Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
7 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Holt v. Hobbsgreen2 sentences2019As part of this analysis, a court must “scrutinize[] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.” O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431 ; see also Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864 (stating that under RFRA, the government must prove that denying a religious “exemption is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest”). 2019As part of this analysis, a court must “scrutinize[] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.” O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431 ; see also Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864 (stating that under RFRA, the government must prove that denying a religious “exemption is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest”). | 2 | 2 |
Kasel v. Remington Arms Co.green2 sentences2007Rather, the court focused on the requirement that a “defendant have a participatory connection with the enterprise which ‘created consumer demand for and reliance upon’ the particular ‘injury-producing product,’ not just products of the same classification.” Id., quoting Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal.App.3d 711 , 101 Cal.Rptr. 314, 323 (1972) (citation omitted). 2007Rather, the court focused on the requirement that a “defendant have a participatory connection with the enterprise which ‘created consumer demand for and reliance upon’ the particular ‘injury-producing product,’ not just products of the same classification.” Id., quoting Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal.App.3d 711 , 101 Cal.Rptr. 314, 323 (1972) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Garcia v. Halsettgreen2 sentences2007It examined both the manufacturer’s and the auctioneer’s connection with the particular product and concluded that “the only connection between [the auctioneer] and [the manufacturer’s] products [wa]s its ‘random and accidental role’ in transferring the planer from one consumer to another.” Id. at 794 , quoting Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal.App.3d 319 , 82 Cal.Rptr. 420, 423 (1970) (citation omitted). ¶ 24 Likewise, in Dillard, Division One of this court held that a product broker was not *555 a seller for strict liability purposes. 162 Ariz. at 298-99 , 782 P.2d at 1191-92 . 2007It examined both the manufacturer’s and the auctioneer’s connection with the particular product and concluded that “the only connection between [the auctioneer] and [the manufacturer’s] products [wa]s its ‘random and accidental role’ in transferring the planer from one consumer to another.” Id. at 794 , quoting Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal.App.3d 319 , 82 Cal.Rptr. 420, 423 (1970) (citation omitted). ¶ 24 Likewise, in Dillard, Division One of this court held that a product broker was not *555 a seller for strict liability purposes. 162 Ariz. at 298-99 , 782 P.2d at 1191-92 . | 2 | 2 |
Dupray v. Jai Dininggreen1 sentence2021Neary asserts “[t]here was absolutely no dispute in the trial court that cause-in-fact was established.” This description of the superior court’s findings misses the mark; the court focused its analysis on whether Crawford’s conduct amounted to an intervening and superseding cause, breaking the causal chain. ¶13 “An event that contributes to the [plaintiff’s] injuries is intervening if it has an independent origin for which the defendant is not responsible.” Dupray, 245 Ariz. at 584, ¶ 17 . | 1 | 1 |
Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of America, Inc.green1 sentence2021“A superseding cause, sufficient to become the proximate cause of the final result and relieve defendant of liability for his original negligence, arises only when an intervening force was unforeseeable and may be described, with the benefit of hindsight, as extraordinary.” Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc., 163 Ariz. 539, 546 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
Corley v. Arizona Board of Pardons & Parolesgreen2 sentences1999See id. at 614 , 775 P.2d at 542 . 1999See id. at 614 , 775 P.2d at 542 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hardesty
green
2 sentences2019This is a focused inquiry, requiring the government to “establish that applying the law in the particular circumstances is the least restrictive means.” Id. at 367 ¶ 14 (emphasis added). 2019This is a focused inquiry, requiring the government to “establish that applying the law in the particular circumstances is the least restrictive means.” Id. at 367 ¶ 14 (emphasis added). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União Do Vegetal
green
2 sentences2019As part of this analysis, a court must “scrutinize[] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.” O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431 ; see also Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864 (stating that under RFRA, the government must prove that denying a religious “exemption is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest”). 2019As part of this analysis, a court must “scrutinize[] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.” O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431 ; see also Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864 (stating that under RFRA, the government must prove that denying a religious “exemption is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest”). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2007Rather, the court focused on the requirement that a “defendant have a participatory connection with the enterprise which ‘created consumer demand for and reliance upon’ the particular ‘injury-producing product,’ not just products of the same classification.” Id., quoting Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal.App.3d 711 , 101 Cal.Rptr. 314, 323 (1972) (citation omitted). 2007Rather, the court focused on the requirement that a “defendant have a participatory connection with the enterprise which ‘created consumer demand for and reliance upon’ the particular ‘injury-producing product,’ not just products of the same classification.” Id., quoting Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 314, 323 (Ct. 11 App. 1972 ) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v. Associated Merchandising Corp.
green
2 sentences2007It examined both the manufacturer’s and the auctioneer’s connection with the particular product and concluded that “the only connection between [the auctioneer] and [the manufacturer’s] products [wa]s its ‘random and accidental role’ in transferring the planer from one consumer to another.” Id. at 794 , quoting Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal.App.3d 319 , 82 Cal.Rptr. 420, 423 (1970) (citation omitted). ¶ 24 Likewise, in Dillard, Division One of this court held that a product broker was not *555 a seller for strict liability purposes. 162 Ariz. at 298-99 , 782 P.2d at 1191-92 . 2007It examined both the manufacturer’s and the auctioneer’s connection with the particular product and concluded that “the only connection between [the auctioneer] and [the manufacturer’s] products [wa]s its ‘random and accidental role’ in transferring the planer from one consumer to another.” Id. at 794 , quoting Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal.App.3d 319 , 82 Cal.Rptr. 420, 423 (1970) (citation omitted). ¶ 24 Likewise, in Dillard, Division One of this court held that a product broker was not *555 a seller for strict liability purposes. 162 Ariz. at 298-99 , 782 P.2d at 1191-92 . | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Boone v. SUPER. CT. IN AND FOR MARICOPA CTY.
green
2 sentences1987Id. at 240-41 , 700 P.2d 1335 . 1987Id. at 240-41 , 700 P.2d 1335 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.