8 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc. v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Though the majority pays lip service to the proper standard, it fails to actually engage in a heightened scruti- ny analysis.5 I respectfully dissent because I believe the majority (1) fails to conduct a searching inquiry into the actual purposes behind the legislation and does not ferret out the stereotypes that underlie it, (2) fails to require the Does to bear their burden to jus- tify the discriminatory classification, and (3) fails to recognize that the statute is not related to any important government purpose where it both stems from gender stereotypes and is duplicative of other statut 2014Though the majority pays lip service to the proper standard, it fails to actually engage in a heightened scruti- ny analysis.5 I respectfully dissent because I believe the majority (1) fails to conduct a searching inquiry into the actual purposes behind the legislation and does not ferret out the stereotypes that underlie it, (2) fails to require the Does to bear their burden to jus- tify the discriminatory classification, and (3) fails to recognize that the statute is not related to any important government purpose where it both stems from gender stereotypes and is duplicative of other statut | 3 | 3 |
Tuan Anh Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Servicegreen2 sentences2014In order to satisfy this searching standard of review, the [government] must demonstrate that the use of individual racial classifications . . . is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 24 See Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001) (―For a gender- based classification to withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.‖ (alter 2014Though the majority pays lip service to the proper standard, it fails to actually engage in a heightened scruti- ny analysis.5 I respectfully dissent because I believe the majority (1) fails to conduct a searching inquiry into the actual purposes behind the legislation and does not ferret out the stereotypes that underlie it, (2) fails to require the Does to bear their burden to jus- tify the discriminatory classification, and (3) fails to recognize that the statute is not related to any important government purpose where it both stems from gender stereotypes and is duplicative of other statut | 3 | 3 |
State v. Herreragreen2 sentences2014In order to satisfy this searching standard of review, the [government] must demonstrate that the use of individual racial classifications . . . is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 24 See Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001) (―For a gender- based classification to withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.‖ (alter 2014In order to satisfy this searching standard of review, the [government] must demonstrate that the use of individual racial classifications . . . is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 24 See Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001) (―For a gender- based classification to withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.‖ (alter | 3 | 3 |
Lehr v. Robertsongreen2 sentences2014Opinion of the Court particularly true where the differential treatment of men and women is rooted in ―[i]nherent differences‖ between the sexes, and where such differences translate not into an outright bar on one of the sexes, see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–33 (internal quotation marks omitted), but a regime preserving meaningful opportuni- ties to both sexes, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983) (holding that where a father had no established relationship with his child and had failed to file with the putative father registry, ―nothing in the Equal Protection Clause [would] preclu 2014Opinion of the Court particularly true where the differential treatment of men and women is rooted in ―[i]nherent differences‖ between the sexes, and where such differences translate not into an outright bar on one of the sexes, see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–33 (internal quotation marks omitted), but a regime preserving meaningful opportuni- ties to both sexes, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983) (holding that where a father had no established relationship with his child and had failed to file with the putative father registry, ―nothing in the Equal Protection Clause [would] preclu | 2 | 2 |
State v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Taylor, 2025 UT App 14 , ¶¶ 26–27, 564 P.3d 962 (concluding that a juror’s comments that she would give “law enforcement testimony” “more weight than the testimony of anybody else that testified” and that she “would have a hard time” “if it came down to the police officer’s word versus the defendant” were problematic and indicative of juror bias (cleaned up)). ¶52 But we judge Counsel’s performance based on what was known in the moment, see State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ¶ 14 , 355 P.3d 1031 (assessing whether defense counsel’s actions were competent “in the real-time context of tri 2025See State v. Taylor, 2025 UT App 14 , ¶¶ 26–27, 564 P.3d 962 (concluding that a juror’s comments that she would give “law enforcement testimony” “more weight than the testimony of anybody else that testified” and that she “would have a hard time” “if it came down to the police officer’s word versus the defendant” were problematic and indicative of juror bias (cleaned up)). ¶52 But we judge Counsel’s performance based on what was known in the moment, see State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ¶ 14 , 355 P.3d 1031 (assessing whether defense counsel’s actions were competent “in the real-time context of tri | 1 | 1 |
State v. Robertsongreen2 sentences2025We then characterized the defendant’s argument as “essentially [a contention] that waiver of any constitutional right attached to criminal trials requires a detailed colloquy to ensure that the defendant fully under[stands] the nature of his [or her] right and the dangers associated with the wavier.” Robertson, 2018 UT App 91, ¶ 35 (cleaned up). ¶25 After so characterizing the defendant’s argument, we observed that there are “constitutional rights that we regularly allow criminal defendants to waive without such a searching inquiry.” Id. 2025We then characterized the defendant’s argument as “essentially [a contention] that waiver of any constitutional right attached to criminal trials requires a detailed colloquy to ensure that the defendant fully under[stands] the nature of his [or her] right and the dangers associated with the wavier.” Robertson, 2018 UT App 91, ¶ 35 (cleaned up). ¶25 After so characterizing the defendant’s argument, we observed that there are “constitutional rights that we regularly allow criminal defendants to waive without such a searching inquiry.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brooksgreen1 sentence2025Specifically, we noted that “we do not require such a colloquy when a criminal defendant waives his [or her] right to testify.” Id. (citing State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362, 365 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (“We hold that the trial court bears no affirmative duty sua sponte to engage in an on-the-record colloquy with [a] defendant at the time of trial to ensure a valid waiver of the right to testify.”)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2025See State v. Taylor, 2025 UT App 14 , ¶¶ 26–27, 564 P.3d 962 (concluding that a juror’s comments that she would give “law enforcement testimony” “more weight than the testimony of anybody else that testified” and that she “would have a hard time” “if it came down to the police officer’s word versus the defendant” were problematic and indicative of juror bias (cleaned up)). ¶52 But we judge Counsel’s performance based on what was known in the moment, see State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ¶ 14 , 355 P.3d 1031 (assessing whether defense counsel’s actions were competent “in the real-time context of tri 2025See State v. Taylor, 2025 UT App 14 , ¶¶ 26–27, 564 P.3d 962 (concluding that a juror’s comments that she would give “law enforcement testimony” “more weight than the testimony of anybody else that testified” and that she “would have a hard time” “if it came down to the police officer’s word versus the defendant” were problematic and indicative of juror bias (cleaned up)). ¶52 But we judge Counsel’s performance based on what was known in the moment, see State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ¶ 14 , 355 P.3d 1031 (assessing whether defense counsel’s actions were competent “in the real-time context of tri | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bolden v. Doe (In re Adoption of J.S.)
green
2 sentences2014See supra ¶ 90 (―[I]t appears to me that the majority opinion‘s formulation of the lower level of intermediate scrutiny it applies is, in practice, virtually indistinguishable from . . . rational basis review . . . .‖). 46 Cite as: 2014 UT 51 NEHRING, A.C.J., dissenting ¶88 The United States Constitution provides that ―[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro- tection of the laws,‖6 and the Utah Constitution guarantees that ―[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.‖7 ―[T]hese two constitutional provisions embody the same general princi 2014See supra ¶ 90 (―[I]t appears to me that the majority opinion‘s formulation of the lower level of intermediate scrutiny it applies is, in practice, virtually indistinguishable from . . . rational basis review . . . .‖). 46 Cite as: 2014 UT 51 NEHRING, A.C.J., dissenting tection of the laws,‖6 and the Utah Constitution guarantees that ―[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.‖7 ―[T]hese two constitutional provisions embody the same general principle: persons similarly situated should be treated similarly . . . .‖8 Although the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah | 3 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2014Opinion of the Court particularly true where the differential treatment of men and women is rooted in ―[i]nherent differences‖ between the sexes, and where such differences translate not into an outright bar on one of the sexes, see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–33 (internal quotation marks omitted), but a regime preserving meaningful opportuni- ties to both sexes, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983) (holding that where a father had no established relationship with his child and had failed to file with the putative father registry, ―nothing in the Equal Protection Clause [would] preclu 2014Opinion of the Court particularly true where the differential treatment of men and women is rooted in ―[i]nherent differences‖ between the sexes, and where such differences translate not into an outright bar on one of the sexes, see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–33 (internal quotation marks omitted), but a regime preserving meaningful opportuni- ties to both sexes, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983) (holding that where a father had no established relationship with his child and had failed to file with the putative father registry, ―nothing in the Equal Protection Clause [would] preclu | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Friehe v. Schaad
green
2 sentences2014Opinion of the Court particularly true where the differential treatment of men and women is rooted in ―[i]nherent differences‖ between the sexes, and where such differences translate not into an outright bar on one of the sexes, see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–33 (internal quotation marks omitted), but a regime preserving meaningful opportuni- ties to both sexes, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983) (holding that where a father had no established relationship with his child and had failed to file with the putative father registry, ―nothing in the Equal Protection Clause [would] preclu 2014Opinion of the Court particularly true where the differential treatment of men and women is rooted in ―[i]nherent differences‖ between the sexes, and where such differences translate not into an outright bar on one of the sexes, see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–33 (internal quotation marks omitted), but a regime preserving meaningful opportuni- ties to both sexes, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983) (holding that where a father had no established relationship with his child and had failed to file with the putative father registry, ―nothing in the Equal Protection Clause [would] preclu | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Alta Industries, Ltd. v. Hurst
green
2 sentences2006Id. (citing Alta Indus. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 , 1284 n. 2 (Utah 1993)). 2006Id. (citing Alta Indus. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 , 1284 n. 2 (Utah 1993)). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Lovett v. Continental Bank and Trust Company
green
2 sentences2006The court of appeals read Lovett to require an appellate court to conduct the more searching inquiry into "whether the trier of facts could reasonably conclude that it is highly probable that the fact exists. " Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 26 The court of appeals coupled its view that appellate deference to factual findings was linked to burden of proof with the principle that lesser deference was due factual determinations made by a trial judge than factual findings incorporated within a jury's verdict. 2006The court of appeals read Lovett to require an appellate court to conduct the more searching inquiry into "whether the trier of facts could reasonably conclude that it is highly probable that the fact exists." Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 126 The court of appeals coupled its view that appellate deference to factual findings was linked to burden of proof with the principle that lesser deference was due factual determinations made by a trial judge than factual findings incorporated within a jury's verdict. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Kufrin
green
1 sentence2025Thus, “if either is lacking, the claim fails and this court need not address the other.” State v. Kufrin, 2024 UT App 86, ¶ 55 , 551 P.3d 416 (cleaned up). ¶24 In this case, Cortez claims that Counsel rendered ineffective assistance in three ways: (1) by failing to challenge the constitutionality of Utah’s affirmative defense statutory scheme, a scheme which precluded him from asserting imperfect self- defense to defend the felony discharge of a firearm charges; (2) by not objecting to (or moving to strike) Nate’s testimony about Cortez being on probation; and (3) by not engaging in a more sea | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Kelson v. Salt Lake County
green
1 sentence2008Although we did not conduct a searching inquiry into why a defense based in the Good Samaritan Act was compatible with a wrongful death action, it is clear that the defenses created by the Act share with comparative negligence, Kel-son, 784 P.2d at 1155 , and statutes of limitations, Jensen, 944 P.2d at 882, a key common characteristic. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.