physician-patient privilege in Texas

2023They also disagree as to whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to examine the documents in camera. 9 The Texas Supreme Court’s test for the litigation exception to the physician- patient privilege recognizes that “just because a condition may be ‘relevant’ to a claim or defense does not mean a party ‘relies upon the condition as a part of the party’s claim or defense.’” Id. at 842 (emphasis omitted).

2018The Supreme Court, in Ramirez, stated that in order for an exception to the physician-patient privilege to apply, the “scope of the exception should be tied in a meaningful way to the legal consequences of the claim or defense.” Id. at 2 842 (rejecting an interpretation that relies on relevance alone).

2025Id; State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Hardy, 963 S.W.2d at 519–23 (citing TEX.

2025Ramirez at 839-40 , citing Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex.1985).

2016Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 164 (Tex.1998) (orig.proceeding) (the attorney-client privilege); Owen s-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell, 818 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex.1991) (orig.proceeding) (the work-product privilege); Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107-08 (Tex.1985) (orig.proceeding) (the physician-patient privilege).

2011See Fort Worth Children's Hosp., 100 S.W.3d at 589 (holding that where hospital failed to present evidence that documents the subject of a discovery request were created or maintained by a physician, it failed to carry its burden to prove that the documents were subject to the physician-patient privilege).

2011See Fort Worth Children's Hosp., 100 S.W.3d at 589 (holding that where hospital failed to present evidence that documents the subject of a discovery request were created or maintained by a physician, it failed to carry its burden to prove that the documents were subject to the physician-patient privilege).

2011See also Walgreen Co. v. Hieger, 243 S.W. 3d 183, 186 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (finding that a registered pharmacist and clinical professor at the College of Pharmacy at the University of Texas was not a "physician").

2011See also Walgreen Co. v. Hieger, 243 S.W. 3d 183, 186 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (finding that a registered pharmacist and clinical professor at the College of Pharmacy at the University of Texas was not a "physician").

1991The plaintiff's motion to strike the expert witness characterized the privilege as a "fiduciary duty" to the patient not to be employed as an expert witness against the patient's interests. [1] Unlike the party seeking discovery in Mutter v. Wood, 744 S.W.2d 600 (Tex.1988), Humana did not ask for a broad authorization requiring the plaintiff to waive the physician-patient privilege completely, even concerning irrelevant matters. *547 This court has not held that the trial court's ruling was correct but that Humana has not met the procedural requirements for mandamus.

1991The plaintiff’s motion to strike the expert witness characterized the privilege as a “fiduciary duty” to the patient not to be employed as an expert witness against the patient’s interests. 1 Unlike the party seeking discovery in Mutter v. Wood, 744 S.W.2d 600 (Tex.1988), Humana did not ask for a broad authorization requiring the plaintiff to waive the physician-patient privilege completely, even concerning irrelevant matters.

2001The policy behind this rule seems to be that, although “[sjociety can afford the physician-patient privilege in certain civil cases to protect privacy, the need to protect the public from crime requires disclosure of the same information in criminal cases.” See Thurman, 861 S.W.2d at 100 .

1997The Court of Appeals in McBride , relying on its decision in Thurman v. State, 861 S.W.2d 96 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no pet.), noted that the section of the Medical Practice Act dealing with the confidentiality of patient’s medical records (and upon which the plurality in Comeaux heavily relied) was repealed, being replaced by a rule of evidence, authored by the Court of Criminal Appeals, that totally eliminated the physician-patient privilege in criminal cases.

2005Exceptions to confidentiality or privilege in administrative proceedings or in civil proceedings in court exist: [[Image here]] (4) as to a communication or record relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of a patient in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as a part of the party’s claim or defense[.] The Supreme Court has held that when this exception applies, the physician-patient privilege is terminated “even though the patient is not a party to the litigation.” 3 R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836 , *602 842 (Tex.1994); see also In re Whitele

2005Exceptions to confidentiality or privilege in administrative proceedings or in civil proceedings in court exist: . . . . (4) as to a communication or record relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of a patient in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as a part of the party's claim or defense[.] The Supreme Court has held that when this exception applies, the physician-patient privilege is terminated "even though the patient is not a party to the litigation." (3) R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 842 (Tex. 1994); see also In re Whiteley, 79 S.W.

2004Id. (citing, among others cases, Mull v. String, 448 So.2d 952, 954 (Ala.1984); Sagmiller v. Carlsen, 219 N.W.2d 885, 896 (N.D.1974); Mattison v. Poulen, 134 Vt. 158, 163 , 353 A.2d 327, 331 (1976)).

2004Id. (citing, among others cases, Mull v. String , 448 So.2d 952, 954 (Ala. 1984); Sagmiller v. Carlsen , 219 S.W.2d 885 , 896 (N.D. 1974); Mattison v. Poulen , 134 Vt. 158, 163 , 353 A.2d 327, 331 (1976)).

2004Id. (citing, among others cases, Mull v. String, 448 So.2d 952, 954 (Ala.1984); Sagmiller v. Carlsen, 219 N.W.2d 885, 896 (N.D.1974); Mattison v. Poulen, 134 Vt. 158, 163 , 353 A.2d 327, 331 (1976)).

2004Id. (citing, among others cases, Mull v. String, 448 So.2d 952, 954 (Ala.1984); Sagmiller v. Carlsen, 219 N.W.2d 885, 896 (N.D.1974); Mattison v. Poulen, 134 Vt. 158, 163 , 353 A.2d 327, 331 (1976)).

2017The court held that “[although the hospitals pleaded preexisting condition as ... an affirmative defense, that defensive theory is in the nature of an inferential rebuttal, not an ultimate issue of fact that alone has legal significance”, and that “the records in question, if protected by the physician-patient privilege, are not discoverable under the patient-litigant exception to that privilege.” Id.

2014P. 52.8(c); see also In re Nance, 143 S.W.3d 506, 514 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, orig. proceeding) (explaining “[a]ny disclosure should be no broader than necessary and it is a trial court’s obligation to oversee and safeguard the records to ensure unnecessary matters are not disclosed,” and ordering the trial court to vacate its order and review documents at issue in camera to determine whether each is subject to the physician-patient privilege); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 S.W.3d 573, 579-80 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (holding discovery requests could have been mor

2016Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 164 (Tex.1998) (orig.proceeding) (the attorney-client privilege); Owen s-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell, 818 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex.1991) (orig.proceeding) (the work-product privilege); Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107-08 (Tex.1985) (orig.proceeding) (the physician-patient privilege).

1996Republic Ins, 856 S.W.2d at 163 . 6 *922 In assessing the application of the physician-patient privilege in this case, we first consider whether a condition of Dr. Levine’s patients is part of a claim or defense in the case as reflected on the face of the pleadings.

2019See Absalon v. State, 460 S.W.3d 158, 162-63 (Tex. Crim.

2017Evid. 509(e)(4). ■Relying in part on In re Jarvis, 431 S.W.3d 129, 136 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, orig. proceeding), relator contends that (1) “it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to order production of medical and billing records for injuries unrelated to those alleged in the lawsuit,” and (2) “the requests for all of Decedent’s medical records are overbroad, invade the patient-physician privilege under Texas Jaw, and are outside the scope of discovery in this case.” Relying in part on In re Kristensen, No, 14-14-00448-CV, 2014 WL 3778903 , at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14

2017See In re Jarvis, 431 S.W.3d at 134-36 .

2016See In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309, 322 (Tex. 2009) (summarizing the proper procedures for discovery of electronic materials).

2016Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 164 (Tex.1998) (orig.proceeding) (the attorney-client privilege); Owen s-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell, 818 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex.1991) (orig.proceeding) (the work-product privilege); Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107-08 (Tex.1985) (orig.proceeding) (the physician-patient privilege).

2014P. 52.8(c); see also In re Nance, 143 S.W.3d 506, 514 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, orig. proceeding) (explaining “[a]ny disclosure should be no broader than necessary and it is a trial court’s obligation to oversee and safeguard the records to ensure unnecessary matters are not disclosed,” and ordering the trial court to vacate its order and review documents at issue in camera to determine whether each is subject to the physician-patient privilege); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 S.W.3d 573, 579-80 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (holding discovery requests could have been mor

2014P. 52.8(c); see also In re Nance, 143 S.W.3d 506, 514 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, orig. proceeding) (explaining “[a]ny disclosure should be no broader than necessary and it is a trial court’s obligation to oversee and safeguard the records to ensure unnecessary matters are not disclosed,” and ordering the trial court to vacate its order and review documents at issue in camera to determine whether each is subject to the physician-patient privilege); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 S.W.3d 573, 579-80 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (holding discovery requests could have been mor

2009Mutter , 744 S.W.2d at 601.

2009See Mutter , 744 S.W.2d at 601 (physician-patient privilege remains in effect for communications and records not relevant to underlying suit).

2004Id. (citing, among others cases, Mull v. String, 448 So.2d 952, 954 (Ala.1984); Sagmiller v. Carlsen, 219 N.W.2d 885, 896 (N.D.1974); Mattison v. Poulen, 134 Vt. 158, 163 , 353 A.2d 327, 331 (1976)).

2003See In re Steger Energy Corp. , No. 04-01-00556-CV, 04-01-00670-CV, 2002 WL 663645 , at *4 (Tex. App.-San Antonio April 24, 2002, orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication) (appellate court declined to address issue not argued before trial court); Kavanaugh v. Perkins , 838 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding) (privilege raised for first time in petition for writ of mandamus is waived).

1999However, “merely because a person ... has filed a claim with an insurance company does not necessarily mean the person ... has consented to making his medical records public.” See In re Dolezal, 970 S.W.2d 650, 652-53 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi, 1998, orig. proceeding) (holding that trial court abused its discretion in ordering chiropractor to disclose the identity of all patients that had any type of connection to the plaintiffs attorneys and to produce all billing records for services rendered to attorneys or patients). 12 Likewise, to the extent that other documents, such as checks, bills o