physician-patient privilege in Arizona

2025Maricopa Cnty., 148 Ariz. 331, 334 (1986) (citations omitted). 3 IN RE: MH 2025-001972 Decision of the Court A. Patient did not impliedly waive the physician-patient privilege because he did not place his mental health “at issue.” ¶13 Patient argues the State first placed his mental health “at issue” when it petitioned for an involuntary treatment order.

2024Consistent with J.F. v. Como, 253 Ariz. 400 , 406, ¶ 32 (App. 2022) (citing Bain v. Superior Court (Mills), 148 Ariz. 331, 334 (1986)), the superior court found that Husband waived the physician-patient privilege by admitting a letter from his physician assistant specializing in psychiatry at the temporary orders hearing and stating his intention to call his therapist to testify at trial.

2019Udall v. Superior Court , 183 Ariz. 462 , 463, 466, 904 P.2d 1286 , 1287, 1289 (App. 1995) (holding that the physician-patient privilege did not shield the medical records of a mother charged with murdering her infant); Benton v. Superior Court , 182 Ariz. 466 , 468, 897 P.2d 1352 , 1354 (App. 1994) ("[T]he public's interest in protecting victims outweighs the privacy interest reflected in the physician-patient privilege."). ¶22 Although we acknowledge that abrogation by implication "is generally disfavored," we have concluded that "it is required when conflicting statutes cannot be harmonized

2019Udall v. Superior Court , 183 Ariz. 462 , 463, 466, 904 P.2d 1286 , 1287, 1289 (App. 1995) (holding that the physician-patient privilege did not shield the medical records of a mother charged with murdering her infant); Benton v. Superior Court , 182 Ariz. 466 , 468, 897 P.2d 1352 , 1354 (App. 1994) ("[T]he public's interest in protecting victims outweighs the privacy interest reflected in the physician-patient privilege."). ¶22 Although we acknowledge that abrogation by implication "is generally disfavored," we have concluded that "it is required when conflicting statutes cannot be harmonized

2025See Waters, 209 Ariz. at 384 ¶ 16 (noting the narrow construction for the clergy-penitent privilege); State v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 390 , 393 ¶ 5 (App. 2001) (noting the narrow construction for the physician-patient privilege).

2019That purpose is served by "protect[ing] information obtained in the physician-patient relationship from disclosure to third parties." Samaritan Health Servs. v. City of Glendale , 148 Ariz. 394 , 397, 714 P.2d 887 , 890 (App. 1986). ¶20 But the physician-patient privilege is not absolute, and the legislature has imposed limitations when "the public good requires [the privilege to] give way to serve a greater good." See Martin v. Reinstein , 195 Ariz. 293 , 320 ¶ 96, 987 P.2d 779 , 806 (App. 1999) ; see also State v. Wilson , 200 Ariz. 390 , 394-95 ¶ 11, 26 P.3d 1161 , 1165-66 (App. 2001).

2009“The physician-patient privilege, codified in Arizona at A.R.S. §§ 12-2235 and 12-2292, exists to foster a patient’s ‘full and frank disclosure of medical history and symptoms’ to his or her physician in order to facilitate the best possible medical treatment.” Carondelet Health Network v. Miller, 221 Ariz. 614, 616, ¶ 6 , 212 P.3d 952, 954 (App.2009) (citing Lewin v. Jackson, 108 Ariz. 27, 31 , 492 P.2d 406, 410 (1972)).

2009“The physician-patient privilege, codified in Arizona at A.R.S. §§ 12-2235 and 12-2292, exists to foster a patient’s ‘full and frank disclosure of medical history and symptoms’ to his or her physician in order to facilitate the best possible medical treatment.” Carondelet Health Network v. Miller, 221 Ariz. 614, 616, ¶ 6 , 212 P.3d 952, 954 (App.2009) (citing Lewin v. Jackson, 108 Ariz. 27, 31 , 492 P.2d 406, 410 (1972)).

2003See State v. Morales, 170 Ariz. 360, 363 , 824 P.2d 756, 759 (App.1991) (“Because there was no such privilege at common law, the statute [creating a physician-patient privilege] must be strictly construed.”).

2003See State v. Morales, 170 Ariz. 360, 363 , 824 P.2d 756, 759 (App.1991) (“Because there was no such privilege at common law, the statute [creating a physician-patient privilege] must be strictly construed.”).

2006Considering a statutory physician-patient privilege similar to the behavioral health profession privilege at issue here, we cited with approval a Washington decision finding “that the public policy mandating prosecution of criminals is more compelling than the physician-patient privilege.” Id. “[The privilege] should not ... become a means whereby criminal activities of third persons may be shielded from detection, prosecution, and punishment, however magnanimous, compassionate or conciliatory the victim might otherwise wish to be.” Id. (quoting State v. Boehme, 71 Wash.2d 621 , 430 P.2d 527,

2006Considering a statutory physician-patient privilege similar to the behavioral health profession privilege at issue here, we cited with approval a Washington decision finding “that the public policy mandating prosecution of criminals is more compelling than the physician-patient privilege.” Id. “[The privilege] should not ... become a means whereby criminal activities of third persons may be shielded from detection, prosecution, and punishment, however magnanimous, compassionate or conciliatory the victim might otherwise wish to be.” Id. (quoting State v. Boehme, 71 Wash.2d 621 , 430 P.2d 527,

2018"Because the language of § 12-2235 'is not significantly different from' § 13-4062(4), 'there is no sound reason why the legal interpretation of the statutes should be any different.'" Wilson, 200 Ariz. at 397 , ¶ 19 (quoting State v. Santeyan, 136 Ariz. 108, 110 (1983)). 6 STATE v. ZEITNER Opinion of the Court justify abrogating the privilege or broadly engrafting a common law 'crime- fraud exception' to the privilege in this particular context." Id. at 395, ¶ 11. ¶20 Wilson's rejection of the asserted common-law exception arose out of the origin of the physician-patient privilege in Arizona.

2005Because the two statutes are “not significantly different!)] ... there is no sound reason why the legal interpretation of the statutes should be any different.” State v. Santeyan, 136 Ariz. 108, 110 , 664 P.2d 652, 654 (1983). 6 .

2019That purpose is served by "protect[ing] information obtained in the physician-patient relationship from disclosure to third parties." Samaritan Health Servs. v. City of Glendale , 148 Ariz. 394 , 397, 714 P.2d 887 , 890 (App. 1986). ¶20 But the physician-patient privilege is not absolute, and the legislature has imposed limitations when "the public good requires [the privilege to] give way to serve a greater good." See Martin v. Reinstein , 195 Ariz. 293 , 320 ¶ 96, 987 P.2d 779 , 806 (App. 1999) ; see also State v. Wilson , 200 Ariz. 390 , 394-95 ¶ 11, 26 P.3d 1161 , 1165-66 (App. 2001).

2019That purpose is served by "protect[ing] information obtained in the physician-patient relationship from disclosure to third parties." Samaritan Health Servs. v. City of Glendale , 148 Ariz. 394 , 397, 714 P.2d 887 , 890 (App. 1986). ¶20 But the physician-patient privilege is not absolute, and the legislature has imposed limitations when "the public good requires [the privilege to] give way to serve a greater good." See Martin v. Reinstein , 195 Ariz. 293 , 320 ¶ 96, 987 P.2d 779 , 806 (App. 1999) ; see also State v. Wilson , 200 Ariz. 390 , 394-95 ¶ 11, 26 P.3d 1161 , 1165-66 (App. 2001).

2019Udall v. Superior Court , 183 Ariz. 462 , 463, 466, 904 P.2d 1286 , 1287, 1289 (App. 1995) (holding that the physician-patient privilege did not shield the medical records of a mother charged with murdering her infant); Benton v. Superior Court , 182 Ariz. 466 , 468, 897 P.2d 1352 , 1354 (App. 1994) ("[T]he public's interest in protecting victims outweighs the privacy interest reflected in the physician-patient privilege."). ¶22 Although we acknowledge that abrogation by implication "is generally disfavored," we have concluded that "it is required when conflicting statutes cannot be harmonized

2019Udall v. Superior Court , 183 Ariz. 462 , 463, 466, 904 P.2d 1286 , 1287, 1289 (App. 1995) (holding that the physician-patient privilege did not shield the medical records of a mother charged with murdering her infant); Benton v. Superior Court , 182 Ariz. 466 , 468, 897 P.2d 1352 , 1354 (App. 1994) ("[T]he public's interest in protecting victims outweighs the privacy interest reflected in the physician-patient privilege."). ¶22 Although we acknowledge that abrogation by implication "is generally disfavored," we have concluded that "it is required when conflicting statutes cannot be harmonized

2019That purpose is served by "protect[ing] information obtained in the physician-patient relationship from disclosure to third parties." Samaritan Health Servs. v. City of Glendale , 148 Ariz. 394 , 397, 714 P.2d 887 , 890 (App. 1986). ¶20 But the physician-patient privilege is not absolute, and the legislature has imposed limitations when "the public good requires [the privilege to] give way to serve a greater good." See Martin v. Reinstein , 195 Ariz. 293 , 320 ¶ 96, 987 P.2d 779 , 806 (App. 1999) ; see also State v. Wilson , 200 Ariz. 390 , 394-95 ¶ 11, 26 P.3d 1161 , 1165-66 (App. 2001).

2019That purpose is served by "protect[ing] information obtained in the physician-patient relationship from disclosure to third parties." Samaritan Health Servs. v. City of Glendale , 148 Ariz. 394 , 397, 714 P.2d 887 , 890 (App. 1986). ¶20 But the physician-patient privilege is not absolute, and the legislature has imposed limitations when "the public good requires [the privilege to] give way to serve a greater good." See Martin v. Reinstein , 195 Ariz. 293 , 320 ¶ 96, 987 P.2d 779 , 806 (App. 1999) ; see also State v. Wilson , 200 Ariz. 390 , 394-95 ¶ 11, 26 P.3d 1161 , 1165-66 (App. 2001).

2009See Ledvina, 213 Ariz. 569, ¶ 3 , 146 P.3d at 72 . ¶ 9 As authority for invoking the physician-patient privilege here, Carondelet relies principally on our supreme court’s statement in Ziegler v. Superior Court, 131 Ariz. 250, 251 , 640 P.2d 181, 182 (1982) (Ziegler I), that disclosing the identities of certain former patients of the defendants in that ease would have violated the privilege.

2009See Ledvina, 213 Ariz. 569, ¶ 3 , 146 P.3d at 72 . ¶ 9 As authority for invoking the physician-patient privilege here, Carondelet relies principally on our supreme court’s statement in Ziegler v. Superior Court, 131 Ariz. 250, 251 , 640 P.2d 181, 182 (1982) (Ziegler I), that disclosing the identities of certain former patients of the defendants in that ease would have violated the privilege.

2020Mental Health Case No. MH 1717-1-85, 149 Ariz. 594, 596 (App. 1986) (rejecting the claim that evaluating physicians breached the physician-patient privilege by testifying in a civil commitment proceeding). ¶9 On appeal, the State does not defend the superior court’s reasoning; instead, the State contends no confidential relationship existed because M.S. did not provide counseling, psychotherapy, or any other behavioral health service to Appellant.

2020Mental Health Case No. MH 1717-1-85, 149 Ariz. 594, 596 (App. 1986) (rejecting the claim that evaluating physicians breached the physician-patient privilege by testifying in a civil commitment proceeding). ¶9 On appeal, the State does not defend the superior court’s reasoning; instead, the State contends no confidential relationship existed because M.S. did not provide counseling, psychotherapy, or any other behavioral health service to Appellant.

2017Information is privileged when acquired by a physician or surgeon in a consultation with the patient under circumstances in which “it is intended that the communication be private and confidential.” State v. Beaty, 158 Ariz. 232, 239-40 , 762 P.2d 519, 526-27 (1988) (“The presence of third parties can eliminate the confidential character of the [communication] and destroy the privilege.”); see also State v. Thomas, 78 Ariz. 52, 63 , 275 P.2d 408, 416 (1954), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Pina, 94 Ariz. 243, 245 , 383 P.2d 167, 168 (1963).

2017Information is privileged when acquired by a physician or surgeon in a consultation with the patient under circumstances in which “it is intended that the communication be private and confidential.” State v. Beaty, 158 Ariz. 232, 239-40 , 762 P.2d 519, 526-27 (1988) (“The presence of third parties can eliminate the confidential character of the [communication] and destroy the privilege.”); see also State v. Thomas, 78 Ariz. 52, 63 , 275 P.2d 408, 416 (1954), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Pina, 94 Ariz. 243, 245 , 383 P.2d 167, 168 (1963).

2009Special action is the proper means to seek relief.” Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Superior Court, 159 Ariz. 24, 25-26 , 764 P.2d 759, 760-61 (App. 1988); see also Ariz. R.

2009Special action is the proper means to seek relief.” Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Superior Court, 159 *616 Ariz. 24, 25-26, 764 P.2d 759, 760-61 (App.1988); see also Ariz. R.P.

2009See Ledvina, 213 Ariz. 569, ¶ 3 , 146 P.3d at 72 . ¶ 9 As authority for invoking the physician-patient privilege here, Carondelet relies principally on our supreme court’s statement in Ziegler v. Superior Court, 131 Ariz. 250, 251 , 640 P.2d 181, 182 (1982) (Ziegler I), that disclosing the identities of certain former patients of the defendants in that ease would have violated the privilege.

2009See Ledvina, 213 Ariz. 569, ¶ 3 , 146 P.3d at 72 . ¶ 9 As authority for invoking the physician-patient privilege here, Carondelet relies principally on our supreme court’s statement in Ziegler v. Superior Court, 131 Ariz. 250, 251 , 640 P.2d 181, 182 (1982) (Ziegler I), that disclosing the identities of certain former patients of the defendants in that ease would have violated the privilege.

2005A defendant in a prosecution for crime has no right to claim the protection.”); People v. Palomo, 31 P.3d 879, 885 (Colo. 2001) (“[I]t falls not to [a] defendant . . . to raise issues concerning the medical records in [the victim’s] file . . . .”); State v. Evans, 802 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Mo. 1991) (defendant convicted of raping his girlfriend was “without standing to object to the introduction of [her] records”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 452 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363 (N.Y. 1982) (“[A] person . . . subject to proceedings for having committed crimes against an individual should not be permitted

2005A defendant in a prosecution for crime has no right to claim the protection.”); People v. Palomo, 31 P.3d 879, 885 (Colo. 2001) (“[I]t falls not to [a] defendant ... to raise issues concerning the medical records in [the victim’s] file____”); State v. Evans, 802 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Mo.1991) (defendant convicted of raping his girlfriend was “without standing to object to the introduction of [her] records”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 56 N.Y.2d 348 , 452 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363 , 437 N.E.2d 1118 (1982) (“[A] person ... subject to proceedings for having committed crimes against an individual shou

2005We also note that “the burden of demonstrating waiver [of the physician-patient privilege] rests with the party seeking to overcome the privilege.” Alcon v. Spicer, 113 P.3d 735, 739 (Colo. 2005). 6 in protecting victims outweighs the privacy interest reflected in the physician-patient privilege.” Id. at 468, 897 P.2d at 1354 ; see generally State v. Karcher, 98 N.E.2d 308, 312 (Ohio 1951) (“[C]ourts have sometimes sought, by main force, to set limits [on the physician-patient privilege] and prevent its evil effects, namely, in cases where the physician . . . has acted on behalf of the victim

2005We also note that "the burden of demonstrating waiver [of the physician-patient privilege] rests with the party seeking to overcome the privilege." Alcon v. Spicer, 113 P.3d 735, 739 (Colo.2005). 5 .

2005The court further stated that “the public’s interest in protecting victims outweighs the privacy interest reflected in the physician-patient privilege.” Id. at 468 , 897 P.2d at 1354 ; see generally State v. Karcher, 155 Ohio St. 253 , 98 N.E.2d 308, 312 (1951) (“[C]ourts have sometimes sought, by main force, to set limits [on the physician-patient privilege] and prevent its evil effects, namely, in cases where the physician ... has acted on behalf of the victim of a crime.”). ¶ 10 In State v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 390 , 26 P.3d 1161 (App.2001), this court distinguished Benton and upheld a claim o

2005The court further stated that “the public’s interest in protecting victims outweighs the privacy interest reflected in the physician-patient privilege.” Id. at 468 , 897 P.2d at 1354 ; see generally State v. Karcher, 155 Ohio St. 253 , 98 N.E.2d 308, 312 (1951) (“[C]ourts have sometimes sought, by main force, to set limits [on the physician-patient privilege] and prevent its evil effects, namely, in cases where the physician ... has acted on behalf of the victim of a crime.”). ¶ 10 In State v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 390 , 26 P.3d 1161 (App.2001), this court distinguished Benton and upheld a claim o

2005See State v. Geist, 142 Ariz. 375, 379 , 690 P.2d 94, 98 (App.1984) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that authorizing release of one’s medical records to department of public safety was not sufficient to waive privilege in criminal proceeding); see also Bain v. Superior Court, 148 Ariz. 331, 334 , 714 P.2d 824, 827 (1986) (”[W]aiver of the physician-patient privilege is two-fold: where a privilege holder (1) offers himself as a witness and voluntarily testifies with reference to privileged communications concerning the condition, ... or (2) places a particular medical condi

2005See State v. Geist, 142 Ariz. 375, 379 , 690 P.2d 94, 98 (App.1984) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that authorizing release of one’s medical records to department of public safety was not sufficient to waive privilege in criminal proceeding); see also Bain v. Superior Court, 148 Ariz. 331, 334 , 714 P.2d 824, 827 (1986) (”[W]aiver of the physician-patient privilege is two-fold: where a privilege holder (1) offers himself as a witness and voluntarily testifies with reference to privileged communications concerning the condition, ... or (2) places a particular medical condi

2005A defendant in a prosecution for crime has no right to claim the protection.”); People v. Palomo, 31 P.3d 879, 885 (Colo. 2001) (“[I]t falls not to [a] defendant ... to raise issues concerning the medical records in [the victim’s] file____”); State v. Evans, 802 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Mo.1991) (defendant convicted of raping his girlfriend was “without standing to object to the introduction of [her] records”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 56 N.Y.2d 348 , 452 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363 , 437 N.E.2d 1118 (1982) (“[A] person ... subject to proceedings for having committed crimes against an individual shou

2005A defendant in a prosecution for crime has no right to claim the protection.”); People v. Palomo, 31 P.3d 879, 885 (Colo. 2001) (“[I]t falls not to [a] defendant ... to raise issues concerning the medical records in [the victim’s] file____”); State v. Evans, 802 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Mo.1991) (defendant convicted of raping his girlfriend was “without standing to object to the introduction of [her] records”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 56 N.Y.2d 348 , 452 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363 , 437 N.E.2d 1118 (1982) (“[A] person ... subject to proceedings for having committed crimes against an individual shou

2005A defendant in a prosecution for crime has no right to claim the protection.”); People v. Palomo, 31 P.3d 879, 885 (Colo. 2001) (“[I]t falls not to [a] defendant . . . to raise issues concerning the medical records in [the victim’s] file . . . .”); State v. Evans, 802 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Mo. 1991) (defendant convicted of raping his girlfriend was “without standing to object to the introduction of [her] records”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 452 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363 (N.Y. 1982) (“[A] person . . . subject to proceedings for having committed crimes against an individual should not be permitted

2005A defendant in a prosecution for crime has no right to claim the protection.”); People v. Palomo, 31 P.3d 879, 885 (Colo. 2001) (“[I]t falls not to [a] defendant ... to raise issues concerning the medical records in [the victim’s] file____”); State v. Evans, 802 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Mo.1991) (defendant convicted of raping his girlfriend was “without standing to object to the introduction of [her] records”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 56 N.Y.2d 348 , 452 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363 , 437 N.E.2d 1118 (1982) (“[A] person ... subject to proceedings for having committed crimes against an individual shou

2019Id. at 234–35. ¶16 On appeal, this court held that when a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial directly conflicts with the physician-patient privilege or the VBR, then due process is the superior right.

2007However, he relies on State ex rel Romley v. Superior Court (Roper), 172 Ariz. 232 , 836 P.2d 445 (App.1992), to argue that his due process right to present a complete defense and to cross-examine witnesses entitles him to the records and overcomes both the physician-patient privilege and any rights the victim’s parents have under the Victims’ Bill of Rights. ¶ 8 Roper, however, did not authorize a wholesale production of the victim’s medical records to the defendant.

1970In State v. Evans, 104 Ariz. 434 , 454 P. 2d 976 , tried before the adoption of § 13-1621.01, A.R.S., we held: “The general rule is that a physician-patient privilege does not arise when the defendant is being examined at the instance of the court or the prosecutor for ■the purpose of determining his mental or physical condition.

1970In State v. Evans, 104 Ariz. 434 , 454 P. 2d 976 , tried before the adoption of § 13-1621.01, A.R.S., we held: “The general rule is that a physician-patient privilege does not arise when the defendant is being examined at the instance of the court or the prosecutor for ■the purpose of determining his mental or physical condition.

2017She contends that a “nonparty cannot be forced to waive their privilege for another party’s lawsuit.” ¶14 The District relies on Duquette, in which this court concluded that a minor patient’s parents impliedly waived the physician-patient privilege by placing their minor son’s medical condition at issue through initiation of a medical malpractice suit. 161 Ariz. at 272 .

2017Id. ¶15 In this case, Mother is the only named plaintiff.