statute makes exception in New York

2026It has been observed that the self-serving aspect of a record does not preclude its admissibility under the statute but is merely a consideration affecting the weight to be given to it ( Publishers' Book Bindery v. Ziegelheim , 184 Misc. 559 , 54 N.Y.S.2d 798 )"]).

2026It has been observed that the self-serving aspect of a record does not preclude its admissibility under the statute but is merely a consideration affecting the weight to be given to it ( Publishers' Book Bindery v. Ziegelheim , 184 Misc. 559 , 54 N.Y.S.2d 798 )"]).

1998Winograd and Basilicato hold that “ ‘the immediate sealing requirement of the statute makes no exception for weekends’ ” or holidays, and that, where no excuse is offered for the failure to contact the issuing Justice, the intervening weekend or holiday is not a satisfactory explanation for noncompliance with the statute (People v Winograd, supra, at 395 , quoting People v Basilicato, supra, at 117 ).

1986More recently, however, in People v Basilicato ( 64 NY2d 103, 117 , supra), we noted that "the immediate sealing requirement of the statute makes no exception for weekends” reasoning that " ' "[l]aw enforcement does not cease on weekends nor holidays” ’ ” (quoting People v Pecoraro, 58 AD2d 462, 470 ; People v Guenther, 81 Misc 2d 258, 259 ).

1986More recently, however, in People v Basilicato ( 64 NY2d 103, 117 , supra), we noted that "the immediate sealing requirement of the statute makes no exception for weekends” reasoning that " ' "[l]aw enforcement does not cease on weekends nor holidays” ’ ” (quoting People v Pecoraro, 58 AD2d 462, 470 ; People v Guenther, 81 Misc 2d 258, 259 ).

1984But the immediate sealing requirement of the statute makes no exception for weekends, and in People v Washington ( 46 NY2d 116,125 , supra) we relied upon cases which had refused to excuse unexplained delays and which reasoned that, “ ‘Law enforcement does not cease on weekends nor holidays’ ” (People v Pecoraro, 58 AD2d 462, 470 ; People v Guenther, 81 Misc 2d 258, 259 ).

1986More recently, however, in People v Basilicato ( 64 NY2d 103, 117 , supra), we noted that "the immediate sealing requirement of the statute makes no exception for weekends” reasoning that " ' "[l]aw enforcement does not cease on weekends nor holidays” ’ ” (quoting People v Pecoraro, 58 AD2d 462, 470 ; People v Guenther, 81 Misc 2d 258, 259 ).

1984But the immediate sealing requirement of the statute makes no exception for weekends, and in People v Washington ( 46 NY2d 116,125 , supra) we relied upon cases which had refused to excuse unexplained delays and which reasoned that, “ ‘Law enforcement does not cease on weekends nor holidays’ ” (People v Pecoraro, 58 AD2d 462, 470 ; People v Guenther, 81 Misc 2d 258, 259 ).

1925(Matter of Turell, 166 N. Y. 330 .) Where a testator subscribed a written instrument and one witness saw the signature and it was declared to both witnesses and both witnesses signed in the presence of the testator and of each other, the execution of a holographic will was held sufficient.

1911(Ruddon v. McDonald, 1 Bradf. 352 ; Riggs v. Riggs, 135 Mass. 238 .) While the statute makes no exception with respect to holographic wills in its requirements as to execution (Matter of Turell, 166 N. Y. 330 ), still in the case of such a will the law allows more-inferences to be drawn in favor of its execution than where the will is prepared by another and presented for execution.

1998Winograd and Basilicato hold that “ ‘the immediate sealing requirement of the statute makes no exception for weekends’ ” or holidays, and that, where no excuse is offered for the failure to contact the issuing Justice, the intervening weekend or holiday is not a satisfactory explanation for noncompliance with the statute (People v Winograd, supra, at 395 , quoting People v Basilicato, supra, at 117 ).

1998Further, the unavailability of the issuing Justice or supervising Justice is not an excuse “ ‘in a county where several justices are present each business day' ” (People v Winograd, supra, at 394 , quoting People v Gallina, supra, at 60).

1984There was, therefore, a failure to justify the delay in sealing, making inadmissible the contents of the intercepted communications, as well as evidence derived therefrom (People v Sher, 38 NY2d 600, 605 , supra; CPLR 700.65, subd 3).

1984But the immediate sealing requirement of the statute makes no exception for weekends, and in People v Washington ( 46 NY2d 116,125 , supra) we relied upon cases which had refused to excuse unexplained delays and which reasoned that, “ ‘Law enforcement does not cease on weekends nor holidays’ ” (People v Pecoraro, 58 AD2d 462, 470 ; People v Guenther, 81 Misc 2d 258, 259 ).

1963While the statute makes no exception for informative or news broadcasts, these are excepted and television enjoys the same immunity accorded to other media (Gautier v. Pro-Football, 304 N. Y. 354 ). ' The immunity granted in respect to informative matter does not extend to dramatized or fictionalized versions- of the event -reported (Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of Amer., 210 N. Y. 51 ).

1963While the statute makes no exception for informative or news broadcasts, these are excepted and television enjoys the same immunity accorded to other media (Gautier v. Pro-Football, 304 N. Y. 354 ). ' The immunity granted in respect to informative matter does not extend to dramatized or fictionalized versions- of the event -reported (Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of Amer., 210 N. Y. 51 ).

1955The court said (p. 3): “ Where the statute makes such requirement, an acknowledgment is not satisfied by that of a subscribing witness ’ ’ and “ Where a statute contains requirements as to compliance with its terms, woids of the statute may not be disregarded, nor other words interpolated, even in an attempt at liberal construction.” (Citing Matter of Bristol v. Buck, 201 App. Div. 100, 102 , affd. 234 N. Y. 504 .) In the Bristol case the statute required verification by the signers.

1955The court said (p. 3): “ Where the statute makes such requirement, an acknowledgment is not satisfied by that of a subscribing witness ’ ’ and “ Where a statute contains requirements as to compliance with its terms, woids of the statute may not be disregarded, nor other words interpolated, even in an attempt at liberal construction.” (Citing Matter of Bristol v. Buck, 201 App. Div. 100, 102 , affd. 234 N. Y. 504 .) In the Bristol case the statute required verification by the signers.

1954(Brandt v. Godfrey, 172 Misc. 768 , affd. 260 App. Div. 851 , motion for leave to appeal denied 285 N. Y. 855 ; Conlew v. Spats, 88 N. Y.

1954(Brandt v. Godfrey, 172 Misc. 768 , affd. 260 App. Div. 851 , motion for leave to appeal denied 285 N. Y. 855 ; Conlew v. Spats, 88 N. Y.

1949In Matter of Hommel v. Town of Saugerties ( 253 App. Div. 84 , affd. without opinion 278 N. Y. 588 ) the court in construing a similar statute said, at page 89, “ The statute makes no exception in the case of a fireman extinguishing a fire on his own premises.

1949In Matter of Hommel v. Town of Saugerties ( 253 App. Div. 84 , affd. without opinion 278 N. Y. 588 ) the court in construing a similar statute said, at page 89, “ The statute makes no exception in the case of a fireman extinguishing a fire on his own premises.

1949In Matter of Hommel v. Town of Saugerties ( 253 App. Div. 84 , affd. without opinion 278 N. Y. 588 ) the court in construing a similar statute said, at page 89, “ The statute makes no exception in the case of a fireman extinguishing a fire on his own premises.

1949In Matter of Hommel v. Town of Saugerties ( 253 App. Div. 84 , affd. without opinion 278 N. Y. 588 ) the court in construing a similar statute said, at page 89, “ The statute makes no exception in the case of a fireman extinguishing a fire on his own premises.

1934(Cook v. Kelley, 12 Abb.

1929The violation of the statute makes the presumption of fault conclusive. (,Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 183 ; Amberg v. Kinley, 214 N. Y. 531 ; Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 217 App. Div. 43 ; affd., 243 N. Y. 458 .) In Jones v. Brim (supra) the action was brought to recover damages resulting to a highway because of a violation of a statute of the Territory of Utah which made hable any person who drove a herd of domestic animals over a public highway constructed on a hillside, and damage was caused by the animals in destroying the banks or rolling rocks into or upon such highway.

1929The violation of the statute makes the presumption of fault conclusive. (,Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 183 ; Amberg v. Kinley, 214 N. Y. 531 ; Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 217 App. Div. 43 ; affd., 243 N. Y. 458 .) In Jones v. Brim (supra) the action was brought to recover damages resulting to a highway because of a violation of a statute of the Territory of Utah which made hable any person who drove a herd of domestic animals over a public highway constructed on a hillside, and damage was caused by the animals in destroying the banks or rolling rocks into or upon such highway.

1929The violation of the statute makes the presumption of fault conclusive. (,Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 183 ; Amberg v. Kinley, 214 N. Y. 531 ; Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 217 App. Div. 43 ; affd., 243 N. Y. 458 .) In Jones v. Brim (supra) the action was brought to recover damages resulting to a highway because of a violation of a statute of the Territory of Utah which made hable any person who drove a herd of domestic animals over a public highway constructed on a hillside, and damage was caused by the animals in destroying the banks or rolling rocks into or upon such highway.

1929The violation of the statute makes the presumption of fault conclusive. (,Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 183 ; Amberg v. Kinley, 214 N. Y. 531 ; Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 217 App. Div. 43 ; affd., 243 N. Y. 458 .) In Jones v. Brim (supra) the action was brought to recover damages resulting to a highway because of a violation of a statute of the Territory of Utah which made hable any person who drove a herd of domestic animals over a public highway constructed on a hillside, and damage was caused by the animals in destroying the banks or rolling rocks into or upon such highway.

1929The violation of the statute makes the presumption of fault conclusive. (,Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 183 ; Amberg v. Kinley, 214 N. Y. 531 ; Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 217 App. Div. 43 ; affd., 243 N. Y. 458 .) In Jones v. Brim (supra) the action was brought to recover damages resulting to a highway because of a violation of a statute of the Territory of Utah which made hable any person who drove a herd of domestic animals over a public highway constructed on a hillside, and damage was caused by the animals in destroying the banks or rolling rocks into or upon such highway.

1911(Ruddon v. McDonald, 1 Bradf. 352 ; Riggs v. Riggs, 135 Mass. 238 .) While the statute makes no exception with respect to holographic wills in its requirements as to execution (Matter of Turell, 166 N. Y. 330 ), still in the case of such a will the law allows more-inferences to be drawn in favor of its execution than where the will is prepared by another and presented for execution.

1911(Matter of Beckett, 103 N. Y. 167 ; Matter of Hunt, 110 id. 278 .) The object of the requirements of the statute with respect to the execution of wills is to make certain that the person executing it knew he was executing a will and not some other instrument.

1911(Matter of Beckett, 103 N. Y. 167 ; Matter of Hunt, 110 id. 278 .) The object of the requirements of the statute with respect to the execution of wills is to make certain that the person executing it knew he was executing a will and not some other instrument.

1911(Ruddon v. McDonald, 1 Bradf. 352 ; Riggs v. Riggs, 135 Mass. 238 .) While the statute makes no exception with respect to holographic wills in its requirements as to execution (Matter of Turell, 166 N. Y. 330 ), still in the case of such a will the law allows more-inferences to be drawn in favor of its execution than where the will is prepared by another and presented for execution.