17 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1991–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Friends of Yamhill County, Inc. v. Board of Commissionersgreen2 sentences2012Instead, the text and context of section 5(3) of Measure 49 makes a determination of the nature of the ultimate project (the *66 location, extent, and type of residential development and its costs) and an assessment of the expenditure ratio particularly material to a vested rights decision under the measure.” 237 Or App at 177 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). 2010Instead, the text and context of section 5(3) of Measure 49 makes a determination of the nature of the ultimate project (the location, extent, and type of residential development and its costs) and an assessment of the expenditure ratio particularly material to a vested rights decision under the measure.” 237 Or App at 177 (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Perrygreen2 sentences2012See State v. Perry , 347 Or 110, 116-17 , 218 P3d 95 (2009) (noting the focused inquiry on appeal when the defendant did not object to discrete pieces of evidence during trial or assign error to any ruling occurring after the jury was empanelled, but instead rested his argument on the trial court’s ruling following a pretrial OEC 104 hearing). 2012See State v. Perry , 347 Or 110, 116-17 , 218 P3d 95 (2009) (noting the focused inquiry on appeal when the defendant did not object to discrete pieces of evidence during trial or assign error to any ruling occurring after the jury was empanelled, but instead rested his argument on the trial court’s ruling following a pretrial OEC 104 hearing). | 1 | 1 |
Eklund v. Clackamas Countygreen1 sentence2010See Eklund, 36 Or App at 81 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Boothby v. D.R. Johnson Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences2016Id. 2016Id. | 3 | 2016–2016 |
Neumann v. Liles
green
2 sentences2016Id. 1 Although Neumann and Dancing Deer Mountain asserted additional claims against Liles, only the trial court’s dismissal of the defamation claim was challenged by Neumann and Dancing Deer Mountain on appeal. 2016Id. *710 at 576-77. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2009Crawford, 541 US at 58 n 8. 2009Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n. 8, 124 S.Ct. 1354 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Gaines
green
2 sentences2021The court believes that a focused analysis of ORS 308.142(1)(b), applying the framework in State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72 , 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (courts to inter- pret statutes based on text, context, and legislative history, with potential resort to general maxims), will address the department’s argument on reconsideration and clarify the court’s order. 2021The court believes that a focused analysis of ORS 308.142(1)(b), applying the framework in State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72 , 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (courts to inter- pret statutes based on text, context, and legislative history, with potential resort to general maxims), will address the department’s argument on reconsideration and clarify the court’s order. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
ACN Opportunity, LLC v. Employment Department
neutral
2 sentences2018Because it was dispositive, the court focused on the requirement in ORS 670.600(2)(b) that the person be "customarily engaged in an independently established business." Id. at 710-19 , 377 P.3d 638 . 2018Because it was dispositive, the court focused on the requirement in ORS 670.600(2)(b) that the person be "customarily engaged in an independently established business." Id. at 710-19 , 377 P.3d 638 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Birchfield
green
1 sentence2007In Birchfield, the Supreme Court acknowledged the inconsistency between its interpretation of ORS 475.235 in Hancock, which placed the “legal responsibility to produce the [criminalist] on the defendant” by requiring that the defendant “subpoena the criminalist [under ORS 475.235] to exercise the right of confrontation,” and State v. Moore, 334 Or 328, 341 , 49 P3d 785 (2002), which held that “the state, not the defendant, bears the burden of producing the witness for confrontation by the defendant^]” 342 Or at 630 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Moore
green
2 sentences2007In Birchfield, the Supreme Court acknowledged the inconsistency between its interpretation of ORS 475.235 in Hancock, which placed the “legal responsibility to produce the [criminalist] on the defendant” by requiring that the defendant “subpoena the criminalist [under ORS 475.235] to exercise the right of confrontation,” and State v. Moore, 334 Or 328, 341 , 49 P3d 785 (2002), which held that “the state, not the defendant, bears the burden of producing the witness for confrontation by the defendant^]” 342 Or at 630 . 2007In Birchfield, the Supreme Court acknowledged the inconsistency between its interpretation of ORS 475.235 in Hancock, which placed the “legal responsibility to produce the [criminalist] on the defendant” by requiring that the defendant “subpoena the criminalist [under ORS 475.235] to exercise the right of confrontation,” and State v. Moore, 334 Or 328, 341 , 49 P3d 785 (2002), which held that “the state, not the defendant, bears the burden of producing the witness for confrontation by the defendant^]” 342 Or at 630 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Hancock
green
2 sentences2007The court focused its analysis on ORS 475.235 and reexamined its prior interpretation of that statute in State v. *338 Hancock, 317 Or 5 , 854 P2d 926 (1993), in which the court had concluded that the subpoena procedure did not violate the state or federal constitution because it was merely a method of putting “the state on notice that the defendant wants to cross-examine the criminalist.” Hancock, 317 Or at 12 . 2007The court focused its analysis on ORS 475.235 and reexamined its prior interpretation of that statute in State v. *338 Hancock, 317 Or 5 , 854 P2d 926 (1993), in which the court had concluded that the subpoena procedure did not violate the state or federal constitution because it was merely a method of putting “the state on notice that the defendant wants to cross-examine the criminalist.” Hancock, 317 Or at 12 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Stauffer
green
2 sentences2006Similarly, in In re Stauffer, 327 Or 44 , 956 P2d 967 (1998), the accused lawyer pursued a former client through various courts in an attempt to collect an attorney fee. 2006Similarly, in In re Stauffer, 327 Or 44 , 956 P2d 967 (1998), the accused lawyer pursued a former client through various courts in an attempt to collect an attorney fee. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Koskela v. Willamette Industries, Inc.
green
1 sentence2004That is, the court weighed the claimant’s private interest in disability benefits; the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures provided; the value, if any, of additional or substitute procedures; and the government’s interest, including the fiscal or administrative burden of additional or substitute procedures. 331 Or at 378-82 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences2004The court focused its analysis on whether the process afforded by the relevant statutes provided claimants with a meaningful opportunity to be heard, using the three-factor test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 , 96 S Ct 893 , 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976). 2004The court focused its analysis on whether the process afforded by the relevant statutes provided claimants with a meaningful opportunity to be heard, using the three-factor test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 , 96 S Ct 893 , 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Bauman v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp.
green
1 sentence1991The court focused its analysis on ORS 656.262, which, in subsection (6), “gives the insurer or self-insured employer 60 days after notice of the claim in which to accept or deny the claim.” 295 Or at 793 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.