7 Colorado opinions name it 1 courts 1912–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Philbin v. Denver City Tramway Co.green2 sentences1912But this presumption will give away to the actual truth, that he did not do so, and we say again, that if the evidence satisfies you that had Weber stopped, looked and listened, he would not have been injured, then he was guilty of negligence, and you should find for the defense, even should you find that the engineer gave no warning of the approach of the train.” The reference to the instruction in the Pennsylvania case is not to be taken as an affirmation that the law of this state imposes on the deceased any absolute duty to “stop, look and listen,” before attempting to cross the street rai 1912But this presumption will give away to the actual truth, that he did not do so, and we say again, that if the evidence satisfies you that had Weber stopped, looked and listened, he would not have been injured, then he was guilty of negligence, and you should find for the defense, even should you find that the engineer gave no warning of the approach of the train.” The reference to the instruction in the Pennsylvania case is not to be taken as an affirmation that the law of this state imposes on the deceased any absolute duty to “stop, look and listen,” before attempting to cross the street rai | 2 | 2 |
People v. Ramirezgreen1 sentence2026See id. (prosecutor’s rebuttal comment that defendant’s theory of reasonable doubt was “absurd” did “nothing more than suggest to the jury that defendant’s theory as to why the jury should find a reasonable doubt was so unlikely as to strain credibility”); People v. Ramirez, 997 P.2d 1200, 1211 (Colo. App. 1999) (concluding that it was not improper to characterize a defense argument as “blowing smoke” when used to assert that the evidence supporting defendant’s innocence lacked substance, rather than to suggest that opposing counsel knew the defense was not meritorious), aff’d, 43 P.3d 611 (Co | 1 | 1 |
People v. Collinsgreen1 sentence2026See id. (prosecutor’s rebuttal comment that defendant’s theory of reasonable doubt was “absurd” did “nothing more than suggest to the jury that defendant’s theory as to why the jury should find a reasonable doubt was so unlikely as to strain credibility”); People v. Ramirez, 997 P.2d 1200, 1211 (Colo. App. 1999) (concluding that it was not improper to characterize a defense argument as “blowing smoke” when used to assert that the evidence supporting defendant’s innocence lacked substance, rather than to suggest that opposing counsel knew the defense was not meritorious), aff’d, 43 P.3d 611 (Co | 1 | 1 |
People v. Roadcapgreen1 sentence2015“Although the reference to defense counsel was arguably inappropriate, as a whole, the prosecutor’s statements were fair comment on the evidence....” People v. Roadcap, 78 P.3d 1108, 1114 (Colo. App. 2003) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Millergreen1 sentence2007See People v. Miller, supra. Nor did plain error result from the prosecutor’s reference to the instruction in closing argument (‘You have the instruction which says the law presumes everyone to be sane until there’s evidence ... otherwise. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Isomgreen1 sentence2007See People v. Isom, 140 P.3d 100, 105-06 (Colo.App.2005); People v. Jones, 990 P.2d 1098, 1108 (Colo.App.1999). (2) The prosecutor’s comment on the absence of a suicide note. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2007See People v. Isom, 140 P.3d 100, 105-06 (Colo.App.2005); People v. Jones, 990 P.2d 1098, 1108 (Colo.App.1999). (2) The prosecutor’s comment on the absence of a suicide note. | 1 | 1 |
Nagy v. District Court of the City & County of Denvergreen1 sentence1992See Nagy v. District Court, 762 P.2d 158 (Colo.1988); C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-18(1)(d). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Davidson v. Denver Tramway Co.
neutral
2 sentences1912But this presumption will give away to the actual truth, that he did not do so, and we say again, that if the evidence satisfies you that had Weber stopped, looked and listened, he would not have been injured, then he was guilty of negligence, and you should find for the defense, even should you find that the engineer gave no warning of the approach of the train.” The reference to the instruction in the Pennsylvania case is not to be taken as an affirmation that the law of this state imposes on the deceased any absolute duty to “stop, look and listen,” before attempting to cross the street rai 1912But this presumption will give away to the actual truth, that he did not do so, and we say again, that if the evidence satisfies you that had Weber stopped, looked and listened, he would not have been injured, then he was guilty of negligence, and you should find for the defense, even should you find that the engineer gave no warning of the approach of the train.” The reference to the instruction in the Pennsylvania case is not to be taken as an affirmation that the law of this state imposes on the deceased any absolute duty to “stop, look and listen,” before attempting to cross the street rai | 2 | 1912–1912 |
Ramirez v. People
green
1 sentence2026See id. (prosecutor’s rebuttal comment that defendant’s theory of reasonable doubt was “absurd” did “nothing more than suggest to the jury that defendant’s theory as to why the jury should find a reasonable doubt was so unlikely as to strain credibility”); People v. Ramirez, 997 P.2d 1200, 1211 (Colo. App. 1999) (concluding that it was not improper to characterize a defense argument as “blowing smoke” when used to assert that the evidence supporting defendant’s innocence lacked substance, rather than to suggest that opposing counsel knew the defense was not meritorious), aff’d, 43 P.3d 611 (Co | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Coria
green
1 sentence2007We conclude that the following remarks of which defendant complains were not improper: (1) The prosecutor’s reference to instruction number 21 as the “theory of defense instruction.” While trial courts are to refrain from distinguishing between the “court’s instructions” and the “defendant’s instruction,” see People v. Coria, supra, 937 P.2d at 392-93 , it is not misconduct for a prosecutor to refer to the fact that an instruction setting forth the defense theory is argument, not a statement of law, and that the jury need not follow it. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Vialpando
green
1 sentence2003Although the reference to defense counsel was arguably inappropriate, see People v. Jones, supro, as a whole, the prosecutor's statements were fair comment on the evidence and responded to defense counsel's closing remarks about "red herrings." See People v. Vialpando, supra. Defendant, for the first time on appeal, also objects to three other comments made by the prosecutor. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.