10 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Chong Hung Hangreen2 sentences2023See Han, 130 Hawai#i at 92, 306 P.3d at 137 . 6 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER "Once a violation of the constitutional right to testify is established, the conviction must be vacated unless the State can prove that the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Pomroy, 132 Hawai#i at 94, 319 P.3d at 1102 (quoting Tachibana, 79 Hawai#i at 240, 900 P.2d at 1307 ). 2022These were "salient facts" that required the court to "engage the defendant in a dialogue that [would] effectuate the rationale behind the colloquy and the on-the-record waiver requirements as set forth in Tachibana[,]" Martin, 146 Hawai#i at 380 463 P.3d at 1037 (citing Han, 130 Hawai#i at 92, 306 P.3d at 137 ), and "should have served as an additional reason for the court to conduct a more searching inquiry of [Falevai]" to ensure that his waiver was voluntary, knowing and intelligent. | 1 | 3 |
Tachibana v. Stategreen1 sentence2023See Han, 130 Hawai#i at 92, 306 P.3d at 137 . 6 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER "Once a violation of the constitutional right to testify is established, the conviction must be vacated unless the State can prove that the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Pomroy, 132 Hawai#i at 94, 319 P.3d at 1102 (quoting Tachibana, 79 Hawai#i at 240, 900 P.2d at 1307 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pomroy.green1 sentence2023See Han, 130 Hawai#i at 92, 306 P.3d at 137 . 6 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER "Once a violation of the constitutional right to testify is established, the conviction must be vacated unless the State can prove that the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Pomroy, 132 Hawai#i at 94, 319 P.3d at 1102 (quoting Tachibana, 79 Hawai#i at 240, 900 P.2d at 1307 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ichimuragreen2 sentences2022Cf. Ichimura, 2017 WL 2590858, at *7 (testimony that the defendant "had a 'handicap' for which she took medication, and that she was being treated by a psychiatrist[, . . .] was a 'salient fact' of which the circuit court was aware, and thus should have served as an 8 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER additional reason for the court to conduct a more searching inquiry of [the defendant], rather than relying on her 'Uh-huh' response to a list of rights"). 2022Ichimura, 2017 WL 2590858, at *7 . | 1 | 1 |
Thomas McKee v. David Harris, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility, Stormville, New Yorkgreen1 sentence2009See Kossman, 101 Hawai`i at 119-21, 63 P.3d at 427-29 ; United States v. John Doe No. 1, 272 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that "if the reasons proffered [for a motion to substitute counsel] are insubstantial and the defendant receives competent representation from counsel, a court's failure to inquire sufficiently or to inquire at all constitutes harmless error"); McKee, 649 F.2d at 933 (noting that where the court's failure to inquire into the reasons for the defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel causes the defendant no harm, that procedural irregularity constitutes harmless error) | 1 | 1 |
United States v. John Doe #1green1 sentence2009See Kossman, 101 Hawai`i at 119-21, 63 P.3d at 427-29 ; United States v. John Doe No. 1, 272 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that "if the reasons proffered [for a motion to substitute counsel] are insubstantial and the defendant receives competent representation from counsel, a court's failure to inquire sufficiently or to inquire at all constitutes harmless error"); McKee, 649 F.2d at 933 (noting that where the court's failure to inquire into the reasons for the defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel causes the defendant no harm, that procedural irregularity constitutes harmless error) | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kossmangreen1 sentence2009See Kossman, 101 Hawai`i at 119-21, 63 P.3d at 427-29 ; United States v. John Doe No. 1, 272 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that "if the reasons proffered [for a motion to substitute counsel] are insubstantial and the defendant receives competent representation from counsel, a court's failure to inquire sufficiently or to inquire at all constitutes harmless error"); McKee, 649 F.2d at 933 (noting that where the court's failure to inquire into the reasons for the defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel causes the defendant no harm, that procedural irregularity constitutes harmless error) | 1 | 1 |
Bidart Brothers, a California Corporation v. The California Apple Commissiongreen1 sentence2008It evaluates whether “the money is not used for a general purpose but rather to defray the expenses generated in specialized investigations and studies, for the hiring of professional and expert services and the acquisition of the equipment needed for the operations provided by law for the [payor].” 967 F.2d at 686 (brackets omitted); see also Bidart Bros. v. California Apple Com’n, 73 F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir.1996) (articulating the third prong of the San Juan Cellular test as “whether the assessment is expended for general public purposes, or used for the regulation or benefit of the parties u | 1 | 1 |
San Juan Cellular Telephone Company, Etc. v. Public Service Commission of Puerto Ricogreen1 sentence2008It evaluates whether “the money is not used for a general purpose but rather to defray the expenses generated in specialized investigations and studies, for the hiring of professional and expert services and the acquisition of the equipment needed for the operations provided by law for the [payor].” 967 F.2d at 686 (brackets omitted); see also Bidart Bros. v. California Apple Com’n, 73 F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir.1996) (articulating the third prong of the San Juan Cellular test as “whether the assessment is expended for general public purposes, or used for the regulation or benefit of the parties u | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Welty, John Jacobgreen2 sentences2006Thus, at sentencing, just as at trial, "a defendant's waiver of counsel can be deemed effective only where the district court has made a searching inquiry sufficient to satisfy him[/her] that the defendant's waiver was understanding and voluntary." Id. (quoting United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 189 (3d Cir.1982)). 2. 2006Thus, at sentencing, just as at trial, “a defendant’s waiver of counsel can be deemed effective only where the district court has made a searching inquiry sufficient to satisfy him[7her] that the defendant’s waiver was understanding and voluntary.” Id. (quoting United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 189 (3d Cir.1982)). 2. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences1986Compare State v. Smith, 61 Haw. 522 , 606 P.2d 86 (1980) (where a tendered plea of guilty is accompanied by a contemporaneous denial ol the acts constituting the crime charged, a searching inquiry addressed personally to the defendant is required to ensure the defendant’s complete understanding of the finality of his guilty plea). 1986Compare State v. Smith, 61 Haw. 522 , 606 P.2d 86 (1980) (where a tendered plea of guilty is accompanied by a contemporaneous denial ol the acts constituting the crime charged, a searching inquiry addressed personally to the defendant is required to ensure the defendant’s complete understanding of the finality of his guilty plea). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
North Carolina v. Alford
green
2 sentences2000The Hawaii Supreme Court has held that where a defendant does not expressly admit guilt at his change of plea and afterwards professes his innocence in a bid to withdraw *462 the plea, a more thorough and intensive colloquy is required of the trial court: While the Supreme Court has held that a guilty plea may be accepted by the trial court, and sentence may be pronounced thereon even where the defendant is unable or unwilling to admit to the commission of the act charged, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), we think that where a tendered plea of guilt 2000The Hawaii Supreme Court has held that where a defendant does not expressly admit guilt at his change of plea and afterwards professes his innocence in a bid to withdraw *462 the plea, a more thorough and intensive colloquy is required of the trial court: While the Supreme Court has held that a guilty plea may be accepted by the trial court, and sentence may be pronounced thereon even where the defendant is unable or unwilling to admit to the commission of the act charged, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), we think that where a tendered plea of guilt | 2 | 1980–2000 |
State v. Martin. ICA s.d.o., filed 03/29/2019.
green
1 sentence2022These were "salient facts" that required the court to "engage the defendant in a dialogue that [would] effectuate the rationale behind the colloquy and the on-the-record waiver requirements as set forth in Tachibana[,]" Martin, 146 Hawai#i at 380 463 P.3d at 1037 (citing Han, 130 Hawai#i at 92, 306 P.3d at 137 ), and "should have served as an additional reason for the court to conduct a more searching inquiry of [Falevai]" to ensure that his waiver was voluntary, knowing and intelligent. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Patterson
green
1 sentence2016Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. George P. Salemo
green
2 sentences2006Thus, at sentencing, just as at trial, "a defendant's waiver of counsel can be deemed effective only where the district court has made a searching inquiry sufficient to satisfy him[/her] that the defendant's waiver was understanding and voluntary." Id. (quoting United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 189 (3d Cir.1982)). 2. 2006Thus, at sentencing, just as at trial, “a defendant’s waiver of counsel can be deemed effective only where the district court has made a searching inquiry sufficient to satisfy him[7her] that the defendant’s waiver was understanding and voluntary.” Id. (quoting United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 189 (3d Cir.1982)). 2. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.