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11 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1911–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mohamed v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Other than a reference to an instruction on failure to reach unanimity, id. at 711 (5), our opinion contains no further information about instructions given to the jury in that case. 6 Another case relied on by Hourin, Sherrod v. State, 280 Ga. 275 ( 627 SE2d 36 ) (2006), did not involve jury instructions but nonetheless presented the issue in the post- conviction context. 2017Other than a reference to an instruction on failure to reach unanimity, id. at 711 (5), our opinion contains no further information about instructions given to the jury in that case. | 2 | 2 |
East v. Stephensgreen2 sentences2015See generally East v. Stephens, 292 Ga. 604, 606 ( 740 SE2d 156 ) (2013) (when a judgment is susceptible of two meanings, one of which would render it illegal and the other proper, the construction which will render legal, if reasonably possible, shall be given). 2015See generally East v. Stephens, 292 Ga. 604, 606 ( 740 SE2d 156 ) (2013) (when a judgment is susceptible of two meanings, one of which would render it illegal and the other proper, the construction which will render legal, if reasonably possible, shall be given). | 1 | 1 |
Parham v. Swift Transportation Co.green2 sentences2015Co., 292 Ga. App. 53, 56, n. 3 ( 663 SE2d 769 ) (2008), which did not involve an injury requiring medical evidence, this court distinguished AFLAC v. Hardy, supra, by noting that the injury at issue in that case “was a heart attack, which requires that claimants meet a higher standard of proof to establish compensability.” As with the ALJ in the instant case, this was not a reference to a standard of proof higher than preponderance of the evidence, but was merely a way of expressing the additional evidentiary requirement of medical evidence in such cases. 2015Co., 292 Ga. App. 53, 56, n. 3 ( 663 SE2d 769 ) (2008), which did not involve an injury requiring medical evidence, this court distinguished AFLAC v. Hardy, supra, by noting that the injury at issue in that case “was a heart attack, which requires that claimants meet a higher standard of proof to establish compensability.” As with the ALJ in the instant case, this was not a reference to a standard of proof higher than preponderance of the evidence, but was merely a way of expressing the additional evidentiary requirement of medical evidence in such cases. | 1 | 1 |
Polk v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Watkins v. State, 276 Ga. 578, 581 (3) ( 581 SE2d 23 ) (2003) (witness cannot be impeached with proof of specific misconduct unless that misconduct has resulted in a criminal conviction); see also Polk v. State, 202 Ga. App. 738, 739 (2) ( 415 SE2d 506 ) (1992) (same). 2011See Watkins v. State, 276 Ga. 578, 581 (3) ( 581 SE2d 23 ) (2003) (witness cannot be impeached with proof of specific misconduct unless that misconduct has resulted in a criminal conviction); see also Polk v. State, 202 Ga. App. 738, 739 (2) ( 415 SE2d 506 ) (1992) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Watkins v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Watkins v. State, 276 Ga. 578, 581 (3) ( 581 SE2d 23 ) (2003) (witness cannot be impeached with proof of specific misconduct unless that misconduct has resulted in a criminal conviction); see also Polk v. State, 202 Ga. App. 738, 739 (2) ( 415 SE2d 506 ) (1992) (same). 2011See Watkins v. State, 276 Ga. 578, 581 (3) ( 581 SE2d 23 ) (2003) (witness cannot be impeached with proof of specific misconduct unless that misconduct has resulted in a criminal conviction); see also Polk v. State, 202 Ga. App. 738, 739 (2) ( 415 SE2d 506 ) (1992) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Whatley v. Stategreen2 sentences2000In Noggle v. State, 256 Ga. 383, 386 (4) ( 349 SE2d 175 ) (1986), we recommended that trial courts discontinue giving the presumption-of-truthfulness charge, as it “can be misleading and is of little positive value. . . .” However, we also have repeatedly “held that the use of such a charge is not unconstitutional and does not constitute reversible error. [Cits.]” Whatley v. State, 270 Ga. 296, 300 (10) (b) ( 509 SE2d 45 ) (1998). 2000In Noggle v. State, 256 Ga. 383, 386 (4) ( 349 SE2d 175 ) (1986), we recommended that trial courts discontinue giving the presumption-of-truthfulness charge, as it “can be misleading and is of little positive value. . . .” However, we also have repeatedly “held that the use of such a charge is not unconstitutional and does not constitute reversible error. [Cits.]” Whatley v. State, 270 Ga. 296, 300 (10) (b) ( 509 SE2d 45 ) (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Noggle v. Stategreen2 sentences2000In Noggle v. State, 256 Ga. 383, 386 (4) ( 349 SE2d 175 ) (1986), we recommended that trial courts discontinue giving the presumption-of-truthfulness charge, as it “can be misleading and is of little positive value. . . .” However, we also have repeatedly “held that the use of such a charge is not unconstitutional and does not constitute reversible error. [Cits.]” Whatley v. State, 270 Ga. 296, 300 (10) (b) ( 509 SE2d 45 ) (1998). 2000In Noggle v. State, 256 Ga. 383, 386 (4) ( 349 SE2d 175 ) (1986), we recommended that trial courts discontinue giving the presumption-of-truthfulness charge, as it “can be misleading and is of little positive value. . . .” However, we also have repeatedly “held that the use of such a charge is not unconstitutional and does not constitute reversible error. [Cits.]” Whatley v. State, 270 Ga. 296, 300 (10) (b) ( 509 SE2d 45 ) (1998). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Knottsgreen2 sentences1986See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 280-281 (103 SC 1081, 75 LE2d 55); United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F2d 992, 993-994. 1986See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 280-281 (103 SC 1081, 75 LE2d 55); United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F2d 992, 993-994. | 1 | 1 |
City of Calhoun v. Hollandgreen2 sentences1969That the city governing authorities may have had knowledge of the fact that plaintiff had a claim which she expected to assert against the city, either from communications which do not meet the requisites of written notice under Code Ann. § 69-308 (City of Calhoun v. Holland, 222 Ga. 817 *303 ( 152 SE2d 752 ); Peek v. City of Albany, 101 Ga. App. 564 ( 114 SE2d 451 ); Allen v. City of Macon, 118 Ga. App. 88 ( 162 SE2d 783 )), or from a reference of the claim to an insurance carrier which undertook an investigation and settlement, can not work a waiver of the notice, an estoppel to assert lack 1969That the city governing authorities may have had knowledge of the fact that plaintiff had a claim which she expected to assert against the city, either from communications which do not meet the requisites of written notice under Code Ann. § 69-308 (City of Calhoun v. Holland, 222 Ga. 817 *303 ( 152 SE2d 752 ); Peek v. City of Albany, 101 Ga. App. 564 ( 114 SE2d 451 ); Allen v. City of Macon, 118 Ga. App. 88 ( 162 SE2d 783 )), or from a reference of the claim to an insurance carrier which undertook an investigation and settlement, can not work a waiver of the notice, an estoppel to assert lack | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sherrod v. State
green
2 sentences2017Other than a reference to an instruction on failure to reach unanimity, id. at 711 (5), our opinion contains no further information about instructions given to the jury in that case. 6 Another case relied on by Hourin, Sherrod v. State, 280 Ga. 275 ( 627 SE2d 36 ) (2006), did not involve jury instructions but nonetheless presented the issue in the post- conviction context. 2017Other than a reference to an instruction on failure to reach unanimity, id. at 711 (5), our opinion contains no further information about instructions given to the jury in that case. 6 Another case relied on by Hourin, Sherrod v. State, 280 Ga. 275 ( 627 SE2d 36 ) (2006), did not involve jury instructions but nonetheless presented the issue in the post- conviction context. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Fears v. State
green
1 sentence1976Fears v. State, 138 Ga. App. 885 , supra. Since in the instant case the conviction of murder had not occurred prior to the escape and was hence not relied upon to establish the felony grade of offense, 1 the reference to it was error as the trial court held. 2. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Maddox Coffee Co. v. McHan
green
2 sentences1969As held *207 in Maddox Coffee Co. v. McHan, 22 Ga. App. 198 (2) ( 95 SE 736 ): "The defendant duly filed a plea presenting a meritorious defense to the action, and setting forth fully the alleged facts constituting his defense, which was referred to in the motion to set aside the judgment against him and thus made a part of said motion, so that the motion itself disclosed the specific nature and character of the defense relied upon... 1969As held *207 in Maddox Coffee Co. v. McHan, 22 Ga. App. 198 (2) ( 95 SE 736 ): "The defendant duly filed a plea presenting a meritorious defense to the action, and setting forth fully the alleged facts constituting his defense, which was referred to in the motion to set aside the judgment against him and thus made a part of said motion, so that the motion itself disclosed the specific nature and character of the defense relied upon... | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Allen v. City of MacOn
green
2 sentences1969That the city governing authorities may have had knowledge of the fact that plaintiff had a claim which she expected to assert against the city, either from communications which do not meet the requisites of written notice under Code Ann. § 69-308 (City of Calhoun v. Holland, 222 Ga. 817 *303 ( 152 SE2d 752 ); Peek v. City of Albany, 101 Ga. App. 564 ( 114 SE2d 451 ); Allen v. City of Macon, 118 Ga. App. 88 ( 162 SE2d 783 )), or from a reference of the claim to an insurance carrier which undertook an investigation and settlement, can not work a waiver of the notice, an estoppel to assert lack 1969That the city governing authorities may have had knowledge of the fact that plaintiff had a claim which she expected to assert against the city, either from communications which do not meet the requisites of written notice under Code Ann. § 69-308 (City of Calhoun v. Holland, 222 Ga. 817 *303 ( 152 SE2d 752 ); Peek v. City of Albany, 101 Ga. App. 564 ( 114 SE2d 451 ); Allen v. City of Macon, 118 Ga. App. 88 ( 162 SE2d 783 )), or from a reference of the claim to an insurance carrier which undertook an investigation and settlement, can not work a waiver of the notice, an estoppel to assert lack | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Peek v. City of Albany
green
2 sentences1969That the city governing authorities may have had knowledge of the fact that plaintiff had a claim which she expected to assert against the city, either from communications which do not meet the requisites of written notice under Code Ann. § 69-308 (City of Calhoun v. Holland, 222 Ga. 817 *303 ( 152 SE2d 752 ); Peek v. City of Albany, 101 Ga. App. 564 ( 114 SE2d 451 ); Allen v. City of Macon, 118 Ga. App. 88 ( 162 SE2d 783 )), or from a reference of the claim to an insurance carrier which undertook an investigation and settlement, can not work a waiver of the notice, an estoppel to assert lack 1969That the city governing authorities may have had knowledge of the fact that plaintiff had a claim which she expected to assert against the city, either from communications which do not meet the requisites of written notice under Code Ann. § 69-308 (City of Calhoun v. Holland, 222 Ga. 817 *303 ( 152 SE2d 752 ); Peek v. City of Albany, 101 Ga. App. 564 ( 114 SE2d 451 ); Allen v. City of Macon, 118 Ga. App. 88 ( 162 SE2d 783 )), or from a reference of the claim to an insurance carrier which undertook an investigation and settlement, can not work a waiver of the notice, an estoppel to assert lack | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Hollett v. Wilmington Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1950Therefore, as stated in Hollett v. Wilmington Trust Co., 36 Del. 170 ( 172 Atl. 763 ), “The law with respect to survivability of actions for torts is to be determined by a reference to the doctrine stated by Lord Mansfield, the statute of Edward III and the statutory enactments of the State.” In Moore v. Backus, 78 Fed. 2d, 571 (101 A. L. 1950Therefore, as stated in Hollett v. Wilmington Trust Co., 36 Del. 170 ( 172 Atl. 763 ), “The law with respect to survivability of actions for torts is to be determined by a reference to the doctrine stated by Lord Mansfield, the statute of Edward III and the statutory enactments of the State.” In Moore v. Backus, 78 Fed. 2d, 571 (101 A. L. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Godwin v. Godwin
green
2 sentences1911It was held that it was not error for the judge to consolidate them, “and in this manner have all' the issues disposed of by a judgment binding and conclusive upon all the parties before the court.” There is nothing in the Code of 1910, § 3863, or in Godwin v. Godwin, 129 Ga. 67 ( 58 S. E. 652 ), in conflict with what is here said; nor is it necessary to discuss the meaning of the words, “without the consent of the testator,” used in that section, when considered in connection with the reference to presumption of revocation in the latter part thereof. 1911It was held that it was not error for the judge to consolidate them, “and in this manner have all' the issues disposed of by a judgment binding and conclusive upon all the parties before the court.” There is nothing in the Code of 1910, § 3863, or in Godwin v. Godwin, 129 Ga. 67 ( 58 S. E. 652 ), in conflict with what is here said; nor is it necessary to discuss the meaning of the words, “without the consent of the testator,” used in that section, when considered in connection with the reference to presumption of revocation in the latter part thereof. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.