firmly rooted exception in New Mexico

2004Rule 11-804(B)(3) provides that a statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if (1) the declarant is unavailable as a witness and (2) the statement "at the time of its making... so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability ... that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true." In State v. Torres, 1998-NMSC-052, ¶ 30 , 126 N.M. 477 , 971 P.2d 1267 , we held this exception "is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule and poses an insignificant risk of unreliability under the Confrontation Clause

2004Rule 11-804(B)(3) provides that a statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if (1) the declarant is unavailable as a witness and (2) the statement "at the time of its making... so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability ... that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true." In State v. Torres, 1998-NMSC-052, ¶ 30 , 126 N.M. 477 , 971 P.2d 1267 , we held this exception "is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule and poses an insignificant risk of unreliability under the Confrontation Clause

2007Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2007Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2004Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (“Properly administered the business and public records exceptions would seem to be among the safest of the hearsay exceptions”) (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted); accord, e.g., United States v. Hemandez-Herrera, 273 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The public records exception is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.”).

2004Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (“Properly administered the business and public records exceptions would seem to be among the safest of the hearsay exceptions”) (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted); accord, e.g., United States v. Hemandez-Herrera, 273 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The public records exception is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.”).

2004Rule 11-804(B)(3) provides that a statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if (1) the declarant is unavailable as a witness and (2) the statement "at the time of its making... so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability ... that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true." In State v. Torres, 1998-NMSC-052, ¶ 30 , 126 N.M. 477 , 971 P.2d 1267 , we held this exception "is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule and poses an insignificant risk of unreliability under the Confrontation Clause

2004Rule 11-804(B)(3) provides that a statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if (1) the declarant is unavailable as a witness and (2) the statement "at the time of its making... so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability ... that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true." In State v. Torres, 1998-NMSC-052, ¶ 30 , 126 N.M. 477 , 971 P.2d 1267 , we held this exception "is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule and poses an insignificant risk of unreliability under the Confrontation Clause

2004Rule 11-804(B)(3) provides that a statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if (1) the declarant is unavailable as a witness and (2) the statement "at the time of its making... so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability ... that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true." In State v. Torres, 1998-NMSC-052, ¶ 30 , 126 N.M. 477 , 971 P.2d 1267 , we held this exception "is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule and poses an insignificant risk of unreliability under the Confrontation Clause

2004Rule 11-804(B)(3) provides that a statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if (1) the declarant is unavailable as a witness and (2) the statement "at the time of its making... so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability ... that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true." In State v. Torres, 1998-NMSC-052, ¶ 30 , 126 N.M. 477 , 971 P.2d 1267 , we held this exception "is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule and poses an insignificant risk of unreliability under the Confrontation Clause

2002The Court noted that the exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment is a firmly-rooted exception, which is “recognized in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), and ... widely accepted among the States.” White, 502 U.S. at 356 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 736 .

2002The Court noted that the exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment is a firmly-rooted exception, which is “recognized in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), and ... widely accepted among the States.” White, 502 U.S. at 356 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 736 .

1999“If the disputed statement does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, then there must be ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ equivalent to those associated with a firmly rooted exception.” Id. at 23 , 919 P.2d at 1088 (quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 815 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 ).

1999“If the disputed statement does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, then there must be ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ equivalent to those associated with a firmly rooted exception.” Id. at 23 , 919 P.2d at 1088 (quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 815 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 ).

2009See id. ¶¶ 32- 9 37 (noting that non-testimonial evidence is still reviewed under the standards, existing 10 before Crawford, to determine whether the evidence is reliable and that reliability is 11 established when the evidence meets a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule). 12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 __________________________________ 15 JONATHAN B.

2004Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (“Properly administered the business and public records exceptions would seem to be among the safest of the hearsay exceptions”) (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted); accord, e.g., United States v. Hemandez-Herrera, 273 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The public records exception is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.”).

2004As noted above, “[t]he [Confrontation [C]lause places two conditions on the admission of hearsay evidence: necessity and reliability.” Christian, 119 N.M. at 782 , 895 P.2d at 682 ; see also Austin, 104 N.M. at 575 , 725 P.2d at 254 .

2004As noted above, “[t]he [Confrontation [C]lause places two conditions on the admission of hearsay evidence: necessity and reliability.” Christian, 119 N.M. at 782 , 895 P.2d at 682 ; see also Austin, 104 N.M. at 575 , 725 P.2d at 254 .

2004As noted above, “[t]he [Confrontation [C]lause places two conditions on the admission of hearsay evidence: necessity and reliability.” Christian, 119 N.M. at 782 , 895 P.2d at 682 ; see also Austin, 104 N.M. at 575 , 725 P.2d at 254 .

2004As noted above, “[t]he [Confrontation [C]lause places two conditions on the admission of hearsay evidence: necessity and reliability.” Christian, 119 N.M. at 782 , 895 P.2d at 682 ; see also Austin, 104 N.M. at 575 , 725 P.2d at 254 .

2002See United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488 , 1494 n. 5 (10th Cir.1993) (noting that such statements “ ‘are made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness’” (quoting White, 502 U.S. at 355 , 112 S.Ct. 736 )). {31} After considering these authorities, we conclude that a firmly-rooted exception under the Confrontation Clause, one that is “established historically” and “widely accepted,” requires compliance with both common law criteria: treatment-seeking motive and physician reliance.

2002As a result, based on our more restrictive construction of Rule 11-804(B)(3) in accordance with the Supreme Court's opinion in Williamson , we determined that New Mexico's Rule 11-804(B)(3) is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule because "the `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' imposed by the federal Confrontation Clause are inherently and necessarily a part of the statement-against-interest analysis under our Rule 11-804(B)(3)." Gonzales, 1999-NMSC-033, ¶ 39 , 128 N.M. 44 , 989 P.2d 419 ; accord United States v. Gallego, 191 F.3d 156 , 167 n. 5 (2d Cir.1999) (declining to

2002As a result, based on our more restrictive construction of Rule 11-804(B)(3) in accordance with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Williamson, we determined that New Mexico’s Rule 11-804(B)(3) is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule because “the ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ imposed by the federal Confrontation Clause are inherently and necessarily a part of the statement-against-interest analysis under our Rule 11-804(B)(3).” Gonzales, 1999-NMSC-033, ¶ 39 , 128 N.M. 44 , 989 P.2d 419 ; accord United States v. Gallego, 191 F.3d 156 , 167 n. 5 (2d Cir.1999) (declining to d

2002Beyond the fact that the firmly rooted exception discussion in Lilly was contained in a plurality opinion, and thus is not binding on this Court, see Shea, 211 F.3d at 669 (stating that " Lilly's full reach may be unclear [because] there was no single `majority' opinion"); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 151, 167 (Ky.2001) ("As a plurality opinion, [ Lilly ] is not binding precedent on the issue of whether statements against penal interests are `firmly rooted' for Confrontation Clause purposes."), we noted in Gonzales that "the co-conspirator's confession in Lilly would have failed to qualif

2002Beyond the fact that the firmly rooted exception discussion in Lilly was contained in a plurality opinion, and thus is not binding on this Court, see Shea, 211 F.3d at 669 (stating that “Lilly’s full reach may be unclear [because] there was no single ‘majority’ opinion”); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 151, 167 (Ky.2001) (“As a plurality opinion, [Lilly ] is not binding precedent on the issue of whether statements against penal interests are ‘firmly rooted’ for Confrontation Clause purposes.”), we noted in Gonzales that “the co-conspirator’s confession in Lilly would have failed to qualify

2002Beyond the fact that the firmly rooted exception discussion in Lilly was contained in a plurality opinion, and thus is not binding on this Court, see Shea, 211 F.3d at 669 (stating that " Lilly's full reach may be unclear [because] there was no single `majority' opinion"); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 151, 167 (Ky.2001) ("As a plurality opinion, [ Lilly ] is not binding precedent on the issue of whether statements against penal interests are `firmly rooted' for Confrontation Clause purposes."), we noted in Gonzales that "the co-conspirator's confession in Lilly would have failed to qualif

2002Beyond the fact that the firmly rooted exception discussion in Lilly was contained in a plurality opinion, and thus is not binding on this Court, see Shea, 211 F.3d at 669 (stating that “Lilly’s full reach may be unclear [because] there was no single ‘majority’ opinion”); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 151, 167 (Ky.2001) (“As a plurality opinion, [Lilly ] is not binding precedent on the issue of whether statements against penal interests are ‘firmly rooted’ for Confrontation Clause purposes.”), we noted in Gonzales that “the co-conspirator’s confession in Lilly would have failed to qualify

1999Id. (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 , 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992)); see also Williams v. State, 714 So.2d 462 , 465 n. 3 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) (“[W]e have exhaustively researched this issue and find that the excited utterance is uniformly considered a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.”), review denied, 717 So.2d 542 (Fla.1998).

1999We now hold that because Cuellar’s declaration had “sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the [federal] Confrontation Clause is satisfied.” White, 502 U.S. at 356 , 112 S.Ct. 736 . {20} Citing State v. Earnest, 106 N.M. 411, 412 , 744 P.2d 539, 540 (1987), Defendant argues that certain factors preclude a determination that the statement was sufficiently reliable for confrontation purposes.

1999We now hold that because Cuellar’s declaration had “sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the [federal] Confrontation Clause is satisfied.” White, 502 U.S. at 356 , 112 S.Ct. 736 . {20} Citing State v. Earnest, 106 N.M. 411, 412 , 744 P.2d 539, 540 (1987), Defendant argues that certain factors preclude a determination that the statement was sufficiently reliable for confrontation purposes.

1998The trial court, relying on Sanchez, 112 N.M. at 63 , 811 P.2d at 96 , considered independent corroborative evidence in admitting Barnett's statement; however, given the fact that the statement met all three of the remaining Earnest factors, we do not believe that the consideration of independent evidence affected the trial court's ultimate conclusion that the statement was sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. [5] "The weight of authority, post Lee v. Illinois and Williamson , supports the conclusion that the exception to the hearsay rule for a statement against penal int

1998"The weight of authority, post Lee v. Illinois and Williamson, supports the conclusion that the exception to the hearsay rule for a statement against penal interest is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.” Aldana, 4 F.Supp.2d at 1329 ; accord United States v. Keltner, 147 F.3d 662, 671 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 574 , 142 L.Ed.2d 478 (1998); Neuman v. Rivers, 125 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 631 , 139 L.Ed.2d 610 (1997); United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 779 (1st Cir.1995); York, 933 F.2d at 1363-64 ; Lilly v. Commonwealth, 255