searching inquiry in Maryland

2023Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004) (conducting a searching analysis of the admission of fingerprint evidence, and concluding that admission of the prosecution’s expert was not error); Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2001) (conducting a fairly searching review, and ultimately holding that “[t]hrough examination of the record in light of the requirements of Daubert and its progeny, ineluctably we are led to conclude the [trial] court’s exclusion of the testimony was an abuse of discretion and fell outside the spirit of admissibility as set for

2023Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004) (conducting a searching analysis of the admission of fingerprint evidence, and concluding that admission of the prosecution’s expert was not error); Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2001) (conducting a fairly searching review, and ultimately holding that “[t]hrough examination of the record in light of the requirements of Daubert and its progeny, ineluctably we are led to conclude the [trial] court’s exclusion of the testimony was an abuse of discretion and fell outside the spirit of admissibility as set for

2023Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004) (conducting a searching analysis of the admission of fingerprint evidence, and concluding that admission of the prosecution’s expert was not error); Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2001) (conducting a fairly searching review, and ultimately holding that “[t]hrough examination of the record in light of the requirements of Daubert and its progeny, ineluctably we are led to conclude the [trial] court’s exclusion of the testimony was an abuse of discretion and fell outside the spirit of admissibility as set for

2023Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004) (conducting a searching analysis of the admission of fingerprint evidence, and concluding that admission of the prosecution’s expert was not error); Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2001) (conducting a fairly searching review, and ultimately holding that “[t]hrough examination of the record in light of the requirements of Daubert and its progeny, ineluctably we are led to conclude the [trial] court’s exclusion of the testimony was an abuse of discretion and fell outside the spirit of admissibility as set for

2023Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004) (conducting a searching analysis of the admission of fingerprint evidence, and concluding that admission of the prosecution’s expert was not error); Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2001) (conducting a fairly searching review, and ultimately holding that “[t]hrough examination of the record in light of the requirements of Daubert and its progeny, ineluctably we are led to conclude the [trial] court’s exclusion of the testimony was an abuse of discretion and fell outside the spirit of admissibility as set for

2023Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004) (conducting a searching analysis of the admission of fingerprint evidence, and concluding that admission of the prosecution’s expert was not error); Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2001) (conducting a fairly searching review, and ultimately holding that “[t]hrough examination of the record in light of the requirements of Daubert and its progeny, ineluctably we are led to conclude the [trial] court’s exclusion of the testimony was an abuse of discretion and fell outside the spirit of admissibility as set for

2007Montgomery County Dep’t of Police v. Lumpkin, 51 Md.App. 557, 566 , 444 A.2d 469 (1982); see also Md.Code Ann., § 3-104(a), supra. *502 We have defined the ordinary meaning of an investigation as “a detailed examination; a searching inquiry; to observe or study closely.” Calhoun, 103 Md.App. at 667 , 654 A.2d 905 (quoting Leibe v. Police Dep’t of Annapolis, 57 Md.App. 317, 323 , 469 A.2d 1287 (1984) (holding that tracking of sick leave was not an investigation)) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

2007Montgomery County Dep’t of Police v. Lumpkin, 51 Md.App. 557, 566 , 444 A.2d 469 (1982); see also Md.Code Ann., § 3-104(a), supra. *502 We have defined the ordinary meaning of an investigation as “a detailed examination; a searching inquiry; to observe or study closely.” Calhoun, 103 Md.App. at 667 , 654 A.2d 905 (quoting Leibe v. Police Dep’t of Annapolis, 57 Md.App. 317, 323 , 469 A.2d 1287 (1984) (holding that tracking of sick leave was not an investigation)) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

1992The basic philosophy was set out by Chief Justice Hughes in Sorrells v. United States, at 287 U.S. 451 -452, at 53 S.Ct. 216 : "[I]f the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue.

1952We do not find this stated in terms in the majority opinion (as it is in the opinion of this court in Callahan v. State, supra) but it may be implied, e.g., in a statement that “if the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon the issue.” Supra, 287 U. S. 451 , 53 S. Ct. 216 .

1988“The cases demonstrate that something more than counseling sessions, but perhaps less than formal complaints leading to inquiry, is necessary to trigger the *668 LEOBR, see Chief, Baltimore County Police Dept. v. Marchsteiner, 55 Md.App. 108 , 461 A.2d 28 (1988).

1988“The cases demonstrate that something more than counseling sessions, but perhaps less than formal complaints leading to inquiry, is necessary to trigger the *668 LEOBR, see Chief, Baltimore County Police Dept. v. Marchsteiner, 55 Md.App. 108 , 461 A.2d 28 (1988).

2026Rochkind replaced the longstanding Frye-Reed general acceptance test for expert scientific testimony with the more searching framework set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

2013A court must examine the reasonableness of the amount fixed as liquidated damages “from the standpoint of the parties at the time the contract was made.” Traylor v. Grafton, 273 Md. 649, 663 , 332 A.2d 651 (1975).

2013A court must examine the reasonableness of the amount fixed as liquidated damages “from the standpoint of the parties at the time the contract was made.” Traylor v. Grafton, 273 Md. 649, 663 , 332 A.2d 651 (1975).

2013Therefore, when a reviewing court is called to determine the validity of a liquidated damages provision, the court conducts “a more searching inquiry into the propriety and reasonableness of the agreement itself, under the auspices of the so-called penalty doctrine, than would be conducted in any more typical contract case.” Willard, 169 Md.App. at 123 , 899 A.2d 940 (footnote and citations omitted).

2013Therefore, when a reviewing court is called to determine the validity of a liquidated damages provision, the court conducts “a more searching inquiry into the propriety and reasonableness of the agreement itself, under the auspices of the so-called penalty doctrine, than would be conducted in any more typical contract case.” Willard, 169 Md.App. at 123 , 899 A.2d 940 (footnote and citations omitted).

2010E.g., Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229 , 74 S.Ct. at 451 , 98 L.Ed. at 656 ("We do not know from this record, nor does the petitioner know, what actually transpired, or whether the incidents that may have occurred were harmful or harmless."); Resko, 3 F.3d at 686 (holding that the District Court abused its discretion in "refusing to conduct a more searching inquiry" into juror misconduct and noting that "[o]rdinarily, a defendant must show that the error was prejudicial in order to obtain a new trial. [In the present case, however], we fail to see how the district court could have made a reasoned deter

2010E.g., Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229 , 74 S.Ct. at 451 , 98 L.Ed. at 656 (“We do not know from this record, nor does the petitioner know, what actually transpired, or whether the incidents that may have occurred were harmful or harmless.”); Resko, 3 F.3d at 686 (holding that the District Court abused its discretion in “refusing to conduct a more searching inquiry” into juror misconduct and noting that “[ojrdinarily, a defendant must show that the error was prejudicial in order to obtain a new trial. [In the present case, however], we fail to see how the district court could have made a reasoned deter

2010E.g., Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229 , 74 S.Ct. at 451 , 98 L.Ed. at 656 ("We do not know from this record, nor does the petitioner know, what actually transpired, or whether the incidents that may have occurred were harmful or harmless."); Resko, 3 F.3d at 686 (holding that the District Court abused its discretion in "refusing to conduct a more searching inquiry" into juror misconduct and noting that "[o]rdinarily, a defendant must show that the error was prejudicial in order to obtain a new trial. [In the present case, however], we fail to see how the district court could have made a reasoned deter

2010E.g., Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229 , 74 S.Ct. at 451 , 98 L.Ed. at 656 (“We do not know from this record, nor does the petitioner know, what actually transpired, or whether the incidents that may have occurred were harmful or harmless.”); Resko, 3 F.3d at 686 (holding that the District Court abused its discretion in “refusing to conduct a more searching inquiry” into juror misconduct and noting that “[ojrdinarily, a defendant must show that the error was prejudicial in order to obtain a new trial. [In the present case, however], we fail to see how the district court could have made a reasoned deter

2007Montgomery County Dep’t of Police v. Lumpkin, 51 Md.App. 557, 566 , 444 A.2d 469 (1982); see also Md.Code Ann., § 3-104(a), supra. *502 We have defined the ordinary meaning of an investigation as “a detailed examination; a searching inquiry; to observe or study closely.” Calhoun, 103 Md.App. at 667 , 654 A.2d 905 (quoting Leibe v. Police Dep’t of Annapolis, 57 Md.App. 317, 323 , 469 A.2d 1287 (1984) (holding that tracking of sick leave was not an investigation)) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

2007Montgomery County Dep’t of Police v. Lumpkin, 51 Md.App. 557, 566 , 444 A.2d 469 (1982); see also Md.Code Ann., § 3-104(a), supra. *502 We have defined the ordinary meaning of an investigation as “a detailed examination; a searching inquiry; to observe or study closely.” Calhoun, 103 Md.App. at 667 , 654 A.2d 905 (quoting Leibe v. Police Dep’t of Annapolis, 57 Md.App. 317, 323 , 469 A.2d 1287 (1984) (holding that tracking of sick leave was not an investigation)) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

2007Montgomery County Dep’t of Police v. Lumpkin, 51 Md.App. 557, 566 , 444 A.2d 469 (1982); see also Md.Code Ann., § 3-104(a), supra. *502 We have defined the ordinary meaning of an investigation as “a detailed examination; a searching inquiry; to observe or study closely.” Calhoun, 103 Md.App. at 667 , 654 A.2d 905 (quoting Leibe v. Police Dep’t of Annapolis, 57 Md.App. 317, 323 , 469 A.2d 1287 (1984) (holding that tracking of sick leave was not an investigation)) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

2007Montgomery County Dep’t of Police v. Lumpkin, 51 Md.App. 557, 566 , 444 A.2d 469 (1982); see also Md.Code Ann., § 3-104(a), supra. *502 We have defined the ordinary meaning of an investigation as “a detailed examination; a searching inquiry; to observe or study closely.” Calhoun, 103 Md.App. at 667 , 654 A.2d 905 (quoting Leibe v. Police Dep’t of Annapolis, 57 Md.App. 317, 323 , 469 A.2d 1287 (1984) (holding that tracking of sick leave was not an investigation)) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

2005Noting that “ ‘[j]urors are in a poor position to make determinations as to their own impartiality’ ” (quoting Beckner, 69 F.3d at 1293 ), appellant insists that the trial court’s failure to conduct a more searching inquiry constituted reversible error.