rule rather exception in Arizona

2024P. 13.3(a). “[I]n the interest of judicial economy, joint trials are the rule rather than the exception.” State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 25 (1995).

2022“Although there is some possibility of confusion in a joint trial, in the interest of judicial economy, joint trials are the rule rather than the exception.” State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 25 (1995) (citation omitted). ¶19 Father fails to show that the evidence against Mother caused him prejudice, as there was sufficient independent evidence presented against Father to support the superior court’s findings.

2022City Prosecutor’s Off. v. Nyquist, 243 Ariz. 227 , ¶ 7 (App. 2017); see also State v. Williams, 144 Ariz. 487, 488 (1985) (“The requirement that in a criminal case the State demonstrate some degree of wrongful intent is the rule rather than the exception.”).

2013Notwithstanding this statute (and earlier, similar versions), our supreme court has held that “[sjtrict liability offenses are the exception rather than the rule and will only be found where there is a clear legislative intent not to require any degree of mens rea.” State v. Jennings, 150 Ariz. 90, 94 , 722 P.2d 258, 262 (1986); accord State v. Williams, 144 Ariz. 487, 488 , 698 P.2d 732, 733 (1985) (“The requirement that in a criminal case the State demonstrate some degree of wrongful intent is the rule rather than the exception.

1985Nonetheless, essentially because of considerations of judicial economy, “|j]oint trials are the rule rather than the exception * * *.” United States v. Camacho, 528 F.2d 464, 470 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 995 , 96 S.Ct. 2208 , 48 L.Ed.2d 819 (1976).

1985Nonetheless, essentially because of considerations of judicial economy, "[j]oint trials are the rule rather than the exception * * *." United States v. Camacho, 528 F.2d 464, 470 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 995 , 96 S.Ct. 2208 , 48 L.Ed.2d 819 (1976).

2022Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.3(a)(1), “two or more offenses may be joined in an indictment . . . if they . . . are of the same or similar character.” See also State v. Lee, 147 Ariz. 11, 17 (App. 1985) (noting that “[t]he rules for joinder and severance must be read together”).

2013Notwithstanding this statute (and earlier, similar versions), our supreme court has held that “[sjtrict liability offenses are the exception rather than the rule and will only be found where there is a clear legislative intent not to require any degree of mens rea.” State v. Jennings, 150 Ariz. 90, 94 , 722 P.2d 258, 262 (1986); accord State v. Williams, 144 Ariz. 487, 488 , 698 P.2d 732, 733 (1985) (“The requirement that in a criminal case the State demonstrate some degree of wrongful intent is the rule rather than the exception.

2013Notwithstanding this statute (and earlier, similar versions), our supreme court has held that “[sjtrict liability offenses are the exception rather than the rule and will only be found where there is a clear legislative intent not to require any degree of mens rea.” State v. Jennings, 150 Ariz. 90, 94 , 722 P.2d 258, 262 (1986); accord State v. Williams, 144 Ariz. 487, 488 , 698 P.2d 732, 733 (1985) (“The requirement that in a criminal case the State demonstrate some degree of wrongful intent is the rule rather than the exception.

1990Khalifa v. Muslim Students’ Ass’n, 131 Ariz. 328, 329 , 641 P.2d 242, 243 (App.1981); Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C.Cir.1966), cer t. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 , 87 S.Ct. 708 , 17 L.Ed.2d 548 (1967) (“In the First Amendment area, summary procedures are even more essential.

1990Khalifa v. Muslim Students’ Ass’n, 131 Ariz. 328, 329 , 641 P.2d 242, 243 (App.1981); Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C.Cir.1966), cer t. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 , 87 S.Ct. 708 , 17 L.Ed.2d 548 (1967) (“In the First Amendment area, summary procedures are even more essential.

1990Khalifa v. Muslim Students’ Ass’n, 131 Ariz. 328, 329 , 641 P.2d 242, 243 (App.1981); Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C.Cir.1966), cer t. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 , 87 S.Ct. 708 , 17 L.Ed.2d 548 (1967) (“In the First Amendment area, summary procedures are even more essential.

1990Khalifa v. Muslim Students’ Ass’n, 131 Ariz. 328, 329 , 641 P.2d 242, 243 (App.1981); Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C.Cir.1966), cer t. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 , 87 S.Ct. 708 , 17 L.Ed.2d 548 (1967) (“In the First Amendment area, summary procedures are even more essential.

1990Khalifa v. Muslim Students’ Ass’n, 131 Ariz. 328, 329 , 641 P.2d 242, 243 (App.1981); Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C.Cir.1966), cer t. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 , 87 S.Ct. 708 , 17 L.Ed.2d 548 (1967) (“In the First Amendment area, summary procedures are even more essential.

1981See Guitar v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 396 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Company, 555 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1976); Klahr v. Winterble, 4 Ariz. App. 158 , 418 P.2d 404 (1966).

1981See Guitar v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 396 F.Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y.1975); Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Company, 555 P.2d 556 (Wyo.1976); Klahr v. Winterble, 4 Ariz.App. 158 , 418 P.2d 404 (1966).

1973In the only case we have found where a state court has refused to exercise jurisdiction *427 in a section 1983 action, the Supreme Court of Tennessee concluded that the section “owes its very existence to Congressional recognition of reluctance or refusal of state courts to act.” Chamberlain v. Brown, 223 Tenn. 25 , 442 S.W.2d 248, 252 (1969).

1973In the only case we have found where a state court has refused to exercise jurisdiction *427 in a section 1983 action, the Supreme Court of Tennessee concluded that the section “owes its very existence to Congressional recognition of reluctance or refusal of state courts to act.” Chamberlain v. Brown, 223 Tenn. 25 , 442 S.W.2d 248, 252 (1969).