13 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Feketegreen2 sentences2018Instead, the totality of circumstances test includes an element of police overreaching." Fekete , 1995-NMSC-049 , ¶ 35, 120 N.M. 290 , 901 P.2d 708 (citing Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157 , 167, 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) ("[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.")).The State has the burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence. 2018Instead, the totality of circumstances test includes an element of police overreaching." Fekete , 1995-NMSC-049 , ¶ 35, 120 N.M. 290 , 901 P.2d 708 (citing Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157 , 167, 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) ("[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.")).The State has the burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence. | 2 | 4 |
Colorado v. Connellygreen2 sentences2018Instead, the totality of circumstances test includes an element of police overreaching." Fekete , 1995-NMSC-049 , ¶ 35, 120 N.M. 290 , 901 P.2d 708 (citing Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157 , 167, 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) ("[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.")).The State has the burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence. 2018Instead, the totality of circumstances test includes an element of police overreaching." Fekete , 1995-NMSC-049 , ¶ 35, 120 N.M. 290 , 901 P.2d 708 (citing Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157 , 167, 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) ("[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.")).The State has the burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Shaulis-Powellgreen1 sentence2020“Rather, the presence or absence of such knowledge is but one factor to consider in the matrix to determine whether a consent to search is voluntary.” Flores, 2008-NMCA-074, ¶ 16 . this approach was necessarily rejected in Franklin, 2019-NMCA___, ¶ 16, by our application of the totality of circumstances test and would run contrary to our well- established approach to determining voluntariness, see Davis, 2013-NMSC-028, ¶¶ 13, 23 (examining the totality of circumstances, including a claim of lawful authority, in determining voluntariness); Shaulis-Powell, 1999-NMCA-090, ¶¶ 9, 12 (same). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen1 sentence2020“Rather, the presence or absence of such knowledge is but one factor to consider in the matrix to determine whether a consent to search is voluntary.” Flores, 2008-NMCA-074, ¶ 16 . this approach was necessarily rejected in Franklin, 2019-NMCA___, ¶ 16, by our application of the totality of circumstances test and would run contrary to our well- established approach to determining voluntariness, see Davis, 2013-NMSC-028, ¶¶ 13, 23 (examining the totality of circumstances, including a claim of lawful authority, in determining voluntariness); Shaulis-Powell, 1999-NMCA-090, ¶¶ 9, 12 (same). | 1 | 1 |
Harger v. Structural Services, Inc.green2 sentences2008Hamberg, 2007-NMCA-078, ¶ 10 , 142 N.M. 72 , 162 P.3d 909 ; see also Rivera, 118 N.M. at 681 , 884 P.2d at 837 . {12} Plaintiff urges instead that we replace all three parts of the Rivera test with the Harger test, recasting special employment as a totality of circumstances test. 2 See Harger, 121 N.M. at 667 , 916 P.2d at 1334 . 2008Hamberg, 2007-NMCA-078, ¶ 10 , 142 N.M. 72 , 162 P.3d 909 ; see also Rivera, 118 N.M. at 681 , 884 P.2d at 837 . {12} Plaintiff urges instead that we replace all three parts of the Rivera test with the Harger test, recasting special employment as a totality of circumstances test. 2 See Harger, 121 N.M. at 667 , 916 P.2d at 1334 . | 1 | 1 |
Rivera v. Sagebrush Sales, Inc.green2 sentences2008Hamberg, 2007-NMCA-078, ¶ 10 , 142 N.M. 72 , 162 P.3d 909 ; see also Rivera, 118 N.M. at 681 , 884 P.2d at 837 . {12} Plaintiff urges instead that we replace all three parts of the Rivera test with the Harger test, recasting special employment as a totality of circumstances test. 2 See Harger, 121 N.M. at 667 , 916 P.2d at 1334 . 2008Hamberg, 2007-NMCA-078, ¶ 10 , 142 N.M. 72 , 162 P.3d 909 ; see also Rivera, 118 N.M. at 681 , 884 P.2d at 837 . {12} Plaintiff urges instead that we replace all three parts of the Rivera test with the Harger test, recasting special employment as a totality of circumstances test. 2 See Harger, 121 N.M. at 667 , 916 P.2d at 1334 . | 1 | 1 |
Alabama v. Whitegreen2 sentences2003See White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 (stating that the totality of circumstances is “the whole picture,” requiring that all factors must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion). {8} The gist of the State’s argument is that New Mexico law presumes that concerned citizen-informants are reliable, that public safety concerns can constitute reasonable suspicion, and that traffic stops are the least intrusive form of seizures, tipping the balance between public safety and private intrusion in favor of the stop. 2003See White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 (stating that the totality of circumstances is “the whole picture,” requiring that all factors must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion). {8} The gist of the State’s argument is that New Mexico law presumes that concerned citizen-informants are reliable, that public safety concerns can constitute reasonable suspicion, and that traffic stops are the least intrusive form of seizures, tipping the balance between public safety and private intrusion in favor of the stop. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sisnerosgreen2 sentences1995Fekete contends that under the test of State v. Sisneros, 79 N.M. 600, 605 , 446 P.2d 875, 880 (1968), his confession should have been suppressed. 1995Fekete contends that under the test of State v. Sisneros, 79 N.M. 600, 605 , 446 P.2d 875, 880 (1968), his confession should have been suppressed. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gallegos
green
2 sentences2021We apply a totality of the circumstances test “to determine the exceptional instances in which the Legislature’s presumption of singularity may be overcome.” Gallegos, 2011-NMSC-027, ¶ 56 . {24} Under the totality of circumstances test we consider whether “the alleged conspiracies (1) have the same location, (2) overlap significantly in time, (3) involve the same or overlapping personnel, (4) involve similar overt acts charged against the defendant, and (5) involve the defendant performing a similar role.” Comitz, 2019- NMSC-011, ¶ 34. 2019“At trial, the state has an opportunity to overcome the Legislature’s presumption of singularity, but doing so requires the state to carry a heavy burden.” Id. {34} In determining whether the State has overcome the Legislature’s presumption of singularity and demonstrated the existence of more than one conspiracy, this Court has adopted a multifactor totality of circumstances test used by federal courts. | 3 | 2019–2021 |
State v. Flores
green
1 sentence2020“Rather, the presence or absence of such knowledge is but one factor to consider in the matrix to determine whether a consent to search is voluntary.” Flores, 2008-NMCA-074, ¶ 16 . this approach was necessarily rejected in Franklin, 2019-NMCA___, ¶ 16, by our application of the totality of circumstances test and would run contrary to our well- established approach to determining voluntariness, see Davis, 2013-NMSC-028, ¶¶ 13, 23 (examining the totality of circumstances, including a claim of lawful authority, in determining voluntariness); Shaulis-Powell, 1999-NMCA-090, ¶¶ 9, 12 (same). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Evans
green
2 sentences2010“Case law makes clear that when interrogators are unaware of, and therefore cannot exploit, the mental or emotional vulnerabilities of a suspect, the crucial link between the confession and official action is missing.” Evans, 2009-NMSC-027, ¶ 38 , 146 N.M. 319 , 210 P.3d 216 . {52} While Detective Dart testified to a general awareness that Defendant had been admitted to the Behavioral Health Unit shortly before February 7, 2007, there is no evidence in the record that Defendant’s confession was anything other than “ ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.’ ” Munoz, 1998-N 2010“Case law makes clear that when interrogators are unaware of, and therefore cannot exploit, the mental or emotional vulnerabilities of a suspect, the crucial link between the confession and official action is missing.” Evans, 2009-NMSC-027, ¶ 38 , 146 N.M. 319 , 210 P.3d 216 . {52} While Detective Dart testified to a general awareness that Defendant had been admitted to the Behavioral Health Unit shortly before February 7, 2007, there is no evidence in the record that Defendant’s confession was anything other than “ ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.’ ” Munoz, 1998-N | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Culombe v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences2010“Case law makes clear that when interrogators are unaware of, and therefore cannot exploit, the mental or emotional vulnerabilities of a suspect, the crucial link between the confession and official action is missing.” Evans, 2009-NMSC-027, ¶ 38 , 146 N.M. 319 , 210 P.3d 216 . {52} While Detective Dart testified to a general awareness that Defendant had been admitted to the Behavioral Health Unit shortly before February 7, 2007, there is no evidence in the record that Defendant’s confession was anything other than “ ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.’ ” Munoz, 1998-N 2010“Case law makes clear that when interrogators are unaware of, and therefore cannot exploit, the mental or emotional vulnerabilities of a suspect, the crucial link between the confession and official action is missing.” Evans, 2009-NMSC-027, ¶ 38 , 146 N.M. 319 , 210 P.3d 216 . {52} While Detective Dart testified to a general awareness that Defendant had been admitted to the Behavioral Health Unit shortly before February 7, 2007, there is no evidence in the record that Defendant’s confession was anything other than “ ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.’ ” Munoz, 1998-N | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Munoz
green
2 sentences2010Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 21 , 126 N.M. 535 , 972 P.2d 847 ; State v. Fekete, 120 N.M. 290, 299 , 901 P.2d 708, 717 (1995) (“[U]nder the totality of circumstances test, a confession is not involuntary solely because of a defendant’s mental state. 2010Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 21 , 126 N.M. 535 , 972 P.2d 847 ; State v. Fekete, 120 N.M. 290, 299 , 901 P.2d 708, 717 (1995) (“[U]nder the totality of circumstances test, a confession is not involuntary solely because of a defendant’s mental state. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Hamberg v. Sandia Corp.
green
2 sentences2008Hamberg, 2007-NMCA-078, ¶ 10 , 142 N.M. 72 , 162 P.3d 909 ; see also Rivera, 118 N.M. at 681 , 884 P.2d at 837 . {12} Plaintiff urges instead that we replace all three parts of the Rivera test with the Harger test, recasting special employment as a totality of circumstances test. 2 See Harger, 121 N.M. at 667 , 916 P.2d at 1334 . 2008Hamberg, 2007-NMCA-078, ¶ 10 , 142 N.M. 72 , 162 P.3d 909 ; see also Rivera, 118 N.M. at 681 , 884 P.2d at 837 . {12} Plaintiff urges instead that we replace all three parts of the Rivera test with the Harger test, recasting special employment as a totality of circumstances test. 2 See Harger, 121 N.M. at 667 , 916 P.2d at 1334 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Ohio v. Robinette
green
2 sentences1997In Ohio v. Robinette, — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 417, 421 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996), the Court states, “[W]e have eschewed bright-line rules [in applying the totality-of-circumstances test], instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry____ [W]e expressly disavowed any ‘litmus-paper test’ ... in recognition of the ‘endless variations in the facts and circumstances’ implicating the Fourth Amendment.” We regard the automobile exception as a failure to recognize such variations. 46. 1997In Ohio v. Robinette, — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 417, 421 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996), the Court states, “[W]e have eschewed bright-line rules [in applying the totality-of-circumstances test], instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry____ [W]e expressly disavowed any ‘litmus-paper test’ ... in recognition of the ‘endless variations in the facts and circumstances’ implicating the Fourth Amendment.” We regard the automobile exception as a failure to recognize such variations. 46. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.