firmly rooted exception in Texas

2003Although the evidence in this case does not fall within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, it may nonetheless be sufficiently reliable for Confrontation Clause purposes if it has "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Guidry , 9 S.W.3d at 149 (citing Wright , 497 U.S. at 816 ; Roberts , 448 U.S. at 66 )).

2003However, even if a statement does not fall within a firmly rooted exception, it may still be sufficiently reliable if it has “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id. at 150.

2007In discussing this issue, the Court discusses prior testimony and quotes from Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 , 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1899 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (plurality opinion) as follows: “[AJccomplices’ confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 , 124 S.Ct. at 1368 .

2007In discussing this issue, the Court discusses prior testimony and quotes from Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 , 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1899 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (plurality opinion) as follows: “[AJccomplices’ confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 , 124 S.Ct. at 1368 .

2002In considering the matter, we have conducted an extensive review of Supreme Court cases and find no instance in which a hearsay exception of such recent origin *664 has been identified as “firmly rooted.” See, e.g., Lilly, 527 U.S. at 127 , 119 S.Ct. at 1895 (voluntary statements against penal interest carry a “distinguished heritage” confirming admissibility in this country as far back as 1846); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 356 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 736 , 743 n. 8, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (the firmly rooted exception permitting admission of spontaneous declarations is at least two centuries old

2002In considering the matter, we have conducted an extensive review of Supreme Court cases and find no instance in which a hearsay exception of such recent origin *664 has been identified as “firmly rooted.” See, e.g., Lilly, 527 U.S. at 127 , 119 S.Ct. at 1895 (voluntary statements against penal interest carry a “distinguished heritage” confirming admissibility in this country as far back as 1846); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 356 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 736 , 743 n. 8, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (the firmly rooted exception permitting admission of spontaneous declarations is at least two centuries old

2004See, e.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545-46 , 106 S.Ct. 2056 , 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986) (concluding “a co-defendant’s confession inculpating the accused is inherently unreliable” and rejecting State’s “interlocking confessions” argument, holding instead “when the discrepancies between the statements are not insignificant, the co-defendant’s confession may not be admitted”); see also Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (plurality opinion) (holding co-defendant’s confession incriminating defendant was “not within a firmly rooted exception to the hears

2004See, e.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545-46 , 106 S.Ct. 2056 , 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986) (concluding “a co-defendant’s confession inculpating the accused is inherently unreliable” and rejecting State’s “interlocking confessions” argument, holding instead “when the discrepancies between the statements are not insignificant, the co-defendant’s confession may not be admitted”); see also Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (plurality opinion) (holding co-defendant’s confession incriminating defendant was “not within a firmly rooted exception to the hears

1999We recently held in Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735 (Tex.Crim.App.1999), that the statement against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule is a firmly rooted exception to the Confrontation Clause.

1999White, 502 U.S. at 353-54 , 112 S.Ct. 736 . [13] Our opinion in Dewberry, supra, could be read as indicating that a reliability analysis must be conducted in addition to a determination of whether the challenged hearsay statements fall within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.

2009See, e.g., Allard v. Freeh, 754 S.W.2d 111, 115 (Tex.1988) (“This holding is based on a firmly rooted principle of community property law which requires the actual partition of community property before a valid joint tenancy with the right of survivorship can be created.”); Maples v. Nimitz, 615 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex.1981) (same).

1988See Maples v. Nimitz, 615 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex.1981); Williams v. McKnight, 402 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex.1966); Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569 , 342 S.W.2d 565, 569 (1961).

2005In fact, hearsay was deemed per se reliable if it fell within a firmly rooted exception to the 5 The decision in White v. Illinois, 512 U.S. 346 (1992), treating the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations as a “firmly rooted” one for the purpose of applying the reliability test of Roberts [ 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)] gave leeway to prosecutors and courts to try cases by introducing statements made in 911 calls and to responding officers (as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted), even if the declarant did not testify. 10 hearsay rule such as an excited utterance.

2003Although the evidence in this case does not fall within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, it may nonetheless be sufficiently rehable for Confrontation Clause purposes if it has “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Guidry, 9 S.W.3d at 149 (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 816 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 ; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ).

2007In discussing this issue, the Court discusses prior testimony and quotes from Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 , 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1899 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (plurality opinion) as follows: “[AJccomplices’ confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 , 124 S.Ct. at 1368 .

2007In discussing this issue, the Court discusses prior testimony and quotes from Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 , 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1899 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (plurality opinion) as follows: “[AJccomplices’ confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 , 124 S.Ct. at 1368 .

2011Hudson v. State, 112 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref‘d) (citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 386 (Tex. Crim.

2011See Hudson, 112 S.W.3d at 800 .

2008In criminal cases, a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 3 Walter v. State, 209 S.W.3d 722, 731 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2006). 4 We granted review of appellant’s ground one: In determining that an accomplice’s statement against penal interest made to his brother was a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule and was sufficiently self- inculpatory, the Sixth Court of Appeals’ reliance on Dewberry v. State was improper in light of the Court of Criminal Appeals’

2008In criminal cases, a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. [3] Walter v. State, 209 S.W.3d 722, 731 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006). [4] We granted review of appellant's ground one: In determining that an accomplice's statement against penal interest made to his brother was a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule and was sufficiently self-inculpatory, the Sixth Court of Appeals' reliance on Dewberry v. State was improper in light of the Court of Criminal Appeal

1988See Maples v. Nimitz, 615 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex.1981); Williams v. McKnight, 402 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex.1966); Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569 , 342 S.W.2d 565, 569 (1961).

1988See Maples v. Nimitz, 615 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex.1981); Williams v. McKnight, 402 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex.1966); Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569 , 342 S.W.2d 565, 569 (1961).

1988See Maples v. Nimitz, 615 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex.1981); Williams v. McKnight, 402 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex.1966); Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569 , 342 S.W.2d 565, 569 (1961).

1988See Maples v. Nimitz, 615 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex.1981); Williams v. McKnight, 402 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex.1966); Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569 , 342 S.W.2d 565, 569 (1961).

2002In considering the matter, we have conducted an extensive review of Supreme Court cases and find no instance in which a hearsay exception of such recent origin *664 has been identified as “firmly rooted.” See, e.g., Lilly, 527 U.S. at 127 , 119 S.Ct. at 1895 (voluntary statements against penal interest carry a “distinguished heritage” confirming admissibility in this country as far back as 1846); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 356 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 736 , 743 n. 8, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (the firmly rooted exception permitting admission of spontaneous declarations is at least two centuries old

2002In considering the matter, we have conducted an extensive review of Supreme Court cases and find no instance in which a hearsay exception of such recent origin *664 has been identified as “firmly rooted.” See, e.g., Lilly, 527 U.S. at 127 , 119 S.Ct. at 1895 (voluntary statements against penal interest carry a “distinguished heritage” confirming admissibility in this country as far back as 1846); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 356 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 736 , 743 n. 8, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (the firmly rooted exception permitting admission of spontaneous declarations is at least two centuries old

2015See Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 880 (Tex. Crim.

2011Hudson v. State, 112 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref‘d) (citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 386 (Tex. Crim.

2009See, e.g., Allard v. Freeh, 754 S.W.2d 111, 115 (Tex.1988) (“This holding is based on a firmly rooted principle of community property law which requires the actual partition of community property before a valid joint tenancy with the right of survivorship can be created.”); Maples v. Nimitz, 615 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex.1981) (same).

2005See, e.g., Rios v. Lansing, 116 Fed.Appx. 983 (10th Cir.2004); United States v. Guitierrez-Gonzales, 2004 U.S.App.

2004See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 355 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992); Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 751 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Bernal v. State, 13 S.W.3d 852, 854 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. ref'd).

2004See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 355 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992); Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 751 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Bernal v. State, 13 S.W.3d 852, 854 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. ref'd).

2004See, e.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545-46 , 106 S.Ct. 2056 , 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986) (concluding “a co-defendant’s confession inculpating the accused is inherently unreliable” and rejecting State’s “interlocking confessions” argument, holding instead “when the discrepancies between the statements are not insignificant, the co-defendant’s confession may not be admitted”); see also Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (plurality opinion) (holding co-defendant’s confession incriminating defendant was “not within a firmly rooted exception to the hears

2004See, e.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545-46 , 106 S.Ct. 2056 , 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986) (concluding “a co-defendant’s confession inculpating the accused is inherently unreliable” and rejecting State’s “interlocking confessions” argument, holding instead “when the discrepancies between the statements are not insignificant, the co-defendant’s confession may not be admitted”); see also Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (plurality opinion) (holding co-defendant’s confession incriminating defendant was “not within a firmly rooted exception to the hears

2001Appellant contends that Lilly v. Virginia , 527 U.S. 116 (1999), in which a plurality of the supreme court held "accomplices' confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence[,]" controls over the court of criminal appeals' holding in Guidry and Dewberry . (2) Lilly , 527 U.S. at 134 ; see State v. Guzman , 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Crim.

2000See Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 753 (Tex.Crim.App.1999), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 120 S.Ct. 2008 , 146 L.Ed.2d 958 (2000); Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 150 (Tex.Crim.App.1999), petition for cert, filed (May 9, 2000).