totality of circumstances test in Illinois

1989Ed. 2d 721 , 104 S. Ct. 2085 (holding that a totality of circumstances standard was proper for determining probable cause for issuance of a search warrant based on information from an informant).

1987(Massachusetts v. Upton (1984), 466 U.S. 727, 728 , 80 L.

1988(Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213 , 76 L.

1988(Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213 , 76 L.

2012See Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 ; Green, 225 Ill. 2d at 622 ; People v. Layhew, 139 Ill. 2d 476, 486 (1990) (applying a totality of circumstances test in a somewhat different context to determine whether certain jury instructions denied the defendant a fair trial). ¶ 56 In the present case, after reviewing the record, we find that no due process violation occurred.

2012See Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 ; Green, 225 Ill. 2d at 622 ; Layhew, 139 -11- Ill. 2d at 486 (applying a totality of circumstances test, in a somewhat different context, to determine whether certain jury instructions denied the defendant a fair trial). ¶ 49 In the present case, I cannot draw such a conclusion.

2007People v. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387, 397 , 546 N.E.2d 561 (1989).

2007People v. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387, 397 , 546 N.E.2d 561 (1989).

2004See generally State v. Jason L. , 129 N.M. 119, 126 , 2 P.3d 856, 863 (2000) (characteristics such as whether the person being questioned is a child or an adult are objective and relevant to the question of whether a reasonable person would feel free to terminate questioning and leave); Ramirez v. State , 739 So. 2d 568, 574 (Fla. 1999) (applying “reasonable juvenile” standard to determine whether defendant would have believed he was in custody at the time of the interrogation); State v. Smith , 546 N.W. 2d 916, 923 (Iowa 1996) (“it is appropriate to consider the age of the defendant as an add

2004See generally State v. Jason L., 129 N.M. 119, 126 , 2 P.3d 856, 863 (2000) (characteristics such as whether the person being questioned is a child or an adult are objective and relevant to the question of whether a reasonable person would feel free to terminate questioning and leave); Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568, 574 (Fla. 1999) (applying “reasonable juvenile” standard to determine whether defendant would have believed he was in custody at the time of the interrogation); State v. Smith, 546 N.W.2d 916, 923 (Iowa 1996) (“it is approprite to consider the age of the defendants as an additio

2004The Alvarado court then observed, “When we survey the landscape of state court decisions, we note that every jurisdiction that has squarely addressed the issue has ruled that juvenile status is relevant to the ‘in custody’ determination, either as a factor in the totality of circumstances test, or by way of modification to the reasonable person standard. ” (Emphasis added.) Alvarado , 316 F.3d at 850 n.5 (collecting cases).

2004The Alvarado court then observed, “When we survey the landscape of state court decisions, we note that every jurisdiction that has squarely addressed the issue has ruled that juvenile status is relevant to the ‘in custody’ determination, either as a factor in the totality of circumstances test, or by way of modification to the reasonable person standard.” (Emphasis added.) Alvarado, 316 F.3d at 850 n.5 (collecting cases).

1999App. 3d 850 , 651 N.E.2d 731 (1995)), the policy underlying the Contribution Act, which encourages the equitable apportionment of damages (Bowers, 272 Ill.

1999App. 3d 850 , 651 N.E.2d 731 (1995)), the policy underlying the Contribution Act which encourages the equitable apportionment of damages ( Bowers, 272 Ill.

1999Rather, the court should conduct a totality of circumstances analysis, considering the present cash value of the settling defendant’s workers’ compensation liability (Chaney v. National Steel Corp., 272 Ill.

1999Rather, the court should conduct a totality of circumstances analysis, considering the present cash value of the settling defendant's workers' compensation liability ( Chaney v. National Steel Corp., 272 Ill.

1987Ed. 2d 637 , 89 S. Ct. 584 , was rejected in Gates, and, instead, the Supreme Court adopted the totality of circumstances analysis.

1985Ed. 2d 637 , 89 S. Ct. 584 , instead reaffirming the totality of circumstances analysis enunciated in Gates.

2026Id.

2013Id.

1996Although it is preferable to have parents present during questioning ( People v. Johnson, 236 Ill.App.3d 125, 132 , 177 Ill.Dec. 554 , 603 N.E.2d 624 (1992)), their presence is only one factor to consider under the totality of circumstances test.

1996Although it is preferable to have parents present during questioning ( People v. Johnson, 236 Ill.App.3d 125, 132 , 177 Ill.Dec. 554 , 603 N.E.2d 624 (1992)), their presence is only one factor to consider under the totality of circumstances test.

1996Williams, 275 Ill.

1996Williams, 275 Ill.

1995App. 3d at 854 , 596 N.E.2d at 1286-87 .) It then evaluated the circuit court’s ruling using the totality of the circumstances standard, and concluded that the circuit court had applied a totality of circumstances standard and not a per se standard and thus affirmed the circuit court’s suppression order.

1995The appellate court said that "there is no per se rule that juveniles must be allowed to consult with their parents prior to questioning." The court also stated that "it is well-settled that the voluntariness of a juvenile's confession is to be determined by the totality of the circumstances." ( J.O., 231 Ill.App.3d at 854 , 173 Ill.Dec. at 407-08 , 596 N.E.2d at 1286-87 .) It then evaluated the circuit court's ruling using the totality of the circumstances standard, and concluded that the circuit court had applied a totality of circumstances standard and not a per se standard and thus affirme

1995App. 3d at 181 , 522 N.E.2d at 640 .) In McGhee, the court, in suppressing the confession of a juvenile because of an illegal arrest, applied the totality of circumstances test and said that denying the juvenile’s mother the opportunity to see him and not having a youth officer present "does not per se constitute a denial of the defendant’s rights.” McGhee, 154 Ill.

1995In Cole , the court suppressed a juvenile's confession because of an illegal arrest and recognized that failure to notify a parent or to have a youth officer present was properly considered, "but that a violation of the statute was not a per se denial of a juvenile's constitutional rights." ( Cole, 168 Ill.App.3d at 181 , 118 Ill.Dec. at 970 , 522 N.E.2d at 640 .) In McGhee , the court, in suppressing the confession of a juvenile because of an illegal arrest, applied the totality of circumstances test and said that denying the juvenile's mother the opportunity to see him and not having a youth

1995App. 3d at 181 , 522 N.E.2d at 640 .) In McGhee, the court, in suppressing the confession of a juvenile because of an illegal arrest, applied the totality of circumstances test and said that denying the juvenile’s mother the opportunity to see him and not having a youth officer present "does not per se constitute a denial of the defendant’s rights.” McGhee, 154 Ill.

1995In Cole , the court suppressed a juvenile's confession because of an illegal arrest and recognized that failure to notify a parent or to have a youth officer present was properly considered, "but that a violation of the statute was not a per se denial of a juvenile's constitutional rights." ( Cole, 168 Ill.App.3d at 181 , 118 Ill.Dec. at 970 , 522 N.E.2d at 640 .) In McGhee , the court, in suppressing the confession of a juvenile because of an illegal arrest, applied the totality of circumstances test and said that denying the juvenile's mother the opportunity to see him and not having a youth

1989(People v. Johnson (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 62 , 302 N.E.2d 20 .) The question is whether the confession was made freely, voluntarily, and without any compulsion or inducement of any sort (Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489 , 237 N.E.2d 466 ), or whether the accused’s will was overborne.

1989(People v. Johnson (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 62 , 302 N.E.2d 20 .) The question is whether the confession was made freely, voluntarily, and without any compulsion or inducement of any sort (Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489 , 237 N.E.2d 466 ), or whether the accused’s will was overborne.

1989(People v. Johnson (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 62 , 302 N.E.2d 20 .) The question is whether the confession was made freely, voluntarily, and without any compulsion or inducement of any sort (Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489 , 237 N.E.2d 466 ), or whether the accused’s will was overborne.

1989(People v. Johnson (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 62 , 302 N.E.2d 20 .) The question is whether the confession was made freely, voluntarily, and without any compulsion or inducement of any sort (Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489 , 237 N.E.2d 466 ), or whether the accused’s will was overborne.

1989Our supreme court adopted the totality-of-circumstances test in People v. Tisler (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 226 , 469 N.E.2d 147 .

1989Our supreme court adopted the totality-of-circumstances test in People v. Tisler (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 226 , 469 N.E.2d 147 .

1989Ed. 2d 502 , 103 S. Ct. 1535 , State v. Redding (Fla. 1978), 362 So. 2d 170 , and State v. Courcy (1987), 48 Wash. App. 326 , 739 P.2d 98 , distinguishable from the present case on the grounds that, in each of those cases, there were either additional incriminating circumstances surrounding the officer’s search which, under the totality of circumstances test, established probable cause, or the packaging was frequently used for contraband.

1989Ed. 2d 502 , 103 S. Ct. 1535 , State v. Redding (Fla. 1978), 362 So. 2d 170 , and State v. Courcy (1987), 48 Wash. App. 326 , 739 P.2d 98 , distinguishable from the present case on the grounds that, in each of those cases, there were either additional incriminating circumstances surrounding the officer’s search which, under the totality of circumstances test, established probable cause, or the packaging was frequently used for contraband.

1989Ed. 2d 502 , 103 S. Ct. 1535 , State v. Redding (Fla. 1978), 362 So. 2d 170 , and State v. Courcy (1987), 48 Wash. App. 326 , 739 P.2d 98 , distinguishable from the present case on the grounds that, in each of those cases, there were either additional incriminating circumstances surrounding the officer’s search which, under the totality of circumstances test, established probable cause, or the packaging was frequently used for contraband.

1989Ed. 2d 502 , 103 S. Ct. 1535 , State v. Redding (Fla. 1978), 362 So. 2d 170 , and State v. Courcy (1987), 48 Wash. App. 326 , 739 P.2d 98 , distinguishable from the present case on the grounds that, in each of those cases, there were either additional incriminating circumstances surrounding the officer’s search which, under the totality of circumstances test, established probable cause, or the packaging was frequently used for contraband.

1989In Texas v. Brown (1983), 460 U.S. 730 , 75 L.

1988For the same reason we find People v. Sokolow (1981), 97 Ill.