searching inquiry in Michigan

2026“This gatekeeper role applies to all stages of expert analysis,” meaning that the court must conduct “a searching inquiry, not just of the data underlying expert testimony, but also of the manner in which the expert interprets and extrapolates from those data.” Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 782 ; 685 NW2d 391 (2004).

2026“This gatekeeper role applies to all stages of expert analysis,” meaning that the court must conduct “a searching inquiry, not just of the data underlying expert testimony, but also of the manner in which the expert interprets and extrapolates from those data.” Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 782 ; 685 NW2d 391 (2004).

2022The court must undertake a searching inquiry into the particular juvenile, as well as the particular offense, and make the admittedly difficult decision of determining whether this is the truly rare juvenile for whom life without parole is constitutionally proportionate as compared to the more common and constitutionally protected juvenile whose conduct was due to transient immaturity for the reasons addressed by our United States Supreme Court. [Bennett, 335 Mich App at 426 (quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added).] As indicated, “[j]uveniles make rash decisions, cannot assess c

2022In the companion case to Skinner, People v Hyatt, the Court of Appeals had stated, “While we do not suggest a presumption against the constitutionality of that sentence, we would be remiss not to note that review of that sentence requires a searching inquiry into the record with the understanding that, more likely than not, a life-without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile is disproportionate.” 37 In Skinner, we rejected this approach, explaining that “this sounds tantamount to a presumption against life-without-parole sentences.” 38 We further observed that “neither Miller nor Montgomery i

2022In support, it notes that in Skinner’s companion case, People v Hyatt, 316 Mich App 368, 425-426 ; 891 NW2d 549 (2016), reversed in part by Skinner, 502 Mich 89 (2018), the Court of Appeals stated, “[w]hile we do not suggest a presumption against the constitutionality of [juvenile LWOP], we would be remiss not to note that review of that sentence requires a searching inquiry into the record with the understanding that, more likely than not, a[n] [LWOP] sentence imposed on a juvenile is disproportionate.” Despite the panel’s caveat, the Skinner Court concluded that this statement sounded “tanta

2022In the companion case to Skinner, People v Hyatt, the Court of Appeals had stated, “While we do not suggest a presumption against the constitutionality of that sentence, we would be remiss not to note that review of that sentence requires a searching inquiry into the record with the understanding that, more likely than not, a life-without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile is disproportionate.” 37 In Skinner, we rejected this approach, explaining that “this sounds tantamount to a presumption against life-without-parole sentences.” 38 We further observed that “neither Miller nor Montgomery i

2021Figurski v Trinity Health-Michigan, 501 Mich 1051, 1053 (2018) (MARKMAN, C.J., dissenting), citing Craig, 471 Mich at 76 .

2019Figurski, 501 Mich at 1053 (MARKMAN, C.J., dissenting), citing Craig, 471 Mich at 76 .

2016A sentencing court abuses its discretion if it “fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only appropriate factors but nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at 27, quoting United States v Haack, 403 F3d 997, 1004 (CA 8, 2005).

2016A sentencing court abuses its discretion if it “ ‘fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only appropriate factors but nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the case.’ ” Id. at 27, quoting United States v Haack, 403 F3d 997, 1004 (CA 8, 2005).

2011Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2d ed.), p 668, defines an “investigation” as “the act or process of investigating or the condition of being investigated” or “a searching inquiry for ascertaining facts; detailed or careful examination.” Similarly, to “investigate” is “to search or examine into the particulars of; examine in detail.” Id.

2004Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2d ed), p 668, defines an “investigation” as “the act or process of investigating or the condition of being investigated” or “a searching inquiry for ascertaining facts; detailed or careful examination.” Similarly, to “investigate” is “to search or examine into the particulars of; examine in detail.” Id.

2016“An evidentiary hearing under MRE 702 and MCL 600.2955 is merely a threshold inquiry to ensure that the trier of fact is not called upon to rely in whole or in part on an expert opinion that is only masquerading as science.” Chapin v A & L Parts, Inc, 274 Mich App 122, 139 ; 732 NW2d 578 (2007) (emphasis in original); see also Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 782 ; 685 NW2d 391 (2004) (providing that “MRE 702 mandates a searching inquiry” and “[c]areful vetting of all aspects of expert testimony”).

2016“An evidentiary hearing under MRE 702 and MCL 600.2955 is merely a threshold inquiry to ensure that the trier of fact is not called upon to rely in whole or in part on an expert opinion that is only masquerading as science.” Chapin v A & L Parts, Inc, 274 Mich App 122, 139 ; 732 NW2d 578 (2007) (emphasis in original); see also Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 782 ; 685 NW2d 391 (2004) (providing that “MRE 702 mandates a searching inquiry” and “[c]areful vetting of all aspects of expert testimony”).

2022However, “although MCL 600.2955(1) explicitly requires the trial court to consider all seven of the factors it enumerates, the statute does not require that each and every one of those seven factors must favor the proffered testimony.” Chapin, 274 Mich App at 137 (DAVIS, J.); see also Elher v Misra, 499 Mich 11, 27 ; 878 NW2d 790 (2016).

2022However, “although MCL 600.2955(1) explicitly requires the trial court to consider all seven of the factors it enumerates, the statute does not require that each and every one of those seven factors must favor the proffered testimony.” Chapin, 274 Mich App at 137 (DAVIS, J.); see also Elher v Misra, 499 Mich 11, 27 ; 878 NW2d 790 (2016).

2016See Roper, 543 US at 570 (announcing that the differences between juveniles and adults “render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders.”).

2016See Roper, 543 US at 570 (announcing that the differences between juveniles and adults “render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders”).

2015If the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute, then expert testimony is unnecessary. [Kowalski, 492 Mich at 123 (footnote omitted).] However, even if expert testimony would assist the trier of fact, the proffered testimony must also meet the so-called “trilogy of restrictions,” which includes a searching inquiry into “qualification, reliability, and fit.” Elher v Misra, 308 Mich App 276 ; ___ NW2d ___ (2014), sli

2015Although these considerations are separate and distinct and must each be satisfied independently, they are, in fact, overlapping in nature. [Kowalski, 492 Mich at 120-121 (footnote omitted).] “MRE 702 requires the trial court to ensure that each aspect of an expert witness’s proffered testimony—including the data underlying the expert’s theories and the methodology by which the expert draws conclusions from that data—is reliable.” Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 779 ; 685 NW2d 391 (2004), citing Daubert.

2015Furthermore, as articulated by our Supreme Court in Dennany, 445 Mich at 438 (opinion by GRIFFIN, J), not only is a record of compliance with Anderson important to protect the defendant’s rights, but a record of compliance is also important for protecting the integrity of the trial court proceedings and to “safeguard against the opening of an appellate parachute . . . .” As recognized in Dennany, -6- Whether the prospective pro per is a naïve character who sincerely believes he can represent himself better than can a lawyer, a cagey loser who is going to try to reduce the trial to a shambles i

2005While a party may waive any claim of error by failing to call this gatekeeping ' obligation to the court’s attention, the court must evaluate *603 expert testimony under MRE 702 once that issue is raised. [Id. at 82 (emphasis in original).] We find that the trial court failed to properly exercise its function as a gatekeeper of expert opinion testimony in striking plaintiffs experts’ testimony without either conducting a more searching inquiry under its obligation to preclude speculative and unreliable evidence under MRE 702, see Beckley, supra at 710-719 , or holding a Davis-Frye evidentiary

2005See Beckley, supra at 718-719 .

1999See Bridges, supra at 222 ; Robinson, supra at 528-529.

1996See, e.g., colloquy between Branch Circuit Judge Michael Cherry and the defendant in People v. Lane, 453 Mich. 132 , 551 N.W.2d 382 (1996) (attached as appendix B).

1996See, e.g., colloquy between Branch Circuit Judge Michael Cherry and the defendant in People v. Lane, 453 Mich. 132 , 551 N.W.2d 382 (1996) (attached as appendix B).