12 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1986–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
cluster 1741green2 sentences2015Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 375 (2010). 10 The principal dissent claims “the rational basis standard invokes objective reason as its measure,” a contention difficult to take seriously.37 Legal fictions abound in the law, but the federal “rational basis test” is something special; it is a misnomer, wrapped in an anomaly, inside a contradiction. 2015Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 375 , 130 S.Ct. 876 , 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). . | 4 | 4 |
Amber Raquel Emerson v. Thomas Chad Emersongreen1 sentence2026See, e.g., In re Est. of Spiller, No. 04-18-00522-CV, 2019 WL 2360100 , at *2 (Tex. App.— San Antonio June 5, 2019, pet. denied) (addressing appellant’s argument that the settlement agreement containing a waiver provision 7 was not enforceable before dismissing the appeal for waiver); Emerson, 559 S.W.3d at 734 (reviewing the record to determine whether appellant waived her appellate rights when she argued she did not consent to such a waiver). | 1 | 1 |
Kelo v. City of New Londongreen1 sentence2019Id. at 518 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Normangreen1 sentence2015See Guerrero v. State, 271 S.W.3d 309 , 312—14 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008), rev’d in part on other grounds, 305 S.W.3d 546 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (concluding- similar defensive theory amounted to "no evidence whatsoever to suggest to the court that [the defendant] was not competent to- stand trial” and therefore holding trial court did not abuse its discretion ■ in failing to conduct a further competency *402 inquiry); see also Jones v. Norman, 633 F.3d 661 , 669 n. 3 (8th Cir.2011) (“Neither Edwards nor any other precedent empowers a trial court to conduct a searching inquiry into a defendant’s | 1 | 1 |
Guerrero v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See Guerrero v. State, 271 S.W.3d 309 , 312—14 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008), rev’d in part on other grounds, 305 S.W.3d 546 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (concluding- similar defensive theory amounted to "no evidence whatsoever to suggest to the court that [the defendant] was not competent to- stand trial” and therefore holding trial court did not abuse its discretion ■ in failing to conduct a further competency *402 inquiry); see also Jones v. Norman, 633 F.3d 661 , 669 n. 3 (8th Cir.2011) (“Neither Edwards nor any other precedent empowers a trial court to conduct a searching inquiry into a defendant’s | 1 | 1 |
Guerrero v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See Guerrero v. State, 271 S.W.3d 309 , 312—14 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008), rev’d in part on other grounds, 305 S.W.3d 546 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (concluding- similar defensive theory amounted to "no evidence whatsoever to suggest to the court that [the defendant] was not competent to- stand trial” and therefore holding trial court did not abuse its discretion ■ in failing to conduct a further competency *402 inquiry); see also Jones v. Norman, 633 F.3d 661 , 669 n. 3 (8th Cir.2011) (“Neither Edwards nor any other precedent empowers a trial court to conduct a searching inquiry into a defendant’s | 1 | 1 |
In Re Pleasant Glade Assembly of Godgreen2 sentences2008In the mandamus proceeding that followed, the court of appeals granted the church’s request for relief, agreeing that the Schuberts’ “religious” claims were barred by the First Amendment because they “involve[d] a searching inquiry into Assembly of God beliefs and the validity of such beliefs.” In re Pleasant Glade As sembly of God, 991 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, orig. proceeding). 2008In the mandamus proceeding that followed, the court of appeals granted the church's request for relief, agreeing that the Schuberts' "religious" claims were barred by the First Amendment because they "involve[d] a searching inquiry into Assembly of God beliefs and the validity of such beliefs." In re Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 991 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, orig. proceeding). | 1 | 1 |
Geraldine McCULLOCK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. H.B. FULLER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellantgreen1 sentence2004Such an inquiry would inexorably lead to evaluating witness credibility and weight of the evidence, the ageless role of the jury." McCullock v. H.B Fuller Co. , 61 F.3d 1038, 1045 (2nd Cir. 1995). 12. | 1 | 1 |
Satterwhite v. Texasgreen2 sentences1991We are satisfied that Rule 81(b)(2) contemplates a more searching analysis than finding “sufficient evidence to convict.” Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, at 258-259 , 108 S.Ct. 1792, at 1798 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284, at 295 (1988) (question not whether legally admitted evidence sufficient to support guilty verdict but whether State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to the verdict); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S 18, 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Harris v. State, supra, at 586, 587-588 (appellate court obligated to examine record in “neutral, impartial and even- 1991We are satisfied that Rule 81(b)(2) contemplates a more searching analysis than finding “sufficient evidence to convict.” Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, at 258-259 , 108 S.Ct. 1792, at 1798 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284, at 295 (1988) (question not whether legally admitted evidence sufficient to support guilty verdict but whether State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to the verdict); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S 18, 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Harris v. State, supra, at 586, 587-588 (appellate court obligated to examine record in “neutral, impartial and even- | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Batson v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence2020Courts must consider “all relevant circumstances,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–97, and make a searching inquiry, because “without [a] searching inquiry into the basis of the challenged strikes, Batson would become a ‘mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis.” Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Miller-El v. Dretke
green
2 sentences2020Id. 2020Courts must consider “all relevant circumstances,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–97, and make a searching inquiry, because “without [a] searching inquiry into the basis of the challenged strikes, Batson would become a ‘mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis.” Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences1991We are satisfied that Rule 81(b)(2) contemplates a more searching analysis than finding “sufficient evidence to convict.” Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, at 258-259 , 108 S.Ct. 1792, at 1798 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284, at 295 (1988) (question not whether legally admitted evidence sufficient to support guilty verdict but whether State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to the verdict); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S 18, 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Harris v. State, supra, at 586, 587-588 (appellate court obligated to examine record in “neutral, impartial and even- 1991We are satisfied that Rule 81(b)(2) contemplates a more searching analysis than finding “sufficient evidence to convict.” Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, at 258-259 , 108 S.Ct. 1792, at 1798 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284, at 295 (1988) (question not whether legally admitted evidence sufficient to support guilty verdict but whether State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to the verdict); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S 18, 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Harris v. State, supra, at 586, 587-588 (appellate court obligated to examine record in “neutral, impartial and even- | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Jenkins v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1986The Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Wier, [ Weir ] 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), enunciated that principle saying: "`In Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 , 100 S.Ct. 2124 (1980), a case dealing with pre-arrest silence, we said: "`"Common law traditionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact and circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted. 3A J. 1986The Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Wier, [ Weir ] 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), enunciated that principle saying: "`In Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 , 100 S.Ct. 2124 (1980), a case dealing with pre-arrest silence, we said: "`"Common law traditionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact and circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted. 3A J. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Fletcher v. Weir
green
2 sentences1986The Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Wier, [ Weir ] 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), enunciated that principle saying: "`In Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 , 100 S.Ct. 2124 (1980), a case dealing with pre-arrest silence, we said: "`"Common law traditionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact and circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted. 3A J. 1986The Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Wier, [ Weir ] 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), enunciated that principle saying: "`In Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 , 100 S.Ct. 2124 (1980), a case dealing with pre-arrest silence, we said: "`"Common law traditionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact and circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted. 3A J. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.