physician-patient privilege in Utah

2018And even if the existing law on physician-patient confidentiality is imperfectly attuned to the concerns implicated in negligent prescription cases filed by nonpatients, the solution is to fine-tune that law, not to categorically foreclose the imposition of a duty. 2012 UT 11 , ¶ 37, 275 P.3d 228 .

2018And even if the existing law on physician-patient confidentiality is imperfectly attuned to the concerns implicated in negligent prescription cases filed by nonpatients, the solution is to fine-tune that law, not to categorically foreclose the imposition of a duty. 2012 UT 11 , ¶ 37, 275 P.3d 228 .

2012Where "a plaintiff attempts to hold a hospital liable for the conduct of its own physician-employees, 'the defendant hospital is included within the physician-patient privilege and the patient has impliedly consented to the release of his medical information to the defendant hospital's attorneys'" Id., 350 IIl.Dec. 489, 948 N.E.2d at 773 (quoting Morgan v. Cnty. of Cook, 252 Ill.App.3d 947 , 192 Ill.Dec. 176 , 625 N.E.2d 136, 140 (1993)).

2012Where "a plaintiff attempts to hold a hospital liable for the conduct of its own physician-employees, 'the defendant hospital is included within the physician-patient privilege and the patient has impliedly consented to the release of his medical information to the defendant hospital's attorneys'" Id., 350 IIl.Dec. 489, 948 N.E.2d at 773 (quoting Morgan v. Cnty. of Cook, 252 Ill.App.3d 947 , 192 Ill.Dec. 176 , 625 N.E.2d 136, 140 (1993)).

2010Hence, the arguments in Debry do not apply to this case. ¶ 28 In Yount , the court of appeals similarly held that a patient’s right to notice “does not change even where the records allegedly contain communications that qualify as an exception to the physician-patient privilege.” 2008 UT App 102, ¶ 15 , 182 P.3d 405 .

2010Hence, the arguments in Debry do not apply to this case. ¶ 28 In Yount , the court of appeals similarly held that a patient’s right to notice “does not change even where the records allegedly contain communications that qualify as an exception to the physician-patient privilege.” 2008 UT App 102, ¶ 15 , 182 P.3d 405 .

2008See State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, ¶ 41 , 125 P.3d 878 (quashing subpoenas because an attorney improperly subpoenaed a victim's "private mental health records in violation of her right to privacy"); State v. Cramer, 2002 UT 9, ¶ 22 , 44 P.3d 690 (acknowledging a "privacy interest[ ] in privileged mental health records"); State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (stating that the purpose of the physician-patient privilege is to encourage a patient's full disclosure to a physician "in order to receive effective medical treatment, free from the embarrassment and invasion of privacy t

2008See State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, ¶ 41 , 125 P.3d 878 (quashing subpoenas because an attorney improperly subpoenaed a victim's "private mental health records in violation of her right to privacy"); State v. Cramer, 2002 UT 9, ¶ 22 , 44 P.3d 690 (acknowledging a "privacy interest[ ] in privileged mental health records"); State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (stating that the purpose of the physician-patient privilege is to encourage a patient's full disclosure to a physician "in order to receive effective medical treatment, free from the embarrassment and invasion of privacy t

2008Utah courts have determined that " '[elven if the communications may fall into [rule 506(d)(1)'s] exception to [the] privilege, the patient has the right to be notified of the potential disclosure of confidential records."" Sorensen, 2008 UT 8, ¶ 16 , 177 P.3d 614 (quoting Debry, 2000 UT App 58, ¶ 28 , 999 P.2d 582 ).

2008Utah courts have determined that " '[elven if the communications may fall into [rule 506(d)(1)'s] exception to [the] privilege, the patient has the right to be notified of the potential disclosure of confidential records."" Sorensen, 2008 UT 8, ¶ 16 , 177 P.3d 614 (quoting Debry, 2000 UT App 58, ¶ 28 , 999 P.2d 582 ).

2008Id. ¶ 8 This court has previously held that “rule 506 supersedes section 78-25-8(4), and ... rule 506 applies to both criminal and civil proceedings.” Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14 , ¶ 12 & n. 2, 133 P.3d 370 (citing Utah Rule of Evidence 506 advisory committee note (stating that rule 506 is intended to supersede statutory privilege)); see also Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT App 58 , ¶ 24 n. 2, 999 P.2d 582 (holding that the scope of the physician-patient privilege is exclusively controlled by rule 506). ¶ 9 Rule 506 privilege enables a patient to prevent a physician “from disclosing diagnoses made, t

2008Id. ¶ 8 This court has previously held that “rule 506 supersedes section 78-25-8(4), and ... rule 506 applies to both criminal and civil proceedings.” Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14 , ¶ 12 & n. 2, 133 P.3d 370 (citing Utah Rule of Evidence 506 advisory committee note (stating that rule 506 is intended to supersede statutory privilege)); see also Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT App 58 , ¶ 24 n. 2, 999 P.2d 582 (holding that the scope of the physician-patient privilege is exclusively controlled by rule 506). ¶ 9 Rule 506 privilege enables a patient to prevent a physician “from disclosing diagnoses made, t

2000The court concluded that, even though the patient was unwilling, a therapeutic relationship was formed because treatment was the goal, and thus was within the scope of the physician-patient privilege: “Determining whether [a person is] a ‘patient’ does not turn on whether he voluntarily consulted a physician.” Id.

2000Instead, the “controlling fact” in such a determination is whether the encounter is “for the purposes of treatment.” Id. ¶ 22 Although our facts are somewhat different, the policies behind the therapist-patient privilege mandate a similar result.