reference defense in Illinois

2015Thus, petitioner's emphasis on the Commission's reference to standard regulatory practice is misplaced. ¶ 41 For the same reason, Ameren, 2013 IL App (4th) 121008 , is inapposite.

2015Thus, petitioner's emphasis on the Commission's reference to standard regulatory practice is misplaced. ¶ 42 For the same reason, Ameren, 2013 IL App (4th) 121008 , is inapposite.

2006The appellate court rejected respondent’s alternate interpretation of the statute, finding that it would “render [ ] meaningless the reference to the exception appearing in the first sentence of section 5 — 715(1).” 361 Ill.

2006The appellate court rejected respondent’s alternate interpretation of the statute, finding that it would “render[ ] meaningless the reference to the exception appearing in the first sentence of section 5–715(1).” 361 Ill.

2024The court reiterated the point a paragraph later: “We fail to see how it can be reasonable assistance of counsel for an attorney to identify claims worth pursuing but then fail to shape them into proper form.” Id. ¶ 26. ¶ 38 The record in this case simply does not demonstrate that this sentencing claim was one that postconviction counsel had “identified” as “worth pursuing.” The only reference to this claim by counsel was at a December 2021 court date in which counsel vaguely referred to a claim that Mr. Perry was making in a “successive” and said, “[S]o honestly it’d be more effective for me

2002Jenkins cites to People v. Kidd, 147 Ill. 2d 510, 544 (1992), and People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487, 497 (1983), for the proposition that the prosecution’s reference to defense counsel’s closing argument as a “smoke screen” constitutes reversible error.

1991(People v. Husted (1981), 97 Ill.

1990Dec. 442 , 438 N.E.2d 180 .) The State's basis for this argument is a reference by defense counsel in her closing argument that "the State wants you to believe those three young men, scared, not scared, or whatever their problem is, were telling you the truth, and they came in here and told you what happened." The State suggests that it properly addressed why the witnesses were scared.

1990(See, e.g., People v. Dixon (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 346, 350-51 .) The State’s basis for this argument is a reference by defense counsel in her closing argument that “the State wants you to believe those three young men, scared, not scared, or whatever their problem is, were telling you the truth, and they came in here and told you what happened.” The State suggests that it properly addressed why the witnesses were scared.

1988Rather, the Court concluded that a juror, receiving the instruction at the close of the sentencing hearing, would “understand the instruction not to rely on ‘mere sympathy’ as a directive to ignore only the sort of sympathy that would be totally divorced from the evidence adduced during the penalty phase.” ( 479 U.S. at 542 , 93 L.

1988Rather, the Court concluded that a juror, receiving the instruction at the close of the sentencing hearing, would “understand the instruction not to rely on ‘mere sympathy’ as a directive to ignore only the sort of sympathy that would be totally divorced from the evidence adduced during the penalty phase.” ( 479 U.S. at 542 , 93 L.

1986The court noted that “[a] careful reading of Gulley reveals that despite the court’s reference to a presumption of prejudice ***, it was actually relying upon a well-articulated showing of actual and substantial prejudice which was amply supported by the record.” People v. Overturf (1984), 122 Ill.

1986App. 3d 625, 627 , 461 N.E.2d 640, 641 .

1984(People v. Gulley (1980), 83 Ill.

1981Co. (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 186 , 142 N.E.2d 104 , cert. denied (1957), 355 U.S. 837 , 2 L.

1981Co. (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 186 , 142 N.E.2d 104 , cert. denied (1957), 355 U.S. 837 , 2 L.

1981Co. (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 186 , 142 N.E.2d 104 , cert. denied (1957), 355 U.S. 837 , 2 L.

1981Co. (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 186 , 142 N.E.2d 104 , cert. denied (1957), 355 U.S. 837 , 2 L.

1980People v. Outlaw (1979), 75 Ill.

1979Although the reference to the rule in John has been described as dictum (Valentine v. North American Co. (1974), 60 Ill. 2d 168, 172 , 328 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ward, J., dissenting)), the supreme court nonetheless applied the rule in Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 345 , 243 N.E.2d 217 , and more recently in Valentine v. North American Co. (1974), 60 Ill. 2d 168 , 328 N.E.2d 265 .

1979Although the reference to the rule in John has been described as dictum (Valentine v. North American Co. (1974), 60 Ill. 2d 168, 172 , 328 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ward, J., dissenting)), the supreme court nonetheless applied the rule in Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 345 , 243 N.E.2d 217 , and more recently in Valentine v. North American Co. (1974), 60 Ill. 2d 168 , 328 N.E.2d 265 .

1979We do not view the supreme court’s decision in Troman v. Wood (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 184 , 340 N.E.2d 292 , as a departure from this rule.

1979We do not view the supreme court’s decision in Troman v. Wood (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 184 , 340 N.E.2d 292 , as a departure from this rule.

1978App. 3d 748 , 289 N.E.2d 452 .) Accordingly, failure to strike this reference was error.

1977(Hoffman v. Lehnhausen (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 323 , 269 N.E.2d 465 ; Coyne Electrical School v. Paschen (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 387 , 146 N.E.2d 73 ; Rogers Park Post No. 108 v. Brenza (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 286 , 134 N.E.2d 292 .) However, in these cases, the reference to the requirement of ownership by a charitable organization focused on the nature of the organization in question, and it was found that none of them qualified as “charitable” organizations.

1977(Hoffman v. Lehnhausen (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 323 , 269 N.E.2d 465 ; Coyne Electrical School v. Paschen (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 387 , 146 N.E.2d 73 ; Rogers Park Post No. 108 v. Brenza (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 286 , 134 N.E.2d 292 .) However, in these cases, the reference to the requirement of ownership by a charitable organization focused on the nature of the organization in question, and it was found that none of them qualified as “charitable” organizations.

1977(Hoffman v. Lehnhausen (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 323 , 269 N.E.2d 465 ; Coyne Electrical School v. Paschen (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 387 , 146 N.E.2d 73 ; Rogers Park Post No. 108 v. Brenza (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 286 , 134 N.E.2d 292 .) However, in these cases, the reference to the requirement of ownership by a charitable organization focused on the nature of the organization in question, and it was found that none of them qualified as “charitable” organizations.

1977(Hoffman v. Lehnhausen (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 323 , 269 N.E.2d 465 ; Coyne Electrical School v. Paschen (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 387 , 146 N.E.2d 73 ; Rogers Park Post No. 108 v. Brenza (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 286 , 134 N.E.2d 292 .) However, in these cases, the reference to the requirement of ownership by a charitable organization focused on the nature of the organization in question, and it was found that none of them qualified as “charitable” organizations.

1977(Hoffman v. Lehnhausen (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 323 , 269 N.E.2d 465 ; Coyne Electrical School v. Paschen (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 387 , 146 N.E.2d 73 ; Rogers Park Post No. 108 v. Brenza (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 286 , 134 N.E.2d 292 .) However, in these cases, the reference to the requirement of ownership by a charitable organization focused on the nature of the organization in question, and it was found that none of them qualified as “charitable” organizations.

1977(Hoffman v. Lehnhausen (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 323 , 269 N.E.2d 465 ; Coyne Electrical School v. Paschen (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 387 , 146 N.E.2d 73 ; Rogers Park Post No. 108 v. Brenza (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 286 , 134 N.E.2d 292 .) However, in these cases, the reference to the requirement of ownership by a charitable organization focused on the nature of the organization in question, and it was found that none of them qualified as “charitable” organizations.