focused analysis in Utah

2024In conducting that analysis, the court stated that “[t]he requirements of Section 78B-6-121 do not apply if the unmarried biological father does not know or have reason to know of a ‘qualifying circumstance’ pursuant to Subsection 78B-6-122(1)(a) prior to the birth mother signing her relinquishment or consent to adoption of the child.” Thus, because it was undisputed that Biological Father “did not know and could not have known of a ‘qualifying circumstance,’” the court focused its analysis on whether Biological Father “strictly satisfied the other requirements of Section 78B-6-122 as well as

2023As noted, the test set forth in rule 15(c)(2) asks whether the new claims relate back to claims set forth in the “original pleading.” Here, however, the court focused its analysis on whether the claims Carrell raised in the Second Amended Petition related back to the claims he raised in his First Amended Petition (as opposed (continued…) 20210145-CA 21 2023 UT App 93 Carrell v. State ¶49 Even so, Carrell claims that what matters is that he made ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his First Amended Petition.

2022The Court merely added in a footnote that “moreover, any concern about lack of notice is 20121040-CA 21 2022 UT App 95 State v. Ray ameliorated by the fact that the [statute] contains a scienter requirement.” Id. ¶ 16 n.1 (quotation simplified). ¶45 Second, turning to Ray’s assertions that Gallegos is distinguishable from the present case on the ground that the enticement provision does not require “enticement to engage in illegal sex,” Ray does not elaborate on this argument other than to reiterate that “underlying crimes are absent” in the enticement provision.

2022The Court merely added in a footnote that “moreover, any concern about lack of notice is 20121040-CA 21 2022 UT App 95 State v. Ray ameliorated by the fact that the [statute] contains a scienter requirement.” Id. ¶ 16 n.1 (quotation simplified). ¶45 Second, turning to Ray’s assertions that Gallegos is distinguishable from the present case on the ground that the enticement provision does not require “enticement to engage in illegal sex,” Ray does not elaborate on this argument other than to reiterate that “underlying crimes are absent” in the enticement provision.

2020The court focused its analysis on at least two (maybe three) factors: first, the limited time between Hernandez’s arrival and the approach of the detective; second, that “a significant number of people” could be 20190347-CA 6 2020 UT App 58 State v. Hernandez induced to patronize a prostitute even though “they weren’t there for it,” if the “opportunity present[ed] itself”; and third, although unclear as to the extent the court actually gave weight to it, the attractiveness of the detective.

2016The court focused its analysis of how the decree was meant to divide Husband's pension payments on language in the pension provision stating that the pension was to be "divided equally pursuant to Johnson v. Johnson ... and ... section [1408](a)(4)(C)." And the court's ultimate determination that Wife was entitled to one half of each net payment, not gross, was explicitly based on the court's interpretation of that case: "Johnson defines the 'authorized' deductions for military pension as federal and state taxes and holds that the Court is not authorized to 'treat gross [military] retirement p

2016The court focused its analysis of how the decree was meant to divide Husband's pension payments on language in the pension provision stating that the pension was to be "divided equally pursuant to Johnson v. Johnson ... and ... section [1408](a)(4)(C)." And the court's ultimate determination that Wife was entitled to one half of each net payment, not gross, was explicitly based on the court's interpretation of that case: "Johnson defines the 'authorized' deductions for military pension as federal and state taxes and holds that the Court is not authorized to 'treat gross [military] retirement p

2016The court focused its analysis of how the decree was meant to divide Husband's pension payments on language in the pension provision stating that the pension was to be "divided equally pursuant to Johnson v. Johnson ... and ... section [1408](a)(4)(C)." And the court's ultimate determination that Wife was entitled to one half of each net payment, not gross, was explicitly based on the court's interpretation of that case: "Johnson defines the 'authorized' deductions for military pension as federal and state taxes and holds that the Court is not authorized to 'treat gross [military] retirement p

2016The court focused its analysis of how the decree was meant to divide Husband's pension payments on language in the pension provision stating that the pension was to be "divided equally pursuant to Johnson v. Johnson ... and ... section [1408](a)(4)(C)." And the court's ultimate determination that Wife was entitled to one half of each net payment, not gross, was explicitly based on the court's interpretation of that case: "Johnson defines the 'authorized' deductions for military pension as federal and state taxes and holds that the Court is not authorized to 'treat gross [military] retirement p

2004Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217-18 ; Utah R.Crim.

2004Rather, the court focused its analysis on its determination that the easement was invalid due to vagueness. .It is also widely’ accepted that " ‘an express easement ... requires "mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be bound by its terms.” ’ " Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, ¶ 9 , 977 P..2d 533 (alterations in original) (quoting Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (additional citations omitted)).