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33 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1839–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kramer v. Schaeffergreen2 sentences2023Id. at 246 (cleaned up). 2015Kramer v. Schaeffer, 751 A.2d 241, 246 (Pa. Super. 2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Gumpertgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gumpert, 512 A.2d 699, 701-03 (Pa.Super. 1986) (holding that where a defendant failed to object to the complete absence of a jury waiver colloquy before the trial court, the issue was waived “insofar as the trial court was denied an opportunity to correct the deficiency”);2 see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). 2021See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gumpert, 512 A.2d 699, 701-03 (Pa.Super. 1986) (holding that where a defendant failed to object to the complete absence of a jury waiver colloquy before the trial court, the issue was waived “insofar as the trial court was denied an opportunity to correct the deficiency”);2 see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). | 2 | 2 |
Reisman v. Ranoel Realty Co.green2 sentences2015Co. v. Fioravanti, 451 Pa. 108 , 299 A.2d 585, 588 (1973) (once a dispute has been submitted to arbitration, the parties are entitled to a hearing with “the necessary essentials of due process, i.e., notice and opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause.”); Reisman v. Ranoel Realty Co., 224 Pa. Super. 220 , 303 A.2d 511, 514 (1973) (arbitrations are not wholly informal proceedings and the basic principles of hearing conduct must be adhered to, with the arbitration process requiring for its 2015Co. v. Fioravanti, 451 Pa. 108 , 299 A.2d 585, 588 (1973) (once a dispute has been submitted to arbitration, the parties are entitled to a hearing with “the necessary essentials of due process, i.e., notice and opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause.”); Reisman v. Ranoel Realty Co., 224 Pa. Super. 220 , 303 A.2d 511, 514 (1973) (arbitrations are not wholly informal proceedings and the basic principles of hearing conduct must be adhered to, with the arbitration process requiring for its | 2 | 2 |
Allstate Insurance v. Fioravantigreen2 sentences2015Co. v. Fioravanti, 451 Pa. 108 , 299 A.2d 585, 588 (1973) (once a dispute has been submitted to arbitration, the parties are entitled to a hearing with “the necessary essentials of due process, i.e., notice and opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause.”); Reisman v. Ranoel Realty Co., 224 Pa. Super. 220 , 303 A.2d 511, 514 (1973) (arbitrations are not wholly informal proceedings and the basic principles of hearing conduct must be adhered to, with the arbitration process requiring for its 2015Co. v. Fioravanti, 451 Pa. 108 , 299 A.2d 585, 588 (1973) (once a dispute has been submitted to arbitration, the parties are entitled to a hearing with “the necessary essentials of due process, i.e., notice and opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause.”); Reisman v. Ranoel Realty Co., 224 Pa. Super. 220 , 303 A.2d 511, 514 (1973) (arbitrations are not wholly informal proceedings and the basic principles of hearing conduct must be adhered to, with the arbitration process requiring for its | 2 | 2 |
Elkin v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pennsylvaniagreen2 sentences2009In Elkin v. Bell Telephone of Pa., 491 Pa. 123 , 420 A.2d 371 (1980), our Supreme Court recognized primary jurisdiction as originally being a federal doctrine and explained: The principles of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are well settled. 2009In Elkin v. Bell Telephone of Pa., 491 Pa. 123 , 420 A.2d 371 (1980), our Supreme Court recognized primary jurisdiction as originally being a federal doctrine and explained: The principles of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are well settled. | 1 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Mayfieldgreen2 sentences2010Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 574 Pa. 460, 832 A.2d 418, 422 (2003); Commonwealth v. Barud, 545 Pa. 297 , 681 A.2d 162, 165 (1996). 2010Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 574 Pa. 460, 832 A.2d 418, 422 (2003); Commonwealth v. Barud, 545 Pa. 297 , 681 A.2d 162, 165 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Barudgreen2 sentences2010Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 574 Pa. 460, 832 A.2d 418, 422 (2003); Commonwealth v. Barud, 545 Pa. 297 , 681 A.2d 162, 165 (1996). 2010Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 574 Pa. 460, 832 A.2d 418, 422 (2003); Commonwealth v. Barud, 545 Pa. 297 , 681 A.2d 162, 165 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Goral v. Fox Ridge, Inc.green2 sentences2009Therefore, where a matter is submitted to arbitration, arbitrators are obliged to abide by the minimal procedural requirements necessary for common law ar *502 bitration which entails granting the parties a full and fair hearing. ¶ 16 In Goral v. Fox Ridge, Inc., 453 Pa.Super. 316 , 683 A.2d 931, 933 (1996) (internal citations omitted), we explained: Once it has been determined that the substantive dispute is arbitrable, all matters necessary to dispose of the claim are normally arbitrable as well. 2009Therefore, where a matter is submitted to arbitration, arbitrators are obliged to abide by the minimal procedural requirements necessary for common law ar *502 bitration which entails granting the parties a full and fair hearing. ¶ 16 In Goral v. Fox Ridge, Inc., 453 Pa.Super. 316 , 683 A.2d 931, 933 (1996) (internal citations omitted), we explained: Once it has been determined that the substantive dispute is arbitrable, all matters necessary to dispose of the claim are normally arbitrable as well. | 1 | 1 |
Dudash v. Dudashgreen2 sentences2000“A corollary to the aforementioned principles is the rule that the mistake under scrutiny, as well as the actual intent of the parties, must be clearly proven.” Dudash v. Dudash, 313 Pa.Super. 547, 554-56 , 460 A.2d 323, 327 (1983), citing Hassler v. Mummert, 242 Pa.Super. 536, 538-39 , 364 A.2d 402, 403 (1976). ¶ 14 The Allstate adjuster states that at the time she extended the second offer to the Kramers’ attorney, she was unaware of the status of the personal injury case. 2000“A corollary to the aforementioned principles is the rule that the mistake under scrutiny, as well as the actual intent of the parties, must be clearly proven.” Dudash v. Dudash, 313 Pa.Super. 547, 554-56 , 460 A.2d 323, 327 (1983), citing Hassler v. Mummert, 242 Pa.Super. 536, 538-39 , 364 A.2d 402, 403 (1976). ¶ 14 The Allstate adjuster states that at the time she extended the second offer to the Kramers’ attorney, she was unaware of the status of the personal injury case. | 1 | 1 |
Hassler v. Mummertgreen2 sentences2000“A corollary to the aforementioned principles is the rule that the mistake under scrutiny, as well as the actual intent of the parties, must be clearly proven.” Dudash v. Dudash, 313 Pa.Super. 547, 554-56 , 460 A.2d 323, 327 (1983), citing Hassler v. Mummert, 242 Pa.Super. 536, 538-39 , 364 A.2d 402, 403 (1976). ¶ 14 The Allstate adjuster states that at the time she extended the second offer to the Kramers’ attorney, she was unaware of the status of the personal injury case. 2000“A corollary to the aforementioned principles is the rule that the mistake under scrutiny, as well as the actual intent of the parties, must be clearly proven.” Dudash v. Dudash, 313 Pa.Super. 547, 554-56 , 460 A.2d 323, 327 (1983), citing Hassler v. Mummert, 242 Pa.Super. 536, 538-39 , 364 A.2d 402, 403 (1976). ¶ 14 The Allstate adjuster states that at the time she extended the second offer to the Kramers’ attorney, she was unaware of the status of the personal injury case. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospitalgreen2 sentences2000See Smith v. Thomas Jefferson University Hosp., 424 Pa.Super. 41, 45-47 , 621 A.2d 1030, 1032 (1993) (citing McFadden, supra . ) "A corollary to the aforementioned principles is the rule that the mistake under scrutiny, as well as the actual intent of the parties, must be clearly proven." Dudash v. Dudash, 313 Pa.Super. 547, 554-56 , 460 A.2d 323, 327 (1983), citing Hassler v. Mummert, 242 Pa.Super. 536, 538-39 , 364 A.2d 402, 403 (1976). ¶ 14 The Allstate adjuster states that at the time she extended the second offer to the Kramers' attorney, she was unaware of the status of the personal inju 2000See Smith v. Thomas Jefferson University Hosp., 424 Pa.Super. 41, 45-47 , 621 A.2d 1030, 1032 (1993) (citing McFadden, supra . ) "A corollary to the aforementioned principles is the rule that the mistake under scrutiny, as well as the actual intent of the parties, must be clearly proven." Dudash v. Dudash, 313 Pa.Super. 547, 554-56 , 460 A.2d 323, 327 (1983), citing Hassler v. Mummert, 242 Pa.Super. 536, 538-39 , 364 A.2d 402, 403 (1976). ¶ 14 The Allstate adjuster states that at the time she extended the second offer to the Kramers' attorney, she was unaware of the status of the personal inju | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Swopegreen1 sentence1997See Green, 732 F.2d at 1400 ; Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir.1937); [White v.]Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir.1930) Martinez, 837 F.2d at 865 . 6 See Green, supra (the inadvertence of a marshal in failing to place a detainer on defendant amounted to mere negligence; it did not amount to violation of defendant’s due process rights and, thus, did not constitute either waiver or es-toppel; nevertheless, defendant was entitled to credit for time at liberty because he was released through the inadvertence of government agents through no fault of his own). 7 Citing to both Martinez a | 1 | 1 |
Donald Wayne Green v. Robert Christiansen, Warden, Federal Correctional Institution, Lompoc, Californiagreen2 sentences1997See Green, 732 F.2d at 1400 ; Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir.1937); [White v.]Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir.1930) Martinez, 837 F.2d at 865 . 6 See Green, supra (the inadvertence of a marshal in failing to place a detainer on defendant amounted to mere negligence; it did not amount to violation of defendant’s due process rights and, thus, did not constitute either waiver or es-toppel; nevertheless, defendant was entitled to credit for time at liberty because he was released through the inadvertence of government agents through no fault of his own). 7 Citing to both Martinez a 1997See Green, 732 F.2d at 1400 ; Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir.1937); [White v.]Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir.1930) Martinez, 837 F.2d at 865 . 6 See Green, supra (the inadvertence of a marshal in failing to place a detainer on defendant amounted to mere negligence; it did not amount to violation of defendant’s due process rights and, thus, did not constitute either waiver or es-toppel; nevertheless, defendant was entitled to credit for time at liberty because he was released through the inadvertence of government agents through no fault of his own). 7 Citing to both Martinez a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
WESTON v. Reading Co.
green
2 sentences2019In Bean, this Court further explained: Although the primary jurisdiction doctrine was originally a federal doctrine that was established by the United States Supreme Court in Texas [& Pacific Railway] v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., [ 204 U.S. 426 , (1907)], our Supreme Court adopted it in Weston v. Reading Co., [ 282 A.2d 714 (Pa. 1971)], and further explained it in Elkin v. Bell Telephone of [Pennsylvania], [ 420 A.2d 123 , 371-376 (Pa. 1980)], as follows: The principles of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are well settled. 2004Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 , 27 S.Ct. 350 , 51 L.Ed. 553 , (1907), our Supreme Court adopted it in Weston v. Reading Co., 445 Pa. 182 , 282 A.2d 714 (1971), and further explained it in Elkin v. Bell Telephone of Pa., 491 Pa. 123, 132-133 , 420 A.2d 371 -376 (1980), as follows: The principles of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are well settled. | 3 | 1978–2019 |
Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.
green
2 sentences2019In Bean, this Court further explained: Although the primary jurisdiction doctrine was originally a federal doctrine that was established by the United States Supreme Court in Texas [& Pacific Railway] v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., [ 204 U.S. 426 , (1907)], our Supreme Court adopted it in Weston v. Reading Co., [ 282 A.2d 714 (Pa. 1971)], and further explained it in Elkin v. Bell Telephone of [Pennsylvania], [ 420 A.2d 123 , 371-376 (Pa. 1980)], as follows: The principles of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are well settled. 2004Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 , 27 S.Ct. 350 , 51 L.Ed. 553 , (1907), our Supreme Court adopted it in Weston v. Reading Co., 445 Pa. 182 , 282 A.2d 714 (1971), and further explained it in Elkin v. Bell Telephone of Pa., 491 Pa. 123, 132-133 , 420 A.2d 371 -376 (1980), as follows: The principles of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are well settled. | 2 | 2004–2019 |
Jones v. Murphy
green
1 sentence2025In Jones, the Court noted the party contesting the probated will bears the burden of proving “the factum of a subsequent will, and that it was suppressed or destroyed by fraud.” Jones, 8 Watts & Serg. at 295 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Andrew v. CUNA Brokerage Services, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015Therefore, where a matter is submitted to arbitration, arbitrators are obliged to abide by the minimal procedural requirements necessary for common law arbitration which entails granting the parties a full and fair hearing. - 16 - J-A09028-15 Andrew, 976 A.2d at 501-02 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Attix v. Lehman
green
1 sentence2011On appeal, this Court first explained our recent interpretation of the presumption in Rule 237.3(b) based on the principles of rule construction: [I]n Attix v. Lehman, 925 A.2d 864 (Pa.Super.2007), ... we concluded that a petitioner does not need to satisfy the common law requirement that he provide a reasonable excuse for the failure that led to the judgment by default, if his petition to open is filed within 10 days of the judgment and states a meritorious defense. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
In Re PAB
green
2 sentences2003Id., 570 A.2d at 525 . ¶ 26 After applying the aforementioned principles to our analysis of the trial court’s ruling, we reversed, holding: *1275 A determination that the [p]arents’ incapacity results in an inability to care for the children and that the condition cannot improve over time is alone insufficient to warrant termination under 2511(a)(5). 2003Id., 570 A.2d at 525 . ¶ 26 After applying the aforementioned principles to our analysis of the trial court’s ruling, we reversed, holding: *1275 A determination that the [p]arents’ incapacity results in an inability to care for the children and that the condition cannot improve over time is alone insufficient to warrant termination under 2511(a)(5). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Commonwealth v. Holzlein
green
1 sentence2002However, as we noted in Commonwealth v. Holzlein, 706 A.2d 848 (Pa.Super.1997), this Court’s authority to rectify an illegal sentence exceeds the principles of waiver and allows for sua sponte review. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Bond v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
green
1 sentence2000(Dr. Homonai’s deposition, p. 30.) The WCJ concluded, under the principles and analysis of our decision in Bond v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Belmont Center), 711 A.2d 554 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), 4 that Claimant’s carpal tun *642 nel condition had resulted from a single incident on January 18, 1995, and dismissed AIG’s joinder petition. 5 The net effect of this determination was to place the risk with AIG as the carrier of record. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Brooks v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
green
1 sentence2000The Board reversed this portion of the WCJ’s decision, relying on our decision in Brooks v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Anchor Glass Container), 155 Pa.Cmwlth.248, 624 A.2d 821 (1993), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 536 Pa. 631 , 637 A.2d 291 (1993), 6 rendering EBI the responsible carrier. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways
green
2 sentences2000Because our resolution of this issue directs us to venture into heretofore unexamined areas of the principles of immunity, a brief historical review of the law of immunity as it existed prior to Ayala and Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384 , 388 A.2d 709 (1978), superceded by statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b) 4 would be in order. 2000Because our resolution of this issue directs us to venture into heretofore unexamined areas of the principles of immunity, a brief historical review of the law of immunity as it existed prior to Ayala and Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384 , 388 A.2d 709 (1978), superceded by statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b) 4 would be in order. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
White v. Pearlman
green
1 sentence1997See Green, 732 F.2d at 1400 ; Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir.1937); [White v.]Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir.1930) Martinez, 837 F.2d at 865 . 6 See Green, supra (the inadvertence of a marshal in failing to place a detainer on defendant amounted to mere negligence; it did not amount to violation of defendant’s due process rights and, thus, did not constitute either waiver or es-toppel; nevertheless, defendant was entitled to credit for time at liberty because he was released through the inadvertence of government agents through no fault of his own). 7 Citing to both Martinez a | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Frank Martinez
green
1 sentence1997See Green, 732 F.2d at 1400 ; Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir.1937); [White v.]Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir.1930) Martinez, 837 F.2d at 865 . 6 See Green, supra (the inadvertence of a marshal in failing to place a detainer on defendant amounted to mere negligence; it did not amount to violation of defendant’s due process rights and, thus, did not constitute either waiver or es-toppel; nevertheless, defendant was entitled to credit for time at liberty because he was released through the inadvertence of government agents through no fault of his own). 7 Citing to both Martinez a | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Commonwealth v. Ford
green
2 sentences1997Commonwealth v. Ford, 315 Pa.Super. 281 , 461 A.2d 1281 , 1289 n. 11 (1983). 1997Commonwealth v. Ford, 315 Pa.Super. 281 , 461 A.2d 1281 , 1289 n. 11 (1983). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United National Insurance v. J.H. France Refractories Co.
green
2 sentences1995However, the court stated that in 1978, the legislature amended 42 Pa.C.S. § 5501, pertaining to statutes of limitation, and added subsection (c), which provides: “[t]his chapter is applicable to equitable matters, but nothing in this chapter shall modify the principles of waiver, laches, and estoppel and similar principles heretofore applicable in equitable matters.” Id. at 624, 612 A.2d at 1376 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 5501(a)). 1995However, the court stated that in 1978, the legislature amended 42 Pa.C.S. § 5501, pertaining to statutes of limitation, and added subsection (c), which provides: "[t]his chapter is applicable to equitable matters, but nothing in this chapter shall modify the principles of waiver, laches, and estoppel and similar principles heretofore applicable in equitable matters." Id. at 624, 612 A.2d at 1376 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 5501(a)). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Alford v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
green
2 sentences1993Alford, 366 Pa.Super. at 513 , 531 A.2d at 794 . 1993Alford, 366 Pa.Super. at 513 , 531 A.2d at 794 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Petty v. Suburban General Hospital
green
2 sentences1993General Hospital, 363 Pa.Super. 277 , 525 A.2d 1230 (1987); Beatrice Foods, supra. This court has recognized that the application of the principles of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in both intrastate and interstate cases serves the same essential purpose: It provides the court with a means of looking beyond technical considerations such as jurisdiction and venue to determine whether litigation in the plaintiffs chosen forum would serve the interests of justice under the particular circumstances. 1993General Hospital, 363 Pa.Super. 277 , 525 A.2d 1230 (1987); Beatrice Foods, supra. This court has recognized that the application of the principles of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in both intrastate and interstate cases serves the same essential purpose: It provides the court with a means of looking beyond technical considerations such as jurisdiction and venue to determine whether litigation in the plaintiffs chosen forum would serve the interests of justice under the particular circumstances. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
National League of Cities v. Usery
red
1 sentence1977It must be noted, however, that a negative answer or a qualified answer could easily be arrived at through application of the principles and analysis set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Spinelli v. United States red | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Collins v. Collins green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| United Mine Workers v. Patton green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Glover v. Officers of the Congregational Church green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Redding v. Texas green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Goldstein v. Hunter green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Nanty-Glo Boro. v. American Surety Co. green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Dzsujko v. Eureka-Maryland Assurance Corp. green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Fowler v. Scully ex rel. First National Bank green | 1 | 1900–1900 |
| Williamson v. Lewis green | 1 | 1899–1899 |
| Martin v. M'Cord neutral | 1 | 1866–1866 |
| Morrison v. Beirer neutral | 1 | 1866–1866 |
| Helmbold v. Man neutral | 1 | 1839–1839 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.