11 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Skilling v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2019See Skilling v. United States , 561 U.S. 358 , 386 (2010) (stating jury selection is particularly within the province of the trial judge). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Walstadgreen2 sentences1991Nevertheless, because " [n]on-scientifically trained courts are at a disadvantage in trying to categorize sophisticated scientific data," Paoli, 916 F.2d at 856 , and because the rules of evidence " 'embody a strong and undeniable preference for admitting any evidence having some potential for assisting the trier of fact and for dealing with the risk of error through the adversary process,' " id., 916 F.2d at 857 (citation omitted), the trial court's searching inquiry into the bases for the expert's opinion "must not be used as a tool by which the court excludes all questionably reliable evide 1991Nevertheless, because " [n]on-scientifically trained courts are at a disadvantage in trying to categorize sophisticated scientific data," Paoli, 916 F.2d at 856 , and because the rules of evidence " 'embody a strong and undeniable preference for admitting any evidence having some potential for assisting the trier of fact and for dealing with the risk of error through the adversary process,' " id., 916 F.2d at 857 (citation omitted), the trial court's searching inquiry into the bases for the expert's opinion "must not be used as a tool by which the court excludes all questionably reliable evide | 1 | 1 |
In Re Paoli Railroad Yard Pcb Litigationgreen2 sentences1991Nevertheless, because " [n]on-scientifically trained courts are at a disadvantage in trying to categorize sophisticated scientific data," Paoli, 916 F.2d at 856 , and because the rules of evidence " 'embody a strong and undeniable preference for admitting any evidence having some potential for assisting the trier of fact and for dealing with the risk of error through the adversary process,' " id., 916 F.2d at 857 (citation omitted), the trial court's searching inquiry into the bases for the expert's opinion "must not be used as a tool by which the court excludes all questionably reliable evide 1991Nevertheless, because " [n]on-scientifically trained courts are at a disadvantage in trying to categorize sophisticated scientific data," Paoli, 916 F.2d at 856 , and because the rules of evidence " 'embody a strong and undeniable preference for admitting any evidence having some potential for assisting the trier of fact and for dealing with the risk of error through the adversary process,' " id., 916 F.2d at 857 (citation omitted), the trial court's searching inquiry into the bases for the expert's opinion "must not be used as a tool by which the court excludes all questionably reliable evide | 1 | 1 |
Sorrells v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1969If in consequence he suffers a disadvantage, he has brought it upon himself by reason of the nature of the defense.” Sorrells v. United States (1932), 287 U. S. 435, 451, 452 , 53 Sup. Ct. 210, 77 L. 1969If in consequence he suffers a disadvantage, he has brought it upon himself by reason of the nature of the defense.” Sorrells v. United States (1932), 287 U. S. 435, 451, 452 , 53 Sup. Ct. 210, 77 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Seifert ex rel. Scoptur v. Balink
green
2 sentences2017Peter at the gates of heaven, performing a searching inquiry into the depth of an expert witness's soul' and thereby usurp 'the ageless role of the jury' in evaluating witness credibility and weight of the evidence." (quoted source omitted)). 53 No. 2014AP195 2015 WI App 59 , ¶36 n.10, 364 Wis. 2d 692 , 869 N.W.2d 493 (citing Pophal v. Siverhus, 168 Wis. 2d 533, 545 , 484 N.W.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1992)). 2017Peter at the gates of heaven, performing a searching inquiry into the depth of an expert witness's soul' and thereby usurp 'the ageless role of the jury' in evaluating witness credibility and weight of the evidence." (quoted source omitted)). 53 No. 2014AP195 2015 WI App 59 , ¶36 n.10, 364 Wis. 2d 692 , 869 N.W.2d 493 (citing Pophal v. Siverhus, 168 Wis. 2d 533, 545 , 484 N.W.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1992)). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Pophal v. Siverhus
green
2 sentences2017Peter at the gates of heaven, performing a searching inquiry into the depth of an expert witness's soul' and thereby usurp 'the ageless role of the jury' in evaluating witness credibility and weight of the evidence." (quoted source omitted)). 53 No. 2014AP195 2015 WI App 59 , ¶36 n.10, 364 Wis. 2d 692 , 869 N.W.2d 493 (citing Pophal v. Siverhus, 168 Wis. 2d 533, 545 , 484 N.W.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1992)). 2017Peter at the gates of heaven, performing a searching inquiry into the depth of an expert witness's soul' and thereby usurp 'the ageless role of the jury' in evaluating witness credibility and weight of the evidence." (quoted source omitted)). 53 No. 2014AP195 2015 WI App 59 , ¶36 n.10, 364 Wis. 2d 692 , 869 N.W.2d 493 (citing Pophal v. Siverhus, 168 Wis. 2d 533, 545 , 484 N.W.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1992)). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Theodore W. Oswald v. Daniel Bertrand
green
1 sentence2020The nature of the inquiry is dependent upon the probability of bias. “[T]he greater that probability, the more searching the inquiry needed to make reasonably sure than an unbiased jury is impaneled.” Id. ¶20 Whether a juror is objectively biased presents a mixed question of fact and law. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Smith
green
1 sentence2020Smith, 291 Wis. 2d 569, ¶22 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Washington v. Harper
green
1 sentence2016As a result, the two should be treated similarly in conducting a substantive due process analysis. ¶74 Both involuntary medication and involuntary commitment to a mental institution "exceed[] [a criminal] sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . . ."15 ¶75 Both involuntary medication and involuntary commitment to a mental institution are "'qualitatively different' from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime, and ha[ve] 'stigmatizing consequences.'"16 As a result, 14 See State v. Alger, | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Sandin v. Conner
green
2 sentences2016As a result, the two should be treated similarly in conducting a substantive due process analysis. ¶74 Both involuntary medication and involuntary commitment to a mental institution "exceed[] [a criminal] sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . . ."15 ¶75 Both involuntary medication and involuntary commitment to a mental institution are "'qualitatively different' from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime, and ha[ve] 'stigmatizing consequences.'"16 As a result, 14 See State v. Alger, 2016As a result, the two should be treated similarly in conducting a substantive due process analysis. ¶74 Both involuntary medication and involuntary commitment to a mental institution "exceed[] [a criminal] sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . . ."15 ¶75 Both involuntary medication and involuntary commitment to a mental institution are "'qualitatively different' from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime, and ha[ve] 'stigmatizing consequences.'"16 As a result, 14 See State v. Alger, | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Vitek v. Jones
green
2 sentences2016As a result, the two should be treated similarly in conducting a substantive due process analysis. ¶74 Both involuntary medication and involuntary commitment to a mental institution "exceed[] [a criminal] sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . . ."15 ¶75 Both involuntary medication and involuntary commitment to a mental institution are "'qualitatively different' from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime, and ha[ve] 'stigmatizing consequences.'"16 As a result, 14 See State v. Alger, 2016As a result, the two should be treated similarly in conducting a substantive due process analysis. ¶74 Both involuntary medication and involuntary commitment to a mental institution "exceed[] [a criminal] sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . . ."15 ¶75 Both involuntary medication and involuntary commitment to a mental institution are "'qualitatively different' from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime, and ha[ve] 'stigmatizing consequences.'"16 As a result, 14 See State v. Alger, | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Ronald Knipfer
green
2 sentences2016As a result, the two should be treated similarly in conducting a substantive due process analysis. ¶74 Both involuntary medication and involuntary commitment to a mental institution "exceed[] [a criminal] sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . . ."15 ¶75 Both involuntary medication and involuntary commitment to a mental institution are "'qualitatively different' from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime, and ha[ve] 'stigmatizing consequences.'"16 As a result, 14 See State v. Alger, 2016As a result, the two should be treated similarly in conducting a substantive due process analysis. ¶74 Both involuntary medication and involuntary commitment to a mental institution "exceed[] [a criminal] sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . . ."15 ¶75 Both involuntary medication and involuntary commitment to a mental institution are "'qualitatively different' from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime, and ha[ve] 'stigmatizing consequences.'"16 As a result, 14 See State v. Alger, | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Curtis
green
1 sentence2003"The hearing is important not only to give trial counsel a chance to explain his or her actions, but also to allow the trial court, which is in the best position to judge counsel's performance, to rule on the motion." State v. Curtis, 218 Wis. 2d 550, 554 , 582 N.W2d 409 (Ct. App. 1998). 10 The State, conceding that the trial court "did not conduct a searching inquiry into the reasons why McDowell sought to discharge Attorney Langford," primarily argues that McDowell "did not offer the court any justification or evidence to support his request." The State's argument is correct; as we have expl | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Anderson v. Creighton
green
2 sentences1994Such a result is inconsistent with the goals qualified immunity is designed to further. ("[PJermitting damages suits against government officials can entail substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638 .) I believe qualified immunity requires us to engage in a more searching inquiry. 1994Such a result is inconsistent with the goals qualified immunity is designed to further. ("[P]ermitting damages suits against government officials can entail substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638 .) I believe qualified immunity requires us to engage in a more searching inquiry. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
McCleary v. State
green
2 sentences1990McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263 , 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971). 9 Here the record reveals a clear abuse of discretion, for the record is devoid of the searching inquiry that a court is required to make before it reaches the conclusion that a party has voluntarily foregone the opportunity to prove or to contest a critical factual element of the lawsuit. 1990McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263 , 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971). 9 Here the record reveals a clear abuse of discretion, for the record is devoid of the searching inquiry that a court is required to make before it reaches the conclusion that a party has voluntarily foregone the opportunity to prove or to contest a critical factual element of the lawsuit. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Sprague v. State
green
1 sentence1969Sprague v. State (1925), 188 Wis. 482 , 206 N. W. 69 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.