “‘full and frank communication’” between the corporate defendant and its employees and agents to discover the facts surrounding the alleged negligent event. 179 Wn.2d at 650 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 , 131 S. Ct. 2313 , 180 L.

2020The intent behind our decision in Youngs was to ensure “‘full and frank communication’” between the corporate defendant and its employees and agents to discover the facts surrounding the alleged negligent event. 179 Wn.2d at 650 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 , 131 S. Ct. 2313 , 180 L.

2019Defense counsel has a duty to ferret out all relevant evidence, “but may not perform this duty by breaching the physician-patient privilege.”8 Id.

2016Id.