principles rule in Illinois

2026“The trial court must ask each potential juror whether he or she understands each of the principles in the rule.” People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 607 (2010). ¶ 21 Defendant argues that, based on the many “unintelligible” portions of the transcript during circuit court’s introductory instructions to the jury, the record does not show that the circuit court complied with Rule 431(b).

2026The State appears to concede error on this point, but it also argues that only a portion of Rule 431(b) was violated and that any error was insignificant because only one prospective juror is involved. ¶ 75 The language of Rule 431(b) is “clear and unambiguous” and “mandates a specific question and response process,” pursuant to which the “trial court must ask each potential juror whether he or she understands and accepts each of the principles in the rule.” Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 607 .

2021Mindful that the principles of waiver should be liberally construed in favor of a defendant (People v. Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d 54, 62 (2010)), we do not find that the record supports a finding that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be physically present for opening statements.

2021We reiterate that the principles of waiver should be liberally construed in favor of a defendant (Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d at 62 ) and conclude that the record does not support a finding that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be physically present for B.M.’s testimony.

2007In exercising the court’s power to override considerations of waiver, “[proper] care should be taken that the litigants are not deprived of an opportunity to present argument.” Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967) (holding that, in the situation presented there, the appellate court did not err by considering arguments not raised by the parties).

2007In exercising the court's power to override considerations of waiver, "[proper] care should be taken that the litigants are not deprived of an opportunity to present argument." Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.2d 223, 225 , 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967) (holding that, in the situation presented there, the appellate court did not err by considering arguments not raised by the parties).

2007A reviewing court should set aside the principles of waiver only for good reason: “to provide a just result [or] to maintain a sound and uniform body of precedent.” Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 505 (2002).

2007A reviewing court should set aside the principles of waiver only for good reason: "to provide a just result [or] to maintain a sound and uniform body of precedent." Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill.2d 483, 505 , 264 Ill.Dec. 653 , 771 N.E.2d 357 (2002).

2025However, “the principles of waiver and forfeiture are binding on the parties but do not limit this court’s jurisdiction.” Maniez v. Citibank, F.S.B., 404 Ill.

2021Rather, we have explained that “the principles of waiver and forfeiture are binding on the parties but do not limit this court’s jurisdiction.” Maniez v. Citibank, F.S.B., 404 Ill.

2021See, e.g., People v. Salgado, 2012 IL App (2d) 100945, ¶ 17 (finding that the defendant did not waive his right to be physically present during the minor victim’s testimony where “nothing in the record shows that defendant understood that he had a right to be present”). ¶ 45 Having found that defendant forfeited rather than waived his claim, we still nonetheless conclude that he is not entitled to any relief under the plain error doctrine because he is unable to show that his absence from the courtroom resulted in an unfair proceeding or caused him to be denied an underlying substantial consti

2021See, e.g., People v. Salgado, 2012 IL App (2d) 100945, ¶ 17 (finding that the defendant did not waive his right to be physically present during the minor victim’s testimony where “nothing in the record shows that defendant understood that he had a right to be present”). ¶ 45 Having found that defendant forfeited rather than waived his claim, we still nonetheless conclude that he is not entitled to any relief under the plain error doctrine because he is unable to show that his absence from the courtroom resulted in an unfair proceeding or caused him to be denied an underlying substantial consti

2021See, e.g., People v. Stroud, 208 Ill. 2d 398, 403, 409 (2004) (declining to find that the defendant waived his right to be present for plea proceedings where he was not specifically informed of his right to be present and thus “did not specifically waive his right to be bodily in the courtroom”).

2021See, e.g., People v. Stroud, 208 Ill. 2d 398, 403, 409 (2004) (declining to find that the defendant waived his right to be present for plea proceedings where he was not specifically informed of his right to be present and thus “did not specifically waive his right to be bodily in the courtroom”).

2015The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that whether, and how, an appellate court applies the principles of waiver to deny review of an argument or issue is governed by “no general rule,” but instead, is left “primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976). ¶ 23 Our analysis on this issue is dicta.

2015The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that whether, and how, an appellate court applies the principles of waiver to deny review of an argument or issue is governed by "no general rule," but instead, is left "primarily to the discretion of the courts of -7- No. 1-13-3048 appeals, to be exercised on the facts of the individual cases." Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976). ¶ 23 Our analysis on this issue is dicta.

2010See People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 142 , 858 N.E.2d 15 (2006); Redelmann v. K.A.

2010See People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 142 , 858 N.E.2d 15 (2006); Redelmann v. K.A.

2007Invoking the principles that a claim that a judgment is void is not subject to waiver and may be raised at any time, either directly or collaterally, and that courts have an independent duty to vacate void orders and may vacate a void order sua sponte even if it is not challenged by the parties (see People v. Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19, 27 (2004)), the court concluded that it was obliged to vacate defendant’s conviction and remand for a new transfer hearing. 358 Ill.

2007Invoking the principles that a claim that a judgment is void is not subject to waiver and may be raised at any time, either directly or -3- collaterally, and that courts have an independent duty to vacate void orders and may vacate a void order sua sponte even if it is not challenged by the parties (see People v. Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19, 27 (2004)), the court concluded that it was obliged to vacate defendant’s conviction and remand for a new transfer hearing. 358 Ill.

2000People *523 v. Winsett, 153 Ill.2d 335, 346 , 180 Ill.Dec. 109 , 606 N.E.2d 1186 (1992).

2000People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 346 (1992).

1999See Fields, 288 Ill.App.3d at 1059-60 , 224 Ill.Dec. 184 , 681 N.E.2d 166 (holding that the failure to file a written waiver in accordance with section 401(a)(2) of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/401(a)(2) (West 1996)) did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction when the parties proceeded to judgment without objection).

1999See Fields, 288 Ill.

2010The basic principles of the doctrine of res judicata have been summarized as follows: "The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction bars any subsequent actions between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of action. [Citations.] The doctrine extends not only to what was actually decided in the original action[] but also to matters which could have been decided in that suit. [Citations.] For the doctrine of res judicata to apply, three requirements must be met: (1) there was a final judgment on the merits

2010The basic principles of the doctrine of res judicata have been summarized as follows: "The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction bars any subsequent actions between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of action. [Citations.] The doctrine extends not only to what was actually decided in the original action[] but also to matters which could have been decided in that suit. [Citations.] For the doctrine of res judicata to apply, three requirements must be met: (1) there was a final judgment on the merits

2026In Zehr, superseded by rule as recognized in Birge, 2021 IL 125644, ¶ 31 , the supreme court observed that it was not enough that the potential jurors were generally “asked whether they would follow the law as given them by the court even though they might personally disagree with it and whether any reason, moral, religious or otherwise, would prevent their being fair and impartial.” Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d at 477 . ¶ 79 As the supreme court stated in Birge, Rule 431(b) mandates a “ ‘specific question and response process’ ” and requires the trial court “ ‘ask each potential juror whether he or she

2025“Under the plain language, a court complies with Rule 431(b) if it (1) instructs the prospective jurors on the four principles, (2) asks if the prospective jurors understand those principles, and (3) asks if the prospective jurors accept those principles.” Id. ¶ 18 Defendant does not argue the court’s explanation and questioning of the principles was error.

2012App. 3d 787, 792 (1985) (citing Graubremse GMBH v. Berg Manufacturing & Sales Co., 417 F.2d 1201, 1204 (7th Cir. 1969), quoting Stewart v. Meyers, 353 F.2d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 1965), and Botti v. Avenue Bank & Trust Co. of Oak Park, 103 Ill.

1985(Graubremse GMBH v. Berg Manufacturing & Sales Co. (7th Cir. 1969), 417 F.2d 1201 , 1204 (quoting Stewart v. Meyers (7th Cir. 1965), 353 F.2d 691, 694 ); Botti v. Avenue Bank & Trust Co. of Oak Park (1982), 103 Ill.

2012App. 3d 787, 792 (1985) (citing Graubremse GMBH v. Berg Manufacturing & Sales Co., 417 F.2d 1201, 1204 (7th Cir. 1969), quoting Stewart v. Meyers, 353 F.2d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 1965), and Botti v. Avenue Bank & Trust Co. of Oak Park, 103 Ill.

1985(Graubremse GMBH v. Berg Manufacturing & Sales Co. (7th Cir. 1969), 417 F.2d 1201 , 1204 (quoting Stewart v. Meyers (7th Cir. 1965), 353 F.2d 691, 694 ); Botti v. Avenue Bank & Trust Co. of Oak Park (1982), 103 Ill.

2012App. 3d 787, 792 (1985) (citing Graubremse GMBH v. Berg Manufacturing & Sales Co., 417 F.2d 1201, 1204 (7th Cir. 1969), quoting Stewart v. Meyers, 353 F.2d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 1965), and Botti v. Avenue Bank & Trust Co. of Oak Park, 103 Ill.

1985(Graubremse GMBH v. Berg Manufacturing & Sales Co. (7th Cir. 1969), 417 F.2d 1201 , 1204 (quoting Stewart v. Meyers (7th Cir. 1965), 353 F.2d 691, 694 ); Botti v. Avenue Bank & Trust Co. of Oak Park (1982), 103 Ill.

2026App. 3d 113, 117 (2010) (citing Grevas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 152 Ill. 2d 407, 410 (1992)). ¶ 24 Argus asserts that the vacancy exclusion was unenforceable under the principles of waiver and estoppel because West Bend knew, or was on notice, that the property was vacant.

2025See Fuller, 205 Ill. 2d at 331 . ¶ 103 Additionally, defendant’s argument is unreasonable.

2021July 1, 2012). ¶ 56 This rule sets forth a “mandatory question and response process” and requires the circuit court to “ask each potential juror whether he or she understands and accepts each of the principles in the rule.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 607 (2010); see also People v. Othman, 2019 IL App (1st) 150823, ¶ 60 (explaining that “[i]n criminal trials, Illinois judges are required to ask the venire eight simple questions: (1) defendant is presumed innocent: (a) do you understand that? (b) do you accept it?; (2) defendant is not required to offer any evidence o

2019July 1, 2012) and the court’s holding in People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 3d 472, 477 (1984). ¶ 16 Finally, prior to beginning their deliberations, the trial court admonished the jurors that the applicable law was stated in the instructions and that it was their duty to follow them. -6- No. 1-15-2528 However, as we recognized in People v. Carpenter, 101 Ill.

2019See contra Casillas, 195 Ill. 2d at 474-77 (defendant’s conviction affirmed because the principles of the presumption of innocence and burden of proof were repeated throughout the trial). ¶ 15 In addition, the State concedes that the venire members were not asked whether they understood and accepted the principle that the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his or her own behalf, in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff.

2019See contra Casillas, 195 Ill. 2d at 474-77 (defendant’s conviction affirmed because the principles of the presumption of innocence and burden of proof were repeated throughout the trial). ¶ 15 In addition, the State concedes that the venire members were not asked whether they understood and accepted the principle that the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his or her own behalf, in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff.