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15 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ohio v. Robertsred2 sentences2026Prior to the decision in Crawford, supra, “the United States Supreme Court was of the view the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of out-of-court statements that fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule or that bore a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness.” Brown, 185 A.3d at 324 , citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); see also Commonwealth v. Carter, 932 A.2d 1261 , 1265 n.3 (Pa. 2007). 2016Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), it was generally the view that “the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of out-of–court statements that fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (abrogated by Crawford). | 4 | 7 |
Commonwealth v. Younggreen2 sentences2024Appellant further claims Officer Horton’s testimony does not fall within any exception to the hearsay rule: [T]he United States Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have held that “[s]tatements made to the authorities by a non-testifying accomplice which inculpate the defendant more than the accomplice are not admissible pursuant -6- J-A11043-24 to a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay doctrine.” Commonwealth v. Robins, 812 A.2d [522, 524] (Pa. 2000)[,] quoting Commonwealth v. Young, 748 A.2d 166, 192 (Pa. 2000). 2002Concerning the question of firm rooting, on reargument in Commonwealth v. Young, 561 Pa. 34 , 748 A.2d 166 (2000), this Court acknowledged that the lead opinion in Lilly represented the view of a plurality of Justices but nonetheless was able to discern a majority holding on a point of law from among the various expressions. 12 This Court summarized that holding as follows: “[Statements made to the authorities by a non-testifying accomplice which inculpate the defendant more than the accomplice are not admissible pursuant to a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay doctrine and thus do not sat | 2 | 3 |
Crawford v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2026Prior to the decision in Crawford, supra, “the United States Supreme Court was of the view the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of out-of-court statements that fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule or that bore a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness.” Brown, 185 A.3d at 324 , citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); see also Commonwealth v. Carter, 932 A.2d 1261 , 1265 n.3 (Pa. 2007). 2016Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), it was generally the view that “the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of out-of–court statements that fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (abrogated by Crawford). | 1 | 6 |
Commonwealth v. Cartergreen1 sentence2026Prior to the decision in Crawford, supra, “the United States Supreme Court was of the view the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of out-of-court statements that fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule or that bore a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness.” Brown, 185 A.3d at 324 , citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); see also Commonwealth v. Carter, 932 A.2d 1261 , 1265 n.3 (Pa. 2007). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Thomasgreen1 sentence2023He conceded that the declaration did not fit within a firmly-rooted exception to the hearsay rule, but argued that it was “admissible as substantive evidence because it evinces overwhelming indicia of reliability and trustworthiness.” Id. at 354 (internal citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 510995green2 sentences2007See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.1988); Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C.App.1984); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.1958); State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562 , 436 A.2d 33 (1980); State v. Malsbury, 186 N.J.Super. 91 , 451 A.2d 421 (Law Div.1982); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash.2d 112 , 542 P.2d 782 (1975). 6 Appellee and the Superior Court majority articulated their concern regarding the possibility of inherent bias by the police lab, as the lab is part of the same branch of government as the prosecutor’s office, both being vested with the task of law enf 2007See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.1988); Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C.App.1984); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.1958); State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562 , 436 A.2d 33 (1980); State v. Malsbury, 186 N.J.Super. 91 , 451 A.2d 421 (Law Div.1982); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash.2d 112 , 542 P.2d 782 (1975). [6] Appellee and the Superior Court majority articulated their concern regarding the possibility of inherent bias by the police lab, as the lab is part of the same branch of government as the prosecutor's office, both being vested with the task of law e | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Reynoldsgreen2 sentences2005Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir.2004); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438 (8th Cir.2004) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Hayes v. York, 311 F.3d 321, 324-25 (4th Cir.2002); Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1107 (10th Cir.1998) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir.1988). 2005Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir.2004); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438 (8th Cir. 2004) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Hayes v. York, 311 F.3d 321, 324-25 (4th Cir.2002); Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1107 (10th Cir.1998) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Horton v. Allengreen2 sentences2005Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir.2004); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438 (8th Cir.2004) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Hayes v. York, 311 F.3d 321, 324-25 (4th Cir.2002); Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1107 (10th Cir.1998) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir.1988). 2005Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir.2004); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438 (8th Cir. 2004) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Hayes v. York, 311 F.3d 321, 324-25 (4th Cir.2002); Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1107 (10th Cir.1998) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir.1988). | 1 | 1 |
James Richard Terrovona v. Larry Kincheloegreen2 sentences2005Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir.2004); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438 (8th Cir.2004) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Hayes v. York, 311 F.3d 321, 324-25 (4th Cir.2002); Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1107 (10th Cir.1998) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir.1988). 2005Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir.2004); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438 (8th Cir. 2004) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Hayes v. York, 311 F.3d 321, 324-25 (4th Cir.2002); Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1107 (10th Cir.1998) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir.1988). | 1 | 1 |
John Francis Hayes v. Michael York, Wardengreen2 sentences2005Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir.2004); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438 (8th Cir.2004) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Hayes v. York, 311 F.3d 321, 324-25 (4th Cir.2002); Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1107 (10th Cir.1998) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir.1988). 2005Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir.2004); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438 (8th Cir. 2004) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Hayes v. York, 311 F.3d 321, 324-25 (4th Cir.2002); Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1107 (10th Cir.1998) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir.1988). | 1 | 1 |
White v. Illinoisgreen1 sentence1999See, e.g., Roberts, supra. “[W]here proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied.” White, supra, at 356 , 112 S.Ct. 736 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ohio v. Robertsred2 sentences2026Prior to the decision in Crawford, supra, “the United States Supreme Court was of the view the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of out-of-court statements that fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule or that bore a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness.” Brown, 185 A.3d at 324 , citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); see also Commonwealth v. Carter, 932 A.2d 1261 , 1265 n.3 (Pa. 2007). 2016Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), it was generally the view that “the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of out-of–court statements that fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (abrogated by Crawford). | 2 | 7 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Illinois
red
2 sentences2014Prior to the decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , [] (2004), the United States Supreme Court took the view that “the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of out-of-court statements that fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.” Williams v. Illinois, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 2223 , [] (2012); see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , [] (1980). 2013Prior to the decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the United States Supreme Court took the view that “the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of out-of-court statements that fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.” Williams v. Illinois, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 2223 , 183 L.Ed.2d 89 (2012); see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). | 3 | 2013–2014 |
Commonwealth v. Brown
green
2 sentences2026Prior to the decision in Crawford, supra, “the United States Supreme Court was of the view the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of out-of-court statements that fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule or that bore a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness.” Brown, 185 A.3d at 324 , citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); see also Commonwealth v. Carter, 932 A.2d 1261 , 1265 n.3 (Pa. 2007). 2026“In Crawford, however, the [High] Court sought to align its Confrontation Clause analysis with the original intent of the framers [of the United States Constitution] who, according to the [High] Court, were concerned about abuses of the civil-law mode of criminal procedure.”14 Brown, 185 A.3d at 324 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Ernest Kay v. United States
green
2 sentences2007See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.1988); Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C.App.1984); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.1958); State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562 , 436 A.2d 33 (1980); State v. Malsbury, 186 N.J.Super. 91 , 451 A.2d 421 (Law Div.1982); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash.2d 112 , 542 P.2d 782 (1975). 6 Appellee and the Superior Court majority articulated their concern regarding the possibility of inherent bias by the police lab, as the lab is part of the same branch of government as the prosecutor’s office, both being vested with the task of law enf 2007See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.1988); Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C.App.1984); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.1958); State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562 , 436 A.2d 33 (1980); State v. Malsbury, 186 N.J.Super. 91 , 451 A.2d 421 (Law Div.1982); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash.2d 112 , 542 P.2d 782 (1975). [6] Appellee and the Superior Court majority articulated their concern regarding the possibility of inherent bias by the police lab, as the lab is part of the same branch of government as the prosecutor's office, both being vested with the task of law e | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Cosgrove
green
2 sentences2007See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.1988); Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C.App.1984); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.1958); State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562 , 436 A.2d 33 (1980); State v. Malsbury, 186 N.J.Super. 91 , 451 A.2d 421 (Law Div.1982); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash.2d 112 , 542 P.2d 782 (1975). 6 Appellee and the Superior Court majority articulated their concern regarding the possibility of inherent bias by the police lab, as the lab is part of the same branch of government as the prosecutor’s office, both being vested with the task of law enf 2007See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.1988); Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C.App.1984); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.1958); State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562 , 436 A.2d 33 (1980); State v. Malsbury, 186 N.J.Super. 91 , 451 A.2d 421 (Law Div.1982); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash.2d 112 , 542 P.2d 782 (1975). 6 Appellee and the Superior Court majority articulated their concern regarding the possibility of inherent bias by the police lab, as the lab is part of the same branch of government as the prosecutor’s office, both being vested with the task of law enf | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Kreck
green
2 sentences2007See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.1988); Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C.App.1984); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.1958); State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562 , 436 A.2d 33 (1980); State v. Malsbury, 186 N.J.Super. 91 , 451 A.2d 421 (Law Div.1982); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash.2d 112 , 542 P.2d 782 (1975). 6 Appellee and the Superior Court majority articulated their concern regarding the possibility of inherent bias by the police lab, as the lab is part of the same branch of government as the prosecutor’s office, both being vested with the task of law enf 2007See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.1988); Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C.App.1984); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.1958); State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562 , 436 A.2d 33 (1980); State v. Malsbury, 186 N.J.Super. 91 , 451 A.2d 421 (Law Div.1982); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash.2d 112 , 542 P.2d 782 (1975). 6 Appellee and the Superior Court majority articulated their concern regarding the possibility of inherent bias by the police lab, as the lab is part of the same branch of government as the prosecutor’s office, both being vested with the task of law enf | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Howard v. United States
green
2 sentences2007See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.1988); Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C.App.1984); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.1958); State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562 , 436 A.2d 33 (1980); State v. Malsbury, 186 N.J.Super. 91 , 451 A.2d 421 (Law Div.1982); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash.2d 112 , 542 P.2d 782 (1975). 6 Appellee and the Superior Court majority articulated their concern regarding the possibility of inherent bias by the police lab, as the lab is part of the same branch of government as the prosecutor’s office, both being vested with the task of law enf 2007See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.1988); Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C.App.1984); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.1958); State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562 , 436 A.2d 33 (1980); State v. Malsbury, 186 N.J.Super. 91 , 451 A.2d 421 (Law Div.1982); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash.2d 112 , 542 P.2d 782 (1975). [6] Appellee and the Superior Court majority articulated their concern regarding the possibility of inherent bias by the police lab, as the lab is part of the same branch of government as the prosecutor's office, both being vested with the task of law e | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Malsbury
green
2 sentences2007See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.1988); Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C.App.1984); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.1958); State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562 , 436 A.2d 33 (1980); State v. Malsbury, 186 N.J.Super. 91 , 451 A.2d 421 (Law Div.1982); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash.2d 112 , 542 P.2d 782 (1975). 6 Appellee and the Superior Court majority articulated their concern regarding the possibility of inherent bias by the police lab, as the lab is part of the same branch of government as the prosecutor’s office, both being vested with the task of law enf 2007See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.1988); Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C.App.1984); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.1958); State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562 , 436 A.2d 33 (1980); State v. Malsbury, 186 N.J.Super. 91 , 451 A.2d 421 (Law Div.1982); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash.2d 112 , 542 P.2d 782 (1975). 6 Appellee and the Superior Court majority articulated their concern regarding the possibility of inherent bias by the police lab, as the lab is part of the same branch of government as the prosecutor’s office, both being vested with the task of law enf | 1 | 2007–2007 |
United States v. James Saget, Also Known as Hesh
green
1 sentence2006Saget, 377 F.3d at 230 ; see also Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Michael Lenza v. Donald W. Wyrick, Warden Attorney General of the State of Missouri
green
2 sentences2005Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir.2004); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438 (8th Cir.2004) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Hayes v. York, 311 F.3d 321, 324-25 (4th Cir.2002); Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1107 (10th Cir.1998) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir.1988). 2005Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir.2004); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438 (8th Cir.2004) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Hayes v. York, 311 F.3d 321, 324-25 (4th Cir.2002); Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1107 (10th Cir.1998) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir.1988). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Rodney Clay Evans v. Allen Luebbers, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center
green
2 sentences2005Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir.2004); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438 (8th Cir.2004) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Hayes v. York, 311 F.3d 321, 324-25 (4th Cir.2002); Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1107 (10th Cir.1998) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir.1988). 2005Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir.2004); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438 (8th Cir. 2004) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Hayes v. York, 311 F.3d 321, 324-25 (4th Cir.2002); Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1107 (10th Cir.1998) (relying on Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.1981)); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir.1988). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Lilly v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2004Young, 748 A.2d at 191 (emphasis added) (construing Lilly, 527 U.S. at 116 , 119 S.Ct. at 1887 ). 2004Young, 748 A.2d at 191 (emphasis added) (construing Lilly, 527 U.S. at 116 , 119 S.Ct. at 1887 ). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Primavera v. Celotex Corp.
green
2 sentences1999As a panel of this court recognized in Primavera v. Celotex Corp., 415 Pa.Super. 41 , 608 A.2d 515 (1992), appeal denied, 533 Pa. 641 , 622 A.2d 1374 (1993), “The fact that experts reasonably and regularly rely on [out of court] information merely to practice their profession lends strong indicia of reliability to source material, when it is presented through a qualified expert’s eyes.” 608 A.2d at 520 . 1999As a panel of this court recognized in Primavera v. Celotex Corp., 415 Pa.Super. 41 , 608 A.2d 515 (1992), appeal denied, 533 Pa. 641 , 622 A.2d 1374 (1993), “The fact that experts reasonably and regularly rely on [out of court] information merely to practice their profession lends strong indicia of reliability to source material, when it is presented through a qualified expert’s eyes.” 608 A.2d at 520 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Idaho v. Wright
green
2 sentences1990The Wright court cited the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule as an example of a firmly rooted exception where “the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous.” Id. 1990The Wright court cited the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule as an example of a firmly rooted exception where "the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous." Id. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.