principles test in New York

1974The principles by which to test the constitutionality of a statute resting on the police power have been asserted over and over again: A legislative enactment carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality, i.e., it is presumed to be supported by facts known to the Legislature (United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 ; South Carolina Highway Dept. v Barnwell Bros., 303 US 177, 191 ; Carmichael v Southern Coal Co., 301 US 495, 509-510 ; Defiance Milk Products Co. v Du Mond, 309 NY 537, 540-541 ; East New York Sav.

1956The principles by which to test the constitutionality of a statute resting on the police power have been asserted over and over again: A legislative enactment carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality, i.e., it is presumed to be supported by facts known to the Legislature (United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 ; South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 191 ; Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. S. 495, 509-510 ; Defiance Milk Products Co. v. Du Mond, 309 N. Y. 537, 540-541 ; East New York Sav.

1974The principles by which to test the constitutionality of a statute resting on the police power have been asserted over and over again: A legislative enactment carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality, i.e., it is presumed to be supported by facts known to the Legislature (United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 ; South Carolina Highway Dept. v Barnwell Bros., 303 US 177, 191 ; Carmichael v Southern Coal Co., 301 US 495, 509-510 ; Defiance Milk Products Co. v Du Mond, 309 NY 537, 540-541 ; East New York Sav.

1956The principles by which to test the constitutionality of a statute resting on the police power have been asserted over and over again: A legislative enactment carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality, i.e., it is presumed to be supported by facts known to the Legislature (United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 ; South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 191 ; Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. S. 495, 509-510 ; Defiance Milk Products Co. v. Du Mond, 309 N. Y. 537, 540-541 ; East New York Sav.

1974The principles by which to test the constitutionality of a statute resting on the police power have been asserted over and over again: A legislative enactment carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality, i.e., it is presumed to be supported by facts known to the Legislature (United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 ; South Carolina Highway Dept. v Barnwell Bros., 303 US 177, 191 ; Carmichael v Southern Coal Co., 301 US 495, 509-510 ; Defiance Milk Products Co. v Du Mond, 309 NY 537, 540-541 ; East New York Sav.

1956The principles by which to test the constitutionality of a statute resting on the police power have been asserted over and over again: A legislative enactment carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality, i.e., it is presumed to be supported by facts known to the Legislature (United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 ; South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 191 ; Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. S. 495, 509-510 ; Defiance Milk Products Co. v. Du Mond, 309 N. Y. 537, 540-541 ; East New York Sav.

1974Bank v Hahn, 293 NY 622, 626-628 , affd 326 US 230 ).

1956Bank v. Hahn, 293 N. Y. 622, 627-628 , affd. 326 U. S. 230 ).

1974Bank v Hahn, 293 NY 622, 626-628 , affd 326 US 230 ).

1956Bank v. Hahn, 293 N. Y. 622, 627-628 , affd. 326 U. S. 230 ).

1974The principles by which to test the constitutionality of a statute resting on the police power have been asserted over and over again: A legislative enactment carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality, i.e., it is presumed to be supported by facts known to the Legislature (United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 ; South Carolina Highway Dept. v Barnwell Bros., 303 US 177, 191 ; Carmichael v Southern Coal Co., 301 US 495, 509-510 ; Defiance Milk Products Co. v Du Mond, 309 NY 537, 540-541 ; East New York Sav.

1956The principles by which to test the constitutionality of a statute resting on the police power have been asserted over and over again: A legislative enactment carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality, i.e., it is presumed to be supported by facts known to the Legislature (United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 ; South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 191 ; Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. S. 495, 509-510 ; Defiance Milk Products Co. v. Du Mond, 309 N. Y. 537, 540-541 ; East New York Sav.

1859The People v. Tioga Common Pleas, 19 Wend., 73 ; McKee v. Judd, 2 Kern., 622.) The right to claim and sue for money or property lost in gaming, is clearly not within the principles on which the exception rests.

1859The People v. Tioga Common Pleas, 19 Wend., 73 ; McKee v. Judd, 2 Kern., 622.) The right to claim and sue for money or property lost in gaming, is clearly not within the principles on which the exception rests.

2011This in turn has created the uncertainty in “meaning and scope” of the doctrine as the Court in Flast noted ( 392 US at 95 ).

2002Despite the existence of “equitable considerations militating in the husband’s favor, in the final analysis it is the child’s best interests which are paramount” (Richard B. v Sandra B.B., 209 AD2d 139, 143 , appeal dismissed 87 NY2d 861 ).

2002That, however, does not end the inquiry, because the principles of the doctrine may be asserted by the Law Guardian on behalf of the children in protecting their best interests (see, Verra v Bowman-Verra, 266 AD2d 682, 683 ).

1994In applying the well-established principles of claim preclusion, the Fourth Department held that the respondent was barred from raising an issue in a second proceeding which it could have raised in the underlying condemnation proceeding (supra, at 998-999, citing Adventurers Whitestone Corp. v City of New York, 65 NY2d 83 , 89-90, appeal dismissed 474 US 935 ).

1992The rule is premised upon the theory that governmental agencies cannot be held accountable for the unauthorized acts of their agents, and is applicable to prevent reliance on the principles of waiver and estoppel in instances where persons rely to their detriment upon a governmental action taken in excess of authority or in contravention of a duty which is statutorily or otherwise legally imposed (see, e.g., Granada Bldgs. v City of Kingston, 58 NY2d 705, 708 ; Lutzken v City of Rochester, 7 AD2d 498 ).

1992The rule is premised upon the theory that governmental agencies cannot be held accountable for the unauthorized acts of their agents, and is applicable to prevent reliance on the principles of waiver and estoppel in instances where persons rely to their detriment upon a governmental action taken in excess of authority or in contravention of a duty which is statutorily or otherwise legally imposed (see, e.g., Granada Bldgs. v City of Kingston, 58 NY2d 705, 708 ; Lutzken v City of Rochester, 7 AD2d 498 ).

1982Corp. ( 38 NY2d 662, 668 ), upon which plaintiffs principally rely, enunciated the principles of this doctrine and held that “where a governmental subdivision acts or comports itself wrongfully or negligently, inducing reliance by a party who is entitled to rely and who changes his position to his detriment or prejudice, that subdivision should be estopped from asserting a right or defense which it otherwise could have raised.” There, a special situation obtained in that the City of New York was timely served with the notice of claim but plaintiffs failed to serve the newly created Health and

1981Once having determined that the right to be present at a parole revocation hearing is a matter of due process (Morrissey v Brewer, supra), the waiver of that right logically becomes governed by the same principles as the waiver of the right to be present at a criminal trial.

1970It is for me difficult to conceive of a clearer case of violation of the principles and the rule of law enunciated by the United States Supreme Court commencing with Miranda v. Arizona ( 384 U. S. 436 [1966]) followed by Mathis v. United States 1( 391 U. S. 1 [1968]) and Orozco v. Texas ( 394 U. S. 324 [1969]).

1970It is for me difficult to conceive of a clearer case of violation of the principles and the rule of law enunciated by the United States Supreme Court commencing with Miranda v. Arizona ( 384 U. S. 436 [1966]) followed by Mathis v. United States 1( 391 U. S. 1 [1968]) and Orozco v. Texas ( 394 U. S. 324 [1969]).

1970It is for me difficult to conceive of a clearer case of violation of the principles and the rule of law enunciated by the United States Supreme Court commencing with Miranda v. Arizona ( 384 U. S. 436 [1966]) followed by Mathis v. United States 1( 391 U. S. 1 [1968]) and Orozco v. Texas ( 394 U. S. 324 [1969]).

1966Corp., 31 Misc 2d 940 .) In the light of the above principles it was error for the court to grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff with respect to the second, third and fourth causes of action upon the ground that defendant was .acting as agent for an undisclosed principal.

1937Nevertheless, after further consideration we believe our original decision should stand, and in that connection attention is called to the case of Mount Vernon Trust Co. v. Bergoff ( 272 N. Y. 192 ), recently decided by the Court of Appeals.

1937Co. ( 130 N. Y. 537, 545 ) the Court of Appeals ruled: “ The courts have applied the principles of waiver and equitable estoppel in a most liberal manner to insurance contracts, but always to enforce good faith and to prevent injustice and fraud where the insured has been misled by the acts of the company or its agents.

1936The leading case on this subject is unquestionably Rudd v. Cornell ( 171 N. Y. 114 ), the following excerpts from which are decisive of the present controversy (p. 127): “It is settled by the decisions of this court that a judgment is conclusive in a second action only when the same question was at issue in the former suit and the subsequent action was between the same parties or their privies, and that the conclusive character of a judgment extends only to the precise issues which were tried in the former action; they must be identical in each action, not merely in name, but in fact and in su

1932Practical considerations must at times determine the bounds of Correlative rights and duties as well as the point beyond Which the courts will decline to trace causal connection,” The basic principles of the doctrine of proximate cause are clearly defined in Laidlaw v. Sage ( 158 N. Y. 73 ).

1932(Florence v. Sands, 4 Redf. 206 .) From a review of the cases, a study of the principles and the rule of their application, it is my opinion that it does not appear by implication on the face of the will that the testator intended that the widow should be excluded from her right of dower because of the testamentary provision made for her, for the reason that there is no clear repugnancy existing between the gift of one-sixth of the rent of the residuary real property and the existence of her dower in such real property.

1874It is true, that the court below at *371 General Term, so far as it directed a reversal of the judgment at Special Term, determined and settled the principles and rule by which such reversal was to be made effective, by the direction to the plaintiff to make certain payments, the amount whereof was directed to be ascertained by a referee; but further proceedings were directed to be taken and required to perfect the judgment, and it did not become operative as a final determination of the rights of the parties, until the amount to be repaid was settled and adjudged on the 6th of June, 1872, and