rule rather exception in Florida

2022See Alvarez v. Salazar, 338 So. 3d 267 , 271 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (holding that a “child support correction should have been made retroactive to the date the final judgment was issued”); see also DeSantis v. Smith, 634 So. 2d 796, 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (“Retroactivity is the rule rather than the exception which guides the trial court’s application of discretion when modification of alimony or child support is granted.”).

2018“Retroactivity is the rule rather than the exception which guides the trial court’s application of discretion when modification of alimony or child support is granted.” Id.

2015“Retroactivity is the rule rather than the exception which guides the trial court’s application of discretion when modification of alimony or child support is granted.” DeSantis v. Smith, 634 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); see also Thyrre, 963 So.2d at 862 (quoting DeSantis in support of same).

2013Retroactivity final issue raised by the for-forhusband is the court’s failure to apply the change in child support retroactively. “ ‘Retroactivity is the rule rather than the exception which guides the trial court’s application of discretion when modification of alimony or child support is granted.’ ” Thyrre, 963 So.2d at 862 (quoting DeSan-DeSanv.

2022See Sordo v. Camblin, 130 So. 3d 743, 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (“[T]he evidence was competent and substantial that there has been a substantial change in circumstances and that the modification is in the best interests of the parties’ [child].”); Levi v. Levi, 780 So. 2d 261, 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (“When child support is modified, retroactivity is the rule rather than the exception.”); Spano v. Bruce, 62 So. 3d 2, 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (“Where the 2 circumstances that give rise to a modification of child support exist at the time during which a petition for modification is filed, failure to orde

2019On remand, the trial court should keep in mind that "[w]hen child support is modified, retroactivity is the rule rather than the exception." Levi v. Levi , 780 So.2d 261 , 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

2022See Nierenberg v. Nierenberg, 758 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“When child support is modified, retroactivity is the rule rather than the exception.”).

2007Nierenberg v. Nierenberg, 758 So.2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (finding that the trial court erred in failing to make child support modification retroactive to date of petition for modification; retroactive award in such cases is the rule rather than the exception).

2018“In Florida, sovereign immunity is the rule rather than the exception.” Pan- Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep’t of Corr., 471 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1984).

2018“In Florida, sovereign immunity is the rule rather than the exception.” Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep’t of Corr., 471 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1984).

2015Co. v. Hanson Dredging, Inc., 393 So.2d 595, 596 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (“We are strongly inclined to the view that adherence to the rule rather than the exception will produce the best result in the great majority of cases.”).

1992We find that on this record appellee has not presented an interest that rises to this level and reiterate what we stated in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hanson Dredging, Inc., 393 So.2d 595, 596 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), namely that adherence to the rule rather than the exception will produce the best result in the majority of cases.

2001See Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 440 , 474 n. 78 (11th Cir.1990) (listing 47 cases reversed by this Court under Tedder between 1975 and 1989 where between one to five valid aggravating factors existed or were assumed to exist), vacated on other grounds, 920 F.2d 721 (11th Cir.1990); Fuente, 549 So.2d at 658-59 (recognizing propriety of jury override reversal in Brookings v. State, 495 So.2d 135, 143 (Fla.1986) despite presence of four "valid" aggravators).

2000See Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 440 , 474 n. 78 (11th Cir.1990) (listing 47 cases reversed by this Court under Tedder between 1975 and 1989 where between one to five valid aggravating factors existed or were assumed to exist), vacated on other grounds, 920 F.2d 721 (11th Cir.1990); Fuente, 549 So.2d at 658-59 (recognizing propriety of jury override reversal in Brookings despite presence of four "valid" aggravators).

2001See Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 440 , 474 n. 78 (11th Cir.1990) (listing 47 cases reversed by this Court under Tedder between 1975 and 1989 where between one to five valid aggravating factors existed or were assumed to exist), vacated on other grounds, 920 F.2d 721 (11th Cir.1990); Fuente, 549 So.2d at 658-59 (recognizing propriety of jury override reversal in Brookings v. State, 495 So.2d 135, 143 (Fla.1986) despite presence of four "valid" aggravators).

2000See Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 440 , 474 n. 78 (11th Cir.1990) (listing 47 cases reversed by this Court under Tedder between 1975 and 1989 where between one to five valid aggravating factors existed or were assumed to exist), vacated on other grounds, 920 F.2d 721 (11th Cir.1990); Fuente, 549 So.2d at 658-59 (recognizing propriety of jury override reversal in Brookings despite presence of four "valid" aggravators).

2006The Third District stated: "Initially, we note that assignability of a cause of action is the rule rather than the exception." See Selfridge v. Allstate Ins., 219 So.2d 127, 128 (Fla.App.1969).

1994"Initially, we note that assignability of a cause of action is the rule rather than the exception." See Selfridge v. Allstate Ins., 219 So.2d 127 , 128 (Fla. 1969).

2022See Sordo v. Camblin, 130 So. 3d 743, 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (“[T]he evidence was competent and substantial that there has been a substantial change in circumstances and that the modification is in the best interests of the parties’ [child].”); Levi v. Levi, 780 So. 2d 261, 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (“When child support is modified, retroactivity is the rule rather than the exception.”); Spano v. Bruce, 62 So. 3d 2, 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (“Where the 2 circumstances that give rise to a modification of child support exist at the time during which a petition for modification is filed, failure to orde

2022See Sordo v. Camblin, 130 So. 3d 743, 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (“[T]he evidence was competent and substantial that there has been a substantial change in circumstances and that the modification is in the best interests of the parties’ [child].”); Levi v. Levi, 780 So. 2d 261, 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (“When child support is modified, retroactivity is the rule rather than the exception.”); Spano v. Bruce, 62 So. 3d 2, 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (“Where the 2 circumstances that give rise to a modification of child support exist at the time during which a petition for modification is filed, failure to orde

2014State v. Stephenson, 973 So.2d 1259, 1264-65 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (“That a defendant refrains from criminal activity for a short time is an insufficient reason for a downward departure.”); see also State v. Geoghagan, 27 So.3d 111, 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); State v. Nathan, 632 So.2d 127, 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

2014State v. Stephenson, 973 So.2d 1259, 1264-65 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (“That a defendant refrains from criminal activity for a short time is an insufficient reason for a downward departure.”); see also State v. Geoghagan, 27 So.3d 111, 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); State v. Nathan, 632 So.2d 127, 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

2014Despite the general rule, the former wife argues that the former husband’s child support obligation should not be applied retroactively based on the following quote from Livingston v. Livingston, 686 So.2d 664, 665 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996): “While an increase in child support may be made retroactive at the discretion of the lower court, absent extraordinary or compelling circumstances, a reduction in child support may not be made retroactive.” (internal citations omitted).

2014“Retroactivity is the rule rather than the exception which guides the trial court’s application of discretion when modification of alimony or child support is granted.” Walters v. Walters, 96 So.3d 972, 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citation and quotations omitted).

2014State v. Stephenson, 973 So.2d 1259, 1264-65 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (“That a defendant refrains from criminal activity for a short time is an insufficient reason for a downward departure.”); see also State v. Geoghagan, 27 So.3d 111, 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); State v. Nathan, 632 So.2d 127, 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

2014Cf. State v. Thompkins, 113 So.3d 95, 100 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (reversing downward departure sentence based upon trial court’s observation that the crime was based upon “anger and stupidity” because those terms are not part of the lexicon of the CPC, and explaining that “if trial courts are permitted to impose sentences below the minimum guideline range based on their perception that a crime was committed out of anger and stupidity, it would be difficult to find many cases that would not qualify for a departure sentence, thus making departure the rule rather than the exception”). [4] Robinson’s

2014Cf. State v. Thompkins, 113 So. 3d 95, 100 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (reversing downward departure sentence based upon trial court’s observation that the crime was based upon “anger and stupidity” because those terms are not part of the lexicon of the CPC, and explaining that “if trial courts are permitted to impose sentences below the minimum guideline range based on their perception that a crime was committed out of anger and stupidity, it would be difficult to find many cases that would not qualify for a departure sentence, thus making departure the rule rather than the exception”).

2013Acosta v. Renta, 84 So.3d 1223, 1226 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (citing DeSantis v. Smith, 634 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)).

2013See Leventhal v. Leventhal, 885 So.2d 919, 920 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (“A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to award retroactive child support from the date of the filing of a petition for dissolution of marriage where there is a need for child support and an ability to pay.”); Levi v. Levi, 780 So.2d 261, 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (“When child support is modified, retroactivity is the rule rather than the exception.

2013Although the award of retroactive child support is discretionary, it is an abuse of discretion not to make the award retroactive where the need for support and the ability of the parent to pay exists at the time the petition for modification is filed.”); Mayfield v. Mayfield, 103 So.3d 968, 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (same); Thyrre v. Thyrre, 963 So.2d 859, 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (same).

2012However, it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether to make the modification retroactive.... ”); Bloom v. Bloom, 503 So.2d 932, 934 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (holding that while the general rule is that “an order granting modification is retroactive to the date the petition is filed, ... the circumstances of the case may dictate otherwise”).

2012“It is an abuse of discretion ... to fail to award support from the date of the petition for modification where the need for the support and the ability of the former spouse to pay existed at the time that the modification petition was filed.” Anderson v. Anderson, 609 So.2d 87, 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

2012“When child support is modified, retroactivity is the rule rather than the exception.” Miller v. Miller, 826 So.2d 480, 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (quoting Levi v. Levi 780 So.2d 261, 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)).

2010See Leonard v. Leonard, 971 So.2d 263, 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); see also Thyrre v. Thyrre, 963 So.2d 859, 861-62 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (“ ‘Retroactivity is the rule rather than the exception ....’”) (quoting DeSantis v. Smith, 634 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)).

2010See Leonard v. Leonard, 971 So.2d 263, 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); see also Thyrre v. Thyrre, 963 So.2d 859, 861-62 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ("`Retroactivity is the rule rather than the exception ....'") (quoting DeSantis v. Smith, 634 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)).

2008See Washington v. State, 813 So.2d 59 (Fla.2002) (knowledge of the illicit nature of a substance is an element of the crime of possession even though this element is not explicitly stated in the standard jury instructions); Scott v. State, 808 So.2d 166 (Fla.2002) (State has the burden in prosecution for possession of controlled substance of proving the defendant's possession was knowing); Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996) (holding that existence of mens rea is the rule rather than an exception to the principles of Florida criminal jurisprudence; guilty knowledge is implicit in the co

2007See, e.g., Brock v. Brock, 695 So.2d 744, 745 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).