totality of circumstances test in Louisiana

2009In State v. Fernandez, 96-2719, p. 10 (La.4/14/98), 712 So.2d 485, 489 , our supreme court stated, “[a] confession by a juvenile given without a knowing and voluntary waiver can be, and should be, suppressed under the totality of circumstances standard applicable to adults, supplemented by consideration of other very significant factors relevant to the juvenile status of the accused.” 3 Additionally, |/‘special needs of juveniles in this regard are analogous to the special need of individuals with mental deficiencies which are simply factored into the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 489

2009In State v. Fernandez, 96-2719, p. 10 (La.4/14/98), 712 So.2d 485, 489 , our supreme court stated, “[a] confession by a juvenile given without a knowing and voluntary waiver can be, and should be, suppressed under the totality of circumstances standard applicable to adults, supplemented by consideration of other very significant factors relevant to the juvenile status of the accused.” 3 Additionally, |/‘special needs of juveniles in this regard are analogous to the special need of individuals with mental deficiencies which are simply factored into the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 489

2009“Such circumstances include ‘evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence.’ Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979).” State v. Maise, 00-1158, p. 12 (La.1/15/02), 805 So.2d 1141, 1150 .

2009"Such circumstances include `evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence.' Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)." State v. Maise, 00-1158, p. 12 (La.1/15/02), 805 So.2d 1141, 1150 .

2009The determination of whether a waiver of constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary is made on a case-by-case basis and such a determination rests upon the "totality of the circumstances." Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 , reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 , 100 S.Ct. 186 , 62 L.Ed.2d 121 (1979); State v. Fernandez, 96-2719, p. 7 (La.4/4/98), 712 So.2d 485, 487 . *1267 In State v. Fernandez, 96-2719, p. 10 (La.4/14/98), 712 So.2d 485, 489 , our supreme court stated, "[a] confession by a juvenile given without a knowing and voluntary waiver can be, and should be,

2009The determination of whether a waiver of constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary is made on a case-by-case basis and such a determination rests upon the "totality of the circumstances." Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 , reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 , 100 S.Ct. 186 , 62 L.Ed.2d 121 (1979); State v. Fernandez, 96-2719, p. 7 (La.4/4/98), 712 So.2d 485, 487 . *1267 In State v. Fernandez, 96-2719, p. 10 (La.4/14/98), 712 So.2d 485, 489 , our supreme court stated, "[a] confession by a juvenile given without a knowing and voluntary waiver can be, and should be,

2003Presence of Shirley Raiford In State v. Fernandez, 96-2719 (La.4/14/98), 712 So.2d 485 , the Louisiana *942 Supreme Court held that the determination of whether a juvenile knowingly waived his Miranda rights was based on consideration of the totality of circumstances standard applicable to adults, overruling State in the Interest of Dino, 359 So.2d 586 (La.1978), cert. denied sub nom.

1979This Court felt, however, that the "exclusive use of the totality of circumstances test in relation to waivers by juveniles tends to mire the courts in a morass of speculation." To end this speculation on the part of both the courts and the police, it was decided that to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver on his part, the State "must affirmatively show that the juvenile engaged in a meaningful consultation with an attorney or an informed parent, guardian, or other adult interested in his welfare before he waived his right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination." This Cou

1985Collum states: "[A]n extremely detrimental effect upon the administration of justice would result from a retroactive application of the Dino rule requiring the release of all persons convicted on the basis of custodial interrogations under the totality of circumstances test." 365 So.2d 1272 at 1277 .

1979The same contention was made in State v. Collum, supra, and was rejected on two grounds: (1) our statute allows those 15 years old or older to be detained in an adult detention place if in a separate room or ward; (2) improper detention is only a factor in the totality of circumstances test for free and voluntary nature of a confession and does not invalidate per se a confession obtained during the statute’s violation.

1981Const. art. 1, § 13 (1974). [2] See State v. Hills, 354 So.2d 186 (La.1977); State v. Hall, 350 So.2d 141 (La.1977). [3] Justice Lemmon notes that this statement in Dino was not necessary to the decision holding the confession inadmissible and that nothing in the present decision should be taken to indicate his approval of the abrogation of the totality of circumstances test.

1979La.Rev.Stat. 15:451; State v. Hills, 354 So.2d 186 (La.1977).

2009The determination of whether a waiver of constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary is made on a case-by-case basis and such a determination rests upon the "totality of the circumstances." Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 , reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 , 100 S.Ct. 186 , 62 L.Ed.2d 121 (1979); State v. Fernandez, 96-2719, p. 7 (La.4/4/98), 712 So.2d 485, 487 . *1267 In State v. Fernandez, 96-2719, p. 10 (La.4/14/98), 712 So.2d 485, 489 , our supreme court stated, "[a] confession by a juvenile given without a knowing and voluntary waiver can be, and should be,

2006The appellants raise the following assignments of error: 1) the district court erred in granting the Folger Coffee Company's motion for summary judgment and *18 in finding that the Folger Coffee Company is the statutory employer of Mr. Dominio because the facts used by the district court to arrive at its conclusions do not support the totality of circumstances analysis articulated by Kirkland v. Riverwood International USA, Inc., 95-1830 (La.9/13/96), 681 So.2d 329 ; 2) the district court erred in finding that Mr. Dominio's work as a truck driver was non-specialized and thus part of the Folger

2003Louisiana v.Dino, 439 U.S. 1047 , 99 S.Ct. 722 , 58 L.Ed.2d 706 (1978).

2003Louisiana v.Dino, 439 U.S. 1047 , 99 S.Ct. 722 , 58 L.Ed.2d 706 (1978).

2000The defendant argues that his case is indistinguishable from State v. Carey, 609 So.2d 897 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992) and State v. Ruffin, 448 So.2d 1274 (La.1984) wherein courts found that lack of corroboration of an informant's tip rendered investigatory stops invalid.

2000The defendant argues that his case is indistinguishable from State v. Carey, 609 So.2d 897 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992) and State v. Ruffin, 448 So.2d 1274 (La.1984) wherein courts found that lack of corroboration of an informant's tip rendered investigatory stops invalid.

1998The court first shifted from a per se rule to a rebuttable presumption, Commonwealth v. Christmas, 502 Pa. 218 , 465 A.2d 989 (1983), and then returned to a totality of the circumstances standard, Commonwealth v. Williams, 504 Pa. 511 , 475 A.2d 1283 (1984), reasoning: The per se ... rule, in discarding the totality of circumstances test, negated the relevance of all those factors which should be and must be considered in deciding whether a confession was knowingly and voluntarily given.

1998The court first shifted from a per se rule to a rebuttable presumption, Commonwealth v. Christmas, 502 Pa. 218 , 465 A.2d 989 (1983), and then returned to a totality of the circumstances standard, Commonwealth v. Williams, 504 Pa. 511 , 475 A.2d 1283 (1984), reasoning: The per se ... rule, in discarding the totality of circumstances test, negated the relevance of all those factors which should be and must be considered in deciding whether a confession was knowingly and voluntarily given.

1998The court first shifted from a per se rule to a rebuttable presumption, Commonwealth v. Christmas, 502 Pa. 218 , 465 A.2d 989 (1983), and then returned to a totality of the circumstances standard, Commonwealth v. Williams, 504 Pa. 511 , 475 A.2d 1283 (1984), reasoning: The per se ... rule, in discarding the totality of circumstances test, negated the relevance of all those factors which should be and must be considered in deciding whether a confession was knowingly and voluntarily given.

1998The court first shifted from a per se rule to a rebuttable presumption, Commonwealth v. Christmas, 502 Pa. 218 , 465 A.2d 989 (1983), and then returned to a totality of the circumstances standard, Commonwealth v. Williams, 504 Pa. 511 , 475 A.2d 1283 (1984), reasoning: The per se ... rule, in discarding the totality of circumstances test, negated the relevance of all those factors which should be and must be considered in deciding whether a confession was knowingly and voluntarily given.

1991Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). 360 F.Supp. at 70 .

1991Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). 360 F.Supp. at 70 .

1991Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). 360 F.Supp. at 70 .

1988In State v. Copeland, 419 So.2d 899 (La. 1982), the defendant was asked to come to the police station to help with a missing persons investigation.

1986However, applying such a test, as the United States Supreme Court did in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and as the Supreme Court of Louisiana did in State v. Dauzat, 364 So.2d 1000 (La.1978), and in other cases, we find that the identification method was not impermissibly suggestive and that the procedure did not give rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.

1986However, applying such a test, as the United States Supreme Court did in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and as the Supreme Court of Louisiana did in State v. Dauzat, 364 So.2d 1000 (La.1978), and in other cases, we find that the identification method was not impermissibly suggestive and that the procedure did not give rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.

1986However, applying such a test, as the United States Supreme Court did in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and as the Supreme Court of Louisiana did in State v. Dauzat, 364 So.2d 1000 (La.1978), and in other cases, we find that the identification method was not impermissibly suggestive and that the procedure did not give rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.

1985The totality of circumstances analysis, established by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and recognized in Louisiana, justifies the instant warrants.

1985The totality of circumstances analysis, established by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and recognized in Louisiana, justifies the instant warrants.

1981Const. art. 1, § 13 (1974). [2] See State v. Hills, 354 So.2d 186 (La.1977); State v. Hall, 350 So.2d 141 (La.1977). [3] Justice Lemmon notes that this statement in Dino was not necessary to the decision holding the confession inadmissible and that nothing in the present decision should be taken to indicate his approval of the abrogation of the totality of circumstances test.

1981What this court said in Robinson, supra, can be repeated here: "...

1979State in the Interest of Wesley, 285 So.2d 308 (La.App. 1973).

1979In its impact on the law and police custodial interrogation, this decision may be likened to the United States Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), in which the Court made the giving of certain warnings or rights an absolute prerequisite to the admissibility of an in-custody confession.

1979In its impact on the law and police custodial interrogation, this decision may be likened to the United States Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), in which the Court made the giving of certain warnings or rights an absolute prerequisite to the admissibility of an in-custody confession.