statute makes exception in Georgia

1994The evidence is sufficient to support this conviction under the standards of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560). 5.

1975The case of Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. Head, 64 Ga. App. 529 ( 13 SE2d 887 ) (1941), decided under an earlier statute that was very similar to the present statute, indicates that the "separate business” rule may be applied.

1975The case of Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. Head, 64 Ga. App. 529 ( 13 SE2d 887 ) (1941), decided under an earlier statute that was very similar to the present statute, indicates that the "separate business” rule may be applied.

1960"In Morgan v. Anderson, 149 Kan. 814 , 89 P. 2d 866, 868 , in construing a statute reading: `. . . (a) person who is transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, as his guest, without payment for such transportation . . .' said: `The weight of authority is that a minor as well as an adult can be a "guest" even though unaccompanied by parent or guardian and even though no express consent of parent or guardian has been shown.' "The Texas Court of Civil Appeals was faced with an interesting situation involving the question whether one incapable of assenting to transportation or accept

1960"In Morgan v. Anderson, 149 Kan. 814 , 89 P. 2d 866, 868 , in construing a statute reading: `. . . (a) person who is transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, as his guest, without payment for such transportation . . .' said: `The weight of authority is that a minor as well as an adult can be a "guest" even though unaccompanied by parent or guardian and even though no express consent of parent or guardian has been shown.' "The Texas Court of Civil Appeals was faced with an interesting situation involving the question whether one incapable of assenting to transportation or accept

1960The Arkansas Supreme Court has said: `It will be observed that in defining a guest the statute makes no exception in favor of minors and we have no authority to write that exception into the statute.' Tilghman v. Rightor, 211 Ark. 229 , 199 S. W. 2d 943, 945 .

1960The Arkansas Supreme Court has said: `It will be observed that in defining a guest the statute makes no exception in favor of minors and we have no authority to write that exception into the statute.' Tilghman v. Rightor, 211 Ark. 229 , 199 S. W. 2d 943, 945 .

1936It is quite true, as earnestly asserted by counsel for the plaintiff in error, that in the sale of personal property the doctrine caveat emptor applies (Daniel v. Hollingshead, 16 Ga. 190 ; Wells v. Walker, 29 Ga. 450 , Code, § 96-111); and that “while possession of personal property is presumptive evidence of ownership, such presumption is not conclusive, and any person dealing with the possessor as the owner will not obtain title to the property as against the true owner, unless he has done something to mislead or deceive such person.” (Harris Loan Co. v. Elliott &c.

1936It is quite true, as earnestly asserted by counsel for the plaintiff in error, that in the sale of personal property the doctrine caveat emptor applies (Daniel v. Hollingshead, 16 Ga. 190 ; Wells v. Walker, 29 Ga. 450 , Code, § 96-111); and that “while possession of personal property is presumptive evidence of ownership, such presumption is not conclusive, and any person dealing with the possessor as the owner will not obtain title to the property as against the true owner, unless he has done something to mislead or deceive such person.” (Harris Loan Co. v. Elliott &c.

1936However, Judge Jenkins in the opinion clearly pointed out that the statute makes an exception to the general rule, as to certain commodities, stating: “It is true that there is a general principle of law to the effect that if one ‘has given the external indicia of the right of disposing of his property, a sale to an innocent purchaser divests the true owner’s title’ (Civil Code, § 4119 [96-207]), which is but an application of another and broader general principle, to the effect that ‘when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third person, he who put it in the power of the t

1936However, Judge Jenkins in the opinion clearly pointed out that the statute makes an exception to the general rule, as to certain commodities, stating: “It is true that there is a general principle of law to the effect that if one ‘has given the external indicia of the right of disposing of his property, a sale to an innocent purchaser divests the true owner’s title’ (Civil Code, § 4119 [96-207]), which is but an application of another and broader general principle, to the effect that ‘when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third person, he who put it in the power of the t

1936However, Judge Jenkins in the opinion clearly pointed out that the statute makes an exception to the general rule, as to certain commodities, stating: “It is true that there is a general principle of law to the effect that if one ‘has given the external indicia of the right of disposing of his property, a sale to an innocent purchaser divests the true owner’s title’ (Civil Code, § 4119 [96-207]), which is but an application of another and broader general principle, to the effect that ‘when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third person, he who put it in the power of the t

1898Mere inaction, in a case where the statute makes it a bar, is a bar in equity as well as at common law.’ “Again, in the case of Bohler v. Verdery, 92 Ga. 715 , it appears that the defendants in error made returns of their property for State and county taxes for the year 1891 to the tax-collector of Richmond county, and that he accepted the same without objection; that afterwards a board of assessors, under an act then in force for Richmond county, assessed the property of the defendants in error and increased the valuation beyond that given in the returns.