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12 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1985–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Stephensgreen2 sentences1995Although the tip in the case sub judice came from an informant of hitherto unconfirmed reliability, the details of that tip, including the predicted timing and route of a particular vehicle driven by a particular individual, were confirmed by the personal observations of the investigating officers. “ ‘Our decisions applying the totality of circumstances analysis . . . have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant’s tip by independent police work.’ Illinois v. Gates, [ 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527)].” State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181, 183 ( 311 SE2d 1995Although the tip in the case sub judice came from an informant of hitherto unconfirmed reliability, the details of that tip, including the predicted timing and route of a particular vehicle driven by a particular individual, were confirmed by the personal observations of the investigating officers. “ ‘Our decisions applying the totality of circumstances analysis . . . have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant’s tip by independent police work.’ Illinois v. Gates, [ 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527)].” State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181, 183 ( 311 SE2d | 5 | 5 |
Illinois v. Gatesgreen2 sentences1998Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983). “[A]n application for a search warrant must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause and a wholly conclusory statement is inadequate to provide such a basis.” Poole v. State, 175 Ga. App. 374 ( 333 SE2d 207 ) (1985); State v. Casey, 185 Ga. App. 726, 727 ( 365 SE2d 878 ) (1988). 1995Although the tip in the case sub judice came from an informant of hitherto unconfirmed reliability, the details of that tip, including the predicted timing and route of a particular vehicle driven by a particular individual, were confirmed by the personal observations of the investigating officers. “ ‘Our decisions applying the totality of circumstances analysis . . . have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant’s tip by independent police work.’ Illinois v. Gates, [ 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527)].” State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181, 183 ( 311 SE2d | 1 | 4 |
Darden v. Stategreen2 sentences2013It is simply a characterization of the analytical framework currently being used by this Court in determining whether a roadblock is well identified.19 the circumstances.” (punctuation omitted)). 18 Cf. U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 ( 101 SCt 690 , 66 LEd2d 621 ) (1981) (holding an investigatory stop valid when totality of circumstances gives officers “particularized and objective basis” for suspicion of criminal activity); Darden v. State, 293 Ga. App. 127, 130 ( 666 SE2d 559 ) (2008) (describing the totality-of- circumstances test as being one that takes “the whole picture . . . into acc 2013It is simply a characterization of the analytical framework currently being used by this Court in determining whether a roadblock is well identified.19 the circumstances.” (punctuation omitted)). 18 Cf. U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 ( 101 SCt 690 , 66 LEd2d 621 ) (1981) (holding an investigatory stop valid when totality of circumstances gives officers “particularized and objective basis” for suspicion of criminal activity); Darden v. State, 293 Ga. App. 127, 130 ( 666 SE2d 559 ) (2008) (describing the totality-of- circumstances test as being one that takes “the whole picture . . . into acc | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Stategreen1 sentence2013It is simply a characterization of the analytical framework currently being used by this Court in determining whether a roadblock is well identified.19 the circumstances.” (punctuation omitted)). 18 Cf. U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 ( 101 SCt 690 , 66 LEd2d 621 ) (1981) (holding an investigatory stop valid when totality of circumstances gives officers “particularized and objective basis” for suspicion of criminal activity); Darden v. State, 293 Ga. App. 127, 130 ( 666 SE2d 559 ) (2008) (describing the totality-of- circumstances test as being one that takes “the whole picture . . . into acc | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cortezgreen2 sentences2013It is simply a characterization of the analytical framework currently being used by this Court in determining whether a roadblock is well identified.19 the circumstances.” (punctuation omitted)). 18 Cf. U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 ( 101 SCt 690 , 66 LEd2d 621 ) (1981) (holding an investigatory stop valid when totality of circumstances gives officers “particularized and objective basis” for suspicion of criminal activity); Darden v. State, 293 Ga. App. 127, 130 ( 666 SE2d 559 ) (2008) (describing the totality-of- circumstances test as being one that takes “the whole picture . . . into acc 2013It is simply a characterization of the analytical framework currently being used by this Court in determining whether a roadblock is well identified.19 the circumstances.” (punctuation omitted)). 18 Cf. U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 ( 101 SCt 690 , 66 LEd2d 621 ) (1981) (holding an investigatory stop valid when totality of circumstances gives officers “particularized and objective basis” for suspicion of criminal activity); Darden v. State, 293 Ga. App. 127, 130 ( 666 SE2d 559 ) (2008) (describing the totality-of- circumstances test as being one that takes “the whole picture . . . into acc | 1 | 1 |
Wood v. Stategreen2 sentences2003“Our decisions applying the totality of circumstances analysis have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant’s tip by independent police work.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wood v. State, 214 Ga. App. 848, 849 ( 449 SE2d 308 ) (1994). 2003“Our decisions applying the totality of circumstances analysis have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant’s tip by independent police work.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wood v. State, 214 Ga. App. 848, 849 ( 449 SE2d 308 ) (1994). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Caseygreen2 sentences1998Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983). “[A]n application for a search warrant must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause and a wholly conclusory statement is inadequate to provide such a basis.” Poole v. State, 175 Ga. App. 374 ( 333 SE2d 207 ) (1985); State v. Casey, 185 Ga. App. 726, 727 ( 365 SE2d 878 ) (1988). 1998Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983). “[A]n application for a search warrant must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause and a wholly conclusory statement is inadequate to provide such a basis.” Poole v. State, 175 Ga. App. 374 ( 333 SE2d 207 ) (1985); State v. Casey, 185 Ga. App. 726, 727 ( 365 SE2d 878 ) (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Munson v. Stategreen2 sentences1994Moreover, the anonymous tip is unreliable because the independent investigation done by the police in an effort to corroborate it was insufficient; the police corroborated only that the house was located where the tipster said it was. “ ‘Our decisions applying the totality of circumstances analysis have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant’s tip by independent police work.’ [Cit.]” (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181, 183 ( 311 SE2d 823 ) (1984); compare Munson v. State, 211 Ga. App. 80 ( 438 SE2d 123 ) (1993). 1994Moreover, the anonymous tip is unreliable because the independent investigation done by the police in an effort to corroborate it was insufficient; the police corroborated only that the house was located where the tipster said it was. “ ‘Our decisions applying the totality of circumstances analysis have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant’s tip by independent police work.’ [Cit.]” (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181, 183 ( 311 SE2d 823 ) (1984); compare Munson v. State, 211 Ga. App. 80 ( 438 SE2d 123 ) (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Gary v. Stategreen2 sentences1994See Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573, 577 ( 422 SE2d 426 ) (1992). 1994See Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573, 577 ( 422 SE2d 426 ) (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Floyd v. Stategreen2 sentences1990In making a judgment call here, seemingly we must “quibble as little as possible on words, and go directly to the substance.” ’ ” Floyd v. State, 191 Ga. App. 569, 570 ( 382 SE2d 668 ) (1989). 1990In making a judgment call here, seemingly we must “quibble as little as possible on words, and go directly to the substance.” ’ ” Floyd v. State, 191 Ga. App. 569, 570 ( 382 SE2d 668 ) (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Bradford v. Stategreen2 sentences1989In making a judgment call here, seemingly we must ‘quibble as little as possible on words, and go directly to the substance.’ [Cit.] There is enough substance here; therefore, the judgment should be affirmed.” Bradford v. State, 184 Ga. App. 459, 460-461 (3) ( 361 SE2d 838 ) (1987). 1989In making a judgment call here, seemingly we must ‘quibble as little as possible on words, and go directly to the substance.’ [Cit.] There is enough substance here; therefore, the judgment should be affirmed.” Bradford v. State, 184 Ga. App. 459, 460-461 (3) ( 361 SE2d 838 ) (1987). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Shivers v. State
green
1 sentence2003We have also said that “[flor the corroboration to be meaningful, the information must include a range of details relating to future actions of third parties not easily predicted or similar information not available to the general public.” (Footnotes omitted.) Shivers, supra, 258 Ga. App. at 255 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Lyons v. State
green
1 sentence2003We have also said that “[flor the corroboration to be meaningful, the information must include a range of details relating to future actions of third parties not easily predicted or similar information not available to the general public.” (Footnotes omitted.) Shivers, supra, 258 Ga. App. at 255 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Poole v. State
green
2 sentences1998Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983). “[A]n application for a search warrant must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause and a wholly conclusory statement is inadequate to provide such a basis.” Poole v. State, 175 Ga. App. 374 ( 333 SE2d 207 ) (1985); State v. Casey, 185 Ga. App. 726, 727 ( 365 SE2d 878 ) (1988). 1998Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983). “[A]n application for a search warrant must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause and a wholly conclusory statement is inadequate to provide such a basis.” Poole v. State, 175 Ga. App. 374 ( 333 SE2d 207 ) (1985); State v. Casey, 185 Ga. App. 726, 727 ( 365 SE2d 878 ) (1988). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Humphrey v. Copeland
green
2 sentences1987In making a judgment call here, seemingly we must “quibble as little as possible on words, and go directly to the substance.” Humphrey v. Copeland, 54 Ga. 543 (1875). 1987In *461 making a judgment call here, seemingly we must "quibble as little as possible on words, and go directly to the substance." Humphrey v. Copeland, 54 Ga. 543 (1875). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Spinelli v. United States
red
1 sentence1985Although the rigid “two-pronged” test set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (84 SC 1509, 12 LE2d 723) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (89 SC 584, 21 LE2d 637), has been replaced by a “totality of circumstances” test, an informant’s veracity or reliability and his “basis of knowledge” are relevant considerations in the totality of circumstances analysis used to determine whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Aguilar v. Texas
red
1 sentence1985Although the rigid “two-pronged” test set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (84 SC 1509, 12 LE2d 723) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (89 SC 584, 21 LE2d 637), has been replaced by a “totality of circumstances” test, an informant’s veracity or reliability and his “basis of knowledge” are relevant considerations in the totality of circumstances analysis used to determine whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.