17 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1892–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Unitog Co.green1 sentence2010See, e.g., Miller v. Unitog Co., 965 S.W.2d 373, 373-74 (Mo.App.1998) (carpal tunnel syndrome caused by repetitive motion or trauma is a "known occupational disease"). [7] The claimant makes clear that all she wants here is treatment under 287.140. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Luttrellgreen1 sentence1998In State v. Luttrell, 366 S.W.2d 453, 459 (Mo.1963), the accused’s motion for new trial averred the court erred in refusing to instruct on manslaughter, that such an instruction was requested and refused, and that the facts warranted such instruction. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Inscoregreen1 sentence1988See State v. Inscore, 592 S.W,2d 809, 813 (Mo. banc 1980). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Danielsgreen2 sentences1984See also: State v. Daniels, 347 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Mo. 1961), 87 A.L.R.2d 1208 , cert, denied 369 U.S. 862 , 82 S.Ct. 951 , 8 L.Ed. 19 : State v. Butler, 353 S.W.2d 698 (Mo.1962). 7 We believe these cases control and the trial court did not commit error in overruling appellant’s objection to the testimony of Officer Siscal that appellant was known to have used the name “James O’Connor” on a prior occasion. 8 The evidence that appellant had previously used the name “James O’Connor” did not in any way suggest he did so in connection with any criminal activity. 1984See also: State v. Daniels, 347 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Mo. 1961), 87 A.L.R.2d 1208 , cert, denied 369 U.S. 862 , 82 S.Ct. 951 , 8 L.Ed. 19 : State v. Butler, 353 S.W.2d 698 (Mo.1962). 7 We believe these cases control and the trial court did not commit error in overruling appellant’s objection to the testimony of Officer Siscal that appellant was known to have used the name “James O’Connor” on a prior occasion. 8 The evidence that appellant had previously used the name “James O’Connor” did not in any way suggest he did so in connection with any criminal activity. | 1 | 1 |
Helfrick v. Taylorgreen2 sentences1970Helfrick v. Taylor, Mo.Sup., 440 S. W.2d 940, 945 [5], while referring to the use of M.A.I. 11.02 defining negligence as mandatory in a negligence case, did not involve the plain error rule. 1970Helfrick v. Taylor, Mo.Sup., 440 S. W.2d 940, 945 [5], while referring to the use of M.A.I. 11.02 defining negligence as mandatory in a negligence case, did not involve the plain error rule. | 1 | 1 |
Ferguson v. Bettertongreen2 sentences1958What was said in Ferguson v. Betterton, 364 Mo. 997 , 270 S. W.2d 756, 762 [7] is here applicable: “De fendant’s instruction A was the only instruction submitting the issue of plaintiff’s contributory negligence for a definite finding upon it, and the reference in instruction No. 1 to other instructions must therefore be necessarily taken as a reference to instruction A.” This is not a particularly suitable form of burden of proof instruction especially in a res ipsa loquitur case. 1958What was said in Ferguson v. Betterton, 364 Mo. 997 , 270 S. W.2d 756, 762 [7] is here applicable: “De fendant’s instruction A was the only instruction submitting the issue of plaintiff’s contributory negligence for a definite finding upon it, and the reference in instruction No. 1 to other instructions must therefore be necessarily taken as a reference to instruction A.” This is not a particularly suitable form of burden of proof instruction especially in a res ipsa loquitur case. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Owen v. Owen
green
1 sentence1985Tobin principally relies upon Owen v. Owen, 642 S.W.2d 410 (Mo.App.1982). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Butler
green
1 sentence1984See also: State v. Daniels, 347 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Mo. 1961), 87 A.L.R.2d 1208 , cert, denied 369 U.S. 862 , 82 S.Ct. 951 , 8 L.Ed. 19 : State v. Butler, 353 S.W.2d 698 (Mo.1962). 7 We believe these cases control and the trial court did not commit error in overruling appellant’s objection to the testimony of Officer Siscal that appellant was known to have used the name “James O’Connor” on a prior occasion. 8 The evidence that appellant had previously used the name “James O’Connor” did not in any way suggest he did so in connection with any criminal activity. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Trinidad Corp. v. Indian Towing Co.
neutral
1 sentence1984See also: State v. Daniels, 347 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Mo. 1961), 87 A.L.R.2d 1208 , cert, denied 369 U.S. 862 , 82 S.Ct. 951 , 8 L.Ed. 19 : State v. Butler, 353 S.W.2d 698 (Mo.1962). 7 We believe these cases control and the trial court did not commit error in overruling appellant’s objection to the testimony of Officer Siscal that appellant was known to have used the name “James O’Connor” on a prior occasion. 8 The evidence that appellant had previously used the name “James O’Connor” did not in any way suggest he did so in connection with any criminal activity. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Daniels v. Missouri
green
1 sentence1984See also: State v. Daniels, 347 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Mo. 1961), 87 A.L.R.2d 1208 , cert, denied 369 U.S. 862 , 82 S.Ct. 951 , 8 L.Ed. 19 : State v. Butler, 353 S.W.2d 698 (Mo.1962). 7 We believe these cases control and the trial court did not commit error in overruling appellant’s objection to the testimony of Officer Siscal that appellant was known to have used the name “James O’Connor” on a prior occasion. 8 The evidence that appellant had previously used the name “James O’Connor” did not in any way suggest he did so in connection with any criminal activity. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
First Union National Bank v. Moss
neutral
2 sentences1977Thereafter, the court considered the extrinsic circumstances of the donee and indicated that these circumstances removed any question of doubt with respect to the validity of the exercise relying primarily upon proof that the donee was aware of his power of appointment and knowingly exercised it. 4 A North Carolina case, First Union National Bank v. Moss, 32 N.C.App. 499 , 233 S.E.2d 88 (1977), has, on even broader language, found a specific reference clause not to require descriptive language in the exercise of the power. 1977Thereafter, the court considered the extrinsic circumstances of the donee and indicated that these circumstances removed any question of doubt with respect to the validity of the exercise relying primarily upon proof that the donee was aware of his power of appointment and knowingly exercised it. 4 A North Carolina case, First Union National Bank v. Moss, 32 N.C.App. 499 , 233 S.E.2d 88 (1977), has, on even broader language, found a specific reference clause not to require descriptive language in the exercise of the power. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
May Department Stores Co. v. Union E.L. P. Co.
green
2 sentences1976Recognition is then given to May Department Stores Co. v. Union Electric Co., 341 Mo. 299 , 107 S.W.2d 41 (1937), wherein the court said: “The [Commission] has exclusive jurisdiction to establish public utility rates and may do so either by approval of rate schedules filed with it or by order after investigation or hearing.” Consumers construe that statement to mean approval of alternative methods, although it is not clear if the “hearing” referred to was in reference to one possibly held in connection with the new rate filing or was a reference to a hearing under the complaint method. 1976Recognition is then given to May Department Stores Co. v. Union Electric Co., 341 Mo. 299 , 107 S.W.2d 41 (1937), wherein the court said: “The [Commission] has exclusive jurisdiction to establish public utility rates and may do so either by approval of rate schedules filed with it or by order after investigation or hearing.” Consumers construe that statement to mean approval of alternative methods, although it is not clear if the “hearing” referred to was in reference to one possibly held in connection with the new rate filing or was a reference to a hearing under the complaint method. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Fields v. Kansas City
green
2 sentences1970Fields v. Kansas City, Mo.Sup., 383 S.W.2d 543 , involved consideration of a damage instruction in a case where there had been *619 an obvious error in the reference to the instruction number in a motion for new trial. 1970Fields v. Kansas City, Mo.Sup., 383 S.W.2d 543 , involved consideration of a damage instruction in a case where there had been an obvious error in the reference to the instruction number in a motion for new trial. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Burow v. Red Line Service, Inc.
green
2 sentences1962We recognize that in Rosenfeld v. Peters, Mo.Sup., 327 S.W.2d 264 , and Burow v. Red Line Service, Inc., 343 Mo. 605 , 122 S.W.2d 919 , partially similar instructions which omitted a reference to the standard of care were held to be more favorable to plaintiff than he was entitled to because those instructions were said to authorize a verdict for defendant only if it were impossible, upon any hypothesis, for the driver to have taken action to avoid the collision. 1962We recognize that in Rosenfeld v. Peters, Mo.Sup., 327 S.W.2d 264 , and Burow v. Red Line Service, Inc., 343 Mo. 605 , 122 S.W.2d 919 , partially similar instructions which omitted a reference to the standard of care were held to be more favorable to plaintiff than he was entitled to because those instructions were said to authorize a verdict for defendant only if it were impossible, upon any hypothesis, for the driver to have taken action to avoid the collision. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Rosenfeld v. Peters
green
1 sentence1962We recognize that in Rosenfeld v. Peters, Mo.Sup., 327 S.W.2d 264 , and Burow v. Red Line Service, Inc., 343 Mo. 605 , 122 S.W.2d 919 , partially similar instructions which omitted a reference to the standard of care were held to be more favorable to plaintiff than he was entitled to because those instructions were said to authorize a verdict for defendant only if it were impossible, upon any hypothesis, for the driver to have taken action to avoid the collision. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Arditi v. Brooks Erection Co.
neutral
1 sentence1954Arditi v. Brooks Erection Co., Mo.Sup., 266 S. W. 2d 556, 560 ; Consolidated School Dist. v. West Missouri Power Co., 329 Mo. 690 , 46 S.W. 2d 174 ; Chamberlain v. Missouri-Arkansas Coach Lines, Inc., 351 Mo. 203 , 173 S.W. 2d 57 . | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Consolidated School District No. 3 v. West Missouri Power Co.
green
2 sentences1954Arditi v. Brooks Erection Co., Mo.Sup., 266 S. W. 2d 556, 560 ; Consolidated School Dist. v. West Missouri Power Co., 329 Mo. 690 , 46 S.W. 2d 174 ; Chamberlain v. Missouri-Arkansas Coach Lines, Inc., 351 Mo. 203 , 173 S.W. 2d 57 . 1954Arditi v. Brooks Erection Co., Mo.Sup., 266 S. W. 2d 556, 560 ; Consolidated School Dist. v. West Missouri Power Co., 329 Mo. 690 , 46 S.W. 2d 174 ; Chamberlain v. Missouri-Arkansas Coach Lines, Inc., 351 Mo. 203 , 173 S.W. 2d 57 . | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Chamberlain v. Mo.-Ark. Coach Lines, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences1954Arditi v. Brooks Erection Co., Mo.Sup., 266 S. W. 2d 556, 560 ; Consolidated School Dist. v. West Missouri Power Co., 329 Mo. 690 , 46 S.W. 2d 174 ; Chamberlain v. Missouri-Arkansas Coach Lines, Inc., 351 Mo. 203 , 173 S.W. 2d 57 . 1954Arditi v. Brooks Erection Co., Mo.Sup., 266 S. W. 2d 556, 560 ; Consolidated School Dist. v. West Missouri Power Co., 329 Mo. 690 , 46 S.W. 2d 174 ; Chamberlain v. Missouri-Arkansas Coach Lines, Inc., 351 Mo. 203 , 173 S.W. 2d 57 . | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Baker v. Lyell
green
1 sentence1933However, it has frequently been held that even in those cases, wherein the account itself constitutes the statement of the cause of action, that it is not error in an instruction to refer to the claim or account where the reference is not 'to determine any issue in the case but merely for purpose of identifying a matter about which an issue had been raised. [Elstroth v. Karrenbrock, 285 S. W. 525 , l. c. 529.] The question as to whether reference to the pleading is so stated as to confuse or mislead the jury to the defendant’s prejudice determines as to whether the reference in the instruction | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Rippetoe v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co.
neutral
2 sentences1930The defendant did not request any further or different definition to these words, and its failure to offer any such instruction waived error, if any. [Dobbs v. Railway Co., 202 S. W. 276 ; Rippetoe v. Railway, 138 Mo. App. 402, 407 , 122 S. W. 314 .] Complaint is made of the court’s failure to give instruction lettered E which undertook to tell the jury that if the jury found the plaintiff was not using ordinary care and exercising ordinary prudence at the time of his injury, and that to fail to use such care and prudence was the sole cause of his injuries then the verdict should be for the de 1930The defendant did not request any further or different definition to these words, and its failure to offer any such instruction waived error, if any. [Dobbs v. Railway Co., 202 S. W. 276 ; Rippetoe v. Railway, 138 Mo. App. 402, 407 , 122 S. W. 314 .] Complaint is made of the court’s failure to give instruction lettered E which undertook to tell the jury that if the jury found the plaintiff was not using ordinary care and exercising ordinary prudence at the time of his injury, and that to fail to use such care and prudence was the sole cause of his injuries then the verdict should be for the de | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Hawes v. Kansas City Stock-Yards Co.
neutral
1 sentence1913Among the cases cited by defendant in support of the objection is Hawes v. Stock Yards Co., 103 Mo. 60 . | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Salmon Falls Bank v. Leyser
neutral
2 sentences1913On the contrary, as we understand it, it is more in the nature of “a policy which insures directly against liability, and one that insures against loss or damage by reason of liability.” [Finley v. Casualty Co., supra. See also Salmon Falls Bank v. Leyser, 116 Mo. 51 , 22 S. W. 504 .] If it was the intention to pay only when and to the amount the assured had paid, a reference to clause 14 of the Travelers policy shows how easily that intention could have been expresed. 1913On the contrary, as we understand it, it is more in the nature of “a policy which insures directly against liability, and one that insures against loss or damage by reason of liability.” [Finley v. Casualty Co., supra. See also Salmon Falls Bank v. Leyser, 116 Mo. 51 , 22 S. W. 504 .] If it was the intention to pay only when and to the amount the assured had paid, a reference to clause 14 of the Travelers policy shows how easily that intention could have been expresed. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Anderson v. Sloan
neutral
1 sentence1906We have found decisions holding that when parties go to trial without an answer being filed raising issues of fact, and without objecting to the trial on that score, the irregularity is waived. [Kirkpatrick v. Alexander, 60 Ind. 95 ; Anderson v. Sloan, 1 Colo. 484 .] The judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Kirkpatrick v. Alexander
neutral
1 sentence1906We have found decisions holding that when parties go to trial without an answer being filed raising issues of fact, and without objecting to the trial on that score, the irregularity is waived. [Kirkpatrick v. Alexander, 60 Ind. 95 ; Anderson v. Sloan, 1 Colo. 484 .] The judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Rapp v. St. Joseph & Iowa Railroad
neutral
1 sentence1892“The jury should have been left to make such finding as they considered just on that issue, without casting into the balance such a reference to the presumption obtaining in the absence of the evidence.” And to the same effect are the decisions of this court in Rapp v. Railroad, 106 Mo. 423 ; Myers v. Kansas City, 108 Mo. 480 ; Barr v. Kansas City, 105 Mo. 558 ; Railroad v. Stebbing, 62 Md. 504 . | 1 | 1892–1892 |
Myers v. City of Kansas
neutral
1 sentence1892“The jury should have been left to make such finding as they considered just on that issue, without casting into the balance such a reference to the presumption obtaining in the absence of the evidence.” And to the same effect are the decisions of this court in Rapp v. Railroad, 106 Mo. 423 ; Myers v. Kansas City, 108 Mo. 480 ; Barr v. Kansas City, 105 Mo. 558 ; Railroad v. Stebbing, 62 Md. 504 . | 1 | 1892–1892 |
Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad v. Stebbing
green
1 sentence1892“The jury should have been left to make such finding as they considered just on that issue, without casting into the balance such a reference to the presumption obtaining in the absence of the evidence.” And to the same effect are the decisions of this court in Rapp v. Railroad, 106 Mo. 423 ; Myers v. Kansas City, 108 Mo. 480 ; Barr v. Kansas City, 105 Mo. 558 ; Railroad v. Stebbing, 62 Md. 504 . | 1 | 1892–1892 |
Correll v. B. C. R. & M. R. R. Co.
neutral
1 sentence1892We are cited by respondent to the case of Correll v. Railroad, 38 Iowa, 120 , in which this instruction was approved. | 1 | 1892–1892 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.