statute makes exception in California

2022J. results produced must be so unreasonable the Legislature could not have intended them.’ (In re D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 948.) Moreover, our courts have wisely cautioned that the absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule ‘should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we violate the separation of powers principle of government. [Citation.] We do not sit as a “super-legislature.” [Citation.]’ ” (Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 129 .) The appellate court concluded that its understanding of section 496(c)’s words was not “absurd at all, much less so

2022J. results produced must be so unreasonable the Legislature could not have intended them.’ (In re D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 948.) Moreover, our courts have wisely cautioned that the absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule ‘should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we violate the separation of powers principle of government. [Citation.] We do not sit as a “super-legislature.” [Citation.]’ ” (Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 129 .) The appellate court concluded that its understanding of section 496(c)’s words was not “absurd at all, much less so

2013People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380 , cited by defendant, is distinguishable because it involved fines and fees that, although included in the minutes and abstract of judgment, had never been orally pronounced by the court.

2013A trial court is required to pronounce a felony sentence orally in the defendant‟s presence. (§ 1193, subd. (a); People v. Prater (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 695, 702 .) The statute makes no exception for cases, such as this one, in which the proper procedure arguably is uneconomical.

2007The statute was originally enacted to abrogate the common law rule allowing "reasonable" restraints of trade ( Hill Medical Corp. v. Wycoff, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 900-901, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 779 ; Bosley Medical Group v. Abramson, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at p. 288 , 207 Cal.Rptr. 477 ), under which "`an agreement in partial restraint of trade, restricting it within certain reasonable limits or times, or confining it to particular persons, would, if founded upon a good and valuable consideration, be valid —'" ( Wright v. Ryder (1868) 36 Cal. 342, 358 , italics in original.) "The statute makes

2007The statute was originally enacted to abrogate the common law rule allowing "reasonable" restraints of trade ( Hill Medical Corp. v. Wycoff, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 900-901, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 779 ; Bosley Medical Group v. Abramson, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at p. 288 , 207 Cal.Rptr. 477 ), under which "`an agreement in partial restraint of trade, restricting it within certain reasonable limits or times, or confining it to particular persons, would, if founded upon a good and valuable consideration, be valid —'" ( Wright v. Ryder (1868) 36 Cal. 342, 358 , italics in original.) "The statute makes

2007The statute was originally enacted to abrogate the common law rule allowing "reasonable" restraints of trade ( Hill Medical Corp. v. Wycoff, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 900-901, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 779 ; Bosley Medical Group v. Abramson, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at p. 288 , 207 Cal.Rptr. 477 ), under which "`an agreement in partial restraint of trade, restricting it within certain reasonable limits or times, or confining it to particular persons, would, if founded upon a good and valuable consideration, be valid —'" ( Wright v. Ryder (1868) 36 Cal. 342, 358 , italics in original.) "The statute makes

2007(See Thompson v. Impaxx, Inc., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429-1430, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [distinguishing Gordon v. Landau (1958) 49 Cal.2d 690 , 321 P.2d 456 ; Fowler v. Varian Associates, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 34 , 241 Cal.Rptr. 539 ; John F. Matull & Associates, Inc. v. Cloutier (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1049 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 211 ; Loral Corp. v. Moyes (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 268 , 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 ; and Gordon v. Wasserman (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 328 , 314 P.2d 759 ]; compare also King v. Gerold (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 316, 318 , 240 P.2d 710 [upholding prohibition against use of proprietary d

2007(See Thompson v. Impaxx, Inc., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429-1430, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [distinguishing Gordon v. Landau (1958) 49 Cal.2d 690 , 321 P.2d 456 ; Fowler v. Varian Associates, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 34 , 241 Cal.Rptr. 539 ; John F. Matull & Associates, Inc. v. Cloutier (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1049 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 211 ; Loral Corp. v. Moyes (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 268 , 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 ; and Gordon v. Wasserman (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 328 , 314 P.2d 759 ]; compare also King v. Gerold (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 316, 318 , 240 P.2d 710 [upholding prohibition against use of proprietary d

2007(See Thompson v. Impaxx, Inc., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429-1430, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [distinguishing Gordon v. Landau (1958) 49 Cal.2d 690 , 321 P.2d 456 ; Fowler v. Varian Associates, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 34 , 241 Cal.Rptr. 539 ; John F. Matull & Associates, Inc. v. Cloutier (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1049 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 211 ; Loral Corp. v. Moyes (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 268 , 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 ; and Gordon v. Wasserman (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 328 , 314 P.2d 759 ]; compare also King v. Gerold (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 316, 318 , 240 P.2d 710 [upholding prohibition against use of proprietary d

2007(See Thompson v. Impaxx, Inc., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429-1430, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [distinguishing Gordon v. Landau (1958) 49 Cal.2d 690 , 321 P.2d 456 ; Fowler v. Varian Associates, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 34 , 241 Cal.Rptr. 539 ; John F. Matull & Associates, Inc. v. Cloutier (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1049 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 211 ; Loral Corp. v. Moyes (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 268 , 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 ; and Gordon v. Wasserman (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 328 , 314 P.2d 759 ]; compare also King v. Gerold (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 316, 318 , 240 P.2d 710 [upholding prohibition against use of proprietary d

2007(See Thompson v. Impaxx, Inc., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429-1430, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [distinguishing Gordon v. Landau (1958) 49 Cal.2d 690 , 321 P.2d 456 ; Fowler v. Varian Associates, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 34 , 241 Cal.Rptr. 539 ; John F. Matull & Associates, Inc. v. Cloutier (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1049 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 211 ; Loral Corp. v. Moyes (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 268 , 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 ; and Gordon v. Wasserman (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 328 , 314 P.2d 759 ]; compare also King v. Gerold (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 316, 318 , 240 P.2d 710 [upholding prohibition against use of proprietary d

2007(See Thompson v. Impaxx, Inc., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429-1430, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [distinguishing Gordon v. Landau (1958) 49 Cal.2d 690 , 321 P.2d 456 ; Fowler v. Varian Associates, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 34 , 241 Cal.Rptr. 539 ; John F. Matull & Associates, Inc. v. Cloutier (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1049 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 211 ; Loral Corp. v. Moyes (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 268 , 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 ; and Gordon v. Wasserman (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 328 , 314 P.2d 759 ]; compare also King v. Gerold (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 316, 318 , 240 P.2d 710 [upholding prohibition against use of proprietary d

2007(See Thompson v. Impaxx, Inc., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429-1430, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [distinguishing Gordon v. Landau (1958) 49 Cal.2d 690 , 321 P.2d 456 ; Fowler v. Varian Associates, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 34 , 241 Cal.Rptr. 539 ; John F. Matull & Associates, Inc. v. Cloutier (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1049 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 211 ; Loral Corp. v. Moyes (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 268 , 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 ; and Gordon v. Wasserman (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 328 , 314 P.2d 759 ]; compare also King v. Gerold (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 316, 318 , 240 P.2d 710 [upholding prohibition against use of proprietary d

2007(See Thompson v. Impaxx, Inc., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429-1430, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [distinguishing Gordon v. Landau (1958) 49 Cal.2d 690 , 321 P.2d 456 ; Fowler v. Varian Associates, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 34 , 241 Cal.Rptr. 539 ; John F. Matull & Associates, Inc. v. Cloutier (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1049 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 211 ; Loral Corp. v. Moyes (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 268 , 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 ; and Gordon v. Wasserman (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 328 , 314 P.2d 759 ]; compare also King v. Gerold (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 316, 318 , 240 P.2d 710 [upholding prohibition against use of proprietary d

2007(See Thompson v. Impaxx, Inc., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429-1430, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [distinguishing Gordon v. Landau (1958) 49 Cal.2d 690 , 321 P.2d 456 ; Fowler v. Varian Associates, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 34 , 241 Cal.Rptr. 539 ; John F. Matull & Associates, Inc. v. Cloutier (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1049 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 211 ; Loral Corp. v. Moyes (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 268 , 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 ; and Gordon v. Wasserman (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 328 , 314 P.2d 759 ]; compare also King v. Gerold (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 316, 318 , 240 P.2d 710 [upholding prohibition against use of proprietary d

2007The statute was originally enacted to abrogate the common law rule allowing "reasonable" restraints of trade ( Hill Medical Corp. v. Wycoff, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 900-901, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 779 ; Bosley Medical Group v. Abramson, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at p. 288 , 207 Cal.Rptr. 477 ), under which "`an agreement in partial restraint of trade, restricting it within certain reasonable limits or times, or confining it to particular persons, would, if founded upon a good and valuable consideration, be valid —'" ( Wright v. Ryder (1868) 36 Cal. 342, 358 , italics in original.) "The statute makes

2007The statute was originally enacted to abrogate the common law rule allowing "reasonable" restraints of trade ( Hill Medical Corp. v. Wycoff, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 900-901, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 779 ; Bosley Medical Group v. Abramson, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at p. 288 , 207 Cal.Rptr. 477 ), under which "`an agreement in partial restraint of trade, restricting it within certain reasonable limits or times, or confining it to particular persons, would, if founded upon a good and valuable consideration, be valid —'" ( Wright v. Ryder (1868) 36 Cal. 342, 358 , italics in original.) "The statute makes

2007The statute was originally enacted to abrogate the common law rule allowing "reasonable" restraints of trade ( Hill Medical Corp. v. Wycoff, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 900-901, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 779 ; Bosley Medical Group v. Abramson, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at p. 288 , 207 Cal.Rptr. 477 ), under which "`an agreement in partial restraint of trade, restricting it within certain reasonable limits or times, or confining it to particular persons, would, if founded upon a good and valuable consideration, be valid —'" ( Wright v. Ryder (1868) 36 Cal. 342, 358 , italics in original.) "The statute makes

2007(See Thompson v. Impaxx, Inc., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429-1430, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [distinguishing Gordon v. Landau (1958) 49 Cal.2d 690 , 321 P.2d 456 ; Fowler v. Varian Associates, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 34 , 241 Cal.Rptr. 539 ; John F. Matull & Associates, Inc. v. Cloutier (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1049 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 211 ; Loral Corp. v. Moyes (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 268 , 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 ; and Gordon v. Wasserman (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 328 , 314 P.2d 759 ]; compare also King v. Gerold (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 316, 318 , 240 P.2d 710 [upholding prohibition against use of proprietary d

2007(See Thompson v. Impaxx, Inc., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429-1430, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [distinguishing Gordon v. Landau (1958) 49 Cal.2d 690 , 321 P.2d 456 ; Fowler v. Varian Associates, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 34 , 241 Cal.Rptr. 539 ; John F. Matull & Associates, Inc. v. Cloutier (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1049 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 211 ; Loral Corp. v. Moyes (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 268 , 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 ; and Gordon v. Wasserman (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 328 , 314 P.2d 759 ]; compare also King v. Gerold (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 316, 318 , 240 P.2d 710 [upholding prohibition against use of proprietary d

2007The statute was originally enacted to abrogate the common law rule allowing "reasonable" restraints of trade ( Hill Medical Corp. v. Wycoff, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 900-901, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 779 ; Bosley Medical Group v. Abramson, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at p. 288 , 207 Cal.Rptr. 477 ), under which "`an agreement in partial restraint of trade, restricting it within certain reasonable limits or times, or confining it to particular persons, would, if founded upon a good and valuable consideration, be valid —'" ( Wright v. Ryder (1868) 36 Cal. 342, 358 , italics in original.) "The statute makes

1999Co. (1932) 122 Cal.App. 205 [ 9 P.2d 562 ], the Court of Appeal found that the decisions that placed a relevancy limitation on the privilege pronounced a “rule independent of statute,” and citing Gosewisch , stated that “[o]ur conclusion is that the wording of the statute makes the privilege absolute.” (Id. at p. 211.) By 1956, our Supreme Court was approvingly citing Gosewisch v. Doran, supra, 161 Cal. 511 , and Moore v. United States Fid. & Guar.

1999Co. (1932) 122 Cal.App. 205 [ 9 P.2d 562 ], the Court of Appeal found that the decisions that placed a relevancy limitation on the privilege pronounced a “rule independent of statute,” and citing Gosewisch , stated that “[o]ur conclusion is that the wording of the statute makes the privilege absolute.” (Id. at p. 211.) By 1956, our Supreme Court was approvingly citing Gosewisch v. Doran, supra, 161 Cal. 511 , and Moore v. United States Fid. & Guar.

1999Co. (1932) 122 Cal.App. 205 [ 9 P.2d 562 ], the Court of Appeal found that the decisions that placed a relevancy limitation on the privilege pronounced a “rule independent of statute,” and citing Gosewisch , stated that “[o]ur conclusion is that the wording of the statute makes the privilege absolute.” (Id. at p. 211.) By 1956, our Supreme Court was approvingly citing Gosewisch v. Doran, supra, 161 Cal. 511 , and Moore v. United States Fid. & Guar.

1954It is a partial restraint on respondent’s right to engage in a “lawful . . . trade or business” and the courts have held that: “The statute makes no exception in favor of contracts only in partial restraint of trade.” (Chamberlain v. Augustine, 172 Cal. 285, 289 [ 156 P. 479 ]; Morey v. Paladini, 187 Cal. 727, 738 [ 203 P. 760 ] ; Davis v. Jointless Fire Brick Co., 300 F. 1, 3 .) Equity recognizes a fiduciary duty of an employee after leaving employer’s service not to take an unfair advantage of trade secrets and customers’ lists.

1949(Ghiozzi v. City of South San Francisco, 72 Cal.App.2d 472 , 476 et seq. [ 164 P.2d 902 ].) The order granting a new trial is affirmed.

1949(Ghiozzi v. City of South San Francisco, 72 Cal.App.2d 472 , 476 et seq. [ 164 P.2d 902 ].) The order granting a new trial is affirmed.

1924The contention finds support in the cases of State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351 [ 195 Pac. 211 ], and State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443 [ 204 Pac. 958 , 206 Pac. 290 ], In Matter of Application, of Ahart, 172 Cal. 762 [ 159 Pac. 160 ], the petitioner was charged under an ordinance prohibiting the transportation of intoxicating liquor “to any place, the establishing or keeping of which is prohibited by this ordinance.” It was contended that “the ordinance itself would make guilty of crime any person who, without knowledge of the character of the place and without intent to violate the law, innocently

1924The contention finds support in the cases of State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351 [ 195 Pac. 211 ], and State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443 [ 204 Pac. 958 , 206 Pac. 290 ], In Matter of Application, of Ahart, 172 Cal. 762 [ 159 Pac. 160 ], the petitioner was charged under an ordinance prohibiting the transportation of intoxicating liquor “to any place, the establishing or keeping of which is prohibited by this ordinance.” It was contended that “the ordinance itself would make guilty of crime any person who, without knowledge of the character of the place and without intent to violate the law, innocently

1924The contention finds support in the cases of State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351 [ 195 Pac. 211 ], and State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443 [ 204 Pac. 958 , 206 Pac. 290 ], In Matter of Application, of Ahart, 172 Cal. 762 [ 159 Pac. 160 ], the petitioner was charged under an ordinance prohibiting the transportation of intoxicating liquor “to any place, the establishing or keeping of which is prohibited by this ordinance.” It was contended that “the ordinance itself would make guilty of crime any person who, without knowledge of the character of the place and without intent to violate the law, innocently

1924The contention finds support in the cases of State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351 [ 195 Pac. 211 ], and State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443 [ 204 Pac. 958 , 206 Pac. 290 ], In Matter of Application, of Ahart, 172 Cal. 762 [ 159 Pac. 160 ], the petitioner was charged under an ordinance prohibiting the transportation of intoxicating liquor “to any place, the establishing or keeping of which is prohibited by this ordinance.” It was contended that “the ordinance itself would make guilty of crime any person who, without knowledge of the character of the place and without intent to violate the law, innocently

1924The contention finds support in the cases of State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351 [ 195 Pac. 211 ], and State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443 [ 204 Pac. 958 , 206 Pac. 290 ], In Matter of Application, of Ahart, 172 Cal. 762 [ 159 Pac. 160 ], the petitioner was charged under an ordinance prohibiting the transportation of intoxicating liquor “to any place, the establishing or keeping of which is prohibited by this ordinance.” It was contended that “the ordinance itself would make guilty of crime any person who, without knowledge of the character of the place and without intent to violate the law, innocently

1924The contention finds support in the cases of State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351 [ 195 Pac. 211 ], and State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443 [ 204 Pac. 958 , 206 Pac. 290 ], In Matter of Application, of Ahart, 172 Cal. 762 [ 159 Pac. 160 ], the petitioner was charged under an ordinance prohibiting the transportation of intoxicating liquor “to any place, the establishing or keeping of which is prohibited by this ordinance.” It was contended that “the ordinance itself would make guilty of crime any person who, without knowledge of the character of the place and without intent to violate the law, innocently

1892It may be said of this case that it is inconsistent with Blood v. Fairbanks, 50 Cal. 420 , which very distinctly holds that the letter of the statute must control; and the statute makes the test as to the competency of the testimony of a party to the action, whether it relates to facts which occurred before the death of the deceased party; and further, that in that particular case, if the proposed evidence did not tend to establish the claim, it was immaterial, and should have been excluded on that ground.