18 New Jersey opinions name it 4 courts 1945–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Hackensack v. Winnergreen2 sentences1994Summarizing the policy behind the doctrine, the Crispin Court noted that [i]t has been recognized that the underlying principles of the doctrine "finality and repose; prevention of needless litigation; avoidance of duplication; reduction of unnecessary burdens of time and expenses; elimination of conflicts, confusion and uncertainty; and basic fairness" have a central place in the adjudication of all legal controversies. [ Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., supra, 96 N.J. at 350-51 , 476 A. 2d 250 (quoting City of Hackensack v. Winner, 82 N.J. 1, 32-33 , 410 A. 2d 1146 (1980))]. 1994Summarizing the policy behind the doctrine, the Crispin Court noted that [i]t has been recognized that the underlying principles of the doctrine "finality and repose; prevention of needless litigation; avoidance of duplication; reduction of unnecessary burdens of time and expenses; elimination of conflicts, confusion and uncertainty; and basic fairness" have a central place in the adjudication of all legal controversies. [ Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., supra, 96 N.J. at 350-51 , 476 A. 2d 250 (quoting City of Hackensack v. Winner, 82 N.J. 1, 32-33 , 410 A. 2d 1146 (1980))]. | 2 | 4 |
Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.green2 sentences1994Summarizing the policy behind the doctrine, the Crispin Court noted that [i]t has been recognized that the underlying principles of the doctrine "finality and repose; prevention of needless litigation; avoidance of duplication; reduction of unnecessary burdens of time and expenses; elimination of conflicts, confusion and uncertainty; and basic fairness" have a central place in the adjudication of all legal controversies. [ Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., supra, 96 N.J. at 350-51 , 476 A. 2d 250 (quoting City of Hackensack v. Winner, 82 N.J. 1, 32-33 , 410 A. 2d 1146 (1980))]. 1994Summarizing the policy behind the doctrine, the Crispin Court noted that [i]t has been recognized that the underlying principles of the doctrine "finality and repose; prevention of needless litigation; avoidance of duplication; reduction of unnecessary burdens of time and expenses; elimination of conflicts, confusion and uncertainty; and basic fairness" have a central place in the adjudication of all legal controversies. [ Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., supra, 96 N.J. at 350-51 , 476 A. 2d 250 (quoting City of Hackensack v. Winner, 82 N.J. 1, 32-33 , 410 A. 2d 1146 (1980))]. | 2 | 4 |
Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Campbell Motor Co.green2 sentences1998The following excerpt from Home Insurance Co. v. Campbell Motor Co., 227 Ala. 499 , 150 So. 486, 489 (1933), which Goldberg quotes with approval, elaborates on that proposition: “We readily agree with counsel for appellant that if the loss was not within the coverage of the policy contract, it cannot be brought within that coverage by invoking the principle of waiver or estoppel. 1998The following excerpt from Home Insurance Co. v. Campbell Motor Co., 227 Ala. 499 , 150 So. 486, 489 (1933), which Goldberg quotes with approval, elaborates on that proposition: “We readily agree with counsel for appellant that if the loss was not within the coverage of the policy contract, it cannot be brought within that coverage by invoking the principle of waiver or estoppel. | 2 | 2 |
Greenberg & Covitz v. National Union Fire Insurancegreen2 sentences2023Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 312 N.J. 2001Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 312 N.J.Super. 251, 264-65 , 711 A. 2d 909 (App.Div.), cert. denied, 157 N.J. 577 , 725 A. 2d 688 , certif. denied, 157 N.J. 578 , 725 A. 2d 688 (1998), certif. granted, 161 N.J. 143 , 735 A. 2d 569 (1999). | 1 | 2 |
Griggs v. Bertramgreen1 sentence2023If it does so with knowledge of facts that are relevant to a policy defense or to a basis for noncoverage of the claim, without a valid reservation of rights to deny coverage at a later time, it is estopped from later denying coverage. [ 88 N.J. 347, 356 (1982) (emphasis added).] A-1428-22 6 "[T]he predominant view is that a loss which is not within the coverage of a policy cannot be brought within such coverage by invoking the principles of waiver or estoppel." Greenberg & Covitz v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Sweeney v. Venezianogreen2 sentences2009See Sweeney v. Veneziano, 70 N.J.Super. 185, 193 , 175 A. 2d 241 (App. Div.1961) (holding that a quasi-contract action assigned to decedent's wife survived his death); Restatement of Restitution § 149(2) (1937) (providing that death does not terminate a cause of action for restitution). 2009See Sweeney v. Veneziano, 70 N.J.Super. 185, 193 , 175 A. 2d 241 (App. Div.1961) (holding that a quasi-contract action assigned to decedent's wife survived his death); Restatement of Restitution § 149(2) (1937) (providing that death does not terminate a cause of action for restitution). | 1 | 1 |
Petrick v. PLAN. BD. OF JERSEY CITYgreen1 sentence2001Id at 333, 671 A. 2d 140 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Foulke v. Bondgreen1 sentence1984The possession must be actual and exclusive—adverse and hostile—visible or notorious—continued and uninterrupted. [Foulke v. Bond, 41 N.J.L. 527, 545 (E. & A. 1879)] This test has remained standard except that the requirement of hostility has been eliminated. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Simsgreen1 sentence1976It did not expressly apply the proper principles to test whether a new trial was warranted, State v. Sims, 65 N.J. 359, 373-374 (1974), and the Appellate Division approved that action. | 1 | 1 |
Nagle v. Conardgreen1 sentence1945See, also Nagle v. Conard, 96 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Goldberg v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of NY
green
2 sentences2001Co., 78 N.J.Super. 183 , 188 A. 2d 188 (App.Div.1963) that "a loss which is not within the coverage of a policy cannot be brought within such coverage by invoking the principles of waiver or estoppel." Id. at 191 , 188 A. 2d 188 ; see Green berg & Covitz v. National Union Fire Ins. 2001Co., 78 N.J.Super. 183 , 188 A. 2d 188 (App.Div.1963) that "a loss which is not within the coverage of a policy cannot be brought within such coverage by invoking the principles of waiver or estoppel." Id. at 191 , 188 A. 2d 188 ; see Green berg & Covitz v. National Union Fire Ins. | 2 | 1998–2001 |
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens
green
2 sentences2013The Court in Wolens, supra, concluded that, notwithstanding its preemption clause, "the ADA permits state-law-based court adjudication of routine breach-of-contract claims . . . ." 513 U.S. at 232 , 115 S.Ct. at 826 , 130 L.Ed.2d at 728 . 2013The Court in Wolens, supra, concluded that, notwithstanding its preemption clause, "the ADA permits state-law-based court adjudication of routine breach-of-contract claims . . . ." 513 U.S. at 232 , 115 S.Ct. at 826 , 130 L.Ed.2d at 728 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Carr v. Carr
green
2 sentences2009On the same principles and the presumption that parties "intend[ ] to deal fairly with one another," quasi-contractual obligations are imposed "to prevent unjust enrichment." Id. at 351-52 , 576 A. 2d 872 (internal quotations omitted). 2009On the same principles and the presumption that parties "intend[ ] to deal fairly with one another," quasi-contractual obligations are imposed "to prevent unjust enrichment." Id. at 351-52 , 576 A. 2d 872 (internal quotations omitted). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor
green
2 sentences2009Neither party made clear to the trial court the significance of the procedural sequence: that in its first papers, the prosecutor's office was complying with the guidelines issued by the Attorney General, in which case the matter was to be analyzed under the forfeiture statute, while in its second set of papers it was exercising the discretion that the Attorney General had just acknowledged, in which case the matter was to be analyzed under the principles of waiver enunciated in subsection (e) of the statute and in Flagg, supra, 171 N.J. at 579 , 796 A. 2d 182 . 2009Neither party made clear to the trial court the significance of the procedural sequence: that in its first papers, the prosecutor's office was complying with the guidelines issued by the Attorney General, in which case the matter was to be analyzed under the forfeiture statute, while in its second set of papers it was exercising the discretion that the Attorney General had just acknowledged, in which case the matter was to be analyzed under the principles of waiver enunciated in subsection (e) of the statute and in Flagg, supra, 171 N.J. at 579 , 796 A. 2d 182 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Greenberg & Covitz v. National Union Fire Insurance
neutral
2 sentences2001Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 312 N.J.Super. 251, 264-65 , 711 A. 2d 909 (App.Div.), cert. denied, 157 N.J. 577 , 725 A. 2d 688 , certif. denied, 157 N.J. 578 , 725 A. 2d 688 (1998), certif. granted, 161 N.J. 143 , 735 A. 2d 569 (1999). 2001Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 312 N.J.Super. 251, 264-65 , 711 A. 2d 909 (App.Div.), cert. denied, 157 N.J. 577 , 725 A. 2d 688 , certif. denied, 157 N.J. 578 , 725 A. 2d 688 (1998), certif. granted, 161 N.J. 143 , 735 A. 2d 569 (1999). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Cogdell v. Hospital Center at Orange
green
2 sentences1994In extending the doctrine to include joinder of parties as well as claims, the Cogdell Court reasoned that the party-joinder rule, R. 4:28-1, and the claims-joinder rule, R. 4:27-1, both "reflect a common policy" and "are not only conceptually similar but are procedural twins." Cogdell, supra, 116 N.J. at 17 , 560 A. 2d 1169 . 1994In extending the doctrine to include joinder of parties as well as claims, the Cogdell Court reasoned that the party-joinder rule, R. 4:28-1, and the claims-joinder rule, R. 4:27-1, both "reflect a common policy" and "are not only conceptually similar but are procedural twins." Cogdell, supra, 116 N.J. at 17 , 560 A. 2d 1169 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Union City Associates v. City of Union City
green
2 sentences1991In that case Justice Handler wrote, in concurrence, while discussing the entire controversy doctrine, as follows: It has been recognized that the underlying principles of the doctrine — ‘finality and repose; prevention of needless litigation; avoidance of duplication; reduction of unnecessary burdens of time and expenses; elimination of conflicts, confusion and uncertainty; and basic fairness’ — have a central place in the adjudication of all legal controversies. [ 96 N.J. at 350, 351 , 476 A.2d 250 (citing City of Hackensack v. Winner, 82 N.J. 1, 32-33 , 410 A.2d 1146 (1980)).] [Union City As 1991In that case Justice Handler wrote, in concurrence, while discussing the entire controversy doctrine, as follows: It has been recognized that the underlying principles of the doctrine — ‘finality and repose; prevention of needless litigation; avoidance of duplication; reduction of unnecessary burdens of time and expenses; elimination of conflicts, confusion and uncertainty; and basic fairness’ — have a central place in the adjudication of all legal controversies. [ 96 N.J. at 350, 351 , 476 A.2d 250 (citing City of Hackensack v. Winner, 82 N.J. 1, 32-33 , 410 A.2d 1146 (1980)).] [Union City As | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service
green
1 sentence1968"The demands of social justice," the court said in Henningsen, supra, 32 N.J., at p. 384 , require a rule of law that holds manufacturers and dealers liable for a defect in an automobile which causes injury to a consumer who, "has neither the opportunity nor the capacity to inspect or to determine the fitness of an automobile for use * * *." In Santor, supra, 44 N.J., at pp. 65-66 the court pointed out that the obligation is "an enterprise liability" [8] that does not depend upon "the intricacies of the law of sales" and that this "strict liability in tort is not conditioned upon advertising t | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Santor v. a & M KARAGHEUSIAN, INC.
red
1 sentence1968"The demands of social justice," the court said in Henningsen, supra, 32 N.J., at p. 384 , require a rule of law that holds manufacturers and dealers liable for a defect in an automobile which causes injury to a consumer who, "has neither the opportunity nor the capacity to inspect or to determine the fitness of an automobile for use * * *." In Santor, supra, 44 N.J., at pp. 65-66 the court pointed out that the obligation is "an enterprise liability" [8] that does not depend upon "the intricacies of the law of sales" and that this "strict liability in tort is not conditioned upon advertising t | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.
green
2 sentences1968"The demands of social justice," the court said in Henningsen, supra, 32 N.J., at p. 384 , require a rule of law that holds manufacturers and dealers liable for a defect in an automobile which causes injury to a consumer who, "has neither the opportunity nor the capacity to inspect or to determine the fitness of an automobile for use * * *." In Santor, supra, 44 N.J., at pp. 65-66 the court pointed out that the obligation is "an enterprise liability" [8] that does not depend upon "the intricacies of the law of sales" and that this "strict liability in tort is not conditioned upon advertising t 1968"The demands of social justice," the court said in Henningsen, supra, 32 N.J., at p. 384 , require a rule of law that holds manufacturers and dealers liable for a defect in an automobile which causes injury to a consumer who, "has neither the opportunity nor the capacity to inspect or to determine the fitness of an automobile for use * * *." In Santor, supra, 44 N.J., at pp. 65-66 the court pointed out that the obligation is "an enterprise liability" [8] that does not depend upon "the intricacies of the law of sales" and that this "strict liability in tort is not conditioned upon advertising t | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Blum Building Co. v. Ingersoll
green
1 sentence1959Blum Building Co. v. Ingersoll, 99 N.J. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.