statute makes exception in Missouri

2020All the showing that the statute requires in this regard is that neither the claimant nor those under whom he claims or might claim have paid any taxes for 30 years.” Id. at 1185 .

2020All the showing that the statute requires in this regard is that neither the claimant nor those under whom he claims or might claim have paid any taxes for 30 years.” Id. at 1185 .

1998Wilson v. Shumate, 296 S.W.2d 72 (Mo.1956), (seventeen-year old driver was required to exercise the highest degree of care in operating a motor vehicle).

1935State v. Hart, 292 Mo. 74 , 100(6), 237 S.W. 473 , 482, states: "The defendant's connection with the crime was through his association with the other men in the attempt to rob the bank, in which attempt the murder was committed.

1935State v. Hart, 292 Mo. 74 , 100(6), 237 S.W. 473 , 482, states: "The defendant's connection with the crime was through his association with the other men in the attempt to rob the bank, in which attempt the murder was committed.

1930“The object of the allowance to counsel bringing the suit is to charge the whole estate with the costs, as the proceedings are for the benefit of all parties interested in the land.” [Whitsett v. Wamack, 95 Mo. App. 296, 300 .] [See, also, Bank v. King, 73 Mo. 590 ; Draper v. Draper, 29 Mo. 1 ; Cooper v. Garesche, 21 Mo. 151 .] The statute makes no exception in the matter of the allowance of attorneys fees where the holder of a mortgage or deed of trust is a party to the proceeding, and we are authorized to make none.

1930“The object of the allowance to counsel bringing the suit is to charge the whole estate with the costs, as the proceedings are for the benefit of all parties interested in the land.” [Whitsett v. Wamack, 95 Mo. App. 296, 300 .] [See, also, Bank v. King, 73 Mo. 590 ; Draper v. Draper, 29 Mo. 1 ; Cooper v. Garesche, 21 Mo. 151 .] The statute makes no exception in the matter of the allowance of attorneys fees where the holder of a mortgage or deed of trust is a party to the proceeding, and we are authorized to make none.

1930“The object of the allowance to counsel bringing the suit is to charge the whole estate with the costs, as the proceedings are for the benefit of all parties interested in the land.” [Whitsett v. Wamack, 95 Mo. App. 296, 300 .] [See, also, Bank v. King, 73 Mo. 590 ; Draper v. Draper, 29 Mo. 1 ; Cooper v. Garesche, 21 Mo. 151 .] The statute makes no exception in the matter of the allowance of attorneys fees where the holder of a mortgage or deed of trust is a party to the proceeding, and we are authorized to make none.

1930“The object of the allowance to counsel bringing the suit is to charge the whole estate with the costs, as the proceedings are for the benefit of all parties interested in the land.” [Whitsett v. Wamack, 95 Mo. App. 296, 300 .] [See, also, Bank v. King, 73 Mo. 590 ; Draper v. Draper, 29 Mo. 1 ; Cooper v. Garesche, 21 Mo. 151 .] The statute makes no exception in the matter of the allowance of attorneys fees where the holder of a mortgage or deed of trust is a party to the proceeding, and we are authorized to make none.

1925In Harkness v. Jarvis, 182 Mo. 231 , 81 S. W. 446 , our Supreme Court ruled that “a motion to set aside or vacate a judgment, independent of the statute in respect to motion for new trial and in arrest of judgment and the time of filing same, may be filed by either party any time during the term at which the judgment was rendered. ’ ’ That case further rules that a motion to set aside a judgment, filed during the term, is a live, active motion from that time on, and to destroy its force and power there must be some affirmative action of the court upon it.

1925In Harkness v. Jarvis, 182 Mo. 231 , 81 S. W. 446 , our Supreme Court ruled that “a motion to set aside or vacate a judgment, independent of the statute in respect to motion for new trial and in arrest of judgment and the time of filing same, may be filed by either party any time during the term at which the judgment was rendered. ’ ’ That case further rules that a motion to set aside a judgment, filed during the term, is a live, active motion from that time on, and to destroy its force and power there must be some affirmative action of the court upon it.

1925It is respondent’s position that since the statute makes no requirement for a motion for rehearing, that then such motion is to be treated as a nullity and cannot serve to carry the matter over the term, and relies chiefly upon the case of Marsala v. Marsala, 288 Mo. 501 , 232 S. W. 1048 .

1925It is respondent’s position that since the statute makes no requirement for a motion for rehearing, that then such motion is to be treated as a nullity and cannot serve to carry the matter over the term, and relies chiefly upon the case of Marsala v. Marsala, 288 Mo. 501 , 232 S. W. 1048 .

1922The answer averred that "the county superintendent did call a special meeting of the qualified voters of the said proposed consolidated district for coflsideration of the quest tion of consolidation, and did make such call by posting within, the proposed district ten notices in public places, stating the place, time and purpose of such meeting, and that at least fifteen days notice was given, and that said meeting did occur and was so published to occur on the 20th day of May, 1920, in Cairo, Missouri, and did commence at two o'clock p. m. on said day; that said county superintendent did also

1893The rule under the statute makes this presumption conclusive in the case of an adjudication of lunacy, as was held by the supreme court in Rannells v. Garner, 80 Mo. 474 .